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Abstract		This	thesis	aims	to	provide	a	contemporary	account	of	the	Dar	es	Salaam’s	water	sector	as	well	 as	 the	 role	of	 the	myriad	stakeholders	 involved	 in	 it,	 taking	 into	account	 the	 complexity	 history	 of	 the	 city’s	 water	 governance.	 As	 a	 rapidly	growing	city	over	recent	years,	 the	 infrastructure	of	Dar	es	Salaam’s	municipal	system	has	not	been	updated	for	a	significant	period	of	time.	As	such,	the	areas	served	by	 this	 system	 face	 intermittent	and	piecemeal	 coverage	whereas	other	large	sections	of	the	city	are	forced	to	come	up	with	alternative,	often	expensive	water	resources	that	are	unreliable	and	at	times,	unsafe.	This	thesis	attempts	to	explore	the	lived	realities	of	the	individuals	who	reside	in	these	unserved	areas,	and	 the	ways	 in	which	 community-based	 organisations	 and	 non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs)	play	a	role	 in	 the	city’s	water	sector.	Through	analysis	of	community-level	 water	 provision	 schemes	 in	 two	 case	 study	 areas	 of	 Dar	 es	Salaam,	 this	 research	provides	a	 thorough	account	of	 the	ways	 in	which	water	resources	are	managed,	debated	and	utilised	at	the	local	level	and	the	challenges	faces	by	these	local	organisations.	In	addition,	through	an	observational	research	at	 two	 local	NGOs	working	 in	 the	water	 sector	 in	Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 this	 research	examines	these	organisations’	place	within	the	city’s	broader	water	governance	framework,	as	well	as	how	they	operate	and	prioritise	their	day	to	day	work	and	their	 outputs.	 This	 research	 also	 takes	 into	 account	 the	 national	 and	international	policy	environment,	as	well	as	the	ways	in	which	Tanzania’s	socio-political	history	has	influenced	the	current	means	of	water	governance.	Through	an	exploration	of	the	prevalent	discourses	in	policy	creation	and	implementation	and	 the	 aforementioned	 stakeholders	 in	 the	water	 sector,	 this	 thesis	 examines	the	multitude	of	influences	on	Dar	es	Salaam’s	water	governance,	as	well	as	the	tensions	 that	 arise	 between	 rhetoric	 and	 reality,	 and	 the	 impacts	 these	 have	upon	its	citizens.						
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Chapter	1:	Introduction		
1.1	Introduction	to	the	thesis		 “Among	 the	 myriad	 problems	 facing	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 residential	 areas,	lack	of	sufficient	water	supply	is	arguably	the	most	enduring,	problematic	and	important.”	(Dill,	2010:613)		Access	 to	 water	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 and	 its	 associated	 challenges	 have	 been	included	in	the	international	development	framework	for	a	number	of	years.	663	million	people	 in	 the	world	are	without	 safe	water	 (Charity	Water,	2015).	900	children	 die	 every	 day	 from	 a	 disease	 caused	 by	 unsafe	 water	 and	 sanitation	(WaterAid,	 2015).	 In	 “developing	 countries”,	 up	 to	 80%	 of	 illnesses	 are	associated	with	poor	access	to	water	and	sanitation	(The	Water	Project,	2015).	Statistics	 can	 indicate	 the	 endemic	 and	 ever-increasing	 difficulties	 faced	 by	 a	significant	 proportion	 of	 the	 world’s	 population	 when	 attempting	 to	 find	 a	potable	 supply	 of	 water,	 but	 fail	 to	 provide	 an	 explanation	 of	 the	 myriad	challenges	 faced	 by	 these	 individuals	 as	 they	 must	 navigate	 the	 ecological,	economic,	 political,	 and	 social	 environments	 that	 impact	 upon	 their	 means	 of	access.	As	well	as	this,	statistics	are	unable	to	address	the	ways	in	which	water	supply	is	governed	at	a	variety	of	levels,	and	in	turn,	how	the	variety	of	ways	in	which	water	 is	understood	and	experienced	must	be	considered	in	its	planning	and	management.			Those	with	 access	 to	 a	 clean,	 affordable	 and	 dependable	 supply	 think	 little	 of	turning	 on	 the	 tap	 for	 his	 or	 her	 daily	 needs,	 an	 incomparable	 experience	 for	those	 who	 face	 a	 daily	 challenge	 in	 simply	 accessing	 a	 viable	 resource.	 This	research	 aims	 to	 address	 the	 variety	 of	 actors	 that	 can	 be	 present	 in	 a	 city’s	water	 governance	 framework,	 and	 in	 turn	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 different	stakeholder	 groups	 experience	 water	 governance	 within	 a	 particular	 locale.	Taking	 the	 increasing	 role	 of	 water	 as	 an	 economic	 good	 (as	 laid	 out	 by	 the	Dublin	Principles	of	1992)	into	account,	and	the	impact	that	neoliberal	ideology	
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has	 impacted	upon	water	governance	in	the	 last	thirty	years,	 this	research	also	examines	 the	 way	 in	 which	 these	 values	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	contemporary	 forms	 of	 water	 governance	 and	 the	 implications	 of	 this.	Additionally,	 this	 research	 examines	 the	 role	 of	 NGOs	 in	 water	 provision	 and	their	position	 in	 the	 increasingly	complex	provision	and	governance	hierarchy.		Paying	 particular	 attention	 to	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	 understandings	 of	water,	 this	 thesis	 provides	 a	 qualitative	 analysis	 of	 water	 governance	 within	Tanzania’s	 largest	 city,	Dar	 es	 Salaam.	 Through	 an	 examination	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	 policy	 has	 been	 conceptualised	 and	 implemented,	 a	 contemporary	explanation	of	Dar	es	Salaam’s	water	governance	and	provision,	and	the	politics	surrounding	 this	 is	provided.	Crucially,	 this	 research	examines	 the	role	of	non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs)	and	community	level	water	provision	in	the	city’s	water	 governance	 and	 the	 power	 relations	 and	 daily	 challenges	 that	 are	prevalent	within	these	groups.			
1.2	Dar	es	Salaam’s	problems	with	water	governance		The	residents	of	Tanzania	have	been	 facing	 issues	when	trying	 to	access	water	for	a	number	of	years.	Tanzania	is	not	only	affected	by	increasing	water	scarcity,	but	 also	 outdated	 institutional	 arrangements,	 and	 fragment	 and	 poorly	 co-ordinated	 management	 (Seppala,	 2002:368).	 In	 2013,	 WaterAid	 (2013:6)	reported	that	water	coverage	on	average	across	Tanzania	was	58%,	but	in	urban	areas	 this	 figure	 rose	 to	 80%.	 However,	 thousands	 of	 residents	 in	 Tanzania’s	largest	 city	 and	 former	 capital,	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	have	 limited	 access	 to	 a	 regular	water	 supply	 and	 are	 often	 forced	 to	 explore	 the	 suite	 of	 methods	 of	 access	available	 to	 acquire	 a	 potable	 supply	 of	water.	 Taking	 the	 complex	 and	 varied	history	 of	 Tanzania’s	 water	 sector	 into	 account,	 Lein	 and	 Tagseth	 (2009:209)	state	 that	 “calls	 for	water	 reform	 in	 Tanzania	 have	 been	 based	 on	 claims	 and	notions	 of	 a	 water	 crisis”.	 However,	 it	 is	 unclear	 as	 to	 who	 in	 particular	 is	describing	 the	 situation	 in	Tanzania	as	 a	 crisis,	 and	 in	 turn,	 the	ways	 in	which	crisis	 is	 itself	 understood.	 WaterAid	 (2017)	 discuss	 Tanzania’s	 water	 crisis	through	 statistics,	 explaining	 that	 within	 the	 country,	 23	 million	 are	 without	access	 to	 safe	 water.	 Morriset	 (2012)	 adds	 nuance	 to	 this	 information,	
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questioning	 why	 a	 country	 that	 seemingly	 has	 an	 abundance	 of	 fresh	 water	resources	 is	unable	to	provide	an	adequate	supply	to	 its	citizens.	Analysing	the	different	ways	in	which	the	idea	of	crisis	can	be	interpreted,	Henrik	Vigh	(2008)	argues	 that	 in	 some	 situations,	 when	 faced	 with	 conflict	 or	 extreme	 levels	 of	poverty,	crisis	can	become	so	embedded	in	day	to	day	life	it	becomes	difficult	for	residents	 to	 distinguish	 between	 a	 state	 of	 crisis	 and	 normality.	 This	 thesis	attempts	 to	 explore	 this	 supposed	 water	 crisis	 in	 Tanzania,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	which	water	governance	 is	articulated	and	 implemented	 in	Dar	es	Salaam,	and	the	experiences	of	the	residents	living	there.	The	ways	in	which	Tanzania’s	water	policy	has	been	developed	over	time	is	examined,	along	with	the	varied	ways	it	has	been	implemented	and	by	which	actors.	Taking	the	role	of	key	actors	in	the	water	 sector	 in	Dar	es	Salaam	 into	account,	 this	 research	provides	an	 in-depth	analysis	 of	 the	 role	 of	NGOs	 and	other	development	 organisations	 in	 the	 city’s	water	 governance,	 as	 well	 as	 these	 organisations’	 interactions	 with	 the	Tanzanian	 state	 and	 the	 population	 of	 the	 country’s	 former	 capital.	 The	community-based	water	schemes	prevalent	in	Dar	es	Salaam	are	also	included	in	this	 thesis,	 as	 an	 example	 of	 how	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy	 materialises	 at	 the	grassroots	 level	 and	 the	 driving	 force	 behind	 the	 establishment	 of	 local-level	water	provision	and	management.	Finally,	Vigh’s	(2008)	theme	of	endemic	crisis	is	 used	 throughout	 to	 interrogate	 structural	 and	 institutional	 process	 at	 work	within	water	governance	in	Dar	es	Salaam.		Tanzania	is	an	interesting	example	of	the	ways	in	which	postcolonial	trajectories	and	involvement	in	global	economic	markets	can	affect	a	country’s	development	and	 ability	 to	 provide	 services	 and	 basic	 needs	 to	 their	 citizens.	 To	 quote	 at	length	from	Edwards	(2014):		 “Here	was	a	nation	that	had	received	very	substantial	amounts	of	foreign	aid	 per	 capita,	 and	 yet	 had	 experienced	 one	 of	 the	 most	 colossal	 and	calamitous	collapses	in	the	history	of	economics.	Income	per	person	had	declined	 precipitously,	 exports	 had	 all	 but	 vanished,	 poverty	 had	skyrocketed,	inflation	was	extremely	high,	once	promising	industries	such	as	 sisal	 had	 disappeared,	 health	 conditions	 had	 deteriorated	 markedly,	
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millions	of	people	had	been	displaced	from	their	homes,	and	the	premium	in	the	currency	black	market	exceeded	700%.”	(Edwards,	2014:xiii)		After	 independence	 in	 the	1960s	and	 the	country’s	 foray	 into	 its	own	brand	of	African	socialism,	Tanzania	was	 facing	a	multitude	of	 issues	with	regards	to	 its	economy	 and	 subsequently	 the	 welfare	 of	 its	 population.	 In	 1991,	 with	 a	 low	gross	national	product	 (GNP)	per	capita	at	 just	under	$100,	at	 that	 time	 it	was	only	Mozambique	who	 had	 a	 lower	 figure	 at	 $80	 (Edwards,	 2014).	 Tanzania’s	water	sector	became	a	casualty	of	the	country’s	economic	difficulties,	with	Dar	es	Salaam	 bearing	 the	 brunt	 of	 the	 issues	 as	 residents	 from	 all	 over	 the	 country	moved	to	the	former	capital	city	in	order	to	improve	their	livelihoods.	Pressure	increased	 on	 the	 existing	 water	 infrastructure	 and	 external	 donors	 became	embedded	in	the	financing	of	the	city’s	water	provision,	driving	both	the	changes	made	to	the	country’s	water	sector	but	also	the	ways	in	which	citizens	were	able	to	access	it.		More	 generally,	 in	 East	 Africa	 donors	 have	 played	 a	 “significant	 political	 and	financial	role”	in	water	governance	(Seppala,	2002:374).	Tanzania	has	received	a	significant	 proportion	 of	 this	 donor	 money	 since	 independence.	 As	 noted	 by	Edwards	(2014):		 “After	independence	in	1961	the	country	became	one	of	the	“darlings”	of	the	international	aid	community;	between	1962	and	1983	was	one	of	the	highest	recipients	of	foreign	aid	in	the	world.	A	high	proportion	of	this	aid	was	bilateral	and	came	from	the	European	nations	–	especially	 from	the	Nordic	countries.”	(Edwards,	2014:2)		Foreign	 aid	donated	 to	Tanzania	 in	 the	 early	 1960s	was	 largely	used	 to	 target	specific	 initiatives,	 but	 after	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Arusha	 Declaration	 in	1967	aid	was	geared	towards	 fulfilling	the	various	elements	of	 Julius	Nyerere’s	African	 Socialism	 (Edwards,	 2014).	 One	 of	 the	 key	 tenets	 of	 the	 Arusha	Declaration	was	the	wholesale	lamentation	of	the	reliance	on	foreign	aid	which	was	prevalent	in	Tanzanian	culture	for	a	number	of	years.		
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	However,	Tanzania’s	relationship	with	the	aid	is	not	merely	historical,	with	large	amounts	of	bilateral	aid	and	a	variety	of	development	organisations	still	having	a	visible	presence	in	the	country.	Tanzania’s	complex	and	rich	history	with	donors	and	 aid	 indicates	 why	 non-governmental	 organisations	 and	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	development	sector	in	general	are	an	important	part	of	this	thesis,	 in	assessing	the	 various	 components	 that	 play	 important	 roles	 in	 Tanzania’s	 water	governance.	Water	was	provided	for	free	by	the	Tanzanian	state	to	its	citizens	up	until	 1991,	 until	 the	 system	 could	 no	 longer	 keep	 up	 with	 demand.	 Dar	 es	Salaam’s	 water	 system	 was	 transferred	 to	 the	 control	 of	 a	 number	 of	 private	providers	 who	 after	 short	 periods	 of	 time	 ended	 the	 contract	 and	 ceased	 ties	with	 Tanzania’s	 water.	 	 The	 most	 notable	 was	 City	 Water,	 jointly	 owned	 by	British,	German	and	Tanzanian	 companies,	who	 after	 failing	 to	 collect	 revenue	and	 meet	 targets	 ended	 their	 contract	 after	 two	 years	 (Dill,	 2010).	 The	 city’s	water	 is	now	under	the	control	of	a	publicly	 limited	company	called	DAWASCO	(Dill	and	Crow,	2014)1	which	provide	an	irregular	supply	to	the	areas	of	the	city	under	its	jurisdiction	(Dill,	2010).	Tanzania’s	water	sector	has	received	a	notable	amount	of	funding	from	the	donor	community;	the	$164	million	World	Bank	loan	granted	 for	 the	 (failed)	 privatisation	 of	 its	water	 system	was	 granted	 in	 2003,	which	expired	in	2010	and	was	replaced	by	a	$951	million	loan	from	the	World	Bank	 and	 their	 other	 development	 partners	 such	 as	 a	 German	 bank	 and	 a	development	organisation	from	the	Netherlands	(Pigeon,	2012:53).			Many	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 residents	 lack	 the	 capital	 to	 connect	 to	 the	 city’s	municipal	 system,	 or	 are	 resident	 outwith	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 system’s	inadequate	coverage.	As	indicated	in	Figure	1.1,	the	city’s	population	is	growing	at	 an	alarming	 rate,	 from	850,000	 in	1978	 to	over	 four	million	 today	 (Dill	 and	Crow,	2014).																																																														1	For	a	full	explanation	of	Tanzania’s	water	history,	see	Chapter	5.		
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Figure	1.1	Dar	es	Salaam	Urban	Growth	1945-1998	(reproduced	with	permission	
from	 Mike	 Shand,	 School	 of	 Geographical	 and	 Earth	 Sciences,	 University	 of	
Glasgow)																				Indeed,	whilst	Robinson	et	al	(2011)	argue	that	Tanzania’s	economic	growth	can	be	 attributed	 to	 the	 incorporation	 of	 market	 values	 into	 the	 country’s	governance,	there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	introducing	a	market	economy	into	the	 water	 sector	 has	 restricted	 access	 for	 Tanzania’s	 population	 with	 limited	capital	 available	 to	 purchase	 water	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 needs.	 	 Discussing	 water	governance	 in	 general,	 Franks	 and	 Cleaver	 (2007)	 suggest	 that	 the	 dominant	discourse	held	by	 international	 institutions	such	as	 the	UN	asserts	 that	private	and	 voluntary	 providers	 are	 vital	 to	 supplement	 the	 work	 of	 state-provided	water	sources.	As	Dar	es	Salaam’s	water	is	provided	to	some	areas	of	the	city	by	a	publicly	limited	company,	with	other	areas	of	the	city	forced	to	use	alternative	
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providers,	it	appears	to	be	the	case	that	Tanzania	is	following	this	model	and	that	the	water	sector	includes	a	number	of	stakeholders.			A	variety	of	coping	mechanisms	are	employed	by	residents	in	the	city	in	order	to	access	water,	such	as	digging	illegal	wells,	buying	from	informal	water	vendors,	or	buying	and	selling	between	neighbours	and	others	that	sell	water	 they	have	collected	from	the	municipal	system	and	deliver	to	unserviced	areas.	Residents	can	buy	water	for	their	household	directly	from	a	sole	provider,	or	can	pool	their	finances	within	their	community	in	order	to	create	access	to	a	water	resource	for	a	 number	 of	 households	 within	 that	 locale.	 Within	 these	 stakeholder	 cohorts,	there	are	a	multitude	of	different	individuals	and	groups	that	both	influence	and	are	influenced	by	the	city’s	waterscape.	Those	fortunate	enough	to	live	in	an	area	under	 the	 coverage	 of	 the	 municipal	 system	 are	 able	 to	 enjoy	 piped	 water	directly	 into	 their	 home,	 and	 pay	monthly	 bills	 to	 the	 public	 limited	 company	that	 controls	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	municipal	 water	 system.	 In	 the	 instances	where	supply	has	been	 intermittent,	 these	 individuals	must	challenge	 the	bills	sent	 to	them	 by	 DAWASCO	 as	 well	 as	 find	 and	 pay	 further	 capital	 for	 the	 alternative	sources	available.	Those	who	provide	these	alternative	sources	can	travel	 from	area	 to	 area,	 transporting	water	 from	 an	 active	 source	 to	 individuals	who	 can	afford	 the	 convenience	 of	 delivery.	 For	 those	 outwith	 the	 coverage	 of	 the	municipal	 system,	 these	 alternative	 sources	 become	 the	 core	 means	 of	 water	access,	 taking	up	not	only	a	 large	proportion	of	 the	household	budget,	but	also	the	time	spent	queuing	daily,	sometimes	only	to	find	out	that	the	day’s	supply	of	water	at	that	source	has	run	out.			For	those	that	install	a	water	point	in	their	home,	the	benefits	are	twofold.	Their	household	 is	 able	 to	 benefit	 from	 a	 resource	 of	 water	 directly	 that	 can	 be	conveniently	accessed,	and	they	can	collect	money	from	their	neighbours,	which	can	 pay	 for	 maintenance	 and	 expansion,	 as	 well	 as	 any	 other	 household	expenses.	 In	 addition,	 locally	 constructed	 points	 such	 as	 these	 serve	 to	strengthen	community	bonds	and	relationships,	and	can	reinforce	an	individuals’	standing	 in	 a	 community.	 Schemes	 funded	 and	 managed	 between	 a	 whole	community	 (rather	 than	 one	 household)	 equally	 reinforce	 these	 inter-
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community	 relationships,	 and	 allow	 informal	 community	 leaders	 such	 as	 local	government	and	those	in	positions	of	authority	to	influence	the	water	provision	of	their	community	and	improve	their	means	of	access.	Those	involved	in	Dar	es	Salaam’s	 water	 sector	 at	 the	 NGO	 level	 also	 have	 a	 multitude	 of	 roles	 and	motivations.	Although	some	receive	remuneration	for	their	work,	others	are	part	of	 these	 organisations	 on	 a	 voluntary	 basis,	 and	 are	 motivated	 by	 either	improving	 access	 to	 water	 within	 the	 city	 or	 educating	 residents	 on	 how	 to	manage	 local	water	 resources	efficiently	and	 in	a	way	 that	 limits	 the	spread	of	water-borne	 diseases.	 Others	 see	 their	 role	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 carry	 out	 in-depth	research	and	empirical	analysis,	which	 in	turn	could	contribute	to	policy	advocacy	and	affect	long-term	change.			Dill	 and	 Crow	 (2014)	 discuss	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 residents	 were	 mobilised	 to	manage	their	water	from	a	community-level	and	Carter	et	al	(1999)	explain	that	community-based	provision	is	largely	borne	of	a	result	of	state	inefficiencies,	this	means	 of	 provision	 has	 now	 been	written	 into	 Tanzanian	water	 policy,	 and	 is	becoming	 embedded	 in	 the	 Tanzania’s	 water	 governance	 framework.	Furthermore,	 Bakker	 (2008)	 notes	 that	 community	 water	 provision	 has	 been	heralded	 as	 a	 key	 alternative	 to	 privatisation,	 providing	 some	 explanation	 for	this	means	of	provision’s	visible	presence	in	within	water	governance	in	Dar	es	Salaam.	 This	 research	 pays	 particular	 attention	 to	 community-based	 water	organisations,	referred	to	by	Dill	and	Crow	(2014)	as	water	user	associations	or	by	 Lein	 and	 Tagseth	 (2009)	 as	 water	 management	 communities,	 these	organisations	usually	form	committees	from	local	members	in	order	to	manage	a	community’s	 water	 supply.	 Residents	 often	 pay	 a	 joining	 fee	 to	 become	 a	member	 of	 the	 scheme	 and	 then	 pay	 smaller	 subsequent	 amounts	 in	 order	 to	purchase	 water	 from	 the	 community’s	 supply	 as	 and	 when	 they	 need	 it.	Committee	 members	 are	 often	 elected	 by	 the	 community	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	individual’s	 community	 standing	 and	 their	 capacity	 at	managing	 a	 community	water	 scheme.	 Taking	Bakker’s	 (2008)	 point	 of	 community	 provision	 being	 an	alternative	 to	 privatisation,	 within	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 there	 is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	that	 community-led	 provision	 originated	 in	 and	 around	 the	 city’s	 privatised	
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water,	and	has	long	been	a	part	of	the	complicated	social	network	that	is	water	provision	and	access.			Notions	of	crisis	can	often	be	used	to	discuss	a	country’s	economic	performance,	and	 the	 impact	 of	 this	 on	 the	 lives	 of	 its	 residents.	 Edwards’	 (2014)	 book	 on	Tanzania	 refers	 to,	 as	 explained	 in	 the	 title,	 the	 country’s	 “economic	 recovery	and	collapse”.	Edwards	(2014:253)	discusses	“the	great	crises	of	1973-4,	1979,	1981-5	and	1991-4”	in	reference	to	times	when	Tanzania’s	economy	was	facing	a	number	 of	 challenges.	 However,	 the	 word	 crisis	 can	 be	 used	 to	 describe	 a	number	 of	 other	 topics	 pertinent	 to	 this	 thesis,	 beyond	 Tanzania’s	 economic	performance.	Dill	and	Crow	(2014:188)	argue	that:		 “The	 many	 subsequent	 and	 documented	 shortcomings	 of	 privatisation	have	led	scholars	and	practitioners	to	interrogate	and	advocate	for	more	comprehensive	approaches	to	solving	the	water	crisis.”			However,	taking	Vigh’s	(2008)	view	that	crisis	can	in	fact	become	an	embedded	and	enduring	state,	 it	 is	 important	to	consider	the	 issues	that	Tanzania’s	water	sector	 has	 been	 experiencing	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years,	 and	 that	 there	 is	 no	imminent	 sign	 of	 significant	 improvement.	 Indeed,	 this	 research	 attempts	 to	consider	 Tanzania’s	water	 sector	 beyond	 its	 history	with	 private	 providers,	 in	order	 to	 understand	 how	 citizens	 access	 water	 in	 a	 post-privatisation	 setting,	and	the	varying	dynamics	that	exist	surrounding	this.		This	thesis	also	takes	into	account	Franks	and	Cleaver’s	(2007)	assertion	that	too	little	attention	is	paid	to	the	ways	in	which	individuals	citizens	experience	water	governance.	Providing	a	multi-scalar	analysis	of	Tanzania’s	water	sector,	this	research	critically	assesses	water	governance	in	Dar	es	Salaam	via	policy	documents,	through	the	experience	of	 development	 organisations,	 and	 the	 lived	 realities	 of	 residents	 in	 the	 city.	Crucially,	 this	research	shows	the	contradictions	and	tensions	between	what	 is	asserted	 in	 terms	 of	 policy	 and	 what	 exists	 in	 practice,	 elucidating	 the	 gaps	between	policy-based	rhetoric	and	the	complicated	realities	experienced	by	the	residents	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam.	 Answering	 Dill	 and	 Crow’s	 (2014)	 claim	 that	 no	published	research	exists	on	community	water	organisations	 in	Dar	es	Salaam,	
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this	research	attempts	to	provide	some	analyses	of	these	groups	and	the	ways	in	which	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy	 has	 materialised	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level.	 In	addition,	paying	attention	to	Dinar’s	 (1998:369)	claim	that	“the	 focus	on	water	resources	management	 to	 solve	 a	 country’s	 water	 resources	 problems	 is	 now	viewed	in	qualitative	as	well	as	quantitative	terms”,	this	research	uses	a	series	of	qualitative	research	methods	in	order	to	address	its	objectives.			Taking	 into	 account	 these	 themes,	 this	 research	 provides	 an	 in-depth	investigation	of	NGOs	and	community	organisations	in	the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam	through	research	with	two	organisations	working	in	the	water	sector	in	the	 city,	 and	 a	 case	 study	 analysis	 of	 two	 areas	 and	 their	 local	 community	initiatives.	Whilst	both	organisations	work	in	the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam	they	differ	 in	 their	 organisational	mandate,	 daily	 activities,	 and	 the	 individuals	that	work	for	and	with	them	by	researching	these	organisations	and	their	related	networks	it	was	felt	that	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	NGOs	in	the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam	could	be	achieved.	Taking	the	significant	population	growth	of	Dar	es	Salaam	and	the	large	areas	of	the	city	outwith	the	remit	of	the	city’s	municipal	system	 into	 account	 (Dill	 and	Crow,	 2014)	 is	 into	 account,	 I	made	 a	 conscious	decision	to	include	these	areas	in	my	case	study	selection,	in	order	to	provide	an	assessment	of	two	areas	of	Dar	es	Salaam	that	had	been	using	alternative	means	of	 water	 provision	 for	 a	 significant	 period	 of	 time.	 Both	 areas	 had	 separate	histories,	 population	 growth	 and	 geographical	 locations,	 and	 allowing	 the	inclusion	 of	 two	 diverse	 areas	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 accessing	 water	 through	community-based	 water	 provision	 allowed	 for	 the	 experiences	 of	 these	 case	study	areas	to	be	compared	and	contrasted.		
	
1.3	Thesis	outline		Whilst	 Tortajada	 (2010)	 asserts	 that	 there	 is	 no	 universally	 agreed	 upon	definition	of	water	governance,	this	thesis	uses	Franks	and	Cleaver’s	(2007:291)	understanding	of	governance	in	order	to	examine	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania;		
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“Governance	provides	a	way	of	conceptualising	this	emerging	network	of	relationships	between	different	sectors	and	interests	in	society,	enabling	us	 to	 analyse	 how	 governments,	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors,	 civil	society,	 citizens	 groups	 and	 individual	 citizens	 forge	 networks	 and	linkages	 to	provide	new	ways	 for	 society	 to	 order	 itself	 and	manage	 its	affairs.”		As	 such,	 this	 thesis	 attempts	 to	 explore	 the	messy,	multi-faceted	 and	 complex	means	 of	 water	 governance	 currently	 in	 existence	 in	 Tanzania,	 tracking	 the	policy	 discourses	 and	 their	 grassroots	 implications,	 and	 the	 role	 that	 the	NGO	sector	 has	 to	 play	 in	 this.	 Within	 this	 thesis,	 the	 following	 objectives	 will	 be	addressed:		
• How	 is	Tanzanian	water	policy	constructed	and	disseminated,	and	what	are	 the	 key	 themes	 that	 are	 prevalent	 in	 water	 policy	 documents	produced	since	1991?		
• What	 role	 do	 NGOs	 play	 in	 Tanzania’s	 water	 sector,	 and	 what	 are	 the	challenges	faced	by	these	organisations	in	their	work?		
• How	 does	 community	 water	 provision	 fit	 within	 the	 water	 policy	framework	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 and	 how	 does	 this	 materialise	 at	 the	grassroots	level?		The	thesis	is	divided	into	eight	chapters,	with	two	chapters	providing	a	review	of	the	 relevant	 literature,	 one	 discussing	 the	 methodology	 of	 this	 research	 and	three	 devoted	 to	 this	 research’s	 empirics.	 Chapter	 2	 reviews	 the	 literature	surrounding	the	growth	of	neoliberalism	as	a	global	economic	doctrine	as	well	as	the	 ways	 in	 which	 this	 ideology	 has	 manifested	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 geographical	contexts.	 The	 chapter	 explores	 neoliberalism’s	 origins,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 key	principles	that	drive	neoliberal	ideology	and	governance.	Discussion	of	the	ways	in	which	neoliberalism	has	changed	over	time	is	also	included,	with	reference	to	the	 Washington	 Consensus	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 neoliberal	 policy	 in	 the	 Global	
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South.	 Finally,	 the	 chapter	 explores	 the	 different	 literary	 perspectives	 on	neoliberal	policy	in	the	water	sector,	and	how	this	has	impacted	upon	the	way	in	which	water	 is	governed	and	accessed	by	 those	under	 the	remit	of	 this	 type	of	policy	framework.				Chapter	3	assesses	the	 literature	on	the	growth	of	NGOs	as	key	vehicles	within	development	and	explores	the	challenges	faced	by	these	types	of	organisations	in	carrying	 out	 their	 work.	 The	 ways	 in	 which	 Global	 North	 definitions	 and	practices	 have	 been	 imposed	 in	 Global	 South	 settings	 will	 be	 explored,	 being	mindful	 of	 ideas	 of	 crisis	 and	 how	 they	 coalesce	 around	 contemporary	international	 development	 practice.	 The	 rise	 of	 NGOs	 as	 an	 established	stakeholder	in	the	international	development	sector	is	discussed,	as	well	as	the	changing	role	of	 these	types	of	organisation	and	the	reasons	behind	this.	Using	examples	 from	recent	 literature	on	 the	NGO	sector	 in	a	variety	of	geographical	locations,	the	difficulties	faced	by	NGOs	in	their	daily	work	is	examined,	as	well	as	 the	 broader	 structural	 challenges	 prevalent	 in	 the	 sector.	 The	 chapter	 also	uses	postcolonial	literature	to	assess	the	role	of	NGOs	in	the	Global	South	and	the	role	of	external	actors	in	influencing	water	governance	and	how	it	is	experienced	by	 the	 communities	 that	 development	 organisations	 work	 with.	 The	 topic	 of	Global	North/South	relations	 is	addressed,	and	the	ways	 in	which	the	 legacy	of	postcolonial	 relationships	 can	 impact	 upon	 future	 interactions,	 particularly	 in	the	case	of	international	NGOs.				Chapter	 4	 provides	 a	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	methodology	used	 to	 conduct	this	 research,	 and	elucidates	 some	of	 the	methodological	 challenges	associated	with	the	research	methods	used.	The	methodological	perspective	of	this	thesis	is	explained,	followed	by	an	explanation	of	the	research	methods	used	in	this	thesis	and	the	reason	behind	their	 inclusion.	The	chapter	also	discussed	the	potential	drawbacks	 with	 each	 of	 the	 research	methods	 employed,	 and	my	 attempts	 at	mitigating	 them.	 	 The	 ethical	 implications	 of	 this	 research	 are	 also	 included	 in	Chapter	4,	with	a	specific	focus	on	the	ways	in	which	my	positionality	as	a	young,	white,	female	conducting	research	in	the	Global	South	could	have	impacted	upon	the	data	collected	in	this	research.		
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	As	 the	 first	 empirical	 chapter,	 Chapter	 5	 assesses	 the	 dominant	 discourses	prevalent	in	a	number	of	Tanzanian	national	policy	documents,	and	assesses	the	ways	 in	 which	 the	 country’s	 prescribed	 water	 governance	 framework	 is	explained.	 In	 addition,	 a	 selection	 of	 other	 documents	 that	 impact	 upon	 the	rhetoric	of	Tanzanian	water	policy	are	also	examined,	such	as	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	 Papers.	 	 The	 socio-political	 history	 of	 Tanzanian	 politics	 is	 also	examined,	 such	 as	 the	 legacy	 of	 the	 socialist	 policies	 implemented	 by	 Julius	Nyerere	 in	 the	 country	 in	 the	 1960s,	 and	 their	 modern	 manifestations	 in	contemporary	 water	 policy.	 As	 such,	 an	 attempt	 is	 made	 to	 understand	 the	variety	of	discourses	prevalent	 in	current	Tanzanian	culture,	and	each	of	 these	discourses	 relate	 to	 the	water	policy	 framework	 in	place	 today.	The	neoliberal	manifestations	in	Tanzanian	water	policy	are	discussed,	particularly	in	terms	of	decentralisation	of	responsibility	and	the	decreasing	role	of	the	Tanzanian	state,	and	 how	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 has	 changed	 in	 the	 country’s	 water	sector	 over	 time.	 The	 chapter	 also	 explores	 some	 of	 the	 terminology	 used	 in	Tanzanian	 water	 policy,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 are	 understood	 within	different	stakeholders	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania.			The	sixth	chapter	in	this	thesis	analyses	the	experiences	of	NGOs	working	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania	and	the	myriad	challenges	faced	by	these	organisations	in	their	day-to-day	practices.	Using	the	ethnographic	data	collected	 from	an	 in-depth	study	of	two	organisations	working	in	the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam	as	well	as	data	gathered	from	interviews	and	focus	groups,	this	chapter	explains	the	main	 activities	 undertaken	 by	 these	 organisations,	 and	 the	 rationale	 behind	them.	Discussion	follows	on	the	impact	of	these	activities	on	improving	access	to	water	for	the	people	of	Dar	es	Salaam,	and	the	variety	of	factors	that	often	impact	upon	water	 NGOs	 being	 able	 to	 carry	 out	 the	work	 they	 desire.	 This	 includes	specific	 challenges	 that	 can	 affect	 individual	 organisations,	 such	 as	 a	 lack	 of	available	 funding.	 It	 also	 includes	 sector-wide	 issues	 such	 as	 partnerships	 and	competition	 that	 can	 lead	 to	 more	 focus	 on	 power	 relations	 between	organisations	rather	than	water-related	outputs.			
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The	 final	 empirical	 chapter	 explains	 the	 experiences	 of	 community	 water	projects	 in	 Tanzania,	 through	 the	 use	 of	 the	 two	 aforementioned	 case	 studies.	Chapter	7	describes	 the	manifestations	 of	 community	water	projects	 in	Dar	 es	Salaam,	 and	 their	 place	 within	 the	 wider	 and	 messy	 water	 governance	framework	 of	 the	 city.	 The	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 grassroots	 schemes	 were	conceptualised	and	implemented	is	discussed,	as	well	as	the	challenges	faced	by	those	in	charge	of	the	projects	and	the	residents	trying	to	access	the	water	they	provide.	 The	 chapter	 also	 discusses	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 Tanzanian	 water	 event	‘Maji	Week’	and	how	it	is	experienced	by	various	groups	across	Tanzania.			Chapter	 8	 provides	 a	 conclusion	 to	 this	 research	 and	 highlights	 the	 questions	raised	by	this	data	that	must	be	asked	in	order	to	provide	a	full	understanding	of	the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam.	The	key	findings	of	this	research	are	discussed	in	relation	to	Dar	es	Salaam’s	water	governance,	as	well	as	the	impacts	that	the	data	 in	 this	 research	 can	 contribute	 towards	 broader	 debates	 on	 international	aid,	 NGOs	 and	 the	 Global	 South’s	 place	 within	 contemporary	 development	practice.	 The	 chapter	 also	 reflects	 on	 the	 politics	 and	 ethical	 considerations	 of	conducting	 research	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 and	 speaking	 on	 behalf	 of	 research	participants,	 and	 refers	 to	 a	 number	 of	 further	 research	 questions	 generated	from	the	findings	of	this	thesis	that	must	be	examined	in	future.														
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Chapter	2:	Neoliberal	Policy	and	its	Impact	on	Water	Governance		
2.1	Introduction		Peck	et	al	(2009:107)	explain	that	“processes	of	neoliberalism	operate,	articulate	and	 interpenetrate	unevenly	across	places,	 territories	and	scales”,	exacerbating	uneven	 global	 development	 and	 perpetuating	 economic	 inequality.	 Although	Pollard	et	 al	 (2009)	 claim	 that	 economic	analysis	within	academic	 literature	 is	ontologically	 placed	 within	 a	 Global	 North	 mindset,	 Peck	 and	 Tickell	 (2002)	instead	explain	that	existing	research	into	neoliberalism	within	various	cultural	contexts	has	been	executed	most	effectively	 in	research	in	the	Global	South.	By	creating	 a	 dichotomy	 between	 the	 market	 and	 the	 state	 (Fine,	 1999),	neoliberalism	has	become	what	is	described	by	Mackinnon	and	Cumbers	(2007)	as	“economic	common	sense”.	As	neoliberalism	manifests	itself	in	different	ways	across	 a	 variety	 of	 locales,	 this	 chapter	 aims	 to	 address	 the	 impacts	 of	 the	economic	 doctrine	 in	 a	Global	 South,	 and	 in	 particular,	 how	 this	 impacts	 upon	water	 governance	 and	 related	 policy.	 Services	 like	 water	 provision	 are	increasingly	being	subject	to	market-values	and	have	been	impacted	upon	by	the	rise	of	neoliberal	governance.	As	such,	 this	chapter	explores	 this	 form	of	water	governance	and	the	ways	in	which	this	has	affected	how	residents	in	the	Global	South	access	water.			As	neoliberalism	became	embedded	in	global	social	and	geopolitical	fabric	in	the	1970s	and	1980s,	free	market	values	took	precedent	in	many	countries’	agendas,	in	 keeping	 with	 the	 values	 imposed	 upon	 them	 by	 international	 financial	institutions.	 The	 privatisation	 of	 state	 water	 services	 was	 put	 in	 place	 by	 a	number	of	states,	at	a	time	when	their	appeared	to	be	no	alternative	(Loftus	and	McDonald,	2001)	to	managing	water	governance.	Capitalising	on	the	narrative	of	the	 time,	 states	 were	 blamed	 for	 inefficient	 water	 provision,	 and	 global	initiatives	 such	as	 the	Dublin	Principles	of	19922	provided	a	 viable	 alternative,																																																									2	The	 Dublin	 Principles	 were	 announced	 at	 the	 International	 Conference	 on	 Water	 and	 the	Environment	 (ICWE)	 held	 in	 Dublin	 in	 January	 1992,	 which	 was	 attended	 by	 government	representatives,	 as	well	 as	 individuals	 from	 international	 and	 nongovernmental	 organisations.	(Gorre-Dale,	1992)	
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justifying	the	need	for	more	market-based	logic	 in	water	provision	to	solve	the	current	 issues	 with	 state	 led	 provision	 (Ioris,	 2012).	 However	 this	 has	 been	subject	to	much	criticism,	with	Swyngedouw	(2005:93)	noting	that	privatisation	altered	 “choreographies	 of	 power”	 and	 Rees	 (1998)	 explaining	 that	 private	companies	 are	 not	 social	 services,	 and	 will	 provide	 water	 system	 under	 a	different	 ethos	 to	 a	 state.	 Additionally,	 those	 without	 the	 capital	 to	 afford	 to	install	 a	 connection	 to	 privately	 provided	 water	 are	 faced	 with	 sourcing	alternative	means	of	access,	often	with	questionable	quality	or	higher	prices	than	the	municipal	system.	The	 increased	marketisation	of	water	services	has	 led	to	class	 division	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 market	 logic	 into	 something	 previously	understood	as	a	natural	depoliticised	resource.	As	such,	neoliberal	policy	has	had	a	significant	 impact	on	contemporary	water	policy,	as	residents	are	often	faced	with	the	challenge	of	finding	enough	capital	to	acquire	water	to	fulfil	their	needs.			This	 chapter	 begins	 by	 discussing	 the	 origins	 of	 neoliberalism	 as	 an	 economic	doctrine	 and	 its	 key	 tenets.	 It	 then	 attempts	 to	 deconstruct	 the	 idea	 of	neoliberalism	as	a	uniform	context	by	discussing	its	application	in	various	Global	South	contexts,	before	leading	onto	a	discussion	of	the	neoliberalisation	of	water.	Through	 exploration	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 neoliberalism	 has	 impacted	 upon	Global	South	access	to	water,	coalescing	around	water’s	simultaneous	roles	as	an	environmental	 good	 and	 essential	 to	 life,	 the	 commodification	 of	 this	 resource	will	 be	 examined.	 Finally,	 the	 chapter	 will	 discuss	 the	 ways	 in	 which	neoliberalism	 has	 impacted	 upon	 the	 water	 sector	 in	 Tanzania	 and	 how	 the	implementation	of	 free	market	 ideals	have	been	carried	out	 in	this	context	and	the	subsequent	effects	on	domestic	access	to	water.	The	chapter	will	end	with	a	brief	 discussion	 of	 crisis	 and	 how	 this	 relates	 to	 understandings	 of	 neoliberal	governance	and	access	to	water	in	the	developing	world.			
2.2	 The	 beginnings	 of	 neoliberalism;	 definitions,	 understandings	 and	
incorporation	into	global	economic	doctrine		Neoliberalism	has	been	defined	by	Mackinnon	(2009:ii)	as;		
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“A	 political	 and	 economic	 framework	 that	 seeks	 to	 reduce	 state	intervention	 and	 embrace	 the	 free	 market,	 stressing	 the	 virtues	 of	enterprise,	competition	and	individual	self-reliance”		McGregor	(2001:83)	also	notes	that	“neoliberalism	is	comprised	of	two	notions	–	‘neo’	 meaning	 new	 and	 ‘liberal’	 meaning	 free	 from	 government	 intervention.”	For	many	years,	Peck	has	problematised	definitive	descriptions	of	this	economic	framework,	noting	that	it	was	a	“transnational,	reactional	and	messy	hybrid	right	from	the	start”	(Peck,	2010:39).	Although	neoliberalism	as	an	economic	doctrine	is	 in	 many	 ways	 variegated	 across	 time	 and	 space,	 the	 core	 belief	 of	 its	propagators	is	that	the	free	market	is	the	most	appropriate	means	for	individuals	to	fulfil	their	own	needs	and	desires,	and	that	the	state	is	either	inefficient	or	a	curb	or	 individual	 freedom	(Crouch,	2011:vii).	Through	this	“essentialisation	of	the	 market”	 (Kendall,	 2003:3)	 neoliberalism	 usurped	 Keynesianism	 as	 the	dominant	 post-war	 economic	 strategy,	 by	 providing	 a	 stark	 alternative	 to	 the	system	 that	 found	 itself	 in	 a	 crisis	 in	 the	 1970s.	 Harvey	 (2005)	 argues	 that	neoliberalism	rose	 in	popularity	 in	the	1970s	due	to	the	context	of	 the	time	by	appealing	 to	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 needs	 of	 an	 electorate	 who	 were	dissatisfied	by	the	means	of	current	economic	governance;			 “For	any	way	of	thought	to	become	dominant,	a	conceptual	apparatus	has	to	be	advanced	that	appeals	to	our	intuitions	and	instincts,	to	our	values	and	our	desires	as	well	as	to	the	possibilities	inherent	in	the	social	world	we	inhabit.”	(Harvey,	2005:5)		Harvey	 then	 goes	 on	 to	 discuss	 the	 various	 anti-statist	 political	movements	 of	1968,	 which	 allowed	 neoliberals	 to	 capitalise	 on	 their	 dissatisfaction	 with	 an	influential	 state	 and	 instead	 transfer	 a	 number	 of	 public	 practices	 to	 private	hands.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 market	 became	 increasingly	 important	 in	service	provision,	 and	 sectors	 that	were	previously	under	 the	 control	 of	 states	became	owned	and	ran	by	private	companies.			
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As	 a	 dominant	 viewpoint	 in	 post-war	 economic	 policy	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	until	 the	 1970s,	 the	 Keynesian	 method	 of	 dealing	 with	 inflation	 included	reducing	 state	 expenditure	 or	 increasing	 taxes,	 although	 this	 resulted	 in	decreased	spending	on	public	services	and	an	 inevitable	rise	 in	unemployment	(Crouch,	 2011).	 When	 Keynesianism	 became	 in	 a	 state	 of	 economic	 crisis,	neoliberal	 propagators	 viewed	 the	 labour	 market	 differently;	 working	 against	those	 who	 tried	 to	 unionise	 and	 increase	 their	 wages	 to	 survive	 inflation	(Crouch,	 2011),	 and	 advocating	 the	 core	 belief	 that	 those	 who	 became	unemployed	had	done	so	on	a	purely	voluntary	basis	 (Harvey,	2005).	The	core	belief	was	 that	market	 regulation	 should	 decrease	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 economic	growth.			Continued	inflation	in	the	1970s	led	to	measures	being	put	in	place	to	curb	the	crisis,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 consequences	 for	 the	 labour	market	 (Harvey,	 2005).	Under	‘monetarism’,	the	supply	of	money	circulation	in	the	United	States	became	restricted	 in	 order	 to	 curb	 inflation	 levels	 (Mackinnon	 and	 Cumbers,	 2011).	Governments	 in	 the	Global	North	began	 to	 follow	 suit,	 and	 in	1976	 the	British	Labour	 Government	 formally	 announced	 a	 move	 away	 from	 Keynesianism	 in	exchange	 for	 financial	 assistance	 from	 the	 International	Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF)	(Crouch,	2011).	 It	was	evident	 at	 this	point	 that	 supporters	of	 the	 free	market	and	 a	 move	 away	 from	 the	 strong	 welfare	 state	 were	 significantly	 impacting	upon	 economic	 discourse	 in	 the	 Global	 North,	 and	 neoliberalism	 was	 fast	becoming	the	viable	economic	alternative.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	the	Global	North	was	the	only	set	of	countries	experiencing	a	change	in	economic	discourse	during	this	period.	Following	the	coup	d’état	in	Chile	in	1977,	overthrowing	the	socialist	 government	 of	 Allende	 (Crouch,	 2011),	 General	 Pinochet	 achieved	power	 and	 allowed	 neoliberal	 policy	 to	 become	 the	 key	 element	 of	 Chilean	economics,	working	 alongside	 the	 IMF	 (Harvey,	 2005).	 Nationalised	 industries	were	privatised,	and	natural	resources	were	introduced	into	the	market,	aligning	with	 Harvey’s	 claim	 that	 neoliberal	 policy	 will	 create	 markets	 where	 they	previously	 did	 not	 exist	 (Harvey,	 2005).	 Additionally,	 foreign	 companies	were	encouraged	to	operate	on	Chilean	land.			
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Politically,	 as	 well	 as	 economically,	 neoliberalism	 was	 increasingly	 gaining	dominance	 in	 other	 locales.	 The	 elections	 won	 by	 Margaret	 Thatcher	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	in	1979,	and	Ronald	Reagan	in	the	United	States	of	America	in	1980	 were	 seen	 as	 key	 moments	 for	 the	 increasing	 hegemony	 of	 neoliberal	policy.	Following	on	from	British	Labour’s	denunciation	of	Keynesian	economic	policy	in	1976,	Thatcher	also	advocated	monetarism,	as	well	as	the	privatisation	of	 state	 assets,	 a	 reduction	 in	 taxes	 for	 the	upper	 classes	 and	 fundamentally,	 a	reduced	 welfare	 state	 (Crouch,	 2011).	 Reagan’s	 election	 in	 1980	 further	cemented	 neoliberal	 economic	 doctrine	 in	 the	 Global	 North,	 supporting	 the	increased	interest	rates	put	in	place	by	Paul	Volcker	in	the	United	States	Federal	Reserve,	 and	 initiating	 the	 deregulation	 of	 industry	 and	 the	 economy	 (Crouch,	2011)	(Harvey,	2005),	also	supporting	decreasing	state	power.			Although	the	transfer	of	power	from	the	state	to	the	market	can	be	rightly	seen	as	one	of	the	key	tenets	of	neoliberal	theory,	there	are	other	reconfigurations	of	power	 that	must	be	 examined	 in	order	 to	 assess	 its	dominance.	Building	upon	the	 ideas	of	Duméil	and	Lévy	(2005),	Harvey	(2005)	claims	that	 irrespective	of	rising	inflation,	the	so-called	‘neoliberalisation’	of	global	economics	was	simply	a	means	by	which	power	could	be	restored	to	the	ruling	classes;	as	a	reactionary	measure	to	the	apparent	rising	political	clout	of	communist	and	socialist	parties	in	the	1970s,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	Keynesian	policy	had	restricted	the	ability	of	the	ruling	elites	to	increase	their	share	of	national	wealth.		Others	have	been	equally	critical,	stating	that	neoliberalism	is	“a	global	system	of	minority	power,	plunder	of	nations	and	despoilment	of	the	environment”	(Saad-Filho	 and	 Johnston,	 2005:5).	 It	 could	 be	 suggested	 that	 as	 economic	 influence	was	 transferred	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 away	 from	 the	 state	 and	 labour	organisations	such	as	trade	unions,	so	too	was	the	financial	security	and	stability	of	 the	 labour	market	 taken	 from	 the	 hands	 of	 the	working	 classes.	 Stuart	Hall	commented	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 that	 neoliberalism	 was	 simply	 a	 “class-based	ideology	 that	attacks	 the	welfare	state	 in	advance	 liberal	countries”	 (Hall,	 from	Ong,	 2007:3).	 Moreover,	 Harvey	 (2005)	 notes	 that	 neoliberalism’s	 main	achievement	has	been	the	redistribution	rather	than	regeneration	of	wealth	and	
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income,	 using	 the	 example	 of	 privatisation	 of	 social	 housing	 in	 the	 United	Kingdom	 and	 how	 it	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 way	 to	 increase	 personal	 wealth,	 but	 the	fluctuations	of	 the	housing	market	ended	up	displacing	 the	working	class	 from	gentrified	areas.	This	is	a	neat	example	of	how	the	choreographies	of	power	were	altered	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 individual	 responsibility	 and	 self-sufficiency	 away	from	the	welfare	state,	and	the	“chill	wind”	of	the	market	(Amin,	1999)	having	a	significant	impact	on	the	working	classes.	Nonetheless,	it	must	also	be	noted	that	for	Thatcher,	the	reconfiguration	of	economic	and	political	power	was	not	simply	a	 reversal	 of	 post-war	 class	 relations;	 instead	 creating	 a	 financially	 viable	environment	 for	what	 Harvey	 (2005:31)	 terms	 the	 entrepreneurial	 “nouveaux	riches”,	instead	of	the	traditional	aristocratic	ruling	elites.			Additionally,	neoliberalism	cannot	be	viewed	as	simply	this	transfer	of	state-to-market	power.	It	also	promoted	the	idea	of	individualistic	values,	and	ownership	over	one’s	own	success.	Taking	the	education	reforms	implemented	by	Thatcher	during	her	time	as	prime	minister	as	an	example,	by	making	league	tables	public,	parents	were	 able	 to	 have	 an	 individual	 influence	 over	 their	 child’s	 education,	using	 information	 provided	 to	 decide	 which	 school	 suited	 them	 best	 (Coman,	2013).	 Although	 this	 is	 not	 an	 explicit	 transfer	 of	 education	 entirely	 into	 the	private	 sector,	 state	 schools	 thus	 had	 an	 element	 of	 competition	 introduced	between	them,	each	attempting	to	provide	the	best	education	and	attain	the	best	pupils.	 This	 illustrates	 how	 market-led	 and	 individualistic	 thinking	 was	becoming	 increasingly	 commonplace,	 infiltrating	 the	 political	 psyche,	 and	indicates	how	widespread	the	influence	of	neoliberalism	had	become.			
2.3	 Post	 1980s	 neoliberalism	 and	 the	 effects	 on	 international	 financial	
institutions		By	 the	 early	 1980s,	 the	 commitment	 to	 Keynesian	 policies	 had	 all	 but	disappeared	from	international	financial	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF,	and	in	the	United	States,	economic	research	had	begun	to	teach	the	key	tenets	 of	 neoliberalism	 as	 standard	 (Harvey,	 2005).	 As	 a	 departure	 from	 the	outwardly	 neoliberal	 values	 of	 both	 Thatcher	 and	 Reagan,	 a	 so-called	 ‘second	
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wave’	 began	 to	 permeate	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	 advocating	 what	 Ong	 (2006:11)	describes	as	“individual	internalisation	of	neoliberal	traits”,	and	the	expectation	that	individuals	would	begin	to	take	a	degree	of	responsibility	for	themselves	in	aspects	of	their	lives	such	as	health	and	education.	Moving	on	from	this,	a	‘third	way’	 of	 neoliberalism	 then	 became	 the	 dominant	 discourse,	 described	 as	“neoliberalism	with	a	human	face”	(Saad-Filho	and	Johnston,	2005:4).	Involving	Bill	Clinton’s	New	Democrats	 in	 the	United	States,	 the	German	 ‘die	neue	Mitte’	and	 New	 Labour	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (Arestits	 and	 Sawyer,	 2005,	 Crouch,	2011)	 there	 was	 a	 new	 emphasis	 on	 community	 and	 self-responsibility.	Additionally,	whilst	still	accepting	the	key	values	of	neoliberalism,	the	Third	Way	wished	 to	 “humanise	 the	 market”	 (Duménil	 and	 Lévy,	 2005:28)	 and	 an	acknowledgement	that	the	state	did	have	a	role	to	play	in	market	failure	(Arestis	and	Sawyer,	2005).			Castree	 (2006)	 warns	 against	 using	 the	 term	 ‘neoliberalism’	 within	 academic	research	in	a	general	sense,	as	there	is	a	risk	that	this	will	lead	to	tenuous	links	between	specific	practices	and	wider	contexts	that	may	not	actually	be	evident,	and	my	 simply	be	being	used	 to	make	 research	 link	up	 to	 a	 “much	bigger	 and	apparently	 important	 conversation”	 (Castree,	 2006:6).	 Additionally,	 Peck	 et	 al	(2009)	 support	 the	 idea	 of	 “neoliberalisation”	 (Peck	 et	 al,	 2009)	 rather	 than	‘neoliberalism’,	 refuting	Brenner	and	Theodore’s	 (2002b)	 idea	 that	 it	 follows	a	‘one	size	fits	all’	model,	and	arguing	that	it	is	an	economic	doctrine	that	is	applied	and	 implemented	 differently	 across	 various	 contexts	 and	 locations.	 The	 ‘pure’	neoliberal	 governance	 that	 took	 place	 in	 Chile	 in	 the	 1970s,	 was	 subject	 to	 a	failure	 which	 led	 to	 adaptations	 and	 compromises	 within	 neoliberal	 practice,	something	 that	was	 replicated	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	 in	1983	 (Harvey,	 2005).	Additionally,	 Fourcade-Gourinchas	 et	 al	 (2002)	 noted	 that	 whilst	 the	 United	Kingdom,	Chile,	Mexico	and	France	all	subscribed	to	free	market	ideals,	how	this	was	 implemented	 in	 each	 location	 had	 was	 varied.	 The	 United	 Kingdom	 and	Chile	adopted	neoliberalism	as	a	wholesale	rescaling	of	state-market	relations,	as	opposed	to	France	and	Mexico	who	adopted	the	new	economic	principles	more	gradually	(Fourcade-Gourinchas	et	al,	2002).			
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As	 noted	 by	 Saad-Filho	 and	 Johnston	 (2005),	 viewing	 neoliberalism	 along	 a	simply	 linear	 trajectory	 neglects	 to	 consider	 the	 myriad	 ways	 it	 has	 become	embedded	 in	 international	 economics	 and	 become	 the	 “commonsense”	 of	 the	times	 (Colás.	2005:78).	Ahiwa	Ong	makes	 the	distinction	between	 the	 ideology	and	 the	 practice	 clear;	 “big	 N	 Neoliberalism	 as	 ‘a	 fixed	 set	 of	 attributes	 with	predetermined	outcomes’	while	‘small	n	neoliberalism’	operates	in	practice	‘as	a	logic	of	governing	 that	mitigates	and	 is	 selectively	 taken	up	 in	diverse	political	contexts”	(Ong,	from	Springer,	2012:136).	An	example	of	this	is	in	Europe,	where	Nordic	 countries	have	 incorporated	a	 significant	amount	of	neoliberal	doctrine	into	 their	 governance,	 yet	 they	 still	 possess	 a	 far-reaching	 welfare	 state	 and	trade	unions	still	have	a	significant	amount	of	influence	(Crouch,	2011).			The	current	manifestations	of	neoliberalism	have	once	again	adapted	to	suit	the	political	 climate	 in	 which	 they	 operate,	 escaping	 supposed	 crisis	 such	 as	 the	financial	 crash	 of	 2008,	 seemingly	 unscathed	 (Mirowski,	 2013).	 Those	 who	enforce	this	economic	set	of	values	are	said	to	“occupy	positions	of	considerable	influence	 in	 education	 (universities	 and	 many	 think	 tanks),	 in	 the	 media,	 in	corporate	 boardrooms	 and	 financial	 institutions	 in	 key	 state	 institutions	(treasury	departments,	central	banks)	and	also	in	international	institutions	such	as	 the	 IMF,	 World	 Bank	 and	 World	 Trade	 Organisation	 that	 regulate	 global	finance	 and	 trade”	 (Harvey,	 2005:2).	 Mirowski	 (2013)	 further	 argues	 that	 the	real	propagators	of	neoliberalism	are	not	those	directly	interacting	with	society,	but	 instead	 those	 who	 disseminate	 their	 ideas	 through	 subtle	 means,	 such	 as	academic	conferences	or	social	media.	As	such,	it	could	be	argued	that	neoliberal	thought	 has	 a	 significant	 presence	 without	 any	 direct	 link	 to	 those	 who	promoted	 this	 ideology	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 The	 growing	 power	 of	multinational	corporations	has	 led	 to	 them	exerting	 influence	 over	 political	 decisions	 to	 suit	their	 own	 business	 interests	 (Crouch,	 2011)	 as	 financial	 institutions	 are	increasingly	able	to	sway	policy	for	their	own	needs.	Instead	of	the	existence	of	what	 Crouch	 (2011:viii)	 terms	 an	 “ideologically	 pure”	 neoliberalism,	 as	 this	economic	doctrine	has	evolved	over	time,	renegotiating	the	relationship	between	the	 market	 and	 the	 state	 and	 further	 reconfiguring	 the	 power	 relations	intrinsically	related	to	capital.		
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	Ong	 (2006)	 argues	 that	 governments	 have	 created	 new	 economic	 spaces	 in	which	to	exert	power	over	national	populations.	As	well	as	the	aforementioned	example	of	the	Conservative	British	Government’s	introduction	of	 league	tables	into	British	schools,	a	more	contemporary	example	of	this	is	through	the	United	Kingdom	 Government’s	 initiative	 of	 the	 Big	 Society,	 whereby	 localism	 and	decentralisation	are	being	advocated	as	a	method	of	restructuring	governance	in	Britain	(Featherstone	et	al,	2012).	The	power	of	the	market	nonetheless	has	an	effect	 here,	 as	 local	 initiatives	 must	 apply	 to	 the	 wealthy	 for	 project	 funding,	allowing	those	with	capital	to	determine	which	local	services	prosper	based	on	their	own	personal	preferences	(Crouch,	2011).		Policies	that	follow	the	rhetoric	of	austerity	and	welfare	reform	have	meant	that	the	state	has	a	decreasing	role	to	play	 in	 the	provision	of	 local	 services,	 leaving	 residents	dependent	on	 them	subject	to	the	volatility	of	the	free	market.			As	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 market	 becomes	 increasingly	complex,	combined	with	 the	ways	neoliberalism	adapts	 to	different	spatial	and	temporal	contexts,	it	is	useful	to	consider	the	impacts	of	this	through	the	idea	of	neoliberal	 governance.	 Using	 the	 conception	 that	 governance	 by	 definition	 is	fundamentally	 “more	 than	 government”	 (Evans	 et	 al,	 2005:77),	 governance	implies	 that	 there	 are	 multiple	 stakeholders	 involved	 in	 service	 provision	beyond	simply	the	state.	The	ideas	of	Big	Society	and	progressive	localism	could	be	suggested	to	be	explicit	examples	of	this.	Using	neoliberalism	as	the	method	of	governance,	market-led	values	become	 intrinsic	 to	political	decision	making,	and	 through	 individual	 values	 (echoing	 Thatcher’s	 derision	 for	 the	 idea	 of	society)	the	idea	of	self-governance	also	came	into	the	fore.	Therefore,	it	is	clear	neoliberal	 values	 have	 become	 intrinsic	 both	 in	 top-down	 methods	 of	governance	 as	 well	 in	 everyday	 discourse	 and	 practice,	 the	 ideas	 of	 this	economic	doctrine	can	become	even	more	endemic.	States	become	an	 inherent	part	 of	 “entrepreneurial	 and	 competitive	 behaviour”	 (Fougner,	 2008:308)	 and	although	 the	manifestations	of	neoliberal	governance	can	vary	between	places,	there	is	nonetheless	an	emphasis	placed	upon	the	market	over	the	state.			
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Peck	 et	 al	 (2009)	 and	 Larner	 (2003)	 insist	 that	 neoliberalism	 should	 be	understood	 as	 a	 process	 constantly	 mutating	 and	 adapting	 to	 the	 context	 it	operates	in,	and	never	as	a	simply	definable	end	state.	Taking	these	viewpoints	into	 account,	 the	 impacts	 and	 interpretations	 of	 neoliberalism	 in	 a	 number	 of	Global	South	contexts	will	be	discussed,	in	order	to	ascertain	the	malleability	of	this	economic	doctrine.			
2.4	Neoliberalism	in	the	Global	South		Specifically	considering	how	neoliberalism	has	impacted	upon	the	Global	South	is	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 this	 form	 of	 economic	 governance	manifests	in	Postcolonial	contexts.	Pollard	et	al	(2009)	made	an	explicit	call	for	this	by	elucidating	the	lack	of	attention	economic	geography	has	paid	to	settings	outwith	the	Global	North	when	assessing	the	global	economy.	Whist	Mackinnon	and	 Cumbers	 (2007)	 note	 that	 the	 supposed	 ‘Third	World’	 is	 often	 discussed	within	 literature	 as	 a	 monolithic	 geographical	 location,	 there	 is	 evidence	 to	suggest	 that	 processes	 of	 neoliberalism	 have	 played	 out	 differently	 within	different	contexts.	Rodney	(1972),	in	his	discussion	of	capitalism’s	manifestation	in	Africa,	 addressed	 this,	noting	 that	 the	 rise	of	 capitalism	had	a	very	different	impact	within	Africa	compared	to	Europe,	and	argued	that	capitalism	had	in	fact	been	 detrimental	 to	 Africa’s	 overall	 development.	 Although	 the	 terms	‘capitalism’	and	 ‘neoliberalism’	are	not	explicitly	synonymous,	 this	 is	simply	an	early	 example	 of	 how	 an	 economic	 ideology	 can	 have	 different	 impacts	 in	different	geographical	locations.			Within	 developing	 country	 contexts,	 neoliberal	 ideology	 served	 as	 a	 departure	from	previous	discourses	existing	in	this	field.	Modernisation	Theory,	the	belief	that	 imposing	 Global	 North	 values	 upon	 non-Global	 North	 cultures	 would	advance	 their	 development,	 was	 followed	 by	 Dependency	 Theory,	 holding	 the	belief	 that	a	withdrawal	 from	the	global	economy	would	sever	any	exploitative	ties	 between	 developing	 and	 developed	 countries	 (Mackinnon	 and	 Cumbers,	2007).	 Neoliberalism	 however,	 offered	 an	 alternative	 to	 previous	 modes	 of	thought,	 instead	simply	actively	encouraging	developing	countries	 to	subscribe	
	 35	
to	Global	North	free	market	values	and	resulting	in	a	number	of	countries	in	the	global	south	adopting	this	form	of	economic	policy.	Instead	of	existing	in	relation	to	 Global	 North	 countries,	 neoliberal	 policy	 offered	 an	 opportunity	 for	 Global	South	 states	 to	 implement	 their	 own	 interpretation	 of	 this	 global	 economic	doctrine.		This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 adoption	 of	 neoliberal	 policies	 in	 the	 Global	 South	happened	 smoothly,	 however.	 For	 example,	 De	 Soto’s	 hypercapitalist	 views	 of	title	deeds	came	into	conflict	with	cultural	understandings	of	property	security	that	do	not	naturally	 lend	themselves	to	market	led	ideology	(Neuwirth,	2005).	This	is	further	explained	by	Harvey	(2005),	who	notes	that	it	is	a	commonly-held	view	 that	 the	 lack	of	private	property	 rights	 in	many	developing	 countries	 are	one	 of	 the	 key	barriers	 to	 their	 economic	 development,	 and	 echoes	previously	held	Modernisation	Theory	values	of	the	precedence	of	Global	North	knowledge.	The	conscious	move	of	the	international	financial	institutions	from	Keynesianism	to	neoliberal	values	led	to	the	formulation	of	the	Washington	Consensus	in	1990,	defined	 by	 “financial	 liberalisation,	 privatisation,	 deregulation,	 the	 creation	 of	secure	property	rights,	tax	reform,	introduction	of	competition	and	public	sector	fiscal	 ‘discipline’”	 (Bakker,	 2010:88).	Wachtel	 (2005)	 argues	 that	 the	 values	 of	the	 Washington	 Consensus	 in	 fact	 predated	 the	 1990s,	 and	 were	 used	 as	 a	vehicle	 in	 the	 1970s	 to	 reduce	 debt	 in	 the	 Global	 South,	 through	 conditional	lending	by	the	IMF.	In	the	1990s,	by	using	IMF	loans	as	a	condition	for	following	this	economic	path	and	adopting	policies	that	suit	this	framework,	it	is	clear	as	to	how	 neoliberalism	 was	 able	 to	 exert	 influence	 over	 a	 number	 of	 countries	irrespective	of	 their	 economic	history.	 In	Africa,	 the	market-led	 reforms	put	 in	place	were	unable	to	alleviate	the	public	health	issues	faced	across	the	continent,	and	the	supposed	success	stories	of	this	economic	reform	were	short-lived	and	in	 relation	 to	 other	 global	 economies,	 still	 in	 a	 tenuous	 and	 fragile	 position	Rodrik	(2006).3			
																																																								3	Rodrik	(2006)	uses	the	examples	of	the	Latin	American	economic	recovery	at	the	beginning	of	the	1990s	and	the	ways	in	which	Uganda,	Tanzania	and	Mozambique	are	lauded	as	success	stories	from	neoliberal	economic	reform	to	illustrate	this	argument.		
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Additionally,	Weiss	(2010)	describes	how	the	Washington	Consensus	posited	the	‘state’	 and	 ‘market’	 as	 working	 against	 each	 other.	 The	 increasing	 role	 of	international	 financial	 institutions	 (such	 as	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	World	 Bank)	 had	significant	levels	of	impact;		 “Because	 of	 its	 decisive	 role	 on	 a	 global	 scale,	 the	World	 Bank	 is	 often	seen	 by	 adherents	 and	 critics	 alike	 as	 the	 most	 influential	 partner	 in	bringing	 about	 particular	 types	 of	 change	 in	 developing	 countries.”	(Singh,	2009:487)		Whilst	 neoliberalism’s	 role	 in	 the	 Global	 South	must	 be	 analysed,	 it	 is	 equally	important	 to	 examine	 how	 the	 adoption	 of	 this	 global	 economic	 doctrine	 has	impacted	 upon	 the	 Global	 North’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 developing	 world.	 As	recipients	of	aid	and	other	forms	of	financial	assistance,	the	multi-scalar	ways	in	which	 neoliberal	 policy	 has	 played	 a	 role	 in	 development	 in	 the	 Global	 South	must	be	assessed.			As	 a	 form	 of	 financial	 assistance	 to	 indebted	 countries	 in	 the	 Global	 South,	structural	 adjustment	 is	 a	 useful	 example	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 presence	 of	Global	 North	 values	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	 Structural	 adjustment	 advises	 that	countries	 operate	 upon	 the	 principles	 of	 austerity,	 free	 trade	 and	 the	privatisation	 of	 state	 services	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 financial	 aid	 (Mackinnon	 and	Cumbers,	 2007)	 which	means	 that	 those	 experiencing	 it	 are	 obliged	 to	 follow	what	 the	 advanced	 capitalist	 countries	 advocate,	 and	 shows	 the	 link	 between	Dependency	Theory	and	neoliberal	 economic	policy.	 Structural	 adjustment	has	been	 replaced	by	poverty	 reduction	 strategy	papers	 in	1999,	 yet	 these	 require	governments	 to	 produce	 detailed	 plans	 for	 these	 global	 institutions	 to	 assess	(Mackinnon	and	Cumbers,	2007),	maintaining	the	advanced	capitalist	countries	hegemony	 over	 developing	 countries’	 decision	 making.	 This	 is	 exemplified	 by	McDonald	 and	 Smith	 (2004)	 who	 in	 their	 assessment	 of	 the	 increasingly	neoliberalised	 form	of	governance	being	used	 in	South	Africa	concluded	 that	 it	had	 become	 effectively	 a	 “home	 grown”	 form	 of	 structural	 adjustment	(McDonald	 and	 Smith,	 2004:161).	 McDonald	 and	 Smith	 (2004)	 found	 that	
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although	 there	were	mechanisms	 in	 place	 from	 local	 decision	makers	 to	make	choices	based	on	 their	 own	principles,	 they	 largely	defaulted	 to	 subscribing	 to	global	economic	ideals.			The	recent	move	away	from	the	Washington	Consensus	to	the	Post-Washington	Consensus	had	an	impact	upon	how	countries	in	the	Global	South	are	governed:		 “While	 the	Washington	consensus	made	economic	growth	the	main	goal	of	 development,	 the	 new	 consensus	 moves	 away	 from	 the	 neo-liberal,	market-friendly	 approach	 and	 places	 sustainable,	 egalitarian	 and	democratic	 development	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 agenda.”	 (World	 Health	Organisation,	2015)			Taking	the	viewpoint	that	markets	are	in	fact,	imperfect	(Fine,	from	KS	and	Fine,	2006),	 and	 not	 an	 absolute	 and	 issue-free	 form	 of	 governance,	 the	 Post-Washington	 Consensus	 has	 been	 described	 as	 a	 “new	 phase	 of	 neoliberalism”	(Van	Waeyenberge	et	al,	2011:7).	Referred	to	by	Peck	as	“the	post-laissez-faire	credo	 of	 neoliberalism”	 (Peck,	 2010:65),	 the	 Post-Washington	 Consensus	 has	once	again	redefined	the	state’s	role,	and	a	“grudging	tolerance	of	the	state	has	re-emerged”	(Bayliss,	2011:73).		As	such,	under	the	Post-Washington	Consensus	states	are	encouraged	 to	 intervene	 to	manage	 these	market	 imperfections,	 and	the	social	relations	embedded	in	society	are	described	as	a	vital	ingredient	to	a	country’s	economic	development	(Fine	et	al,	2001).	This	is	an	explicit	example	of	the	 ways	 in	 which	 neoliberalism	 changes	 its	 ethos	 to	 suit	 the	 contexts	 it	 is	operating	 in,	 agreeing	 with	 previous	 comments	 made	 in	 the	 literature	 and	explaining	its	continued	hegemony.		By	advocating	the	role	of	the	state	in	certain	situations	and	emphasising	collective-decision	making	at	 the	national	and	 local	level,	 the	 Post-Washington	 consensus	 is	 a	means	 by	which	modern	 neoliberal	policy	is	able	to	continue	to	promote	economic	values	without	being	wholly	and	explicitly	market-driven.			As	previously	discussed,	a	prominent	feature	of	neoliberalised	governance	is	that	of	the	decentralisation	of	state	power,	and	a	focus	on	a	more	local	or	community	
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aspect	of	economic	 interaction,	which	has	materialised	 in	a	number	of	ways	 in	the	Global	South.	Willis	and	Khan	(2009:992)	noted	that;		 “Neoliberal	 policies	 throughout	 the	 world	 have	 been	 associated	 with	attempts	 to	 decentralise	 decision	 making	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 greater	involvement	of	people	and	communities.”			There	 has	 been	 a	 rising	 interest	 in	 local	 and	 regional	 economic	 spaces	within	economic	 geography	 since	 the	 1990s	 (MacKinnon	 and	 Cumbers,	 2007),	 and	Brenner	and	Theodore	(2002a)	stated	that	 they	are	 increasingly	being	“viewed	as	key	 institutional	arenas	 for	a	wide	range	of	policy	experiments	and	political	strategies”.	 	However,	 commentary	on	 the	 success	of	decentralised	governance	has	 concluded	 with	 mixed	 results.	 Grindle	 (2004)	 states	 that	 the	 supposed	benefits	of	decentralisation,	in	that	it	can	lead	to	quicker	decision	making,	more	accountability	in	local	level	government	and	the	empowerment	of	citizens,	is	not	necessarily	what	happens	in	practice	and	can	often	lead	to	increased	inequality	within	decentralised	regions.	Whilst	 the	Post-Washington	Consensus	advocates	the	importance	of	local	social	relations	and	governance	to	a	country’s	economic	development	(Batemen	et	al	2011),	McDonald	and	Smith	(2004)	disagree,	stating	that	 the	 impact	 of	 neoliberal	 policy	 outweighs	 the	 potential	 for	 participatory	grassroots	movements	to	subvert	this	economic	doctrine.			Additionally,	Akin	et	al’s	(2005)	consultation	of	literature	on	this	topic	concluded	that	due	to	a	 lack	of	appropriate	knowledge,	 local	 level	decision	makers	do	not	often	have	the	ability	to	make	the	best	decisions	for	those	they	are	accountable	to,	 which	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 detrimental	 impact	 on	 the	 service	 provision	 available.	Atampugre	 (1997)	 is	 also	 incredibly	 cynical	 about	 the	 supposed	 benefits	 of	decentralised	 governance,	 maintaining	 the	 view	 that	 political	 devolution	 is	meaningless	 unless	 economic	 resources	 are	 decentralised	 also,	 and	 that	economic	 disparities	 and	 class	 divisions	 remain	 or	 worsen	 when	 this	reconfiguration	of	governance	is	put	in	place,	thus	leading	to	very	little	benefit	at	the	 grassroots	 level.	 	 In	 Bolivia,	 decentralised	 governance	 strengthened	 local	rights	movements,	reconfigured	political	power	dynamics	and	led	to	the	election	
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of	 the	 country’s	 first	 indigenous	 president	 (Kohl	 and	 Farthing,	 from	Miraftab,	2009).	However,	McDonald	and	Smith	(2004)	concluded	from	their	research	 in	South	Africa	that	policies	and	decision-making	within	these	localised	methods	of	governance	were	still	heavily	 influenced	by	the	hegemonic	nature	of	neoliberal	ideology.	In	their	research	in	Cape	Town,	McDonald	and	Smith	(2004)	argue	that	since	the	1990s	there	has	been	a	reduction	in	the	scope	of	policy	debate,	and	an	increasing	importance	placed	upon	the	private	sector	and	commercial	interests.	Whilst	decentralised	governance	can	encourage	grassroots	decision	making	that	is	 appropriate	 for	 the	 local	 context,	 the	 above	 examples	 suggest	 that	 the	necessary	resources	are	often	not	in	place	for	this	to	happen	effectively.			The	 decentralisation	 of	 power	 across	 a	 number	 of	 states	 and	 its	 impact	 on	economies	 and	 their	 social	 relations	 has	 been	 explored	 in	 depth.	 The	decentralisation	 of	 governance	 to	 the	 local	 level	 is	 also	 part	 of	 mainstream	development	 discourse,	which	 has	 presented	 challenges	 in	 its	 implementation.	McDonald	 and	 Smith’s	 (2004)	 research	 into	 decentralised	 governance	 in	 Cape	Town	 found	that	even	 though	 local-level	government	was	given	a	great	deal	of	autonomy,	“ideological	pressures”	(McDonald	and	Smith,	2004:1461)	meant	that	although	 adopting	 centralised	 policy	 practices	 was	 not	 officially	 enforced	 it	largely	happened	at	 the	grassroots	anyway.	Whilst	Tungaraza	(1993)	discusses	the	 importance	 of	 kinship	 values	 in	 Tanzania	 to	 the	 social	 security	 and	 well-being	of	many	of	the	country’s	residents,	it	is	clear	that	such	values	could	conflict	with	 the	neoliberal	 values	 that	 are	 currently	 in	 place	 across	 the	 globe	 and	 the	ways	 in	 which	 water	 is	 provided	 through	 decentralised	 forms	 of	 governance.	Water	is	a	resource	with	both	local	and	national	properties,	being	accessed	at	the	grassroots	 level	 whilst	 simultaneously	 being	 part	 of	 a	 complex	 hydrological	network.	As	such,	the	ways	in	which	local	and	national	economic	values	impact	upon	water	 governance	 in	 the	Global	 South	will	 now	be	discussed,	 in	 order	 to	explore	 the	ways	 in	which	neoliberal	 economic	policy	has	 impacted	upon	how	residents	access	water.			
2.5	Water	governance	in	the	Global	South		
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Currently,	 the	World	 Health	 Organisation	 and	 UNICEF	 estimate	 that	 there	 are	880	million	people	without	access	to	safe	drinking	water,	and	2.6	billion	people	without	 access	 to	 an	 adequate	 level	 of	 sanitation	 (Jiménez	 and	 Pérez-Fouget,	2010).	Moreover,	whilst	there	might	be	a	tendency	to	attribute	this	to	climate	or	technical	issues,	many	of	the	challenges	faced	by	those	living	in	the	Global	South	could	 be	 suggested	 to	 be	 a	 result	 of	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 impacts	 of	inadequate	water	 governance	 (Jiménez	 and	 Pérez-Fouget,	 2010).	 Returning	 to	Evans	et	al’s	(2005:77)	distinction	that	governance	is	“more	than	government”,	in	 order	 to	 account	 for	 the	 hybrid	 and	 messy	 forms	 of	 service	 provision	 and	access	that	can	exist,	this	section	attempts	to	explore	the	extent	to	which	water	provision	 in	 the	Global	 South	 has	 become	 subject	 to	 neoliberalised	 values	 and	complex	means	of	governance.	Analysis	from	this	viewpoint	allows	for	a	detailed	examination	 of	 the	 numerous	 networks	 and	 relationships	 currently	 in	 place	involving	the	public	and	private	sector,	residents	and	grassroots	initiatives,	and	the	state	(Franks	and	Cleaver,	2007).	Franks	and	Cleaver	(2007)	point	out	 that	residents	no	longer	rely	solely	on	the	state	for	access	to	water,	and	thus	define	water	governance	as	“the	system	of	actors,	resources,	mechanisms	and	processes	which	mediate	society’s	access	to	water”	(Franks	and	Cleaver,	2007:303).			The	 ways	 in	 which	 residents	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 have	 accessed	 water	 has	changed	within	the	last	forty	years.	Water	governance	has	been	one	of	the	areas	that	has	been	most	affected	by	rising	neoliberal	discourse,	with	privatisation	of	the	resource	serving	as	a	neoliberal	solution	to	providing	water	to	those	without.	A	significant	change	in	global	economic	policy	resulted	in	structural	adjustment	in	 the	developing	world,	 as	well	 as	 the	global	 financial	 institutions	 such	as	 the	IMF	 and	 the	World	 Bank	 using	 conditional	 loans	 to	 enforce	 their	 agendas	 on	countries	in	the	Global	South.	The	aforementioned	Washington	Consensus	of	the	1990s	 introduced	a	culture	 largely	 surrounding	privatisation,	deregulation	and	private	 property	 rights,	 leading	 to	 a	 number	 of	 countries	 in	 the	 Global	 South	engaging	 in	 private	 water	 contracts	 with	 multinational	 water	 companies	 and	placing	 their	 country’s	 water	 provision	 outwith	 their	 jurisdiction.	 As	privatisation	of	water	 (and	other	state	assets)	became	the	dominant	discourse,	global	development	initiatives	also	took	an	interest	in	water	governance,	placing	
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it	as	a	key	component	of	Millennium	Development	Goal	7,	involved	in	water	and	sanitation	(Franks	and	Cleaver,	2007).			Encounters	with	water	privatisation	and	the	subsequent	impacts	on	governance	have	been	mixed,	both	in	terms	of	experience	and	the	ways	in	which	individual	countries	 introduced	 private	 sector	 participation	 into	 their	 water	 sector.	 In	addition	 to	 this,	 informal	 methods	 of	 water	 provision	 continue	 to	 be	 a	 vital	method	 of	 access	 for	 many	 living	 in	 the	 Global	 South,	 making	 a	 full	understanding	of	water	governance	a	complex	issue	in	many	areas.	Swyngedouw	(from	Ioris,	2012:126)	notes	that	in	terms	of	water	governance,	issues	faced	are	“not	merely	a	question	of	management	and	technology,	but	rather,	and	perhaps	in	the	first	instance,	a	question	of	social	power”.		Thus,	by	considering	the	power	choreographies	 as	 a	 result	 of	 wider	 economic	 practices,	 as	 well	 as	 the	subsequent	 implications	 for	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	 water	 provision,	 the	complex	nature	of	water	governance	in	the	Global	South	will	be	addressed.			Continued	reliance	on	the	market	and	configuration	of	the	role	of	the	state	are	at	the	heart	of	neoliberal	ideology,	with	the	continuing	belief	that	as	a	result	of	the	“profit	 motive”	 (Bayliss,	 2011:73),	 services	 will	 be	 provided	 at	 a	 higher	 level	than	 those	 controlled	 solely	 by	 the	 state.	 The	 1980s	 was	 referred	 to	 as	 the	International	 Drinking	 Water	 and	 Sanitation	 decade,	 placing	 emphasis	 on	increasing	access	 to	water	 for	 those	without	 in	 the	Global	 South.	As	 the	1980s	came	to	a	close	and	it	was	evident	that	the	targets	set	out	by	the	decade’s	plan	had	not	been	met,	there	became	the	core	belief	that	private	sector	participation	was	the	solution	to	extending	water	provision	for	those	in	the	developing	world	(Budds	and	McGranahan,	2003)	aligning	with	the	key	tenets	of	neoliberalism	and	the	current	economic	discourse.			This	 belief	 was	 combined	 with	 and	 reinforced	 by	 a	 series	 of	 international	agreements	and	meetings	that	all	supported	this	shift	in	water	governance	away	from	the	control	of	individual	states.	Complementing	the	key	components	of	the	Washington	 Consensus,	 both	 the	 United	 Nations	 Convention	 on	 Environment	and	 Development	 held	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janerio	 in	 1992	 and	 the	 Dublin	 Principles	
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created	 in	 the	 same	 year	 advocated	 that	 water	 should	 now	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	economic	good,	in	order	to	promote	efficient	use	and	market-led	principles	in	its	governance	 (Budds	 and	 McGranahan,	 2003)	 (Bjornlund,	 2004),	 further	explaining	the	trajectory	along	which	this	neoliberalised	consensus	surrounding	water	became	commonsense.					Returning	to	Saad-Filho	and	Johnston’s	(2005:5)	description	of	neoliberalism	as	“a	global	 system	of	minority	power,	plunder	of	nations	and	despoilment	of	 the	environment”,	 the	 word	 ‘environment’	 is	 key	 here.	 The	 so-called	‘neoliberalisation	of	nature’	(Bakker,	2005)	moved	discussions	away	from	water	as	 a	 natural	 resource	 to	 that	 of	 a	 commodity	 to	 be	 traded	 and	 profited	 from.	Asthana	 (2011)	 discusses	 how	 water	 policy	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 political	 tool	 to	redefine	 contemporary	 understandings	 of	 water	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 a	 new	paradigm	shift	and	a	subsequent	improvement	in	access.	Supposedly,	if	an	issue	is	receiving	political	attention	and	is	causing	unrest,	an	opportunity	is	created	for	policymakers	to	raise	morale	with	new	agendas	or	policy	directions	(Huitema	et	al,	2011).	Swyngedouw	(2005:82)	 is	equally	polemic,	stating	that	“privatisation	is	 nothing	 else	 than	 a	 legally	 and	 institutionally	 condoned,	 if	 not	 encouraged,	form	of	theft”.		Tucker	states	that;		 “Challenges	 for	 managing	 watersheds	 and	 distributing	 water	 equitably	can	 multiply	 in	 contexts	 where	 multiple	 stakeholders	 have	 competing	legal	 or	 traditional	 claims,	 or	poorly	defined	property	 rights.	 Ineffective	or	 inappropriate	 institutions	 (rules-in-use),	 including	 unclear	 or	inequitable	property	 rights,	have	been	viewed	as	 root	problems	of	poor	natural	 resource	 management	 and	 associated	 social	 tensions.”	 (Tucker,	2014:216)		In	 turn,	 broader	 arguments	 surrounding	 resource	 sovereignty	 are	 pertinent	here,	where	the	privatisation	of	natural	resources	has	caused	a	situation	of	legal	pluralism	 whereby	 usufructuary	 rights	 come	 into	 conflict	 with	 private	
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acquisition.	 Sovereignty	 over	 a	 natural	 resource	 implies	 that	 a	 state	 or	indigenous	community	has	control	over	said	resource	with	the	ability	to	use	it	as	they	see	fit,	with	little	consideration	for	external	forces	such	as	the	market	(Emel	et	al,	2011).	Such	a	concept	has	been	eroded	by	liberalised	ideals,	with	a	number	of	 contemporary	 capital-focused	 teachings	 arguing	 that	 these	 views	 have	 no	place	 in	 modern	 society	 (Tarlock,	 1997).	 The	 increasing	 popularity	 of	neoliberalism	has	begun	to	threaten	these	values.	Harvey	(2005),	building	upon	Marx’s	 concept	 of	 primitive	 accumulation,	 uses	 the	 phrase	 ‘accumulation	 by	dispossession’,	 explaining	 that	 “dispossession	 is	 not	 part	 of	 some	 “primitive”	past	 but	 is	 rather	 an	 on-going	 process	 associated	 with	 the	 accumulation	 of	capital”	 (Roberts,	 2008:541).	 As	 noted	 by	 Emel	 et	 al	 (2011:70);	 “national	sovereignty	over	 territorial	 resources	 is	often	couched	 in	opposition	 to	 foreign	capital”.	 Land	 privatisation	 in	 Morocco	 has	 labelled	 any	 impoverished	pastoralists	 who	 use	 the	 land	 as	 “outlaws”	 (Davis,	 2006:100),	 criminalising	indigenous	 rights	 and	 following	 a	 market	 based	 agenda	 that	 has	 presented	 a	number	 of	 obstacles	 for	 local	 people.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 Dublin	Principles	and	their	counterparts	were	used	to	instil	hope	for	those	at	a	loss	as	to	how	to	 improve	water	provision	across	many	developing	countries,	whilst	also	acting	as	a	means	to	bring	neoliberal	values	in	to	global	policy	discourse.			Privatisation	of	water	in	the	Global	South4	was	put	in	place	through	a	variety	of	measures	advocated	by	the	international	financial	institutions	who	were	the	key	proponents	of	this	practice.	Based	on	the	core	belief	that	the	private	sector	will	be	 more	 efficient	 in	 providing	 water	 and	 injecting	 finance	 into	 underfunded	municipal	water	systems	(Bakker,	2010;	Hall	and	Lobina,	2005;	Hall	et	al,	2005),	advocates	of	water	privatisation	also	claimed	that	private	provision	would	help	to	 facilitate	 the	 growing	belief	 set	 out	 in	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 and	Dublin	 that	water	should	be	 treated	as	an	economic	good	 (Bakker,	2010).	As	with	 in	many	other	sectors,	countries	in	the	Global	South	were	coerced	by	the	international	financial	
																																																								4	This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 privatisation	 of	water	only	 occurred	 in	 the	Global	 South.	 Both	 the	United	 Kingdom	 and	 Canada	 experienced	 their	 domestic	 water	 being	 placed	 under	 the	jurisdiction	 of	 private	 companies.	However,	 as	 the	 key	 focus	 here	 is	 how	 those	without	water	experience	privatisation	it	is	more	useful	to	focus	on	the	Global	South	where	coverage	and	access	is	much	more	problematic.		
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institutions	into	handing	over	their	power	over	water	provision	from	the	state	to	a	 private	 company	 in	 exchange	 for	 loans	 and	 overseas	 aid.	 For	 example,	 the	Inter-American	Development	Bank	provided	Ecuador	with	a	loan	of	$40	million,	under	 the	 condition	 that	 half	 of	 this	 loan	 was	 spent	 on	 privatising	 the	 public	water	system	(Swyngedouw,	2005).	When	faced	with	existing	crippling	debt	and	an	 inability	 to	 generate	 funds	 within	 the	 country	 for	 national	 improvements,	countries	were	faced	with	little	choice	but	to	adopt	these	neoliberal	principles	in	their	water	sector	in	order	to	continue	to	survive.				In	addition	to	this,	 in	several	 instances	water	provision	followed	the	neoliberal	tenet	of	decentralisation,	altering	governance	and	power	structures	and	funding	allocations,	 something	 that	 Uhlendahl	 et	 al	 (2011)	 found	 was	 a	 problematic	institutional	 shift	 in	 Zambia.	 Decentralisation	 of	 water	 became	 a	 convincing	argument	 when	 the	 dominant	 discourse	 became	 that	 grassroots	 systems	required	 localised	 knowledge	 to	 operate	 efficiently	 (Cosgrove	 and	Rijsberman,	2000),	yet	dismisses	discussions	of	water	systems	existing	as	natural	monopolies	(Budds	 and	 McGranahan,	 2003)	 or	 fragmented	 water	 governance	 with	uncomplimentary	 elements.	 	 Additionally,	 a	 World	 Bank	 review	 of	decentralisation	in	health	care	in	the	developing	world	admitted	that	there	was	no	evidence	that	it	had	any	benefit	to	access	and	provision	(McGregor,	2001),	so	it	 could	 be	 called	 into	 question	 why	 this	 mode	 of	 governance	 is	 continually	pursued.			Proponents	 of	 water	 privatisation	 had	 a	 series	 of	 arguments	 against	 state	provision	of	water,	such	as	a	lack	of	finance,	inefficient	management	and	political	interests,	 and	 in	 some	 cases,	 corruption,	 inhibiting	 improvement	 in	 water	systems	 (Bakker,	 2010;	 Budds	 and	 McGranahan,	 2003;	 Robinson,	 2004).	Kazimbaya-Senkwe	and	Guy	(2007)	also	note	that	states	in	Africa	especially	(and	in	 some	 areas	 of	 Latin	 America	 and	 Asia)	 have	 been	 blamed	 for	 over-bureaucratisation	 of	 water	 provision	 and	 subsequent	 inefficiency.	Fundamentally,	 one	 of	 the	 key	 ways	 in	 which	 privatisation	 seemed	 such	 an	attractive	prospect	is	through	the	‘pro-poor’	values	it	seemingly	provided.			
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It	has	been	argued	that	state	provision	is	problematic	for	the	lower	classes,	as	it	is	the	wealthier,	planned	areas	that	receive	subsidised	water	whereas	the	lower-class	 informal	 settlements	 often	 are	 completely	 underserviced	 (Bakker,	 2010).	Neoliberal	 propagators	 believe	 that	 private	 provision	 would	 alleviate	 this	inequality,	 providing	 water	 to	 all	 areas	 at	 equal	 prices.	 However,	 Budds	 and	McGranahan	(2003)	refute	this,	arguing	that	large	private	water	companies	have	showed	 little	 interest	 in	 extending	 provision	 to	 these	 underserved	 areas.	 As	poorer	 residents	 have	 the	 least	 capital	 available	 to	 pay	 for	water	 on	 a	 regular	basis,	 they	 end	 up	 paying	 higher	 prices	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 ad	 hoc	 access	 to	 the	resource	if	and	when	they	are	able	to	afford	to	do	so	(McGranahan,	2002).		Another	 issue	 that	 impacts	 upon	 water	 provision	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 how	 it	 is	provided.	As	water	 systems	are	 said	 to	be	 ‘natural	monopolies’	 (Bayliss,	 2003;	Budds	 and	McGranahan,	 2003)	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 it	 is	more	 cost	 effective	 for	one	 provider	 (be	 it	 a	 government	 or	 a	 private	 company)	 to	 be	 in	 charge.	 This	means	 that	 prices	 and	 provision	 can	 be	 altered	 by	 the	 provider	 without	consequence,	as	there	is	no	element	of	competition	that	means	that	people	will	stop	using	their	water.	This	also,	in	the	case	of	private	companies,	allows	them	to	gain	more	profits	from	the	service	that	they	provide.	Additionally,	whilst	foreign	investors	 were	 crucial	 to	 provide	 the	 capital	 to	 improve	 Global	 South	 water	systems,	 the	 number	 of	 countries	 privatising	 their	 water	 systems	 at	 the	 same	time	created	problems	as	they	competed	to	attract	 foreign	investment	(Bayliss,	2003).	 Paradoxically,	 granting	 provision	 rights	 to	 one	 sole	 private	 company	removes	any	element	of	 competition	 from	their	work,	allowing	 them	to	charge	high	 prices	 and	 invest	 profits	 elsewhere	 (Loftus	 and	 McDonald,	 2001),	undermining	one	of	the	key	arguments	for	privatisation	of	water.				The	 public-private	 dichotomy	 of	 water	 provision	 is	 nonetheless	 fraught	 with	confusion,	 with	 Hall	 and	 Lobina	 (2005)	 and	 Prasad	 (2006)	 both	 stating	 that	research	has	been	inconclusive	as	to	whether	public	or	private	provision	is	the	best	option.	In	terms	of	monopoly	markets,	Budds	and	McGranahan	(2003)	have	also	 argued	 that	 both	 public	 and	 private	monopolies	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 number	 of	issues	 in	 terms	 of	 regulation	 and	 provision.	 It	 is	 therefore	 useful	 to	 look	 at	
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specific	examples	of	the	water	privatisation	to	develop	an	understanding	of	the	reasons	for	whether	these	projects	were	successful	or	not.		Bayliss	(2003)	argues	that	privatisation	is	unable	to	generate	the	capital	required	to	make	a	significant	improvement	 to	 a	 country’s	 water	 system,	 and	 does	 not	 address	 some	 of	 the	nuanced	 issues	 in	 place	 such	 as	 the	 inability	 of	 a	 section	 of	 the	 population	 to	afford	their	water	bills.	Other	examples	cited	by	Budds	and	McGranahan	(2003)	include	the	 impacts	of	privatisation	 in	Colombia,	Peru	and	Cote	d’Ivoire,	where	lower	 income	 settlements	 were	 left	 out	 of	 the	 remit	 of	 provision	 by	 private	companies,	 and	 did	 not	 improve	 on	 the	 coverage	 that	 the	 previous	 state-controlled	 provision	 had	 been	 criticised	 for.	 Furthermore,	 Yeboah	 (2006)	discusses	at	length	the	issues	faced	in	Ghana	when	the	water	was	placed	under	private	 provision,	whereby	 access	 in	 lower	 income	 areas	worsened	 and	 led	 to	resistance	 from	 the	 people	 most	 affected	 by	 the	 privatisation	 of	 water.	 The	failure	of	the	privatisation	initiative	of	the	international	financial	institutions	can	be	mostly	attributed	to	one	key	paradox,	that	it	is	difficult	to	attract	investment	from	efficient	companies	 to	a	 low	 income	environment	where	 the	potential	 for	profit	 margins	 is	 limited	 from	 the	 outset	 (Bayliss,	 2003).	 Negative	 outcomes	from	 the	 privatisation	 of	 water	 extend	 beyond	 economics	 also,	 as	 post-privatisation	price	hikes	 and	 service	disconnections	 in	Kwagulu-Natal	 in	 South	Africa	 forced	 the	 poorest	 residents	 to	 access	 water	 from	 a	 polluted	 river,	resulting	 in	 a	 cholera	 outbreak	 that	 killed	 hundreds	 and	 infected	 thousands	(Bond,	from	Roberts,	2008).				However,	this	is	not	the	case	everywhere.	Cocq	and	McDonald’s	(2010)	research	into	the	privatisation	of	water	in	Havana,	Cuba,	revealed	that	the	experiences	of	residents	had	been	rather	positive.	Although	initial	questions	were	raised	as	to	why	a	country	with	such	a	strong	commitment	to	socialism	would	adopt	such	an	inherently	 neoliberal	 framework	 for	 water	 provision,	 Cocq	 and	 McDonald	concluded	 that	 in	 this	 instance,	 water	 privatisation	 in	 Havana	 had	 been	successful,	as	the	state	made	a	point	of	creating	a	close	working	relationship	with	the	 private	 company	 involved,	 leading	 to	 a	 strong	 regulatory	 capacity	 and	assurance	 that	 the	 affected	 population	 were	 receiving	 an	 adequate	 supply	 of	water.	 As	 the	 Cuban	 state	 had	 worked	 with	 the	 private	 company	 in	 question	
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previously,	this	allowed	for	a	fluid,	co-operative	contract	to	be	drawn	up	without	rigid	 parameters.	 Conversely,	 Cocq	 and	McDonald	 (2010:10)	 describe	 Cuba	 as	still	 “essentially	 a	 socialist	 state”	 which	 may	 indicate	 why	 the	 state	 has	 an	atypical	involvement	in	the	work	of	the	private	company,	and	explains	why	this	example	could	be	considered	somewhat	of	an	anomaly.	The	success	 is	perhaps	also	 attributed	 to	 the	 way	 the	 private	 company	 marketed	 itself	 to	 the	 Cuban	state;	by	highlighting	that	it	had	knowledge	of	water	provision	that	the	state	did	not	possess.	Furthermore,	whilst	private	contractors	have	been	critiqued	for	not	venturing	 into	 areas	 that	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 lucrative	 business	 ventures	 for	them	(Budds	and	McGranahan,	2003),	it	appears	that	in	this	instance	the	private	company	did	take	a	financial	risk	where	other	companies	would	not.	However,	it	must	 be	 considered	 as	 to	 whether	 a	 similar	 situation	 would	 occur	 in	 a	 fully	marketised	economy,	so	the	context	of	this	privatisation	‘success’	must	be	noted.	Indeed,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 if	 private	 actors	 are	 able	 to	 offer	 expertise	that	could	genuinely	benefit	an	area’s	water	provision	then	they	may	be	the	most	beneficial	option	for	residents	living	there.			Bayliss	 (2003)	 discusses	 the	 mixed	 experiences	 of	 water	 privatisation	 across	Africa,	 concluding	 that	 the	 successes	 or	 failures	 of	 individual	 privatisation	strategies	in	many	instances	reflect	the	broader	economic	climate	of	the	country	itself.	Guinea’s	water	sector	was	facing	significant	difficulty	before	privatisation,	which	undoubtedly	inhibited	its	success.	Conversely,	Gabon	and	Senegal’s	water	systems	were	performing	well	when	 they	became	privatised,	 yet	 this	 indicates	how	 the	 international	 financial	 institutions	 were	 using	 privatisation	 to	 exert	influence	as	opposed	to	a	solution	to	those	unable	to	provide	their	populations	with	water.			Indeed,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 consider	 the	 specific	 experiences	 of	 successful	 or	unsuccessful	 water	 privatisation	 without	 considering	 the	 Cochabamba	 Water	War	 in	 Bolivia.	 Latin	 America	 privatised	 water	 and	 sanitation	 more	 than	anywhere	 else	 in	 the	 world	 (Budds	 and	 McGranahan,	 2003),	 and	 although	initially	 described	 as	 a	 “star	 reformer”	 that	 implemented	 some	 of	 the	 most	significant	 structural	 adjustment	on	 the	 continent	 (Spronk,	2007:9)	by	 the	 late	
	 48	
1990s,	widespread	opposition	to	neoliberalism	on	the	whole	in	Bolivia	was	a	key	aspect	 of	 the	Bolivian	people	 overthrowing	 the	 private	 contractor	 there	 (Kohl,	2006).	 One	 of	 the	 central	 facets	 of	 the	 privatisation	 of	 Bolivia’s	 water	 that	sparked	 unrest	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 community	 based	 water	 that	 had	 been	implemented	and	 funded	by	 the	 communities	 themselves	was	 taken	under	 the	remit	 of	 the	 private	 contractor	 and	 thus	 taken	 away	 from	 the	 communities’	ownership	 (Spronk,	 2007).	 Acting	 as	 a	 wholesale	 marketisation	 of	 a	 natural	resource,	and	those	who	had	worked	within	the	“structures	provided”	(Yeboah,	2006:61)	 had	 instead	 become	 very	 much	 a	 part	 of	 the	 hegemonic	 neoliberal	structure,	 and	 residents	 began	 to	 be	 charged	 for	 water	 from	 their	 own	 wells	(Spronk,	2007).		This	was	an	explicit	and	unjust	removal	of	power	by	the	private	company,	 and	 coupled	with	 tariff	 increases	 of	 200%	 (Budds	 and	McGranahan,	2003)	led	to	the	street	protests	that	began	in	April	2000.		However,	the	resistance	by	the	Bolivian	people	against	the	private	company	was	not	 fully	 successful.	 In	 2006,	 six	 years	 after	 the	 ‘Water	War’,	 connection	 rates	were	less	than	50%	(Bakker,	2010).	Returning	control	of	the	water	sector	to	the	state	 resulted	 in	 the	 debts	 that	 were	 previously	 wiped	 out	 by	 the	 private	company	 being	 returned	 to	 the	 Bolivian	 government	 (Spronk,	 2007)	 and	 an	explicit	 divide	 between	 those	 living	 in	 wealthy	 areas	 who	 are	 provided	 with	subsidised	water	and	those	living	in	lower	income	areas	who	must	come	up	with	both	labour	and	financial	resources	in	order	to	access	water.			Whilst	 anti-privatisation	 activists	 herald	 the	 Bolivian	 Water	 War	 as	 a	 key	example	of	how	community	can	triumph	over	private	power	(Bakker,	2010),	this	line	of	thought	fails	to	consider	the	elements	of	private	provision	that	caused	the	unrest	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Although	 indeed,	 community	 water	 sources	 were	transferred	to	the	control	of	a	private	company,	there	does	not	appear	to	be	an	indication	that	this	situation	has	been	rectified,	or	that	those	outwith	the	remit	of	the	municipal	water	 system	have	been	accounted	 for.	The	market	mechanisms	prevalent	as	a	result	of	neoliberal	discourse	still	appear	to	perpetuate	in	Bolivia,	which	 community	 resistance	 was	 unable	 to	 fully	 defeat.	 In	 a	 situation	 where	water	provision	has	been	 transferred	back	 to	centralised	state	control,	 it	 could	
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be	argued	that	this	is	no	better	an	alternative	than	placing	water	provision	under	the	 role	 of	 a	 private	 company.	 Conversely,	 recent	 debates	 on	 the	remunicipalisation	of	water	has	examined	the	ability	of	municipal	organisations	in	water	provision	 in	response	to	 failed	attempts	at	privatisation.	Described	by	McDonald	 (2012)	 as	 the	 transfer	 of	 ownership	 of	 water	 resources	 from	 the	private	sector	to	municipal	institutions,	Hoedeman	et	al	(2012)	argue	that	recent	successes	of	remunicipalisation	across	the	globe	can	be	attributed	to	more	than	just	a	transfer	from	private	to	public	provision,	but	additionally	a	renewed	form	of	water	governance	that	includes	increased	transparency	and	accountability.	It	could	 be	 suggested	 that	 improvements	 to	 water	 provision	 are	 not	 simply	 a	dichotomised	argument	for	market-led	or	state-led	provision,	but	in	fact	call	for	a	 complete	 reconceptualization	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 water	 is	 managed	 and	provided,	in	alignment	with	contemporary	understandings	and	requirements	of	the	resource.			
2.6	The	 ‘other’	private	sector	–	 informal	markets	and	their	 importance	 in	
the	Global	South		There	 is	 a	danger	 that	discussing	private	 sector	water	provision	 indicates	 that	this	 is	only	 in	reference	 to	global	water	companies	 taking	over	a	water	system	previously	 under	 the	 control	 of	 a	 nation-state,	 and	 ignores	 the	 complexity	 of	water	 governance	 in	 the	 developing	 world	 and	 the	 multiple	 ways	 in	 which	people	access	water	(Bakker,	2010)	(Budds	and	McGranahan,	2003).	However,	in	the	Global	South,	where	cities	are	rapidly	expanding	and	the	infrastructure	of	the	municipal	 water	 system	 often	 does	 not	 serve	 unplanned	 or	 peri-urban	settlements,	residents	have	to	look	to	alternative	means	in	order	to	access	water.	Thus,	by	considering	 the	 ‘other’	private	sector	(Kjellen,	2000)	(Solo,	1999),	 the	messy	and	complex	system	of	water	governance	and	informal	provision	must	be	discussed.			In	a	number	of	countries	 in	the	Global	South,	small-scale	provision	of	water	by	informal	 sources	 such	 as	 water	 vendors,	 tanker	 trucks	 and	 selling	 between	neighbours	 has	 long	 been	 established	 (Agyeman,	 2007).	 Spronk	 (2007)	 notes	
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that	there	used	to	be	a	general	belief	that	this	sector	would	eventually	disappear	as	 countries	 became	 more	 economically	 developed,	 but	 the	 sector	 has	 since	gained	 legitimacy,	 now	 growing	 faster	 than	 the	 ‘official’	 provider	 in	 Asia	 and	Latin	 America	 (Solo,	 1999).	 As	 an	 informal	 response	 to	 the	 ‘formal’	 service	vacuum	(Kjellen,	2000)	existing	outwith	the	framework	of	structural	adjustment	and	other	policies	driven	by	the	international	financial	institutions,	the	flexibility	of	these	providers	has	been	a	necessary	component	of	many	residents’	means	of	accessing	water.	These	small-scale	providers	are	lauded	for	a	number	of	reasons;	they	require	no	external	funding,	are	financially	sustainable	and	are	not	biased	in	terms	of	income	levels	or	legality	of	tenure	when	providing	to	customers	(Solo,	1999).	Additionally,	although	not	generally	viewed	as	an	‘official’	provider,	they	align	with	the	growing	neoliberal	discourse	of	water	as	an	economic	good	as	they	do	not	waste	water	(Solo,	1999)	and	treat	it	as	a	product	to	be	bought	and	sold	on	for	a	profit.			The	ways	in	which	these	small-scale	providers	have	managed	to	provide	a	means	of	 access	 to	water	 for	unserved	areas	 is	 a	 clear	 example	of	 seeking	alternative	means	 of	 survival	 under	 the	 hegemony	 of	 neoliberal	 governance.	 As	 noted	 by	Yeboah	 (2006:61),	 with	 reference	 to	 research	 in	 Ghana,	 residents	 “operated	within	 the	 structures	 provided	 to	 come	 up	 with	 solutions	 to	 [their]	 water	problems”.	These	providers	work	within	the	(market)	system	to	provide	and	sell	water	to	those	who	do	not	have	a	connection	to	the	main	water	system.	As	the	reasons	that	people	are	not	connected	to	the	system	are	due	to	a	lack	of	coverage	in	their	area,	or	that	the	household	cannot	afford	the	exorbitant	costs	to	install	a	connection,	these	small-scale	providers	are	attempting	to	provide	water	to	those	without.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 market-led	 thinking	 is	 evident	 here,	 as	these	small-scale	providers	also	make	a	profit	from	their	services.			The	 issues	 of	 pricing	 and	 profit	 made	 by	 these	 small-scale	 providers	 are	nonetheless	contentious.	Mashauri	and	Katko	(from	Kjellen,	2000)	critique	these	informal	 sellers	 for	 their	 high	 prices,	 arguing	 that	 the	 costs	 that	 they	 amass	whilst	collecting	the	water	are	minimal	compared	to	the	prices	that	they	charge.	However,	 Solo	 (1999)	 noted	 that	 in	 the	 developing	 world	 informal	 water	
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providers	determine	their	prices	depending	on	the	distance	that	they	travel	and	the	number	of	alternative	sources	available,	whilst	Kjellen’s	(2000)	research	into	informal	water	provision	 in	Dar	es	Salaam	described	the	physical	exertion	that	this	group	must	do	in	order	to	transport	water,	and	that	it	is	a	means	of	income	for	many	young	men.	These	aspects	provide	a	partial	explanation	for	the	logic	of	pricing	by	small-scale	providers,	although	does	not	excuse	the	fact	that	they	are	often	much	higher	than	the	municipal	system.	Conversely,	although	arguably	the	intention	 for	neoliberal	critics	would	be	 to	provide	a	 lower	price	 for	 the	water	provided	 to	 the	working	 classes,	 the	 complexity	 of	water	 governance	 in	many	Global	South	contexts	means	that	it	is	often	the	working	classes	selling	the	water	also	 (Spronk,	 2007).	 Lowering	 prices	would	 result	 in	 lower	 incomes	 for	 these	individuals,	 indicating	 how	 the	 neoliberalisation	 of	 water	 is	 more	 than	 an	increase	 in	 privately	 owned	 providers,	 but	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 market	 that	 exist	within	these	networks.	As	noted	by	Swyngedouw;		 “Supplying	 water	 therefore	 becomes	 a	 means	 to	 achieve	 economic	objectives:	capital	accumulation	and	profit	maximisation.”	(Swyngedouw,	2005:93)		Water	 risks	 losing	 its	 social	 or	 cultural	 meaning,	 or	 as	 noted	 previously,	 any	environmental	 value	 when	 continually	 valued	 as	 an	 economic	 good.	 The	introduction	 of	 market	 logic	 into	 providing	 a	 vital	 resource	 has	 undermined	previous	 cultural	 understandings	 of	 it,	 resulting	 in	 a	 capitalist	 agenda	 always	taking	priority.	Bakker	(2002)	refers	 to	 this	as	“mercantilización”,	whereby	the	change	in	neoliberalised	water	governance	is	not	an	abrupt	change	from	public	to	 private	 control,	 but	 instead	 what	 Bakker	 describes	 as	 “an	 organisational	and/or	 institutional	 shift	 along	 a	 continuum	 or	 water-management	 options	towards	 the	 market	 and	 private	 corporations	 and	 away	 from	 the	 state”	(Bakker:2002:769)		High	 prices	 could	 be	 considered	 additionally	 problematic	 as	 often	 these	providers	 are	 selling	 water	 to	 those	 who	 live	 in	 low	 income	 areas	 and	subsequently	are	the	ones	facing	the	highest	prices.	Smets	(from	Prasad,	2006)	
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states	 that	 in	 Mexico,	 the	 upper	 classes	 pay	 0.8%	 of	 their	 income	 for	 water	whereas	 the	 poorest	 pay	 5.2%.	 Furthermore,	 Kjellen	 (2000)	 found	 that	 in	Tanzania,	households	resold	water	for	more	than	four	times	what	the	municipal	system	 charged.	 This	 aligns	 with	 what	 Dill	 (2009)	 notes	 is	 a	 choice	 between	having	 expensive	 water	 or	 no	 water	 at	 all,	 and	 questions	 the	 impact	 of	 this	supposed	resistance	to	neoliberalism	if	those	living	marginally	within	a	market-led	 system	 are	 still	 paying	 exorbitant	 prices	 as	 a	means	 of	 survival.	 Friedrich	Engel’s	nineteenth	century	commentary	that	“water	pipes	are	laid	where	people	can	pay	for	the	service”	(Swyngedouw,	2005:84)	shows	how	history	is	repeating	itself	and	that	the	same	sections	of	society	remain	a	priority	when	implementing	a	municipal	water	system.			The	 fact	 that	 residents	 in	 lower-income	areas	 are	willing	 to	pay	high	prices	 to	access	water	has	led	to	the	belief	by	some	scholars	that	if	a	service	is	provided,	residents	are	willing	to	pay	for	it	irrespective	of	price.	(Bayliss,	2003;	Budds	and	McGranahan,	 2003).	 This	 type	 of	 research	 can	 be	 incredibly	 problematic	however,	 as	 it	 implies	 that	 these	 groups	 have	 a	 choice,	 and	 that	 there	 are	 not	wider,	economic	processes	 involved	also.	Another	critique	 that	 can	be	made	of	this	body	of	 literature	 is	 that,	once	again	 returning	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	private	sector	 can	 extend	 provision	 to	 the	 previously	 “untapped	 market”	 (Budds	 and	McGranahan,	2003)	 that	a	 state-owned	water	system	did	not	provide	coverage	for,	seeing	these	residents	as	a	group	of	potential	consumers	ignores	the	myriad	difficulties	 faced	 living	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	 Whilst	 residents	 may	 in	 some	instances	be	able	to	afford	expensive	water	(provided	to	their	door	by	a	vendor,	for	example),	this	does	not	mean	that	this	does	not	take	funding	away	from	other	expenditures	such	as	healthcare,	 transport	or	education,	or	 that	 this	amount	of	money	spend	on	water	is	a	regular	occurrence.			As	 small	 scale	 and	 informal	 providers	 of	 water	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 gain	increasing	 prominence	 in	 local	 water	 governance,	 their	 future	 role	 in	 water	access	must	 be	 considered.	To	 return	 to	 ideas	 of	water	provision	 existing	 as	 a	monopoly,	 there	are	generally	restrictions	on	entering	the	sector,	which	means	that	these	providers	are	often	considered	illegal	(Solo,	1999).	Furthermore,	 the	
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flexibility	 of	 these	 providers	 means	 that	 even	 if	 they	 are	 operating	 within	 a	supposed	‘monopoly’,	they	can	introduce	competition	into	the	market	in	terms	of	price	and	quality	(Ahlers	et	al,	2013).	Spronk	(2007)	noted	that	those	within	the	informal	economy	are	extremely	vulnerable	workers	with	no	contract	or	welfare	provision.	As	a	means	to	combat	this	there	have	been	discussions	over	whether	formalising	 these	 small-scale	 providers	 would	 help	 alleviate	 these	 issues.	Aligning	with	pro-formalisation	arguments	of	Hernando	de	Soto	and	once	again,	a	discourse	propagated	by	the	World	Bank	(Ahlers	et	al,	2010),	there	is	the	belief	that	formalisation	will	not	only	protect	those	employed	informally	but	improve	regulation	also	(Matsinhe	et	al,	2008).			However,	 there	 are	 also	 social	 impacts	 related	 to	 formalisation,	 in	 a	 context	where	residents	have	been	continually	disappointed	by	 formal	water	provision	and	 do	 not	 have	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 trust	 in	 it.	 Ruano	 et	 al	 (2011)	 noted	 that	 in	Guatemala,	 once	 an	 informal	 community	 based	 water	 group	 became	 legally	recognised	by	the	state	the	community	lost	trust	in	it,	believing	their	practices	to	reflect	 the	 supposed	 issues	 of	 corruption	 synonymous	 with	 state	 provision.	There	 is	 a	 possibility	 that	 residents	 choose	 informal	 sources	 of	 water	 simply	because	 they	 know	 that	 they	 are	 separate	 from	 the	 official	 provider,	 and	 the	formalisation	of	small-scale	providers	could	potentially	alter	the	choreographies	of	 water	 governance	 significantly.	 Whilst	 Matsinhe	 et	 al	 (2008)	 believe	 that	formalisation	 of	 these	 groups	 is	 necessary,	 there	 is	 the	 risk	 that	 the	 flexibility	and	autonomy	over	their	own	prices	will	be	removed	if	they	become	part	of	the	‘official’	 system	 of	 water	 provision.	 These	 types	 of	 water	 provision	 would	 no	longer	act	as	a	form	of	resilience5	within	the	broader	economic	climate,	and	will	simply	transfer	their	power	back	to	the	private	company	or	state	involved	in	the	main	water	system.			The	complex	ways	 in	which	people	access	water	 in	 the	developing	world	align	with	the	idea	that	governance	extends	beyond	just	state	provision	and	involves	a	multitude	of	stakeholders.	It	is	necessary	to	be	cautious	of	attributing	this	wholly																																																									5	Using	Katz’s	categories	of	resistance,	reworking	and	resilience,	whereby	resilience	is	a	means	of	survival	by	individuals	or	groups	that	does	not	significantly	alter	the	broader	environment	that	these	individuals	or	groups	are	living	in	(Katz,	2004).	
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to	 the	growth	of	neoliberalism	as	 the	 infrastructure	used	 to	provide	water	had	not	 kept	 up	 with	 population	 growth	 before	 the	 introduction	 of	 structural	adjustment,	 privatisation	 and	 deregulation,	 and	 thus	 methods	 of	 informal	provision	must	 have	 been	 called	 upon	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years	 previous	 to	 this	market-led	 paradigm	 shift.	 Nonetheless,	 Graham	 and	 Marvin	 (from	 Bakker,	2010)	 directly	 attribute	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 utility	 provision	 to	 economic	projects	 (such	 as	 neoliberalism)	 changing	 the	 way	 cities	 in	 particular	 are	governed	and	how	services	are	provided.	They	especially	note	 that	 as	national	debt	increases,	states	are	unable	to	extend	service	provision,	which	is	perhaps	an	indication	 of	 why	 these	 informal	 methods	 of	 provision	 continue	 to	 grow	 and	water	governance	becomes	increasingly	complex.			The	 aforementioned	 discussion	 surrounding	 ideas	 of	 self-governance	 become	relevant	 once	 again	 here,	 as	 there	 is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 an	 individual	 or	community’s	 access	 is	 largely	 based	 upon	 their	 personal	 ability	 to	 source	 a	means	to	acquire	water,	and	to	raise	the	personal	capital	to	be	able	to	afford	it.	The	distinction	between	providing	governance	and	being	governed	(Ong,	2006)	(Isin,	 from	 Phillips	 and	 Ilcan,	 2011)	 becomes	 blurred	 in	 a	 situation	 where	residents	 must	 draw	 upon	 their	 individual	 or	 community	 capacity	 to	 access	water,	 yet	nonetheless	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 infrastructure	 and	distribution	of	 the	local	 municipal	 system,	 and	 in	 a	 more	 abstract	 sense,	 the	 fluctuations	 of	 the	market.	Ong’s	definition	of	“neoliberalism	with	a	small	 ‘n’”	(2007:4)	as	a	means	of	governing	supposed	“free	subjects”	shows	how	neoliberalism	is	able	to	exert	influence	 over	 those	 who	 believe	 they	 are	 acting	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 own	agency.	Neoliberalised	water	has	created	messy	and	complex	hybrid	systems	of	governance	across	a	number	of	different	contexts,	as	a	product	of	specific	social	and	historical	trajectories.	Acknowledging	this,	and	neoliberalism’s	more	general	abilities	at	mutating	to	suit	specific	discourses,	the	impact	of	the	marketisation	of	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania	will	be	discussed	in	this	thesis.				
2.7	Conceptions	of	crisis;	economic	crisis,	the	global	water	crisis,	narratives	
and	realities		
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The	 origins	 and	 history	 of	 neoliberalism	 have	 been	 explored	 in	 depth	 in	 this	chapter,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 mutations	 over	 time	 and	 to	 fit	 specific	 geographical	contexts.	 More	 recent	 literature	 has	 questioned	 the	 future	 of	 neoliberalism	 in	light	of	a	global	recession	and	the	volatility	of	a	free-market	society	having	been	exposed;		 “While	 previous	 crises	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 era,	 such	 as	 the	 wave	 of	 debt	defaults	across	Latin	America	and	the	Asian	financial	collapse,	may	have	been	 (problematically)	 “managed”	 by	 way	 of	 a	 series	 of	 midcourse	adjustments	in	neoliberal	governance,	discourse,	and	strategy,	the	current	crisis	 threatens,	perhaps	 fatally,	 to	undermine	 the	political	 legitimacy	of	neoliberalism”	(Peck	et	al,	2009:95)		However,	 it	 is	 unclear	 from	 Peck	 et	 al’s	 (2009)	 argument	where	 the	 future	 of	neoliberalism	in	an	African	and	in	particular	a	Tanzanian	context,	lies,	and	if	the	idea	 of	 the	 economic	 ideology	 in	 crisis	 is	 as	 evident	 within	 this	 locale.	Investigation	 into	water	 poverty	 or	 issues	 in	water	 governance	 and	 the	Global	South	 immediately	becomes	embroiled	 in	discussions	of	 a	 “global	water	 crisis”	(Mosse,	 2008a:939)	 to	 describe	 those	without	 potable	water	 across	 the	 globe.	However,	 it	 must	 be	 called	 into	 question	 what	 these	 supposed	 definitions	 of	‘crisis’	mean.	Whilst	Peck	et	al	(2009)	describe	the	last	three	moments	of	‘crisis’	for	 neoliberalism	 as	 predicted,	 the	 global	 water	 ‘crisis’	 is	 instead	 generally	referred	to	as	an	endemic	problem	that	requires	urgent	attention,	and	in	the	case	of	 development	 organisations,	 immediate	 financial	 support.	 Henrik	 Vigh	provides	 an	 alternative	 understanding	 of	 crisis,	 problematising	 its	 definitions	and	use	in	contemporary	discourse;		 “When	we	look	a	bit	closer	into	the	phenomenon	of	crisis	it	becomes	clear	that	conflict,	violence,	and	abject	poverty	can	become	so	embedded	in	the	social	 fabric	 that	 they	 become	 indistinguishable	 from	 it	 (Das,	 2006:80)	making	crisis	chronic	and	forcing	people	to	make	lives	in	fragmented	and	volatile	 worlds	 rather	 than	 waiting	 for	 normalisation	 and	reconfiguration.”	(Vigh,	2008:8)	 	
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	Peck	et	al’s	(2009)	discussions	of	neoliberalism	align	with	this,	as	they	question	how	such	a	dominant	economic	system	can	be	truly	considered	in	crisis,	as	it	is	so	 firmly	 embedded	 in	 the	 global	 financial	 structure.	 Additionally,	 the	 issues	faced	 in	 accessing	water	 services	 in	 Tanzania	 act	 as	 a	 clear	 example	 of	 Vigh’s	understanding	 of	 crisis.	 The	 growing	 informal	 sector	 in	 Tanzania,	 and	 other	Global	South	countries,	indicates	how	residents	have	been	“forced	to	make	lives”	in	a	situation	where	potable	water	is	not	readily	available.	Kjellen’s	(2000:145)	research	 into	water	 vendors	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 concluded	 that	 “the	 reliance	 on	vendors	can	also	be	a	sign	of	relative	deprivation	and	exclusion	 from	the	often	higher	 quality	 piped-supply	 systems”.	 	 The	 increasing	 legitimacy	 of	 this	 sector	and	the	intentions	of	governments	to	bring	this	into	formal	policy	also	dismantle	understandings	of	normality,	when	 it	 could	be	argued	 that	a	 response	 to	 crisis	has	become	an	embedded	practice.				However,	 ideas	 of	 a	 ‘crisis	 moment’	 (Peck	 et	 al,	 2009)	 become	 inappropriate	when	 a	 crisis	 has	 become	 part	 of	 a	 social	 structure,	 and	 is	 so	 endemic	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 separate	 from	 a	 ‘pre-crisis’	 state.	 In	 Tanzania,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	definable	moment	where	the	population	had	a	plentiful	amount	of	potable	water,	explaining	 the	 need	 for	 Vigh’s	 (2006a)	 definition	 of	 “crisis	 as	 context”.	Furthermore,	Vigh	raises	an	interesting	point	about	cultural	nuances	and	related	conceptions	of	crisis;			 “For	 most	 of	 us	 crisis	 is	 an	 experience	 of	 temporary	 abnormality	primarily	 related	 to	 traumatic	 events	 such	 as	 violence,	 disease	 or	bereavement.	We	experience	crisis	when	a	traumatic	event	fragments	the	coherence	 or	 unity	 of	 our	 lives,	 which	 we	 otherwise	 take	 for	 granted,	leaving	us	to	reconfigure	the	pieces	before	we	normalise	our	social	being	and	once	again	go	about	our	lives.”	(Vigh,	2008:7)		Whether	 intentionally	or	not,	Vigh’s	use	of	 ‘we’	 indicates	a	knowledge	situated	within	 Global	 North	 discourse,	 reinforcing	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 to	 indicate	 a	‘moment’	(Peck	et	al,	2009)	of	unrest.	Aforementioned	discussions	of	embedded	
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crisis	situations	do	not	fit	this	model	however,	and	it	can	be	called	into	question	how	useful	this	terminology	is	when	used	in	Global	South	contexts.			Huitema	 et	 al	 (2011)	 deconstruct	 ideas	 of	 a	 crisis	 related	 to	water,	 explaining	that	governance	responses	to	a	flood	or	other	natural	disaster	cannot	be	placed	in	the	same	category	as	those	to	an	economic	or	financial	crisis.	They	argue	that	crisis	can	be	exploited	to	issue	governance	transitions,	particularly	those	related	to	neoliberal	 values	 such	 as	 the	privatisation	of	 state	 assets.	 Peck	 et	 al	 (2009)	correctly	 notes	 that	 neoliberalism	 requires	 crisis	 to	 survive,	 as	 at	 times	 of	financial	or	economic	crisis	global	financial	institutions	are	able	to	capitalise	on	this	by	insisting	that	affected	countries	adopt	their	policy	frameworks	(Huitema	et	al,	2011).	This	offers	an	opportunity	 for	a	 “parallax	movement”	 (Zizek,	 from	Ioris,	2012)	of	policy	to	take	place	whereby	it	is	continually	updated	to	improve	upon	 the	 previous	 document	 without	 any	 significant	 change.	 Governance-through-crisis	 creates	 an	 environment	 where	 piecemeal	 changes	 in	 policy	 are	welcomed,	with	no	measurable	results	occurring.			The	 previously	 held	 belief	 that	 the	 informal	 water	 sector	 would	 eventually	disappear	 (Spronk,	 2007)	 indicates	 that	 it	 was	 viewed	 as	 a	 means	 of	 crisis	response,	as	a	short	term	coping	mechanism	until	Global	South	countries	caught	up	 and	 developed	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 allowed	 them	 to	 extend	 the	 coverage	 of	municipal	systems.	However,	the	continuing	growth	of	informal	water	provision	can	 allow	 two	 alternative	 conclusions	 to	 be	 drawn;	 firstly,	 that	 crisis	 has	worsened,	putting	more	residents	into	the	situation	where	they	must	self-govern	and	 adapt	 their	 own	 behaviour	 to	 access	 water,	 or	 secondly,	 that	 informal,	flexible	and	localised	means	of	water	provision	suit	the	needs	of	those	living	in	the	 Global	 South	 best,	 and	 that	 a	 consistent	 mandate	 from	 global	 financial	institutions	 to	 extend	 the	 monopoly	 provision	 of	 a	 centralised	 system	 is	 not	appropriate	 for	 these	 specific	 social	 and	 cultural	 contexts.	 Willingness-to-pay	literature	provides	some	level	of	justification	for	high	prices	faced	by	residents,	and	 ignores	 larger	budgetary	 issues	 faced	within	households,	whilst	neoliberal	discourse	 views	 citizens-as-customers,	 detracting	 from	 humanitarian	 concerns	
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about	 water	 access	 to	 simply	 viewing	 the	 provision	 of	 water	 as	 a	 business	transaction.				Ioris	states	that;		 “The	 water	 sector	 has	 become	 entrapped	 in	 a	 vicious	 circle	 or	 social	exclusion,	passive	governmental	responses	and	fresh	opportunities	 for	a	new	round	of	demagogy	and	populism.”	(Ioris,	2012:276)		Arguably,	 it	 could	 be	 suggested	 that	 ideas	 of	 a	water	 crisis	 have	 been	 used	 in	Global	North	 rhetoric	 to	 justify	 the	pressure	placed	on	developing	countries	 to	privatise	 state	 assets,	when	 in	 reality	 systems	 that	have	been	generated	at	 the	grassroots	level	are	materialising	as	the	most	successful.	Crucially,	this	argument	does	not	intend	to	be	reductive	of	the	struggles	faced	by	Global	South	residents	in	both	acquiring	and	affording	potable	water,	but	wishes	to	elucidate	that	Global	North	 based	 conceptions	 of	 crisis	 and	 subsequent	 responses	 are	 perhaps	 not	always	appropriate.			
2.8	Conclusion		Whether	 neoliberalism	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 theoretical	 concept	 or	 a	 political	project	 to	 reconfigure	 power,	 markets	 and	 governance	 (Harvey,	 2005),	 it	 is	important	 to	 continue	 to	 be	 critical	 of	 how	 these	 ideas	 materialise	 in	 many	different	 cultures;	 of	 which	 a	 specific	 attention	 to	 the	 Global	 South	 has	 been	discussed	here.	It	 is	 important	to	consider	Peck’s	(2010:7)	continued	argument	that	“neoliberalism	has	only	ever	existed	in	‘impure’	form”,	and	that	there	is	no	clear-cut	 example	 of	 this	 global	 economic	 framework.	 As	 such,	 analysis	 of	 its	manifestations	must	consider	its	mutating	forms	and	the	adaptable	nature	of	this	ideology.	Considering	both	‘official’	private	provision	and	more	informal	types	of	private	provision	has	provided	a	useful	framework	in	which	to	view	the	impacts	of	neoliberalism	on	water	governance	 in	 the	Global	South.	Nonetheless,	 simply	explaining	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 water	 is	 accessed	 in	 these	 areas	 neglects	 to	
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consider	the	issues	faced	by	those	living	in	lower-income,	unserviced	areas	who	perhaps	cannot	afford	the	water	that	is	essential	for	their	survival.		To	 return	 to	 the	 ideas	 of	 Duménil	 and	 Lévy	 (2005)	 and	 Harvey	 (2005),	 that	neoliberalism	 was	 simply	 a	 transfer	 of	 power	 from	 the	 middle	 and	 working	classes	to	the	elites,	 there	are	clear	parallels	between	these	 ideas	and	the	 lived	experiences	of	 those	trying	to	access	water	 in	the	developing	world.	The	 lower	classes	have	been	left	powerless	by	the	transfer	of	water	to	the	private	sector.	In	Bolivia,	 community-owned	water	 pumps	were	 placed	 under	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	the	private	provider.	 In	 the	Global	South,	 the	 lower	classes	can	often	pay	up	to	thirty	five	times	what	the	wealthy	pay	(Solo,	1999).	Admittedly,	states	have	been	unable	to	keep	up	with	growing	populations	and	rapidly	expanding	cities,	but	it	could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 international	 financial	 institutions	 capitalised	 on	 this	and	 forced	 them	to	privatise	 their	assets,	 leaving	 them	without	a	 choice	but	 to	involve	 the	 private	 sector	 in	 their	 water	 provision.	 Cocq	 and	 McDonald	(2010:39)	 rightly	 state	 that	 “water	 reforms	 are	 therefore	 one	 piece	 of	 a	much	larger	 puzzle”	 as	 each	 country’s	 move	 towards	 market-based	 ideals	 is	undoubtedly	 a	 decision	 based	 upon	 broader	 discourses	 imposed	 by	 the	international	financial	institutions.			There	 is	 little	 indication	 that	 support	 for	 private	 sector	 involvement	 in	 water	provision	will	decrease	in	the	immediate	future.	Ahlers	et	al	(2013)	state	that	its	key	advocates	have	yet	to	change	their	stance,	the	only	significant	change	being	that	small-scale	providers	are	now	being	considered	as	 legitimate	as	 the	 larger	institutions	 that	 provide	 water,	 although	 the	 previously	 discussed	 issues	 of	formalisation	 of	 this	 type	 of	 water	 provision	 make	 this	 remain	 a	 contentious	issue.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 privatisation	 has	 not	 been	 a	 panacea	 for	inefficient	water	provision	(Bayliss,	2002),	and	there	 is	a	wealth	of	evidence	to	suggest	 that	 in	 countries	 that	 have	 taken	 part	 in	 a	 neoliberalisation	 of	 their	economies,	most	residents	have	seen	their	standards	of	 living	fall	(Kohl,	2006).	Additionally,	proponents	of	privatisation’s	arguments	are	not	based	on	evidence	from	 the	 water	 and	 sanitation	 sector	 (Budds	 and	McGranahan,	 2003),	 so	 it	 is	
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unclear	as	to	why	private	sector	participation	was	vociferously	advocated	in	so	many	countries.		With	water	being	a	natural	resource	and	part	of	the	physical	environment,	water	governance	 is	 a	 unique	 issue,	 and	 should	 not	 be	 taken	 as	 all-encompassing	 of	neoliberal	 governance	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	 Governance	 failure	 is	 more	 than	simply	a	result	of	economic	relations,	and	can	be	affected	by	ecological	and	social	impacts	 also	 (Bakker,	 2010)	 (Ioris,	 2012).	 As	well	 as	 this,	 there	 are	 numerous	health	implications	involved	in	the	different	sources	of	water	available	(Reweta	and	Sampath,	2000),	so	access	to	water	may	be	affected	by	more	than	just	price	and	 the	 fluctuations	 of	 the	 market.	 Nonetheless,	 water	 governance	 in	 the	developing	world	is	complex	and	ever	changing.	Through	discussions	of	both	the	formal	 and	 informal	 ways	 in	 which	 private	 sector	 participation	 has	 affected	water	governance	an	attempt	has	been	made	to	explain	the	varying	methods	of	provision,	 and	 the	 impacts	 faced	at	 the	grassroots	 level	as	a	potential	 result	of	neoliberal	policy.			The	 effects	 of	 neoliberal	 governance	 in	 terms	 of	 water	 provision	 and	 its	subsequent	 privatisation	 are	 evident.	 Tanzania’s	 move	 to	 privatise	 water	 as	 a	result	 of	 a	World	 Bank	 ultimatum	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	 vicious	 circle	 that	many	countries	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 have	 found	 themselves	 in,	 as	 the	 increasing	influence	of	global	markets	and	the	decision	to	move	power	away	from	the	state	meant	that	in	many	cases	national	governments	were	faced	with	no	option	but	to	privatise	state	assets	in	order	to	survive.	Whilst	examples	such	as	the	resistance	to	water	privatisation	 in	Bolivia	are	not	wholly	positive,	 these	are	examples	of	the	ways	in	which	residents	access	water	in	the	Global	South	that	tell	a	different	story,	 involving	 formal	 provision.	 Taking	 myriad	 definitions	 of	 ‘crisis’	 into	account,	day-to-day	 coping	mechanisms	 that	have	become	embedded	 in	Global	South	discourses	can	partially	be	seen	as	a	response	to	a	crisis	of	a	lack	of	water,	but	in	turn	can	problematise	notions	of	crisis	when	a	response	has	been	in	place	for	some	time.	This	raises	the	question	of	whether	descriptions	of	water	access	in	 the	Global	 South	 truly	 exist	 in	 a	 state	 of	 crisis,	 or	 this	 is	 simply	 a	 construct	used	to	make	sense	of	a	situation	that	rarely	occurs	in	the	Global	North.		
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Chapter	3:	NGOs	and	the	Role	of	Development	Organisations	in	the	Global	
South		
3.1	Introduction		This	 chapter	discusses	 the	 role	of	non-governmental	organisations	 (NGOs)	and	grassroots	 organisations	 in	 the	 current	 development	 framework,	 examining	their	 growth	 and	 transformation	 into	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 Global	 South	governance.	The	post-Cold	War	development	discourse	followed	by	bilateral	and	multilateral	donor	agencies	was	that	of	the	“New	Policy	Agenda”	(Edwards	and	Hulme,	1996:961)	which	placed	 importance	upon	 the	role	of	nongovernmental	organisations	 (NGOs)	 and	 grassroots	 organisations.	 Since	 the	 1980s	 those	referred	 to	 as	 either	 NGOs,	 private	 voluntary	 organisations,	 and	 non-profit	organisations	 (Vakil,	 1997)	 had	 mandates	 which	 were	 described	 as	“nongovernmental	 (private),	 tax-exempt,	 non-profit	 agencies	 engaged	 in	overseas	 provision	 of	 services	 for	 relief	 and	 development	 purposes”	 (Gorman,	from	 Vakil,	 1997:2058).	 Additionally,	 Fisher	 (1997)	 explains	 that	 discussion	around	NGOs	uses	a	number	of	key	terms,	such	as	“participation,	empowerment,	local	and	community”	 (Fisher,	1997:442).	The	size	of	 the	NGO	sector	has	since	expanded	 to	 align	with	neoliberal	 economic	policy	 and	 the	 increase	 in	 funding	available	for	their	activities,	and	they	have	since	been	charged	with	the	tasks	of	“poverty	 alleviation,	 social	 welfare	 and	 the	 development	 of	 civil	 society”	(Edwards	and	Hulme,	1996:961).			In	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 complexity	 of	 contemporary	 water	 governance	 in	Tanzania,	this	chapter	explores	literature	on	participatory	development	and	the	increasingly	 popularity	 of	 NGOs	 in	 service	 provision	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	 As	discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 the	 Post-Washington	 Consensus	 exists	 as	 a	 departure	from	 the	 neoliberal	 derision	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 recognises	 the	 role	 that	governments	 have	 to	 play	 in	 a	 country’s	 economic	 development.	 Thus,	 NGOs	exist	 as	 a	 gap	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	market,	 playing	 a	 pivotal	 role	 in	 the	reconfiguration	 of	 governance	 in	 contemporary	 society	 (Cameron,	 2000).	Through	 examining	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 NGOs	 work	 across	 a	 growing	 suite	 of	
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activities	in	Global	South	regions,	as	well	as	the	challenges	they	face	in	doing	so,	the	 following	 discussion	 aims	 to	 address	 the	 power	 relations	 that	 exist	 in	 this	sector.	The	internal	dynamics	of	these	organisations	will	be	discussed,	as	well	as	how	 different	 organisations	working	 towards	 the	 same	 goals	 interact,	 and	 the	impact	this	has	on	the	local	communities	surrounding	them.	Alongside	this,	the	chapter	considers	the	impacts	of	external	influences	on	the	NGO	sector,	and	the	conflicts	 that	 can	 occur	 as	 a	 result	 of	 local	 needs	 versus	 international	 donor	motivations.	 Taking	 into	 account	 Briggs	 and	 Sharp’s	 (2004:662)	 view	 that	‘’development	experts’	 from	the	West	are	brought	 in	 to	analyse	a	development	problem	 and	 offer	 a	 solution’,	 this	 chapter	 assesses	 the	 impact	 of	 Western	economic	thought	and	development	rhetoric	on	grassroots-based	agendas.			NGOs	can	vary	in	size,	mandate	and	capacity,	and	as	such,	the	term	can	be	used	to	refer	to	a	wide	range	of	organisations.	Cameron	attempted	to	define	NGOs;		 	“The	 NGO	 idealised	 position	 is	 as	 a	 pure	 civil	 society	 institution	negotiating	with	both	market	and	state	agents	to	ensure	the	sustainability	of	 those	 civil	 society	 institutions	 most	 conducive	 to	 increasing	 the	certainty	of	livelihoods	for	the	most	vulnerable.”	(Cameron,	2000:632)		A	 similar	 viewpoint	 will	 be	 used	 in	 reference	 to	 NGOs	 in	 this	 chapter,	 whilst	keeping	in	mind	that	a	variety	of	different	organisations	also	refer	to	themselves	as	NGOs	as	they	oscillate	around	this	fluid	definition.	The	chapter	begins	with	a	brief	discussion	of	the	discourses	that	supported	the	rise	of	NGOs,	including	the	role	 of	 the	 community	 in	 local	 activity	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 participatory	development.	 	 The	 chapter	 continues	 by	 exploring	 some	 of	 the	 key	 terms	discussed	by	Fisher	(1997),	before	detailing	the	historical	trajectory	of	NGOs	and	subsequently,	the	current	challenges	that	they	face.	The	chapter	concludes	with	some	theoretical	examination	of	North-South	development	relationships,	taking	into	account	 the	power	relations	 inherently	related	to	 this	 topic,	before	 linking	the	discussion	in	this	chapter	to	the	concept	of	crisis.			
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3.2	Decentralised	governance,	the	role	of	the	community	and	participatory	
Development		Accompanying	 the	 so-called	 ‘rolling-back’	 of	 the	 state	 that	 has	 occurred	 along	with	 the	 rise	 of	 neoliberalism,	 also	 evident	 is	 the	 increasing	 prevalence	 of	 the	discourse	of	participatory	development.	The	 idea	of	participatory	development	originated	 within	 the	 NGO	 community,	 but	 was	 written	 into	 the	 plans	 of	international	 development	 agencies	 and	 governments	 in	 the	 1990s	 (Williams,	2004).	 Reflecting	 a	 changing	 policy	 discourse,	 the	 belief	 of	 the	 time	 aimed	towards	 destabilising	 hierarchies	 that	 impeded	 development	 and	 transferring	ownership	 of	 projects	 to	 communities	 that	 would	 be	 most	 affected	 by	 them.	Drabek	 (1987),	 referring	 to	 the	 World	 Overseas	 Development	 Institute	Symposium	 in	1986,	notes	how	 the	main	 theme	of	 the	 symposium	called	 for	 a	paradigm	 shift	 in	 relationships	 between	 Northern	 and	 Southern	 NGOs.	 There	was	a	call	 for	more	of	an	equal	partnership	between	these	organisations,	 in	an	attempt	 to	alleviate	previous	 issues	of	dependency	and	 lack	of	 trust.	Combined	with	the	rise	of	the	Post-Washington	Consensus,	the	move	towards	development	that	 originated	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level	 was	 adopted	 fully	 by	 the	 International	Financial	 institutions,	 and	 adapted	 so	 that	 it	 became	 embedded	 within	 their	wider	neoliberal	project	(Townsend	et	al,	2004).			Simply	 put,	 participatory	 development	 means	 involving	 communities	 in	 the	implementation	of	development	projects	that	will	affect	their	local	areas	(Clark,	1995),	allowing	them	to	act	as	 “producers	as	well	as	consumers	of	knowledge”	(Drabek,	 1987:xii).	 Participation	 implies	 the	 idea	 that	 impoverished	communities	can	play	a	role	in	their	own	development	(Wallace,	2004).	The	core	belief	 by	 its	 propagators	 is	 that	 participation	 by	 local	 communities	 increases	transparency	and	accountability	in	the	activity	by	donor	organisations,	as	well	as	empowering	 the	 communities	 and	 individuals	 involved	 (Kang,	 2011).	 In	addition,	 citizenship	 is	 said	 to	 be	 strengthened	 by	 participatory	 methods	 of	development,	 through	 the	expectation	 that	 they	would	 increase	 the	capacity	of	local	 groups	 to	 hold	 the	 state	 accountable	 for	 their	 rights	 as	 citizens	 (Hickey,	2002).			
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	Chambers	 (1994)	 believes	 that	 instead	 of	 top-down	 imposed	 development	projects,	 an	 increased	 level	 of	 participation	 by	 local	 people	 in	 their	 own	development	would	 dismantle	 pre-existing	 power	 structures.	 Endeavouring	 to	dismantle	 hierarchical	 power	 relations	 and	 inclusion	 of	 the	 communities	affected,	Chambers	and	other	supporters	of	participatory	development	believed	that	this	was	the	paradigm	shift	required	for	development	policy.	At	a	basic	level,	participatory	 development	 is	 said	 to	 create	 inclusive	 spaces	 for	 marginalised	groups	 to	 express	 opinions	 and	 to	 have	 more	 influence	 over	 local	 activity	(Cornwall,	 2003).	 Chambers	 (1994)	 describes	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 use	 of	participatory	 research	 methods	 in	 rural	 settings	 (described	 under	 the	 title	 of	Participatory	 Rural	 Appraisal)	 have	 enabled	 rural	 residents	 to	 express	 their	knowledge	of	their	lives	as	well	as	provide	reflective	analysis	of	the	information	they	provide.	Those	who	advocated	participatory	forms	of	development	and	the	empowerment	 of	 communities	 were	 motivated	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 theoretical	reasons.	Through	participatory	diagramming,	mapping	and	modelling,	amongst	other	 methods,	 rural	 residents	 were	 able	 to	 take	 ownership	 of	 the	 research	process	 and	 in	 turn	 provide	 a	 more	 holistic	 and	 rich	 set	 of	 data	 to	 the	researchers	involved.			Williams	describes	the	three	main	critiques	of	this	mindset;		 	“Participatory	 development	 today	 stands	 accused	 of	 three	 interrelated	failings;	 of	 emphasising	 personal	 reform	 over	 political	 struggle,	 of	obscuring	 local	 power	 differences	 by	 uncritically	 celebrating	 ‘the	community’,	 and	 of	 using	 a	 language	 of	 emancipation	 to	 incorporate	marginalised	populations	of	 the	Global	South	within	an	unreconstructed	project	of	capitalist	modernisation”	(Williams,	2004:558)		However,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 literature	 that	 criticises	participation	both	 for	 its	ethos	and	the	ways	 it	 is	 implemented.	Kothari	(2001)	provides	 the	 key	 argument	 that	 by	 bringing	 local	 people	 into	 development	activity	 they	 become	 so	 embedded	 within	 the	 process	 they	 are	 unable	 to	
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objectively	 critique	 the	 unequal	 structures	 that	 in	 many	 cases	 created	 their	problematic	situation	in	the	first	instance.	Despite	this,	some	literature,	such	as	Hickey	 and	 Mohan	 (2004)	 and	 Kesby	 (2005)	 argue	 that,	 for	 all	 its	 issues,	participatory	development	practices	have	provided	a	platform	for	marginalised	groups	to	acquire	knowledge	on	their	rights,	enabling	them	for	future	advocacy	(Walker	et	al,	2007).		As	 noted	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 one	 of	 the	 key	 tenets	 of	 neoliberal	 ideology	 is	 that	 of	decentralised	 governance,	 and	 the	 reification	 of	 community.	 Gibson-Graham	(2006:166)	 commented	 that	 community	 as	 a	 concept	 is	 an	 “unmapped	 and	uncertain	terrain”,	yet	there	is	an	increasing	body	of	literature	that	has	assessed	relationships	 within	 communities	 in	 a	 number	 of	 ways.	 This	 section	 expands	upon	 previous	 discussion	 of	 decentralised	 governance	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	community	 and	 participatory	 development	 in	 contemporary	 development	practice.			The	 emphasis	 on	 the	 community	 within	 the	 development	 sector	 has	 been	critiqued	 by	 Cleaver	 (2001),	 who	 states	 that	 there	 is	 a	 widespread	 belief	amongst	 development	 practitioners	 in	 support	 of	 participatory	 development	that	 communities	 are	 “capable	 of	 anything”	 (Cleaver,	 2001:46),	 which	 is	 often	not	the	case.	Williams	(2004)	expands	on	this,	problematising	the	ways	in	which	communities	in	the	Global	South	are	often	viewed	as	uniform	social	structures	by	the	 development	 sector,	 and	 how	 in	 some	 instances	 the	 development	 sector’s	instance	on	working	with	communities	leads	to	arbitrary	divisions	of	space	that	bear	no	 reflection	on	 the	 lived	 realities	 of	 the	 affected	 individuals.	 In	 addition,	there	 is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 whilst	 participation	 is	 heralded	 for	 its	inclusiveness,	it	can	actually	have	a	detrimental	effect	on	the	gender	relations	in	certain	 locales,	 further	 marginalising	 the	 role	 of	 women	 (Agarwal,	 2001,	Cornwall,	 2003).	 Cornwall	 (2003)	 explains	 that	 many	 participatory	 projects	continue	 to	 support	 the	 status	 quo	 in	 which	 women	 have	 a	 limited	 role	 in	community	 activities,	 and	 it	 is	 only	 the	 voices	 of	 men	 who	 determine	 the	direction	of	community-based	projects.	Agarwal	(2001)	alludes	to	this	using	data	from	 research	 in	 India,	 using	 the	 sample	 of	 community	 forestry	 management	
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where	women	were	generally	not	 represented	at	planning	committees	and	 the	results	 of	 meetings	 not	 passed	 on	 to	 them,	 and	 women	 in	 the	 community	continuing	to	play	an	implementation	role	even	as	part	of	a	participatory	project.			It	 is	 clear	 that	 these	 critiques	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 situation	 in	Tanzania.	Whilst	Tungaraza	 (1993)	 stated	 that	 within	 Tanzania,	 kinship	 and	 social	 networks	within	communities	are	strong,	 it	could	be	argued	that	this	does	not	mean	that	states	 should	 completely	 withdraw	 from	 the	 provision	 of	 services.	 Whilst	established	community	relationships	may	be	evident,	they	often	do	not	possess	the	 capacity	 to	 deal	 with	 issues	 such	 as	 poor	 infrastructure	 or	 electricity	shortages,	 aligning	 with	 Cleaver’s	 (2001)	 point	 about	 the	 misunderstood	capabilities	 of	 communities.	Williams	 (2004)	 also	 importantly	 notes	 that	 with	the	 greater	 involvement	 of	 local	 individuals,	 supposed	 failures	 of	 development	projects	 can	 be	 blamed	 upon	 these	 groups,	 devolving	 responsibility	 from	international	 or	 donor	 organisations.	 Nonetheless,	 with	 the	 increasing	prevalence	of	NGOs	and	subsequently,	the	responsibilities	places	upon	them	by	retreating	 states,	 participatory	 development	 seems	 like	 it	 will	 be	 part	 of	 the	contemporary	 development	 framework	 for	 some	 time.	 With	 this	 devolved	responsibility	 to	 local	 communities	 and	 actors,	 comes	 a	 reconfiguration	 of	governance	 and	 an	 emphasis	 on	what	 can	 be	 achieved	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level	beyond	the	state.	As	such,	this	chapter	goes	on	to	discuss	the	growing	number	of	these	types	of	organisations,	and	the	 impact	 that	 it	has	had	on	governance	and	access	to	services	for	communities	affected.			
3.3	The	rise	of	non-governmental	organisations		The	 ways	 in	 which	 decentralisation	 and	 changing	 social	 relations	 are	 most	evident	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 is	 through	 the	 increasing	 influence	 of	 NGOs.	 Also	generally	 situated	 within	 the	 community,	 NGOs	 align	 with	 the	 ethos	 of	participatory	 development	 by	 avoiding	 hierarchical	 models	 of	 development.	Harvey	(2005:176)	claims	that	by	filling	the	gap	left	by	the	decreasing	influence	of	 the	 state,	 NGOs	 are	 simply	 another	 subtle	 way	 for	 neoliberal	 hegemony	 to	influence	governance,	supporting	the	findings	of	McDonald	(2010)	and	aligning	
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with	Fine’s	(2002)	scepticism	of	how	contemporary	social	relations	in	the	Global	South	are	conceptualised.	Described	by	Smith	(2010)	as	a	way	of	expanding	and	reinforcing	 neoliberal	 ideology,	 many	 of	 the	 arguments	 for	 their	 increasing	prevalence	in	the	developing	world	could	be	seen	as	an	example	of	the	rhetoric	surrounding	 decentralised	 governance	 to	 other,	 sometimes	 locally	 based,	organisations.		The	 role	 of	 NGOs	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 has	 changed	 dramatically	 since	 the	preliminary	 organisations	 of	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s	 (Mawdsley	 et	 al,	 2005).	Beginning	as	small,	almost	radical	organisations,	NGOs	currently	play	a	far	more	significant	 role	 in	 governance	 and	 service	 provision	 in	 the	 developing	 world,	often	working	closely	with	the	state	or	simply	acting	as	a	supplementary	level	of	governance,	filling	the	so-called	gaps	left	by	many	states	in	the	Global	South.	As	such,	as	NGOs	have	grown	both	in	size	and	in	number,	and	as	the	world	becomes	increasingly	 globalised,	 a	 new	 type	 of	 politics	 has	 emerged	 surrounding	 these	organisations,	both	internally	and	amongst	the	groups	that	they	work	with.			The	early	NGOs	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	often	originated	from	social	movements	that	 existed	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 state	 (Mawdsley	 et	 al,	 2005).	 They	 were	fundamentally	 grassroots	 oriented,	 and	 any	 relationship	 they	 had	 with	 their	Northern	 counterparts	 was	 “highly	 personal	 in	 nature”	 (Mawdsley	 et	 al,	2005:77).	As	a	 result	of	 this,	NGOs	have	often	been	 “idealised	as	organisations	through	 which	 people	 help	 others	 for	 reasons	 other	 than	 profit	 or	 politics”	(Fisher,	 1997:442),	 and	 are	 seen	 as	 organisations	 entirely	 separate	 from	 the	state.	 However,	 during	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 when	 neoliberalism	 was	 gaining	increasing	economic	prominence,	donors	significantly	increased	funding	to	third	sector	organisations,	dramatically	increasing	the	number	of	these	organisations	in	 existence,	 and	 expanding	 their	 remits	 to	 service	 provision,	 advocacy	 and	examination	 of	 policy	 (Mawdsley	 et	 al,	 2005)	 (Kang,	 2010).	 As	 a	 result,	 those	such	as	Tvedt	(from	Mawdsley	et	al,	2005)	and	Wallace	(2004)	believe	that	this	eroded	the	autonomy	once	held	by	NGOs,	and	instead	made	them	merely	another	agent	 in	the	broader	neoliberal	project.	 International	donor	agencies	and	NGOs	began	 to	 provide	 support	 to	 local	 NGOs	 for	 their	 pursuit	 of	 the	 New	 Policy	
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Agenda;	a	suite	of	policies	largely	based	on	neoliberal	values	(Fisher,	1997).	The	New	Policy	Agenda	indicated	that	NGOs	are	the	best	means	to	provide	services	instead	of	the	state.			As	a	way	to	empower	and	 increase	accountability	and	participation,	 the	theory	behind	 NGOs	 is	 that	 they	 would	 overcome	 previous	 failures	 in	 development	policy.	However,	the	word	‘theory’	is	key	here,	as	both	Mkandawire	(from	Hearn	2007)	 and	 Edwards	 and	 Hulme	 (from	 Hearn,	 1998)	 remark	 that	 the	 case	 for	NGOs	 was	 indeed	 based	 on	 theoretical	 assumptions	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 these	organisations,	and	not	based	on	empirical	evidence.	They	argue	that	instead,	the	growth	of	NGOs	aligned	with	 the	growing	economic	 influence	of	neoliberalism.	Nonetheless,	 any	 discussion	 of	 NGOs	 as	 new	 actors	 created	 to	 enforce	 the	neoliberal	 paradigm	 should	 be	 held	with	 caution,	 as	 there	 is	 a	 long	 history	 of	NGOs	 providing	 health	 and	 education	 services	 in	 Africa	 and	 Asia,	 when	 states	were	 unable	 to	 provide	 coverage	 themselves	 (Edwards	 and	 Hulme,	 1996).	 It	must	 be	 noted	 however,	 that	 these	 organisations	 originally	 provided	 these	services	 by	 “default	 rather	 than	 design”	 (Edwards	 and	 Hulme,	 1996:961)	whereas	 neoliberal	 development	 policy	 sees	 NGOs	 as	 the	 preferred	 means	 of	service	 provision.	 In	 the	 1980s,	 NGOs	 were	 closely	 linked	 with	 local	 popular	movements	 and	 marginalised	 groups,	 whilst	 working	 alongside	 states	 to	facilitate	service	provision	(Molyneux,	2008).		Whilst	NGOs	that	originated	at	the	grassroots	 level	 often	 began	 as	 informal	 organisations	 (Vakil,	 1997),	 for	 some	organisations	 there	 was	 an	 emphasis	 on	 formalisation	 and	 expansion	 so	 that	these	 organisations	 could	 fulfil	 their	 increased	 responsibilities.	 This	 in	 turn	increased	the	fluidity	of	the	understanding	of	what	an	 ‘NGO’	officially	 is,	and	at	which	 levels	 and	 geographical	 scales	 the	 organisation	 operates.	 Kang	 (2010)	discussed	the	variety	of	terms	used	to	separate	the	different	categories	of	NGOs,	such	 as	 referring	 to	 more	 locally-based	 organisations	 as	 community-based	organisations,	whereas	Northern	NGOs	refers	to	those	with	their	base	in	Global	North	countries	but	operate	internationally.			
	 69	
In	 terms	of	 the	marketplace,	NGOs	 sit	 in	 a	 unique	position,	 existing	 in	 a	 space	said	 to	 be	 unaffected	 by	 national	 politics	 and	 market	 values	 (Smith,	 2010)	(Cameron,	2000).	Controversially,	Hearn	(1998)	instead	states;		 “On	the	economic	side,	NGOS	are	viewed	as	‘market-based	actors’	able	to	deliver	social	welfare	services	to	poor	people	at	a	 lower	cost	and	higher	standards	or	quality	than	the	government.”	(Hearn,	1998:89)		Furthermore,	 Leat	 (from	 Beckmann	 and	 Burja	 (2010)	 remarked	 that	 NGOs	cannot	 be	 fully	 theorised	 if	 their	 political	 nature	 needs	 to	 be	 ignored,	 so	 the	political	and	economic	impact	of	their	practices	must	be	assessed	to	understand	the	 impact	 of	 their	 existence	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 and	 as	 part	 of	 contemporary	international	 development	 practice.	 In	many	 cases,	 NGOs	 have	 taken	 over	 the	role	of	the	state	in	some	areas	such	as	service	provision,	altering	the	dynamics	of	governance	 in	many	 countries.	 Hickey	 and	Mohan	 (2005:244)	 refer	 to	 this	 as	“the	 weakening	 of	 the	 ‘social	 contract’	 between	 state	 and	 citizen”,	 which	 can	undoubtedly	 have	 a	 fundamental	 impact	 on	 expectations	 of	 the	 state	 and	 how	citizens	relate	to	it.			The	 significant	 growth	 in	NGOs’	 influence	over	 a	 relatively	 short	 space	of	 time	can	be	attributed	to	the	context	in	which	they	carry	out	their	work	in.	Nagar	and	Raju	(2008:452)	refer	to	their	willingness	to	take	on	issues	that	are	“politically	and/or	 culturally	 so	 sensitive	 no	 government	 wants	 to	 touch	 them	 with	 a	bargepole”,	 whereas	Molyneux	 (2008:788)	 states	 that	 they	 are	 able	 to	 “[plug]	some	 of	 the	 many	 gaps	 in	 existing	 provision.	 Moreover,	 Howes	 (1997:820)	explains	 that	 the	 donors	 that	 largely	 fund	 NGO	 finances	 expect	 them	 to	contribute	 to	 “the	 emergence	 of	 a	 stronger	 civil	 society.”	 This	 is	 a	 contentious	issue	however.		Smith	(2010)	defines	civil	society	as;		 “Situated	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society,	 or	 as	 occupying	 the	 political	space	 between	 the	 individual	 or	 household	 and	 the	 state.”	 (Smith,	2010:244)		
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Woods	 (2000)	 however	 critiques	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 International	Monetary	 Fund	 for	 using	 the	 terms	 ‘NGO’	 and	 ‘civil	 society’	 interchangeably	when	they	have	incredibly	different	meanings,	explaining	that	civil	society	is	the	society	 over	 which	 a	 state	 governs,	 which	 may	 or	 may	 not	 contain	 organised	groups	but	either	way,	is	affected	by	government	policy.	NGOs	on	the	other	hand	are	 described	 by	 Woods	 (2000)	 as	 organised	 groups,	 perhaps	 working	 in	 a	particular	 sector	 and	 in	 turn	 potentially	 only	 representing	 the	 members	 of	society	impacted	upon	by	that	sector.			There	are	understandable	merits	to	an	increased	role	for	NGOs	in	development	in	the	Global	South.	Lawrence	and	Brun	(2011)	argue	that	as	NGOs	work	at	the	grassroots	 level,	 they	 are	 far	 more	 equipped	 to	 understand	 the	 cultural,	economic	 and	 political	 nuances	 of	 specific	 geographical	 locations	 and	 should	therefore	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 support	 and	 services	 successfully.	 However,	 the	rising	 presence	 of	 NGOs	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 has	 not	 been	met	without	 issues.	Nagar	and	Raju	(2008)	suggest	that	NGOs	are	often	being	asked	to	perform	roles	beyond	 their	 remit.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 complex	 relationship	 with	 the	 state	 and	increased	confusion	with	respect	to	accountability.	Gugerty	(2008)	explains	this	paradox;		 “On	 one	 hand,	many	 governments	 viewed	NGOs	 as	 competitors,	 fearing	that	funding	for	NGOs	would	crowd	out	funding	for	public	services.	Also,	governments	 became	 increasingly	 reliant	 on	 NGOs	 for	 public	 service	delivery	 and	 needed	 new	 ways	 to	 manage	 relationships	 with	 these	organisations,	particularly	since	many	regulatory	frameworks	dated	back	to	 the	 colonial	 era	 and	 were	 inappropriate	 for	 current	 conditions.”	(Gugerty,	2008:106)		This	 provides	 some	 insight	 as	 to	 how	 the	 role	 of	 NGOs	 can	 blur	 state-society	relations,	as	whilst	they	may	fill	gaps	in	governance	and	provide	services	that	the	state	 cannot,	 this	 does	 not	 indicate	 whether	 this	 is	 now	 a	 permanent	 role	 of	NGOs	or	a	 temporary	 fixture.	This	aligns	with	Cameron’s	 (2000:632)	argument	that	the	mission	statements	of	NGOs	often	refer	to	them	as	being	“superseded	by	
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other	 institutions,	 grassroots	 and/or	 state	 and/or	 markets”.	 The	 international	financial	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 and	 the	World	Bank	also	supported	the	 increased	responsibility	on	NGOs,	 lauding	civil	society	as	a	productive	space	of	economic,	political	and	social	development,	and	NGOs	as	the	 key	 part	 of	 this,	 correcting	 the	 failures	 of	 corrupt	 and	 inefficient	 states	(Smith,	2010).			There	 was	 also	 the	 widely	 held	 belief	 across	 the	 development	 sector	 and	international	 financial	 institutions	 that	 NGOs	 were	 more	 cost-effective	 at	providing	services	than	governments,	which	further	enabled	their	infiltration	of	Global	 South	 governance.	 Edwards	 and	 Hulme	 (1996)	 cite	 the	 example	 of	 a	sanitation	project	in	Pakistan	run	by	a	larger	NGO	that	was	able	to	operate	at	the	third	of	the	cost	than	the	private	sector	or	the	state.	They	also	note	that	there	is	no	empirical	evidence	to	suggest	that	smaller	organisations	operate	at	any	lower	costs	than	the	public	sector.	It	must	also	be	noted	that	the	relationship	between	NGOs	and	states	is	somewhat	paradoxical.	Gugerty,	(2008)	explains	that	in	some	instances,	governments	saw	themselves	as	 in	competition	with	 local	NGOs	 that	would	 take	 the	majority	 of	 donor	 funding	 for	 providing	 public	 services,	whilst	simultaneously	not	being	able	to	provide	these	services	without	the	help	of	NGOs	(Gugerty,	2008).					The	 impacts	 of	 the	 increasing	 proliferation	 of	 NGOs	 have	 been	 discussed	 at	length	 within	 academic	 literature.	 Their	 prevalence	 in	 many	 countries	 in	 the	developing	world	has	risen	significantly	since	1990.	Reuben	(from	Hearn,	2007)	notes	than	in	1990,	there	were	forty	one	registered	NGOs	in	Tanzania,	yet	by	the	year	2000	there	were	almost	 ten	thousand	of	 them.	The	sector	was	growing	at	such	an	overwhelming	rate	that	in	Tanzania	that	the	government	suspended	the	registration	of	 any	new	NGOs	 in	1996	 (Igoe,	2003).	Replicating	 this	 growth,	 in	Kenya	 there	were	 five	hundred	NGOs	 in	1990,	 (Ndegawa,	 from	Gugerty,	2008)	and	in	2004	there	were	over	three	thousand	(NGO	Council,	from	Gugerty,	2008).	Interestingly,	Smith’s	(2010)	research	in	Nigeria	revealed	that	a	number	of	NGOs	were	created	solely	on	the	basis	that	there	was	donor	money	available	to	do	so,	rather	 than	 for	 altruistic	 reasons.	 Smith	 (2010)	 argues	 that	 the	 money	 made	
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available	 by	 donors	 to	 establish	 and	maintain	 local	NGOs	was	 instead	 used	 by	individuals	to	improve	their	social	and	financial	standing	within	the	community.		It	 is	 pertinent	 to	 note	 that	 discussion	 of	 NGOs	 as	 subjects	 of	 discourse	 or	monolithic	 organisations	 neglects	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 roles	 of	 the	 individuals	employed	by	them.	Indeed,	Vakil	(1997)	discusses	the	variety	of	ways	in	which	NGOs	 are	 structured	 in	 practice,	 and	 problematises	 trying	 to	 categorise	 them	into	 distinct	 categories.	 The	 impact	 of	 individuals	 who	 are	 employed	 by	 or	volunteer	 for	 NGOs	 could	 further	 differentiate	 these	 organisations	 from	 each	other.	Whilst	 NGOs	 as	 a	 cohort	 could	 be	 said	 to	 be	 no	 longer	 as	 critical	 as	 in	previous	 decades,	 there	 is	 still	 a	 general	 assumption	 across	 the	 literature	 that	employees	 do	 subscribe	 to	 a	 mindset	 of	 poverty	 reduction	 and	 increased	participation	 by	 local	 people	 (Bebbington,2005).	 Bebbington	 (2005)	 questions	which	 broader	 structures	 must	 be	 in	 place	 that	 make	 it	 so	 difficult	 for	 well-meaning	 NGO	 employees	 to	 have	 any	 measurable	 impact.	 Some	 of	 the	 issues	faced	by	NGO	 employees	 in	 their	 day	 to	 day	practices	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	following	section.			
3.4	 Contemporary	NGO	practices	 and	 challenges:	 autonomy	 and	 financial	
pressures		As	 participatory	 development	 discourse	 and	 the	 responsibilities	 transferred	 to	NGOs	have	gained	prominence,	so	have	the	number	of	 issues	that	 face	NGOs	in	conducting	their	day	to	day	activities.		The	NGO	sector	has	become	increasingly	globalised,	 creating	 new	 connections	 between	 different	 organisations	 and	expanding	the	 levels	of	 influence	of	 the	 international,	 long-established	ones.	As	the	number	of	NGOs	 in	existence	 in	 the	Global	South	 (and	North)	 is	 constantly	increasing,	 so	 too	 rises	 the	 pressure	 on	 potential	 funding	 sources	 for	 these	smaller,	 localised	 organisations.	 In	 many	 cases,	 local	 NGOs	 are	 forced	 into	partnership	 with	 international	 NGOs	 who	 can	 capitalise	 on	 the	 smaller	organisations’	financial	dependence	on	them	to	affect	their	practices	and	politics,	which	 is	 problematic	 when	 establishing	 a	 partnership	 is	 almost	 necessary	 for	smaller	organisations	to	access	funding	(Porter,	2003).		
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	Although	 smaller	 organisations	 are	 not	 forced	 against	 their	 will	 into	 entering	partnerships	with	larger	international	NGOs,	both	Clark	(1995)	and	Edwards	and	Hulme	 (1996)	 discuss	 the	 difficulties	 of	 existing	 independently	 without	 these	donors,	and	that	an	NGO’s	preference	for	isolation	(Clark,	1995)	may	impact	on	a	smaller	 organisations	 ability	 to	 access	 funding	 and	 in	 turn,	 carry	 out	 projects.	Additionally,	being	 in	partnership	with	an	already	established	organisation	can	lead	 to	more	 opportunities	 for	 future	 funding,	 yet	 can	make	 things	 even	more	difficult	 for	 new	 and	 not	 yet	 established	 NGOs	 who	 have	 to	 comply	 with	 the	needs	of	donor	organisations	as	opposed	to	their	own	agendas	(Barr	et	al,	2005).	As	stated	by	Porter,	donor	partnerships;		 “[are]	promoting	a	pernicious	 form	of	clientalism,	 refocusing	NGO	effort	upwards	 towards	 satisfying	 donor	 demands,	 rather	 than	 downwards	 to	the	poor.”	(Porter,	2003:135)		With	 increased	 competition	 for	 funding,	 for	 many	 smaller	 organisations	 they	must	 comply	 with	 donor	 conditions	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 their	 funding,	irrespective	 of	whether	 they	 agree	with	 the	 conditions	 imposed	upon	 them	or	not	 (Dolinhow,	 2005).	 The	 pressure	 to	 keep	 funding	 coming	 in	 begins	 to	consume	 organisations,	 which	 then	 begin	 to	 lose	 sight	 of	 their	 other	 tasks.	Dolinhow’s	(2005)	research	into	the	colonias6	lived	in	by	Mexican	immigrants	to	the	United	States	of	America	found	that	local	NGOs	had	simply	began	to	focus	on	short	term	projects	with	quick	results	as	a	result	of	donor	pressure,	and	had	lost	sight	 of	 the	 larger	 structural	 changes	 that	 would	 have	 more	 of	 a	 long	 term	benefit	 for	 the	 colonias.	 To	 return	 to	 Smith’s	 (2010)	 point	 that	 a	 number	 of	Nigerian	 NGOs	 were	 created	 solely	 because	 donor	 funding	 available,	 this	provides	some	explanation	for	the	rapid	growth	of	the	sector	and	the	change	in	
																																																								6	Although	typically	a	form	of	community	located	in	Mexico,	in	Dolinhow’s	research	the	colonias	discussed	are	situated	in	the	United	States	of	America,	described	as	“any	identifiable	community	in	the	US-Mexico	border	regions	of	Arizona,	California,	New	Mexico	and	Texas	that	is	determined	to	 be	 a	 colonia	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 objective	 criteria,	 including	 lack	 of	 a	 potable	 water	 supply,	inadequate	 sewage	 systems,	 and	 a	 shortage	 of	 decent,	 safe	 and	 sanitary	 housing”	 (Dolinhow,	2005:560).		
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donor	 dynamics	 that	 has	 led	 to	 far	 less	 funding	 available	 for	 the	 number	 of	organisations	currently	in	existence.			Just	as	the	international	financial	institutions	helped	facilitated	global	neoliberal	governance,	as	the	NGO	sector	has	become	more	saturated	market-led	thinking	has	 started	 to	 infiltrate	 their	practices.	As	 their	presence	grows	 in	 a	 variety	of	sectors	in	the	Global	South,	their	increasing	competition	for	human	and	financial	resources	has	resulted	 in	what	Power	 (from	Mueller-Hirth,	2012:651)	referred	to	in	the	1990s	as	“the	audit	explosion”,	whereby	NGOs	are	increasingly	required	to	spend	time	and	resources	on	monitoring	and	evaluation	exercises	in	order	to	secure	funding	for	the	future.	Both	Mueller-Hirth	(2012)	and	Smith	(2010)	have	remarked	that	this	reconfigures	NGO	practice,	both	decreasing	their	agency	and	meaning	that	projects	that	please	donors	are	given	precedent.						Whilst	 NGOs	 previously	 had	 almost	 entire	 control	 of	 their	 programs	 and	locations	 of	 their	 projects,	 even	 when	 using	 donor	 funding,	 increased	competition	 for	 funding	has	meant	 that	donors	can	now	fund	only	 the	projects	that	 they	 believe	 in,	 and	 have	more	 of	 an	 input	 in	 NGOs	 day	 to	 day	 practices	(Lawrence	 and	 Brun,	 2011).	 Elbers	 and	 Arts	 (2011)	 cite	 an	 example	 where	 a	Ghanaian	NGO	was	 given	 funds	 by	 its	 only	 donor	 to	 build	 ten	 hand-dug	wells.	However,	 local	 communities	 wanted	 boreholes	 constructed	 instead,	 which	resulted	 in	 the	 NGO	 having	 to	 visit	 around	 fifty	 communities	 until	 they	 found	some	willing	to	accept	these	wells.	Whilst	it	is	unclear	what	the	most	appropriate	approach	 for	 the	 community	 was	 in	 this	 instance,	 this	 is	 a	 clear	 example	 of	Porter’s	 (2003:135)	 point	 about	 “donor	 fashion	 dominating	 local	 ideas”.	 The	Ghanaian	NGO’s	leader	admitted	that	yes,	his	actions	were	donor	driven,	but	as	the	 organisation	 had	 only	 one	 donor,	 simply	 surviving	 as	 an	 organisation	 and	complying	with	the	donor’s	wishes	had	to	be	his	main	priority.			Wallace	 (2004)	 describes	 at	 length	 the	 changing	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 United	Kingdom’s	 Department	 for	 International	 Development	 (DFID)	 has	 awarded	funding	 to	smaller	organisations.	He	argues	 that	DFID	changed	 the	scope	of	 its	funding	 to	 allocate	 more	 money	 to	 projects	 that	 aligned	 with	 DFID’s	 own	
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objectives,	 and	 less	 to	 the	 Joint	 Funding	 Scheme	 which	 provided	 grants	 to	organisations	with	organic	project	proposals.	With	DFID’s	funds	only	available	to	its	self-determined	priority	countries	and	themes,	grassroots	NGOs	are	no	longer	able	 to	 come	up	with	project	plans	by	 themselves.	The	awarding	of	 grants	has	lost	 its	holistic	nature,	with	one	organisation	who	proposed	work	 in	politically	unstable	South	Sudan	receiving	a	grant	rejection	from	DFID	because	they	had	not	included	anything	about	“poor	people	claiming	their	rights”	(Wallace,	2004:206),	even	 although	 this	 was	 not	 appropriate	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 project	 the	organisation	 was	 attempting	 to	 propose.	 There	 are	 also	 examples	 of	organisations	 including	 fashionable	 terms	 in	 their	 project	 proposals	 whether	relevant	to	the	project	or	not,	simply	to	increase	their	chances	of	funding.	Elbers	and	Arts	(2011)	cite	the	example	of	organisations	in	Ghana	adding	in	gender	or	HIV/AIDS	 aspects	 to	 the	 projects	 under	 the	 direction	 of	 donors	 but	 in	 many	situations	 did	 not	 understand	 how	 these	 themes	 related	 to	 the	 projects	 these	organisations	 had	 requested	 funding	 for.	 Additionally,	 Igoe	 (2003)	 discusses	how	 donors	 encouraged	 pastoralist	 NGOs	 in	 Tanzania	 to	 “scale	 up	 their	operations	and	diversify	their	activities”	(Igoe,	2003:874).	By	trying	to	persuade	NGOs	 to	 replicate	 the	 practices	 of	 the	 private	 sector,	 these	 actions	 by	 donors	indicate	 the	 widespread	 prevalence	 of	 market-led	 thinking	 across	 the	 NGO	sector,	 and	how	 the	neoliberal	 values	of	 the	 international	 financial	 institutions	has	been	able	to	permeate	all	levels	of	the	development	industry.				Examples	 such	 as	 this	 call	 into	 question	 the	 viewpoint	 held	 by	 Lawrence	 and	Brun	 (2011)	 that	 one	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 NGOs	 is	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	cultural	specificities	of	the	areas	they	work	in,	as	examples	suggest	that	pressure	from	external	donors	is	potentially	restricting	the	use	of	this	knowledge.	As	well	as	 this,	 although	 embedded	within	 their	 own	 localities,	 NGOs	 are	 increasingly	employing	 individuals	 from	 the	private	 sector	 in	managerial	posts,	providing	a	platform	 for	 many	 private	 sector	 practices	 to	 infiltrate	 third	 sector	 ones	(Wallace,	2004)	and	giving	 some	explanation	 for	 the	 increasing	use	of	market-based	 logic	 employed	 by	 these	 organisations.	 	 Whilst	 NGOs	 are	 “idealised	 as	organisations	through	which	people	help	others	for	reasons	other	than	profit	or	politics”	 (Fisher,	 1997:442),	 such	 values	 may	 have	 been	 eroded	 by	 the	 rising	
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prominence	 of	 neoliberal	methods	 of	 governance.	Moreover,	 activities	 such	 as	complying	with	donor	requirements	can	subsequently	lead	to	distrust	from	local	communities	towards	NGOs,	as	they	are	seen	as	largely	ineffective	and	working	closely	 with	 outsiders	 (Kapoor,	 2005)	 which	 may	 eventually	 damage	 an	organisation’s	 reputation	 beyond	 repair.	 Porter	 (2003)	 also	 warns	 that	 as	competition	 for	 resources	 increases,	 NGOs	 stop	 working	 in	 tandem	with	 each	other	 and	 instead	 see	 other	 local	 organisations	 as	 competitors,	 which	 could	result	in	the	NGO	sector	becoming	a	hostile	and	individualistic	environment.		
3.5	 Accountability	 and	 reporting	 difficulties	 for	 NGOs:	 the	 new	
managerialism		Monitoring	and	evaluation	of	their	projects	has	now	become	a	regular	output	of	NGOs.	 Grants	 are	 often	 now	 awarded	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	 donor	will	 receive	detailed	 feedback	on	the	results	of	 the	project,	 in	 the	 form	of	reports.	Part	of	a	drive	 towards	 results-oriented	 development,	 formally	 stated	 in	 the	 Paris	Declaration	on	Aid	Effectiveness,	 these	new	reporting	mechanisms	were	put	 in	place	 to	 increase	 the	 accountability	 of	 NGOs	 to	 their	 donors	 (Mueller-Hirth,	2012).	 Based	 on	 the	 belief	 that	 increased	 accountability	 will	 lead	 to	 greater	efficiency	 by	 development	 staff,	 reporting	 and	 evaluation	 mechanisms	 were	promoted	 for	 their	 ability	 to	 help	 development	 professionals	 self-govern	 their	own	behaviour	(Cavill	and	Sohail,	2007).	Although	some	donors	do	not	stipulate	how	 much	 of	 a	 grant	 should	 be	 spent	 on	 auditing	 activities,	 USAID	 grants	awarded	to	South	African	NGOs	require	that	nine	per	cent	of	the	project	budget	is	 for	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 (Mueller-Hirth,	 2012).	 More	 broadly,	 the	increase	 in	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 is	 a	 materialisation	 of	 the	 belief	 that	organisations	would	be	more	effective	if	they	employed	the	use	of	private	sector	practices	(Shore	and	Wright,	2000).	This	is	exemplified	by	the	highly	neoliberal	language	used	when	describing	this	process;		 “Donors	tend	to	look	for	the	highest	return	for	their	investments.	NGOs	do	what	 they	 believe	 is	 needed,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 return.”	 (Lawrence	 and	Brun,	2011:80)	
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	Furthermore,	it	is	clear	that	the	use	of	capitalist,	profit	and	results	driven	values	does	not	 complement	 the	 core	ethos	of	NGOs,	 and	provides	 an	explanation	 for	why	 imposed	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 practices	 have	 been	 problematic	 to	implement	for	a	number	of	these	types	of	organisation.			The	constant	insistence	on	NGOs	being	made	accountable	for	their	activities	has	led	 to	 polarised	 opinion	 in	 the	 literature.	 Some	 believe	 that	 as	 the	 number	 of	NGOs	increases	and	the	intentions	of	some	organisations	begin	to	overlap,	NGOs	must	 be	 as	 transparent	 and	 clear	 on	 their	 practices	 as	 possible	 (Burger	 and	Owens,	 2010,	 Kang,	 2010).	 However,	 other	 believe	 that	 this	 so-called	 ‘new	managerialism’	 culture	 within	 NGOs	 instead	 creates	 increased	 levels	 of	bureaucracy	 within	 the	 sector,	 and	 means	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 these	organisations’	time	is	spent	writing	reports	rather	than	with	the	communities	or	local	 people	 that	 they	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 working	 with	 (Roberts	 et	 al,	 2005,	Townsend	 and	 Townsend,	 2004).	 This	 section	 of	 the	 literature	 believes	 that	increased	bureaucracy	and	paperwork	is	one	of	the	core	reasons	that	NGOs	are	no	longer	radical	organisations,	and	are	instead	simply	functioning	as	a	business	that	is	subject	to	constant	auditing.	Mawdsley	et	al’s	(2005)	research	into	NGOs	revealed	 that	 respondents	 felt	 so	 pressurised	 by	 donor	 imposed	 targets	 and	report	writing	that	they	had	little	time	left	for	the	organisation’s	day	to	day	tasks,	and	in	turn	no	opportunity	for	critical	analysis	of	their	current	outputs.			The	 impact	 of	 this	 ‘new	 managerialism’	 on	 NGOs	 is	 apparent	 both	 at	 the	conceptual	and	grassroots	 level,	 as	discussed	 in	depth	by	Roberts	et	al	 (2005).	The	type	of	management	and	bureaucracy	introduced	to	these	organisations	 is,	as	described	by	Roberts	et	al	(2005:1849)	“of	a	distinctly	Northern	type”	which	could	 jar	with	 some	 of	 the	 cultural	 practices	 that	 exist	 in	 organisations	 in	 the	Global	South.	Additionally,	Mueller-Hirth	(2012)	discusses	the	evaluation	criteria	of	monitoring	and	evaluation	set	by	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-Operation	and	Development,	including	“effectiveness,	impact,	relevance,	sustainability	and	efficiency”	(Mueller-Hirth,	2012:654),	a	further	set	of	externally	imposed	values	imposed	 upon	 NGOs	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	 These	 changes	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 an	
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imposition	 of	 Global	 North	 values	 in	 the	 NGO	 sector,	 irrespective	 of	 whether	local	employees	agree	with	these	practices	or	not.	Additionally,	the	rigidities	and	rules	 that	 come	 along	 with	 reporting,	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 somewhat	undermine	the	flexibility	and	local	adaptability	that	NGOs	are	lauded	for	(Fowler,	1993).	 Wallace	 (2004)	 additionally	 argues	 that	 NGOs	 have	 simply	 become	vehicles	 to	 distribute	 the	 ideas	 held	 by	 Northern	 organisations,	 helping	 to	reinforce	 development	 trends	 and	 fashions	 whilst	 having	 little	 influence	 over	them.	 	 Conceptually,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 these	 viewpoints	 validate	 Shivji’s	assertion	that	“colonialism	left	by	the	front	door	and	returned	through	the	back	door	 in	 the	 form	 of	 neo-colonialism”	 in	 the	 form	 of	 NGOs	 (Shivji,	 2007:16),	discussed	later	in	the	chapter.			There	are	specific	examples	of	 the	 issues	that	 this	new	focus	on	accountability,	transparency	 and	 participation	 can	 create.	 Roberts	 et	 al	 (2005)	 discuss	 how	most	reports	must	be	written	in	English,	with	the	specific	buzzwords	and	jargon	used	 in	 NGO	 report	 writing.	 This	 can	 prove	 difficult	 for	 the	 many	 local	 NGO	employees	who	do	not	have	English	as	their	first	language,	and	can	mean	that	a	lot	 of	 time	 is	 spent	 concerned	 with	 the	 correct	 use	 of	 language	 rather	 than	achieving	the	targets	that	have	been	set.	Conversely,	Wallace	(2004)	states	that	at	 the	 levels	 that	 these	countless	reports	are	written	 for,	very	 few	people	have	the	 time	 to	 read	 or	 meaningfully	 engage	 with	 them.	 It	 must	 be	 called	 into	question	why	there	is	such	an	emphasis	on	reporting	culture	when	there	seems	to	be	little	justification	for	it.	Muller-Hirth	(2012)	discusses	how	NGOs	perceive	monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 as	 a	 “tick-box	 exercise”	 (Mueller-Hirth,	 2012:657),	and	led	to	them	describing	themselves	as	weak	subjects	with	little	agency	within	these	reporting	structures.			The	pressures	of	accessing	money	and	keeping	a	good	relationship	with	donors	are	potentially	having	a	negative	impact	on	NGOs	practices	as	it	has	altered	their	focus	onto	an	additional	set	of	administrative	tasks.	However,	it	is	not	clear	what	alternative	these	organisations	have,	and	there	are	some	merits	to	the	argument	that	NGOs	should	be	held	accountable	to	both	their	donors	and	the	groups	that	they	are	working	with.	The	main	difficulty	that	is	faced	in	terms	of	accountability	
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is	that	NGOs	have	a	number	of	stakeholders	that	they	must	be	held	accountable	to;	 “downwards”	 to	 their	 partners,	 beneficiaries,	 staff	 and	 supporters,	 and	“upwards”	 to	 their	 trustees,	 donors	 and	 governments”	 (Edwards	 and	 Hulme,	1996:967).	 A	 significant	 barrier	 faced	 is	 often	 the	 physical	 distance	 between	NGOs	and	their	donor	organisations,	as	well	as	conceptual	differences	(Lawrence	and	 Brun,	 2011).	 This	 is	 exacerbated	 by	 Townsend	 et	 al’s	 (2004)	 research	 in	Mexico	 City,	 where	 NGO	 employees	 expressed	 a	 desire	 for	 more	 face	 to	 face	contact	with	their	donors,	or	 for	donors	to	come	and	visit	 their	projects,	which	they	believed	would	be	more	valuable	than	sending	a	series	of	reports	via	email.	Indeed,	Mawdsley	et	 al	 (2005)	discuss	at	 length	 the	value	 in	 these	 face	 to	 face	interactions,	such	as	a	reduction	in	administrative	tasks,	more	opportunities	for	meaningful	dialogue,	and	the	opportunity	for	the	smaller	organisations	receiving	funding	 to	 have	 more	 of	 a	 voice	 in	 the	 partnership	 and	 for	 the	 donor	organisation	 to	 understand	 their	 issues	 better.	 	 The	 problematic	 relationships	that	 exist	 between	 NGOs	 and	 their	 donors	 results	 in	 “lopsided	 friendships”	(Gibbs	 et	 al,	 from	Porter,	 2003:135),	whereby	 the	 smokescreen	 of	 partnership	masks	 how	 the	 partner	 that	 holds	 the	 funding	 dominates	 the	 relationship	through	accountability	mechanisms.			Furthermore,	this	“downwards	accountability”	(Edwards	and	Hulme,	1996:967)	often	becomes	forgotten	about	amongst	all	of	the	report	writing	and	evaluation	(Hickey,	2002,	Mueller-Hirth,	2012),	potentially	having	an	impact	on	the	reasons	that	 NGO	 and	 participatory	 development	 are	 advocated	 and	 making	development	hierarchy	unequal;		 “Participation	 thus	 becomes	 a	 means	 of	 servicing	 donor	 requirements,	rather	than	an	act	of	citizenship.”	(Hickey,	2002:843)		Therefore,	it	is	clear	that	with	the	growing	numbers	of	NGOs	in	the	Global	South	and	 in	 turn,	 increased	 competition	 when	 accessing	 funding,	 the	 inherent	bureaucracy	 of	 this	 sector	 may	 impact	 upon	 NGO	 culture	 for	 many	 years.	Returning	to	ideas	that	the	individual	characteristics	of	NGOs	mean	that	many	of	these	organisations	could	still	be	attempting	to	affect	meaningful	change	in	their	
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work,	it	is	also	relevant	to	consider	Fisher’s	(1997)	viewpoint	that	NGOs	are	not	homogenous	organisations	with	the	same	views	and	structure.	Nonetheless,	with	the	 process	 of	 auditing	 and	 report	 writing	 to	 donors	 increasingly	 becoming	standard	 practice	 for	 contemporary	 NGOs,	 whether	 these	 organisations	individual	 traits	 impact	 upon	 their	 actions	 remains	 to	 be	 seen.	 NGO	 staff	 can	often	 be	 put	 in	 the	 complex	 situation	 where	 every	 stakeholder	 that	 they	 are	accountable	to	has	unrealistic	demands	of	the	NGOs	capabilities	(Igoe,	2003).			The	ways	 in	which	NGOs	subvert	 increasing	pressure	 from	donors	or	partners,	and	 the	 specific	 strategies	 employed	 by	 NGOs	 as	 a	 means	 of	 survival	 and	maintaining	some	of	their	organisations’	principles,	has	been	discussed	at	length	within	the	literature.	Elbers	and	Arts	(2011)	discuss	some	of	the	main	strategies	employed	 by	 Southern	 NGOs,	 such	 as	 withholding	 information	 from	 donors,	sending	inaccurate	information	to	donors	and	agreeing	to	donor	conditions	on	a	superficial	 level,	 without	 changing	 anything	 substantial	 in	 their	 day	 to	 day	practices.		Burger	and	Owens	(2010)	are	rather	critical	of	the	ways	in	which	NGOs	subvert	the	 influence	 of	 donors	 and	 partners,	 referring	 to	 it	 as	 “deceit	 and	ineffectiveness”	(Burger	and	Owens,	2010:1265).	In	fairness,	Burger	and	Owens	(2010)	 also	 highlight	 the	 potential	 consequences	 of	 these	 activities;	 citing	examples	 where	 NGOs	 had	 claimed	 to	 work	 closely	 with	 local	 communities,	whilst	 these	communities	maintained	 that	 this	was	wholly	 inaccurate,	and	 that	there	`had	been	little	or	no	contact	from	these	organisations.	Moreover,	Barr	et	al	(2005)	 found	 that	 in	 their	 research	 into	 NGOs	 in	 Uganda,	 smaller	 NGOs	 feel	under	scrutiny	 from	donors	and	partners,	and	 in	 turn,	hide	 the	cost	of	 salaries	paid	 to	 employees	 as	 well	 as	 per	 diem	 payments.	 The	 audit	 culture	 seems	increasingly	 complex,	 as	 so	 much	 time	 seems	 to	 be	 spent	 on	 general	administrative	 tasks	 that	 little	 work	 is	 getting	 done	 in	 a	 practical	 sense.	Conversely,	it	is	questionable	as	to	whether	misrepresenting	data	to	donors	and	partners	 is	 the	 correct	 approach	 by	 NGOs,	 especially	 in	 light	 of	 research	 into	corrupt	or	“briefcase	NGOs”	(Townsend	et	al,	2004).								
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Furthermore,	 there	 is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 corruption	 is	 becoming	increasingly	prevalent	in	the	NGO	sector,	through	a	variety	of	means;		 “INGO	misbehaviour	has	been	highlighted	in	terms	of	misuse	of	funds,	the	abuse	 of	 power	 over	 vulnerable	 people,	 dishonesty	 in	fundraising/advocacy,	poor	management	and	governance,	 and	 so	 forth.”	(Cavill	and	Sohail,	2007:232)		Smith	(2010)	states	that	in	Nigeria,	NGOs	are	being	continually	created	by	elites	so	that	they	can	access	the	organisations’	resources	for	their	own	personal	gain.	Igoe’s	 (2003)	 research	 in	 Tanzania	 supports	 this,	 explaining	 that	 some	 NGO	leaders	salaries	were	not	enough	to	fulfil	their	families’	needs,	so	NGO	resources	were	 often	 used	 for	 personal	 use,	 meaning	 that	 the	 NGO’s	 funding	 often	 had	more	 of	 an	 individual	 benefit	 than	 a	 community	 one.	 This	 echoes	 neoliberal	thinking	 on	 promoting	 individual	 values,	 and	 perhaps	 elucidates	 the	 fact	 that	decentralising	 governance	 and	 service	 provision	 will	 not	 reinforce	 collectivity	but	instead	only	benefit	certain	individuals.			Nonetheless,	Smith	(2010)	also	notes	that	corruption	accusations	are	often	used	as	 a	 mechanism	 to	 explain	 the	 failures	 of	 individual	 development	 projects,	masking	 any	 more	 complex	 reasons	 behind	 why	 a	 project	 has	 not	 been	 as	successful	 as	 predicted.	Additionally,	 generalised	 accusations	 of	 corruption	 fail	to	 recognise	 the	 complexity	 of	 certain	 situations	 faced	 by	 NGOs	 and	 the	individuals	that	work	for	them.	Townsend	et	al	(2004),	in	their	research	of	NGOs	in	Ghana,	discussed	how	one	respondent	working	for	a	grassroots	NGO	accepted	funding	from	donors	for	projects	that	she	did	not	believe	in	and	knew	would	not	work.	 The	 respondent	 justified	 this	 by	 her	 need	 for	 her	 and	 her	 family’s	 own	personal	need	for	survival,	and	explained	her	pursuit	of	long-term	goals	that	she	believed	 would	 make	 a	 difference,	 describing	 donor	 money	 as	 a	 short-term	solution	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 organisation	 she	 worked	 for	 continued	 to	 exist	(Townsend	 et	 al,	 2004).	 Barr	 et	 al	 (2005)	 provide	 an	 additional	 point	 about	employees	 within	 NGOs,	 arguing	 that	 whilst	 the	 development	 sector	 attracts	very	competent	individuals,	the	funding	is	not	in	place	to	maintain	the	salaries	of	
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these	employees,	or	for	them	to	carry	out	the	projects	that	they	want	to.	Whilst	it	could	 be	 argued	 that	 this	 is	 a	 further	 example	 of	 corrupt	NGO	practice,	 it	 also	indicates	 how	 the	 donor-NGO	 relationship	 sometimes	 creates	 a	 situation	 in	which	certain	unethical	practices	become	necessary	for	survival.			Igoe	(2003)	cites	an	example	whereby	a	pastoralist	NGO	in	Tanzania	took	donor	money	to	fund	a	water	project	even	though	the	local	community	had	no	need	for	one.	 Additionally,	 the	 donor,	 supporting	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 participatory	development,	required	that	a	women’s	group	be	involved	in	the	water	project,	as	a	 means	 to	 empower	 them,	 and	 although	 a	 women’s	 group	 already	 existed	within	the	community,	the	donors	selected	individual	women	to	form	a	new	one.	The	community	complied	with	the	project	against	their	wishes,	based	on	the	fear	put	 forward	 by	 NGO	 staff	 that	 it	 would	 appear	 that	 they	 “didn’t	 like	development”	(Igoe,	2003:873).	Igoe	(2003)	further	discusses	this	case	study:		 “In	speaking	of	this	experience	women	stressed	that	they	had	no	control	over	 the	 processes	 of	 development,	which	 came	 from	mysterious	white	people	and	were	mediated	by	the	male	elites	of	their	community.”	(Igoe,	2003:873)		The	use	of	“mysterious	white	people”	is	 interesting	here,	and	indicates	the	vast	difference	 between	 donor	 knowledge	 and	 that	 of	 local	 organisations.	 Phillips	(2013)	reinforces	this	when	discussing	the	high	numbers	of	“posh	white	blokes”	working	in	the	development	sector:		 “There	 is	 so	much	 rich	 information	 and	 understanding	 vital	 to	 tackling	poverty,	that	those	who	have	never	been	hungry	and	never	been	shut	out	can	never	fully	possess.”	Phillips	(2013:1)		Whilst	Phillips	does	not	completely	refute	 the	presence	of	 individuals	 from	the	Global	North	in	the	development	industry,	he	problematizes	their	dominant	role	and	 the	 effects	 this	 can	 have	 on	 the	 projects	 selected	 and	 how	 they	 are	implemented.	 The	 impact	 of	 inappropriate	 projects	 being	 implemented	 by	
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foreign	donors	has	an	impact	upon	how	relations	between	the	Global	South	and	developed	countries,	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section.			
3.6	North-South	relations	and	the	impact	on	development		Parpart	states	that;		 “Development	 is	 predicated	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 some	 people	 and	places	 are	 more	 developed	 than	 others,	 and	 therefore	 those	 who	 are	‘developed’	have	the	knowledge	and	expertise	to	help	those	who	are	not.”	(Parpart,	from	Kothari,	2005:2005).		As	 previously	 discussed,	 the	NGO	 sector	 has	 expanded	 rapidly	 in	 recent	 years,	creating	a	variety	of	power	relations	between	local	and	international	NGOs,	and	the	donor	organisations	that	support	them.	It	is	important	to	consider	explicitly	the	role	of	organisations	whose	base	is	outwith	the	Global	South,	and	to	return	to	Bebbington’s	 (2005)	 point,	 examine	 in-depth	 the	 hegemonic	 structures	 that	these	development	organisations	exist	within.	 Sheppard	and	Nagar	 (2004:558)	note	 that	 “the	 geographies	 of	 global	North	 and	 South	 are	 progressively	 fractal	and	 closely	 inter-related”.	 This	 is	 exemplified	 by	 previous	 discussion	surrounding	 the	 impact	 of	 international	 donors	 over	 grassroots	 organisations,	and	 the	 imposition	 of	 these	 organisations’	 ideas	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 local	knowledge	held	by	grassroots	NGOs.	The	increasingly	blurred	relations	between	the	 Global	 North	 and	 South	 in	 contemporary	 development	 practice	 must	 be	examined,	and	the	root	of	the	most	hegemonic	and	embedded	discourses	traced	and	understood.	These	power	dynamics	serve	as	an	important	lens	within	which	the	water	governance	structure	of	Tanzania	can	be	examined.					Early	 attempts	 at	defining	NGOs	 created	a	dichotomy	between	knowledge	 that	originated	 from	 the	 Global	 North	 or	 South.	 Vakil	 (1997)	 critiques	 Gorman’s	(1984)	 description	 of	 private	 voluntary	 organisations,	 and	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	word	‘overseas’;		
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“The	inclusion	of	“overseas”	activities	in	the	definition	implies	that	these	organisations	 being	 referred	 to	 are	 exclusively	 those	 based	 in	 the	developed	countries	and	that	their	mandate	is	“relief	and	development”	in	the	nations	of	the	Third	World.”	(Vakil,	1997:2058)		Vakil	believes	that	this	ignores	the	knowledge	base	of	organisations	based	in	the	Global	 South,	 and	 prioritises	 Global	 North	 knowledge	 over	 any	 other.	 Mohan	(2001)	agrees	with	this,	warning	that	even	in	instances	where	local	knowledge	is	given	 precedent	 over	 that	 of	 international	 development	 organisations,	 it	 still	creates	 a	 dynamic	 where	 a	 Global	 North	 development	 worker	 is	 a	 vital	requirement	 to	 bring	 together	 these	 two	 sets	 of	 knowledges.	 De	 Santisteban	(2005)	 refers	 to	 how	 the	 good	 intentions	 of	 NGOs	 and	 other	 development	organisations	are	often	assumed,	yet	Bienefeld	 (1994)	calls	 this	viewpoint	 into	questions,	arguing	that	it	 is	 impossible	to	understand	the	benefits	without	fully	understanding	 the	 impact	 if	 these	 organisations	 and	 modern	 development	practice	 never	 existed.	 There	 are	 however,	 a	 number	 of	 arguments	 to	 suggest	that	the	shift	in	power	relations	has	not	necessarily	been	from	those	hegemonic	powerful	 states	 to	 their	 former	 colonies	 but	 instead	 a	 more	 diluted	 and	 less	explicit	 form	 of	 power	 and	 control,	 exerted	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 channels.	 As	discussed	 earlier	 in	 the	 chapter,	 the	 World	 Overseas	 Development	 Institute	Symposium	 called	 for	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 relationships	 between	 Northern	 and	Southern	NGOs	which	promoted	equal	partnership.	 Instead,	 it	 could	be	argued	that	 what	 has	 transpired	 since	 is	 simply	 a	 reconfiguration	 of	 power	 and	influence,	manifesting	in	more	subtle	ways.		Kothari’s	(2001)	comment	that	local	people	become	so	embedded	within	development	processes	 they	are	unable	 to	provide	a	critical	view	of	international	influence	is	relevant	here,	as	an	example	of	 the	variety	of	ways	 in	which	Global	North	organisations	and	 their	mandates	are	able	to	be	hegemonic.			Additionally,	there	are	some	instances	where	colonial	language	is	used	to	discuss	donor-NGO	relations.	Keeping	in	mind	the	aforementioned	discussion	of	the	UK	DFID’s	 geographical	 preference	 for	 the	 projects	 they	 are	 willing	 to	 fund,	 it	 is	
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useful	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 Lawrence	 and	 Brun’s	 (2011)	 research	 into	 NGOs	working	in	the	health	sector	in	India;		 “The	large	donors	have	carved	up	the	country	for	themselves	with	respect	to	 the	HIV/AIDS	epidemic.	They	won’t	 fund	programs	 in	certain	regions	such	 as	 Delhi,	 UP/Bihar,	 as	 they	 are	 so	 called	 “low	 prevalence”	 states.”	(Interview	Quote,	Lawrence	and	Brun,	2011:80).		The	use	 of	 the	phrase	 ‘carved	up’	 echoes	 other	Postcolonial	 literature,	 such	 as	Seth	 (2012:19)	 who	 uses	 the	 phrase	 to	 describe	 how	 nineteenth	 century	colonisers	 divided	 their	 rule	 across	 Africa,	 and	 relates	 to	 Shivji’s	 (2007)	 point	about	NGOs	being	a	modern	form	of	colonial	control	over	countries	in	the	Global	South.	By	employing	the	use	of	such	a	phrase,	Lawrence	and	Brun’s	(2011)	data	suggests	 people	 living	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 believe	 similar	 practices	 are	happening	 once	 again,	 perhaps	 through	 a	 more	 subtle	 colonialism	 of	 the	development	sector.			Although	Simon	(2006)	notes	that	there	is	little	connection	between	Postcolonial	literature	 and	 development	 literature,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 are	 commonalities	between	the	two.	Briggs	and	Sharp	(2004)	align	with	this,	explaining	how	some	Postcolonial	theorists	believe	that	development	literature	is	still	written	from	a	colonial	mindset,	whereas	those	conducting	research	in	the	latter	field	argue	that	Postcolonialism	 is	 too	 abstract	 and	 does	 not	 consider	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	those	 affected.	 Postcolonial	 theory	 in	 some	 instances	 calls	 into	 question	 the	validity	of	comments	within	economic	theory,	which	calls	into	question	the	way	in	 which	 both	 theoretical	 channels	 have	 been	 used	 throughout	 this	 thesis.	Discussing	 the	 differences	 between	 economic	 theory	 and	 postcolonial	 analysis	Zein-Elabdin	 (2011)	 states	 that	 the	 latter	 has	 usually	 been	 used	 in	 order	 to	deconstruct	 the	ways	 in	which	 economic	 theory	 has	 been	 seen	 as	 the	 primary	mode	of	analysis	to	theorise	an	empirical	example.	Rather	than	seeing	these	two	modes	of	thought	as	“separate	analytical	spaces”	(Zein-Elabdin,	2011:40),	Zein-Elabdin	does	not	think	of	the	culture-economy	as	a	binary	but	instead	examines	the	 interrelationship	 between	 the	 two,	 building	 upon	 the	 teachings	 of	 key	
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postcolonial	theorists	such	as	Spivak,	Said	and	Bhabha.	In	terms	of	some	of	the	key	terms	used	in	economic	analysis,	Zein-Elabdin	(2011)	states	that:		 “Pioneering	 postcolonial	 theorists	 did	 not	 always	 speak	 to	 economic	themes	directly	or	in	the	familiar	language	of	‘poverty’	‘the	market’	‘class’	or	‘capitalism”	(Zein-Elabdin,	2011:47)		Zein-Elabdin	(2011)	also	considers	this	from	the	perspective	of	economists	and	notes	that	they	see	any	cultural	manifestations	as	a	result	of	a	hegemonic	class-based	structure.	In	this	research,	‘class’	and	access	to	capital	undoubtedly	has	an	impact	on	the	water	resource,	amount	and	cleanliness	that	households	are	able	to	afford,	but	there	are	also	supposed	‘cultural’	elements	that	potentially	impact	upon	this	such	as	community	relations	or	the	presence	of	an	international	NGO.	Indeed,	 whilst	 postcolonial	 theory	 attaches	 cultural	 meaning	 to	 some	 of	 the	constructs	of	economic	theory	that	initially	seem	to	be	a	result	of	the	rule	of	the	market,	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 understand	 the	 variety	 of	 factors	 that	 impact	 on	residents’	access	to	water	in	Dar	es	Salaam,	both	considering	economic	factors	as	well	as	other	cultural	impacts	upon	this	also.			Frantz	Fanon’s	 ‘Black	Skin,	White	Masks’	 	(2008)	argues	the	point	that	in	order	to	survive	 in	a	white	world,	black	people	must	adopt	white	 identities,	 and	 in	a	sense	 can	 never	 adopt	 either	 a	 white	 or	 black	 identity	 fully	 which	 leads	 to	confusion	 and	 as	 Fanon	describes	 it,	 an	 almost	 schizophrenic	 sense	of	 identity	(Fanon,	2008:119).	Indeed,	the	previous	discussion	of	inappropriate	monitoring	and	 evaluation	 requests	 from	 international	 donors	 replicates	 this	 confused	understanding	 of	 identity,	 as	well	 as	 the	 use	 of	 funding	 to	 determine	 that	 the	projects	that	the	donors	support	are	the	ones	that	receive	funding.	Pressure	on	monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 activity	 also	 relates	 to	 the	 work	 of	 Spivak	 (1988).	Insofar	 that	 Spivak	 argues	 that	 for	 the	 subaltern	 to	 speak,	 they	 must	 speak	through	 the	 means	 of	 Western	 communication,	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	reports	serve	as	an	example	of	local	organisations	having	to	frame	their	work	to	fit	Western	criteria,	 and	report	 their	work	 in	such	a	way	 that	 they	will	 receive	funding	 in	 future.	Hearn	 (1998)	 argues	 that	 colonialism	of	 states	 in	Africa	 has	
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instead	become	a	 situation	of	 “multiple	 spheres	of	 influence”	 (Hearn,	1998:98)	from	 the	 Global	 North.	 	 Using	 Townsend	 et	 al’s	 (2002:829)	 view	 that	“imperialism	 constantly	 reshapes	 itself”,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 assess	 how	 current	development	practices	align	with	some	of	the	key	tenets	of	Postcolonial	thought.		Postcolonial	 analysis	 of	 knowledge	 removes	 the	 hegemony	 of	 Western	knowledge	over	more	local	forms	of	indigenous	knowledge	situated	in	the	Global	South.	In	doing	this,	the	concept	of	knowledge	becomes	one	that	is	multifaceted	and	made	up	of	a	number	of	different	ontologies	and	belief	systems.	Taking	the	example	 of	 water	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 into	 this	 theoretical	 lens,	 Postcolonial	literature	 can	 elucidate	 the	 local	 experience	of	 accessing	water	 and	 the	 coping	mechanisms	 used	 by	 residents,	 as	 well	 as	 how	 these	 have	 been	 altered	 by	supposed	 external	 ‘Global	 North’	 knowledge	 through	 aid	 and	 the	 presence	 of	international	NGOs.	As	well	as	 this,	neoliberalism	and	the	growth	of	water	as	a	commodity	explain	how	this	mode	of	 thought	compares	and	contrasts	with	the	views	 of	 aforementioned	 stakeholders,	 and	 provides	 further	 insight	 into	 how	complex	the	water	sector	 in	Dar	es	Salaam	is.	Spivak	(1988)	problematizes	 the	concept	of	 representing	 the	knowledge	of	 another	group,	 as	 those	 speaking	on	behalf	 of	 others	 are	 unable	 to	 determine	 the	 variety	 of	 factors	 related	 to	 that	groups’	experience,	and	that	is	something	that	group	can	only	know	themselves.	Such	 analysis	 of	 knowledge,	 power	 and	 representation	 will	 be	 used	 in	 this	research,	 as	 the	 impact	 of	 external	 development	 thought	 on	 water	 policy	 and	practice	 is	 examined,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 local	 individuals	 and	community	 groups	 experience	 the	 work	 of	 various	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 water	sector	in	trying	to	access	a	supply	of	water.			Expanding	upon	 the	work	of	Spivak,	Briggs	and	Sharp	(2004)	also	explain	 that	for	a	subaltern	to	‘speak’,	it	may	not	necessarily	be	through	the	medium	of	voice	but	 instead	 of	 practices	 and	 actions.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 behaviours	 and	 choices	made	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 will	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 form	 of	expression	 in	 this	 thesis,	 and	posited	 against	 the	 top-down	 structures	 in	 place	that	may	be	impacted	upon	by	economic	influences.	Furthermore,	this	research	takes	 the	way	 in	which	 economics	 and	market-let	 thought	 influence	 access	 to	
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water,	and	interlink	with	postcolonial	theory	in	order	to	determine	the	ways	in	which	 external	 Western	 influences	 have	 impacted	 upon	 this	 access.	 It	 is	 also	important	 to	 be	 mindful	 of	 the	 irony	 of	 commenting	 on	 the	 dominance	 of	Western	research	and	analysis	in	the	Global	South	when	I	as	a	researcher	from	the	United	Kingdom	am	part	of	 this	 imbalance.	This	 thesis	 involves	 sections	of	introspective	writing	 on	my	behalf,	 examining	my	positionalty	 in	 the	 field	 and	exploring	 the	 power	 relations	 and	 dynamics	 within	 this	 piece	 of	 work,	 also	feeding	into	the	thesis’	theoretical	discussion.			In	 a	 further	 examination	 of	 relationships	 between	 the	 Global	 North	 and	 the	Global	South,	Porter	(2003)	refers	to	the	“power	of	aid”	(Porter,	2003:142)	as	a	means	 of	Global	North	 control	 over	 countries	 that	 require	 financial	 assistance.	Additionally,	 Townsend	 et	 al	 (2002)	 discuss	 how	 dependency	 and	 unequal	relationships	 are	 inherent	 to	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 aid,	 not	 necessarily	 as	explicit	as	neo-colonial	relationships	but	 in	many	ways	replicating	them.	Some,	such	 as	 de	 Santisteban	 (2005)	 question	 why	 the	 wealth	 of	 the	 Global	 North	continues	 to	 increase	 whilst	 overseas	 development	 assistance	 is	 in	 decline,	whilst	others,	such	as	Moyo	(2009)	believe	that	when	aid	is	assessed	against	its	conceptual	origins,	and	the	goals	of	economic	growth	and	poverty	reduction,	it	is	seen	 to	be	a	complete	 failure.	Paradoxically,	 although	participatory	methods	of	development	are	lauded	for	their	ability	to	empower	communities	and	increase	notions	of	 citizenship,	Martin	 (2014)	argues	 that	 the	persistence	of	 the	 foreign	aid	culture	has	 instead	resulted	 in	the	opposite,	 leading	to	civic	disengagement	and	increased	distrust	of	politicians	when	money	received	in	aid	does	not	lead	to	results.			In	what	Edwards	(2014:47)	refers	to	as	the	“Easterly-Sachs”	debate,	a	number	of	development	scholars	are	indeed	polarised	in	opinion	over	whether	the	agenda	of	foreign	aid	should	be	pursued.	On	one	side,	theorists	such	as	William	Easterly	believe	 that	 foreign	 aid	 makes	 little	 difference	 to	 the	 lives	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	benefit.	 Contesting	 this,	 Jeffrey	 Sachs,	 along	with	others	 such	 as	 Joseph	Stiglitz	instead	believe	that	 foreign	aid	still	has	an	 important	role	to	play,	not	 in	a	top-down	 imposed	 way,	 but	 in	 a	 holistic	 manner	 that	 is	 appropriate	 to	 local	
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conditions	 and	 culture	 (Edwards,	 2014).	 Paul	 Collier	 (2008)	 notes	 that	 whilst	overseas	assistance	 in	 the	 last	 three	decades	has	contributed	 to	a	one	per	cent	gross	domestic	product	growth	in	some	of	the	world’s	poorest	countries,	vastly	increasing	the	amount	of	aid	donated	to	these	nations	will	not	add	any	more	to	this	 growth	 unless	 technical	 assistance	 and	 the	 skills	 of	 local	 populations	 are	prioritised	(Edwards,	2014:48).	Indeed,	Collier	(2008)	believes	that	there	needs	to	be	more	creativity	 in	 the	development	sector	 in	order	 to	combat	each	of	his	self-described	 “four	 poverty	 traps”	 (2008:5).	 In	 2004,	 United	 Kingdom	 based	NGO	War	on	Want	was	even	more	damning	of	current	development	practice,	and	published	 a	 report	 stating	 that	 current	 development	 approaches	 were	ineffective,	and	 instead	of	 trying	to	correct	 these	 issues	a	complete	overhaul	of	the	 development	 sector	was	 required	 (Simon,	 2006).	 Taking	 this	 into	 account,	and	 all	 the	 aforementioned	 challenges	 faced	 by	 NGOs	 and	 the	 development	sector	 on	 the	 whole,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 what	 lies	 ahead	 for	 these	organisations,	and	what	merit	there	is	continuing	to	support	a	sector	that	seems	so	fraught	with	issues.			It	 is	 important	 to	 make	 note	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Tanzania’s	 socio-cultural	 history	extends	beyond	an	exchange	of	South-North	cultural	 ideas,	with	China	having	a	large	 presence	 in	 the	 country	 since	 the	 1960s	 and	 impacting	 upon	 Nyerere’s	conceptualisation	of	Tanzanian	socialism.	Across	Africa,	China	has	had	the	most	significant	 impact	 in	 Zambia	 and	 Tanzania,	 playing	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	construction	 of	 the	 TAZARA	 railway	 between	 the	 two	 countries	 between	 the	1960s	 and	 1970s	 (Lee,	 2009).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 China	 also	 built	 over	 one	hundred	 factories	 in	 Tanzania	 (Lee,	 2009)	 and	 Tanzania	 had	 a	 stronger	diplomatic	relationship	with	China	compared	 to	any	other	country	at	 that	 time	(Bailey,	1975).	It	is	believed	that	the	success	of	Sino-Tanzanian	relations	can	be	attributed	 to	 the	 sense	 of	 optimism	 provided	 by	 the	 large	 amounts	 of	development	that	the	people	of	Tanzania	could	see	(Lee,	2009)	and	importantly,	the	commonalities	between	each	country’s	development	policy	(Bailey,	1975).	In	addition,	 the	 format	 of	 Chinese	 aid	 differed	 from	 that	 of	 Global	 North	 donors,	normally	being	provided	in	the	form	of	interest	free	loans	on	the	condition	that	Tanzanian	would	begin	to	import	Chinese	goods:	
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	 “The	Tanzanians	–	who	have	seen	too	many	expatriates	come	to	‘develop’	their	country	from	the	comfort	of	an	air	conditioned	office	and	a	luxurious	villa	–	certainly	appreciate	the	Chinese	attitude.”	(Bailey,	1975:43)		However,	 Lee	 (2009)	 discusses	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Chinese	 and	 Tanzanian	work	ethics	 face	 some	 incompatibility	 issues,	 with	 the	 Chinese	 finding	 the	 pace	 at	which	 Tanzanians	work	 frustrating,	 which	 caused	 conflict	 during	 construction	projects	and	in	factories.			
3.7	Challenges	within	the	development	sector,	and	the	future	of	NGOs?			Drawing	upon	ideas	of	crisis	discussed	by	Vigh	(2008)	in	Chapter	1,	the	direction	of	 the	 development	 sector,	 and	more	 broadly,	 Global	 North	 relations	with	 the	Global	 South	 overall,	 must	 be	 examined.	 As	 previously	 discussed,	 the	 original	mandate	 for	 NGOs	 was	 said	 to	 be	 to	 fill	 the	 gaps	 left	 by	 inefficient	 or	underfunded	 state	 provision,	 with	 a	 view	 that	 in	 time	 these	 responsibilities	would	 be	 transferred	 back	 to	 the	 national	 government	 or	 another	 appropriate	providers	 (Molyneux,	 2008;	 Cameron,	 2000).	 Yet	 whilst	 the	 origins	 of	 these	discussions	began	in	the	1990s,	and	large	amounts	of	money	have	been	donated,	allocated,	and	spent	on	various	development	activities	since,	the	industry	shows	no	 sign	 of	 disappearing	 and	 has	 instead	 become	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 many	countries’	governance	frameworks	in	the	developing	world.	Instead	of	existing	as	a	temporary	solution,	NGOs	and	their	development	counterparts	now	exist	as	an	industry	 that	 continues	 to	 grow	 and	 secure	 its	 place	 as	 part	 of	 the	 fabric	 of	developing	 world	 culture.	 As	 organisations	 that	 originally	 existed	 by	 “default	rather	 than	 design”	 (Edwards	 and	 Hulme,	 1996:961),	 increasing	 the	 mandate	and	responsibilities	of	NGOs	without	providing	them	the	resources	to	do	so	has	simply	transferred	the	failures	in	governance	and	service	provision	by	the	state	onto	another	actor.			The	current	 issues	 faced	by	development	organisations	have	been	discussed	at	length	in	this	chapter,	examining	the	implications	of	monitoring,	evaluation	and	
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endless	 report	writing.	The	day	 to	day	practices	of	 organisations	have	become	filled	with	bureaucratic	activities	to	ensure	an	organisation’s	survival,	and	have	taken	significant	time	and	attention	from	the	practical	and	in	some	cases,	radical	activities	 that	 materialise	 in	 measurable	 change.	 This	 provides	 a	 somewhat	ironic	outcome,	when	the	rationale	behind	implementing	these	activities	was	to	promote	 “results-oriented	 development”	 (Mueller-Hirth,	 2012:651)	 when	 the	reality	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 multitude	 of	 reports	 that	 are	 not	 even	 properly	 read	(Wallace,	 2004).	 Downwards	 accountability	 to	 supposed	 beneficiaries	 is	 weak	(Townsend	et	al,	2002,	and	with	these	groups	often	having	no	alternative	means	of	accessing	the	services	an	NGO	may	provide	(Vakil,	1997),	 they	are	unable	to	do	anything	but	accept	what	the	organisation	delivers,	allowing	inadequate	and	inappropriate	provision	to	continue	to	exist	unchallenged.				With	 many	 organisations	 completely	 relying	 on	 a	 small	 number	 of	 donors	 to	carry	out	their	work,	they	exist	on	a	project	to	project	basis,	often	because	their	work	is	not	well	known	enough	to	be	funded	without	significant	effort	(Wallace,	2004).	 	NGOS	must	organise	their	activities	based	on	securing	the	next	 funding	grant,	 resulting	 in	 a	 cyclical	 system	 of	 outputs,	 that	 echoes	 Zizek’s	 ideas	surrounding	a	“parallax	movement”	(from	Ioris,	2012)	in	which	work	continues	to	 be	 produced	 but	 with	 no	 quantifiable	 difference.	 If	 organisations	 with	uncommon	or	innovative	ideas	struggle	to	get	funding	(Wallace,	2004)	because	they	 do	 not	 comply	 with	 development	 rhetoric	 or	 the	 use	 of	 fashionable	buzzwords,	it	is	impossible	for	new	ideas	to	enter	the	foray	or	for	the	NGO	sector	to	reclaim	its	position	as	a	dynamic	one.	Moreover,	heavily	structured	reporting	techniques	required	by	donors	could	mask	the	complex	and	nuanced	successes	of	 any	 grassroots	 based	 NGOs	 (Mueller-Hirth,	 2012),	 which	 could	 eventually	result	in	these	activities	being	abandoned	in	exchange	for	ones	that	appear	more	lucrative	within	reports.			As	opposed	to	paperwork	and	bureaucracy	being	a	necessary	task	that	takes	up	only	 a	 portion	 of	 NGOs	 time,	 the	 current	 situation	 indicates	 that	 it	 is	 instead	taking	up	the	majority	of	it,	creating	a	situation	of	“endemic	crisis”	(Vigh,	2008:7)	whereby	this	situation	has	become	so	normalised	that	these	organisations	exist	
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in	an	entirely	different	way	to	their	time	of	creation.	These	organisations	could	be	said	 to	be	 in	a	state	of	crisis	 simply	because	 their	key	mandate	has	become	somewhat	eroded	by	the	influence	of	neoliberal	governance,	and	there	appears	to	 be	 no	 means	 of	 solution	 to	 reorganise	 the	 balance	 of	 their	 activities.	 As	explained	succinctly	by	de	Santisteban	(2005:200);	“[NGOs]	are	not	only	failing	to	change	the	prevailing	international	order	but	may	even	be	helping	to	sustain	it”.	De	Santisteban	(2005)	expands	 further	on	this,	referring	to	the	existence	of	NGOs	 as	 a	 “tragicomedy”	 (de	 Santisteban,	 2005:206)	 whereby	 roles	 and	activities	 are	 scripted,	 repeated	 and	embedded	 in	 a	 system	where	 the	broader	issues	in	place	seem	too	complex	to	address	and	are	thus	ignored	at	the	expense	of	day	to	day	menial	tasks.			There	is	the	potential	that	these	organisations	end	up	inhibiting	their	success	in	order	 to	 maintain	 their	 longevity,	 holding	 back	 on	 their	 outputs	 in	 order	 to	perpetuate	 their	 employment.	 Although	 undoubtedly	 a	 cynical	 view,	 the	continued	 growth	 of	 the	 sector	 does	 appear	 not	 correlate	with	 any	 significant	change,	 and	whilst	organisations	are	 faced	with	aforementioned	 issues,	 it	does	seem	that	contemporary	development	organisations	are	almost	unrecognisable	from	their	original	counterparts.	Additionally,	Fisher	(1997)	discusses	the	fickle	nature	 of	 the	 development	 industry,	 and	 the	 sector’s	 ability	 to	 generate	 new	ideas	and	disregard	existing	ones.	Fisher	(1997)	warns	that	NGOs	are	very	much	at	risk	of	this	possibility,	and	questions	what	will	be	the	next	supposed	panacea	to	development.	Whilst	Fisher	put	forward	this	idea	almost	twenty	years	ago,	it	should	 still	 be	 considered	 whether	 NGOs	 really	 are	 the	 final	 solution	 for	 the	development	 industry,	 or	 perhaps	 that	 their	 behaviours	 have	 made	 them	 an	indispensible	part	of	governance	and	service	provision	in	the	Global	South.					To	 return	 to	 ideas	 of	 corruption,	 Smith’s	 (2010)	 viewpoint	 that	 corruption	 is	often	 blamed	 for	 the	 failures	 of	 development	 organisations	 in	 Nigeria	 is	pertinent	here;		 “The	use	of	deceptive	mechanisms	for	corruption	has	diffused	throughout	society,	 creating	 a	 popular	 sense	 of	 crisis,	 wherein	 Nigerians	 see	 the	
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repercussions	 of	 corruption	 in	 everyday	 life	 as	 both	 caused	 by	 and	contributing	to	the	demise	of	morality.	The	perception	that	corruption	is	rooted	 in	 social	 amorality	 obscures	 the	 political	 and	 economic	underpinnings	 of	 inequality,	while	 paradoxically	 creating	 hope.”	 (Smith,	2010:248)		As	 such,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 embedded	discourses	of	 corruption	 and	 failure	have	led	to	a	cultural	expectation	within	Nigeria	that	these	issues	are	inevitable.	As	an	avoidance	 tool	 by	 Global	 North	 to	 explain	 the	 limited	 successes	 of	 NGOs	 in	Nigeria,	Nigerians	now	believe	that	their	own	people	are	not	able	to	run	NGOs	by	themselves,	 further	 increasing	 dependence	 on	 the	 Global	 North	 by	 creating	 a	sense	of	crisis	within	Nigerian	managerial	practices	and	morality.			Howes	(1997)	discusses	Esman	and	Uphoff’s	framework	for	the	success	of	strong	local	organisations;		 “Success	 is	 shown	 to	be	partly	 a	 question	of	 how	well	 certain	 functions	are	carried	out	–	the	capacity	to	deal	with	conflict,	 to	plan	effectively,	 to	mobilise	resources,	and	to	execute	routine	resource	management	tasks.”	(Howes,	1997:821)		Using	 this	 framework	 against	 the	 current	 practices	 in	 the	 NGO	 sector,	 NGO’s	ability	for	success	must	be	called	into	question.	NGOs	have	a	limited	capacity	to	deal	with	conflict.	Existing	on	a	project	to	project	basis	means	they	are	unable	to	build	up	any	reserve	resources	for	emergencies,	which	also	undermines	Esman	and	 Uphoff’s	 second	 point,	 their	 ability	 to	 plan	 effectively.	 Current	 NGOs	 are	unable	to	mobilise	resources	to	their	full	potential	because	their	resources	are	so	focused	 on	 these	 “routine	 resource	 management	 tasks”	 (Howes,	 1997:821).	Thus,	 whilst	 this	 framework	 is	 not	 an	 all-encompassing	 assessment	 of	 the	abilities	 of	 NGOs,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 there	 are	 many	 issues	 in	 place	 that	undermine	their	successes.	It	is	the	fact	that	these	issues	are	so	embedded,	and	often	unquestioned,	within	 the	NGO	sector	 that	 reflects	Vigh’s	 (2008:9)	 idea	of	
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“crisis	as	a	constant”,	as	this	problematic	situation	continues	to	perpetuate	with	no	real	move	towards	an	alternative	solution.			
3.8	Conclusion		As	noted	by	Wallace;		 “Recent	 critical	 writings	 on	 NGOs,	 whether	 stressing	 their	 role	 in	fostering	 ‘a	 new	 type	 of	 cultural	 and	 economic	 colonialism’	 or	 in	becoming	 ‘an	 increasingly	 important	part	of	 the	 international	regulatory	system’	 of	 global	 capitalism,	 have	 unfortunately	 painted	 an	 over-generalised	 picture,	 failing	 to	 capture	 the	 concrete	 mechanisms	 and	specific	effects	of	what	is	a	complex	and	contradictory	process”	(Wallace,	2004:202)		Indeed,	 whilst	 at	 times	 this	 chapter	 may	 have	 come	 across	 as	 a	 wholesale	critique	of	the	NGO	sector	and	the	structures	that	allowed	its	rapid	expansion,	it	instead	attempts	 to	 take	 into	account	 the	established	and	recognised	problems	with	this	industry	discussed	in	the	literature	and	to	make	sense	of	these	issues.	NGOs	 have	 become	 adept	 at	 externally	 enforced	 auditing	 practices,	 at	 the	detriment	of	their	core	values	(Mueller-Hirth,	2012)	Nonetheless,	Vakil’s	(1997)	attempt	 to	 provide	 a	 taxonomy	 of	 NGOs	 is	 pertinent	 here;	 although	 these	aforementioned	 issues	 broadly	 affect	 the	 sector	 and	 its	 practices,	 this	 chapter	does	 not	 mean	 to	 dismiss	 the	 meaningful	 work	 done	 by	 these	 organisations	across	 the	 globe,	 and	 the	 significant	 impact	 that	 their	 work	 can	 have	 on	 a	number	of	individual’s	lives.	As	noted	by	Fisher	(1997:447)	“the	generalisations	about	the	NGO	sector	obscure	the	tremendous	diversity	found	within	it”.		The	discourse	surrounding	participation	has	been	problematic,	with	thinly	veiled	promises	of	 empowerment	 and	 increased	 attention	being	paid	 to	 the	 voices	 of	those	 experiencing	 the	 issues	 that	 NGOs	 wish	 to	 mitigate	 failing	 to	 make	 any	measurable	difference.	Igoe	(2003),	discussing	his	research	in	Tanzania,	goes	as	far	to	say	that;	
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	 “Communities	 become	 commodities	 of	 an	 international	 NGO	 industry,	rather	 than	 active	 participants	 in	 Tanzanian	 civil	 society.”	 (Igoe,	2003:881)		Whilst	Hickey	and	Mohan	(2004)	are	of	 the	mindset	 that	participation,	despite	all	 its	failures,	is	“better	than	nothing”	(Walker	et	al,	2007:438)	there	are	still	a	number	 of	 recognised	 issues	 that	 must	 be	 addressed	 before	 this	 form	 of	development	activity	continues	to	be	promoted.	Townsend	et	al	(2004)	suggest	that	the	neoliberal	version	of	empowerment	is	simply	being	given	small	pieces	of	power	 by	 those	 in	 control,	 rather	 than	 empowerment	 originating	 from	 an	individual’s	 own	 doing.	 The	 difficulty	 faced	 in	 maintaining	 an	 organisation’s	survival	often	neglects	the	needs	of	the	poor,	creating	a	dichotomy	between	what	participation	 means	 when	 written	 into	 funding	 proposals,	 and	 how	 it	materialises	in	reality	(Porter,	2003).				Instead,	 in	 some	 instances	 this	 chapter	 has	 questioned	 the	 very	 existence	 of	these	 development	 organisations	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 As	 their	 temporary	 and	responsive	 nature	 has	 been	 eroded,	 fully	 integrating	 them	 into	 Global	 South	governance	frameworks,	the	continued	transfer	of	responsibilities	from	states	to	these	 organisations	 fails	 to	 address	 the	 broader	 structural	 issues	 in	 place,	 and	continues	 the	 uneven	 power	 dynamics	 that	 exist	 between	 the	 North	 and	 the	South.	 The	ways	 in	which	 Northern	 development	 ideology	 has	 impacted	 upon	the	work	of	grassroots-based	organisations	 in	 the	South	has	been	examined	as	well	 as	 the	 changing	 trajectory	 of	 these	 types	 of	 organisations	 as	 the	development	 sector	 becomes	 increasingly	 globalised	 and	 configured	 by	international	 donors.	 The	 current	 system	 of	 decentralised	 and	 non-governmental	 governance	 maintains	 the	 temporary	 solutions	 that	 fail	 to	implement	significant	change,	and	offer	no	clear	strategy	for	solving	the	various	development	 issues,	 or	 a	 recognisable	 ‘end	 point’,	 whereby	 the	 role	 of	 these	organisations	will	become	obsolete.	An	industry	that’s	success	is	measured	upon	organisations	closing	down,	offices	being	cleared	out	and	individuals	losing	jobs	elucidates	Vigh’s	(2008:7)	idea	of	“endemic	crisis”.	Conversely,	it	must	be	noted	
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that	this	is	not	an	argument	for	the	wholesale	return	of	power	to	the	state.	Whilst	Lawrence	and	Brun	(2011:75)	discuss	“responsibilities	that	should	rightly	fall	to	the	government”,	this	fails	to	recognise	the	inability	of	certain	states	to	fulfil	their	responsibilities,	or	the	availability	of	other	sectors	at	doing	so	more	efficiently.				NGOs	 cannot	 expect	 to	 replicate	 the	 same	 work	 carried	 out	 by	 bilateral	 and	multilateral	 aid	 organisations,	 but	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 their	 locally	 based	work	 exists	 in	 a	 development	 vacuum	 (Drabek,	 1987).	 Amongst	 concerns	 that	NGOs	have	lost	their	“critical	voice	and	role”	(Townsend	et	al,	2004:871),	it	could	be	argued	that	NGOs	should	pay	more	attention	to	their	radical	origins	and	less	to	donor	and	other	financially	related	pressures.	However,	as	the	sector	becomes	increasingly	 turgid,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 ignore	 these	 issues	and	continue	 to	exist	as	organisations	without	paying	a	significant	level	of	attention	to	them.	 	Ferguson,	(1994:255)	 notes	 that	 “reducing	 poverty	 to	 a	 technical	 problem”	 and	 offering	affected	 communities	 technical	 solutions	 fails	 to	 address	 the	 problematic	structures	in	place,	depoliticising	a	previously	radical	and	progressive	sector.	As	the	issues	faced	in	the	Global	South	such	as	poverty,	environmental	degradation,	and	 the	 provision	 of	 services	 become	 increasingly	 complex	 and	 interlinked,	NGOs	should	recognise	the	role	they	play	in	the	governance	framework,	and	how	to	make	the	best	of	this.				Taking	 these	 ideas	 into	 account,	 this	 research	 aims	 to	 provide	 an	 account	 of	NGOs	working	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania	and	the	dynamics	and	challenges	that	exist	within	this	industry.	Issues	such	as	funding,	monitoring	and	evaluation	and	inter-sectoral	politics	will	be	examined	through	an	in-depth	analysis	of	two	organisations	as	well	as	interviews	across	a	number	of	water	NGOs,	in	order	to	ascertain	 how	 the	 myriad	 themes	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	 reflect	 Dar	 es	Salaam’s	water	 sector.	 Through	 participant	 observation	 and	 interviews	 on	 the	issues	 faced	 by	 these	 organisations,	 this	 research	 aims	 to	 provide	 a	contemporary	 analysis	 on	 the	practices	of	 the	NGO	 sector	 in	Tanzania	 and	 the	impact	that	their	work	has.	This	work	will	aim	to	conceptualise	this	data	against	the	 backdrop	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 complex	 and	multi-layered	water	 governance	and	policy	framework,	and	in	addition,	discuss	the	ways	in	which	communities	in	
	 97	
the	 city	 experience	 the	action	of	 these	organisations	and	play	an	active	 role	 in	their	local	area’s	access	to	water..	In	addition,	through	my	own	experiences	as	a	researcher	 and	 other	 data	 collected,	 the	 aforementioned	 power	 relations	between	the	Global	North	and	the	Global	South	will	be	explored.	Building	upon	the	discussion	of	neoliberalism	 in	Chapter	2,	 alongside	 the	 supposed	 “complex	theories”	 (Briggs	 and	Sharp,	2004:662)	of	Postcolonial	 literature,	 this	 research	aims	 to	explain	 the	current	water	provision	 in	Dar	es	Salaam,	and	 theorise	 the	variety	of	complexity	that	exists	within	it.																					
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Chapter	4:	Research	Design	and	Methodological	Reflections		
4.1	Introduction		Del	Casino	Jr.	et	al	(2000)	explain	that:		 “Methodology	requires	the	translation	of	epistemological	and	ontological	precepts	and	assumptions	into	‘data’	that	can	be	analysed”	(Del	Casino	Jr.	et	al,	2000:523).		They	suggest	 that	a	methodology	should	follow	the	process	of	selecting	objects	for	 analysis,	 conceptualising	 data	 collection,	 and	 deciding	 upon	 the	 research	being	 address.	 Taking	 this	 into	 account,	 this	 chapter	 will	 explore	 the	 ways	 in	which	 I	 collected	 my	 data	 for	 this	 thesis,	 as	 well	 as	 my	 justifications	 for	 the	research	used,	and	the	power-relations	and	ethical	challenges	intrinsically	linked	to	this	research.	Through	an	in	depth	discussion	of	my	research	methods	and	the	impacts	 of	 my	 positionality	 and	 the	 power-relations	 inherent	 in	 conducting	research	 in	 the	Global	South,	 this	 chapter	endeavours	 to	explore	 the	myriad	of	aspects	 that	 must	 be	 considered	 when	 researching	 water	 governance	 in	Tanzania.			Taking	 some	 of	 the	 key	 discussions	 surrounding	 various	 research	 techniques	into	account,	as	well	consulting	literature	that	has	employed	these	techniques	in	various	settings,	I	have	attempted	to	explore	fully	the	myriad	of	issues	that	can	be	faced	when	conducting	fieldwork,	and	more	specifically,	the	specificities	that	can	result	from	this	data	collection	taking	place	in	the	Global	South.	I	will	use	the	experiences	 of	 other	 researchers	 and	 literary	 discussions	 of	 methodologies	 to	relate	to	my	own	experiences	of	fieldwork	in	Tanzania,	and	explore	in	depth	the	varying	 methodological	 issues	 that	 are	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	 this	 research	project.			This	 chapter	 firstly	 explains	 in	 detail	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 this	 research	 was	conducted.	The	chapter	then	explores	some	of	the	politics	of	conducting	research	
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and	 the	 challenges	 surrounding	 my	 positionality	 as	 a	 white,	 young,	 solo	researcher	 from	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 conducting	 research	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	After	some	personal	reflections	from	the	field	the	chapter	takes	each	of	the	data	gathering	methods	used	 in	 this	 research	 in	 turn	and	discusses	 the	 justification	for	using	 them	and	explains	how	they	were	employed	 in	 the	 field.	The	chapter	finishes	with	how	 the	data	was	 transcribed	 and	 interpreted,	 before	 reaching	 a	conclusion.			Denzin	and	Lincoln	(2000)	note	that:		 “Qualitative	research	is	a	situated	activity	in	the	world.	It	consists	of	a	set	of	 interpretive,	material	practices	that	makes	the	world	visible.”	(Denzin	and	Lincoln,	2000,	from	Ritchie	and	Lewis,	2003:2)		It	is	therefore	clear	why	qualitative	research	is	the	appropriate	methodology	for	this	project,	as	it	will	enable	the	subtleties	and	nuances	of	water	governance	in	Tanzania	 to	be	examined	 fully,	 to	 see	what	 is	unseen.	Researching	 the	 topic	of	water	governance	in	Dar	es	Salaam	from	a	qualitative	perspective	allows	for	the	myriad	 understandings	 and	 perceptions	 of	 the	 city’s	 water	 sector	 to	 be	examined,	 and	 in	 turn,	 compare	and	contrast	 these	understandings	 in	order	 to	achieve	a	robust	understanding	of	the	current	situation.	From	the	perspective	of	critical	 realism,	 this	research	attempts	 to	understand	the	structures	 that	are	 in	place	 (Bryman,	 2008:14)	 with	 respect	 to	 water	 provision	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam,	Tanzania.	Using	a	combination	of	research	methods,	this	research	attempted	to	understand	the	structures	in	place	that	form	the	water	governance	framework	in	Tanzania,	 whilst	 considering	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 practices	 and	 prevalent	discourses	that	individuals	are	involved	in	when	navigating	these	structures.			Through	 conducting	 the	 majority	 of	 data	 collection	 through	 participant	observation,	 this	 research	 aims	 to	 explore	 what	 Cook	 (2005:167)	 explains	 as	viewing	 people	 “from	 the	 ‘inside’,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 their	 everyday,	 lived	experiences”	in	order	to	understand	the	complexity	of	water	governance	in	Dar	es	 Salaam.	 Supplemented	 by	 interview	 data	 and	 documentary	 analysis,	 this	
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research	attempts	to	provide	a	robust	and	comprehensive	account	of	the	ways	in	which	residents	of	Dar	es	Salaam	access	water	and	the	challenges	that	they	face	in	doing	so.			
4.2	Research	design		The	 fieldwork	 period	 for	 this	 research	 was	 carried	 out	 over	 a	 during	 two	fieldwork	periods	in	Tanzania	in	2013	and	2014,	comprising	of	around	eighteen	weeks	 of	 fieldwork	 in	 total.	 This	 research	 also	 uses	 data	 from	 my	 Masters	research	 into	 the	 water	 sector	 in	 Tanzania,	 which	 served	 as	 an	 interrelated	project	 to	 this	 thesis.	 As	 well	 as	 conducting	 research	 with	 two	 civil	 society	organisations	 working	 in	 the	 water	 sector	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 five	 in-depth	interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 those	 working	 for	 other	 organisations	 in	 the	same	 sector.	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 interviews	were	 conducted	with	 two	 separate	representatives	from	the	Ministry	of	Water,	as	well	as	one	with	at	the	municipal	government	office	in	Temeke.	Interviews	and	focus	groups	were	conducted	with	customers,	 board	members,	 and	 community	 water	 scheme	 employees	 in	 both	case	study	areas.7		The	 case	 study	 is	 referred	 to	 by	 Flyvbjerg	 (from	 Seale	 et	 al,	 2007:390)	 as	 a	detailed	examination	of	a	single	sample;	a	study	of	a	phenomenon	within	its	real-life	setting	(Kitchin	and	Tate,	2000:225).	Whilst	case	studies	have	been	critiqued	for	being	context–biased	and	 for	 their	 lack	of	 contribution	 to	wider	 theoretical	frameworks	(Flyvbjerg,	from	Seale	et	al,	2007:391),	Loftus	and	Sultana	(2012:7)	have	commented	that	 in	 terms	of	water	a	geographic	specificity	 to	 the	study	 is	required	 to	 understand	 the	 complexities	 of	 the	 water	 system	 being	 studied.	Scheyvens	and	Storey	(2003:65)	claim	that	the	task	of	qualitative	research	is	not	to	 come	 up	 with	 undisputable	 truths,	 but	 it	 is	 my	 belief	 that	 by	 using	 a	 case	study,	 this	 research	will	 be	 able	 to	 produce	 truths	 about	Dar	 es	 Salaam	of	 the	specific	 temporal	 context	 during	 which	 this	 research	 was	 undertaken.	 This	research	aims	to	use	a	case	study	approach	to	elucidate	individual	properties	of	
																																																								7	For	full	details	of	the	fieldwork	carried	out	in	this	research,	see	the	appendices	of	this	thesis.	
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specific	 situations,	 as	 well	 as	 provide	 some	 commentary	 on	 the	 underlying	debates	of	water	governance	in	the	Global	South.		The	 first	 organisation	 in	 this	 research,	Water	Project	Management	 (WPM),	 are	located	in	a	small	office	in	the	Kinondoni	district	of	the	city	and	employ	around	ten	members	of	staff.	Their	output	generally	involves	the	provision	of	technical	training	to	community	water	projects	both	in	Dar	es	Salaam	and	across	Tanzania,	and	their	funding	for	this	work	comes	from	donors	or	other	larger	organisations	on	an	adhoc	basis.	The	other	organisation,	Tanzania	Water	Network	(TWN),	are	situated	in	an	office	in	another	area	of	Dar	es	Salaam,	also	within	the	district	of	Kinondoni,	 and	 largely	 exist	 as	 a	 co-ordination	 organisation	 for	 all	 small	organisations	working	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania.	As	well	as	co-ordinating	the	 network,	 TWN	 carry	 out	 work	 of	 their	 own,	 including	 technical	 training,	education	workshops	 and	 liaising	 closely	with	 the	Ministry	 of	Water	 on	 large,	government	related	initiatives,	such	as	Maji	Week.	 	WPM	were	former	members	of	 TWN’s	 official	 network,	 and	 during	my	 research	 both	 organisations	worked	together	on	several	projects	within	Dar	es	Salaam.		This	research	also	made	use	of	two	case	study	areas	of	Dar	es	Salaam	in	order	to	elucidate	the	complexities	of	water	provision	that	occur	within	specific	localities	and	amongst	communities.	The	first	case	study	involved	in	this	research	was	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	Water	Project,	 located	across	 three	villages	within	 the	Temeke	district	of	Dar	es	Salaam.	This	project	was	part	of	a	wider	 initiative	of	 fourteen	water	 projects	 established	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 large	 amount	 of	Belgian	 donor	 money.	 The	 Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	 project	 had	 an	 official	 board	 of	management,	 as	well	 as	eight	elected	committee	members	 in	each	of	 the	 three	areas	 the	 project	 covered.	 Residents	 typically	 accessed	water	 from	 the	 project	using	 communal	 wells	 dispersed	 across	 the	 three	 areas.	 The	 project	 also	 had	strong	 links	 with	 local	 government	 representatives	 and	 the	 board	 of	management	 worked	 closely	 with	 them	 to	 manage	 the	 project.	 The	 Mitonga	Water	 Users	 Group,	 situated	 in	 Ilala,	 was	 a	 fast	 growing	 community	 water	scheme	that	had	started	in	the	area	but	had	since	began	making	links	with	local	government	 and	 NGOs.	 Managed	 by	 a	 board	 including	 a	 chairperson,	
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maintenance	officer	and	an	accountant,	the	scheme	also	had	a	committee	of	eight	elected	 community	 members	 to	 assist	 in	 managing	 the	 project.	 Residents	accessed	 water	 from	 the	 project	 through	 either	 communal	 wells	 who	 were	watched	 by	 security	 guards,	 or	 household	wells	managed	 by	 local	 community	members.	All	names	of	organisations	and	community	groups	have	been	replaced	with	 synonyms	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 the	 anonymity	 of	 research	 participants.	 In	addition	 to	 this,	 the	 locations	of	 these	groups	has	only	been	referred	 to	by	 the	district	of	Dar	es	Salaam	that	they	operate	in,	to	further	anonymise	participants.	Both	 case	 studies	 were	 selected	 based	 on	 recommendations	 from	 interview	participants	 as	 well	 as	 TWN	 and	 WMP	 staff	 after	 I	 expressed	 an	 interest	 in	studying	community	water	provision	in	Tanzania.	Suggestions	were	made	about	which	 areas	 of	 the	 city	 I	 should	 look	 into,	 and	 it	was	 only	 after	making	 initial	contact	in	these	areas	I	specified	which	projects	and	communities	I	would	carry	out	my	data	collection	with.																					
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Figure	4.1	Ward	Map	of	Dar	 es	 Salaam	 (reproduced	with	permission	 from	Mike	
Shand,	School	of	Geographical	and	Earth	Sciences,	University	of	Glasgow)																									Both	 TWN	 and	 WMP	 were	 approached	 as	 a	 result	 of	 connections	 made	 in	previous	research	trips	to	Tanzania	8	and	were	asked	if	they	would	be	willing	for	me	to	volunteer	at	their	organisation	as	part	of	my	research.		Both	organisations	were	small	in	size,	with	less	than	ten	members	of	staff,	and	worked	closely	with	communities	 to	 improve	 their	 water	 provision,	 either	 through	 maintenance	training	or	the	hosting	of	activities	such	as	handwashing	workshops.	I	explained	
																																																								8	During	my	undergraduate	and	Masters	fieldwork.	
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to	both	TWN	and	WPM	that	my	research	was	interested	in	their	organisational	practice	and	the	work	carried	out	on	a	day	to	day	basis.	Through	working	there	two	 or	 three	 days	 a	 week	 on	 a	 voluntary	 basis	 during	 the	 final	 period	 of	fieldwork,	 I	 expressed	my	 intention	 to	 attempt	 to	 understand	 the	workings	 of	their	 organisation	 within	 the	 water	 sector	 in	 Tanzania	 on	 the	 whole,	 and	 the	challenges	 that	 they	 faced	 in	 carrying	out	 their	work.	 In	 terms	of	my	 role	 as	 a	volunteer,	 the	 expectation	 from	 both	 TWN	 and	 WMP	 was	 that	 I	 helped	 with	small	 administrative	 tasks	 when	 there	 was	 work	 available.	 Overall	 both	organisations	were	supportive	of	my	research	and	made	an	effort	to	ensure	I	had	access	to	a	number	of	key	documents	and	was	invited	along	to	any	events	they	thought	 might	 be	 useful	 for	 me.	 Examples	 of	 these	 events	 were	 planning	meetings	for	events	or	update	meetings	with	other	organisations	working	in	the	sector.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 results	 of	 my	 data,	 no	 official	 request	 was	 made	 from	either	organisation	for	access,	but	representatives	from	TWN	and	WMP	attended	a	data	dissemination	workshop	I	held	at	the	end	of	my	fieldwork	in	Tanzania.				After	 three	 months	 of	 volunteering	 at	 these	 organisations,	 data	 based	 on	 my	observations	was	collected	in	a	field	diary	and	a	field	notebook.	The	distinction	between	 these	 two	documents	 is	 important,	where	 the	 field	diary	was	used	 to	write	extended,	and	at	times,	reflective	accounts	of	my	thoughts	on	my	data.	This	method	of	writing	gave	me	an	opportunity	to	critically	reflect	upon	the	data	I	had	collected	so	far,	and	enabled	me	to	organise	my	thoughts	for	subsequent	pieces	of	data	collection	during	the	fieldwork	period.	The	field	notebook	instead	served	as	a	vessel	for	these	“scratch	notes”	(Allsop	et	al,	2010:209),	as	a	place	where	I	could	write	down	quick	statements	or	pieces	of	information	collected,	or	even	to	remind	myself	of	something	that	I	should	explore	at	a	later	date.	Although	both	organisations	I	volunteered	at	were	aware	I	was	a	researcher,	at	times	I	was	not	sure	if	they	were	aware	of	how	observational	my	research	was	in	nature9.	As	a	result,	 sometimes	 I	would	write	openly	 in	my	 field	notebook	whereas	on	other	occasions	I	would	conceal	this	activity	either	by	waiting	for	people	to	 leave	the	
																																																								9	For	discussions	of	the	politics	of	research	and	the	complexities	of	the	‘inside/outside’	relationship	when	conducting	ethnographic	research,	see	later	sections	in	this	chapter.		
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room	 or	 going	 to	 the	 toilet	 to	 write	 up	 notes	 quickly,	 an	 example	 of	 the	‘ethnographers’	bladder’,	as	discussed	by	Cook	(2005).			My	day-to-day	experiences	during	my	observation	tended	to	vary.	As	explained	by	 Allsop	 et	 al	 (2010),	 as	 a	 research	method,	 ethnographic	 and	 observational	research	is	difficult	to	plan	in	advance	of	the	fieldwork	period.	I	therefore	had	to	adopt	my	data	collection	on	a	regular	basis	in	order	to	fit	in	with	the	daily	task	of	the	organisations	being	studied.	My	time	was	largely	spent	in	the	offices	of	each	organisation,	either	helping	out	with	daily	tasks	(which	ranged	from	things	such	as	 folding	promotional	 items	of	clothing	to	writing	reports)	or	reading	through	documents	that	the	organisation	had	given	me	so	that	I	could	learn	about	their	work.	Occasionally,	I	was	invited	to	attend	meetings	alongside	members	of	TWN	and	WPM,	 and	was	 generally	 presented	 in	 these	meetings	 as	 a	member	 of	 the	respective	 organisation	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 researcher.	 These	 meetings	 led	 to	 a	number	of	encounters	with	other	 stakeholders	 in	 the	water	 sector	 in	Tanzania	and	 also	 led	 to	 me	 being	 introduced	 to	 individuals	 who	 would	 later	 become	interview	participants	 during	my	 fieldwork.	 Lastly,	 for	 TWN	 I	was	 involved	 in	the	planning	and	hosting	of	a	community	sensitisation	workshop	in	a	village	on	the	outskirts	of	Dar	es	Salaam.	TWN	and	WMP	also	served	as	a	means	of	access	and	introduction	to	other	stakeholders	in	the	water	sector	within	Dar	es	Salaam,	and	enabled	me	to	find	other	research	participants;		 “[The	chairman	of	TWN]	is	going	to	set	up	loads	of	meetings	with	smaller	water	CSOs	and	also	I’ll	be	doing	some	administration	and	report	writing	for	 TAWASANET	 themselves.	 Afterwards	 I	 went	 to	 WPM	 who	 kindly	drove	me	 to	Temeke	 to	meet	 an	MWST.	After	 that	we	drove	with	 some	MWST	members	 to	 meet	 a	 COWSO.	 This	 type	 of	 research	 is	 great	 as	 I	don’t	really	feel	like	I’m	imposing	too	much,	as	WPM	need	to	continually	monitor	local	COWSOs	and	also	MWSTs	anyway.”	(Field	Diary,	22nd	June	2013)		Both	organisations	also	helped	me	to	access	participants	working	in	other	NGOs	and	 civil	 society	 organisations	 within	 Dar	 es	 Salaam.	 For	 the	 five	 in-depth	
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interviews	I	carried	out	with	these	organisations,	meetings	were	either	set	up	by	the	 chairman	 of	 TWN	or	 the	 chairman	 of	WMP,	 or	 I	would	 come	 across	 these	organisations	during	my	day	at	the	TWN	or	WMP	offices.	In	addition,	sometimes	I	would	 attend	meetings	 alongside	members	 of	 staff	 from	TWN	and	WMP	 and	would	 be	 introduced	 to	 individuals	 there,	 which	 gave	 me	 an	 opportunity	 to	explain	 my	 research	 to	 them	 and	 ask	 if	 I	 could	 interview	 them.	 	 Whilst	participants	from	these	organisations	have	been	fully	anonymised	in	this	thesis,	and	each	organisation	only	referred	to	by	a	numeric	value,	some	context	on	the	organisations	included	is	displayed	below.																									
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Table	4.1	NGOs	and	Civil	Society	Organisations	involved	in	this	research		Organisation	 Description	NGO	#1	 An	organisation	that	comprises	of	a	network	of	over	seventy	NGOs	registered	in	Tanzania,	that	has	been	in	operation	since	2002.	NGO	#1	is	focused	on	a	number	of	topics	across	all	sectors	of	Tanzanian	governance,	 and	 the	 organisation	 largely	 works	 towards	strengthening	the	voice	of	civil	society	and	enabling	organisations	to	work	together	towards	the	same	goals.		NGO	#2	 NGO	#2	is	an	internationally	recognised	organisation	for	their	work	in	 the	 water	 sector,	 that	 has	 been	 in	 operation	 for	 a	 number	 of	years.	Their	work	involves	project-based	efforts	as	well	as	enabling	local	organisations	to	carry	out	local	work	in	partnership	with	this	organisation.		NGO	#3	 This	 organisation	 was	 set	 up	 by	 a	 group	 of	 locally	 based	environmental	 engineers	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam.	 NGO	 #3	 provides	technical	expertise	to	communities	 in	water	projects	 in	 their	area,	and	they	have	been	in	operation	less	than	a	decade.		NGO	#4	 NGO	#4	 has	 been	 in	 operation	 since	 2009	 and	 is	 a	medium-sized	Tanzanian	NGO	that	works	across	a	number	of	sectors.	They	focus	on	 research,	 advocacy	and	 innovative	approaches	 to	development	in	Tanzania.	NGO	#5	 As	an	established	international	organisation,	NGO	#5	works	across	a	 number	 of	 sectors	 in	 development,	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	human	 rights	 and	policy	 advocacy.	The	organisation	have	been	 in	operation	 in	 Tanzania	 since	 the	 1950s,	 in	 both	 an	 emergency	capacity	and	as	part	of	the	wider	NGO	community.	Within	the	water	sector,	 the	 organisation	 focus	 on	 research	 into	 improving	 water	and	sanitation,	especially	for	young	people	in	Tanzania.				Within	my	days	 spent	at	my	case	 study	communities,	 the	days	would	be	 spent	either	 interviewing	those	who	managed	or	sat	on	the	committee	of	community	water	organisations	or	 the	customers	 that	purchased	their	water.	Some	days	 it	would	generally	be	 the	case	 that	one	community	member	would	guide	 the	day	and	introduce	me	to	other	research	participants,	which	enabled	me	to	speak	to	
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around	twenty	individual	members	in	each	case	study	community.	Occasionally	these	 individuals	 preferred	 to	 be	 interviewed	 collectively,	 and	 instead	 a	 focus	group	format	was	used	to	collect	data.			Interview	questions	tended	to	be	based	on	the	role	of	 the	participant	 in	Dar	es	Salaam’s	 water	 sector.	 When	 interviewing	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Water,	 questions	focused	around	water	governance	and	policy	implementation,	as	well	as	some	of	the	key	terminology	in	use	in	contemporary	water	policy	discourse	in	the	city.	In	terms	 of	 NGOs	 included	 in	 this	 research,	 participants	 were	 asked	 questions	surrounding	 their	 role	 in	 the	 sector	 and	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 city’s	 residents	accessing	water,	as	well	as	the	challenges	faced	in	working	in	their	organisation	and	how	this	had	changed	over	time.	Within	communities,	both	interviewees	and	focus	group	attendees	were	asked	about	their	means	of	accessing	water	and	how	this	 was	 managed	 within	 the	 community,	 as	 well	 as	 any	 inhibiting	 factors.	Questions	 also	 covered	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 their	 respective	 locality’s	means	 of	accessing	water	had	changed	over	time,	and	in	terms	of	the	broader	changes	in	Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 water	 sector	 being	 discussed	 at	 within	 policy	 and	 NGO	documentation,	how	these	had	materialised	at	the	grassroots	level.		In	 interview	 and	 focus	 group	 settings,	 I	 employed	 the	 use	 of	 a	 translator	who	translated	 for	 me	 during	 interviews	 and	 focus	 groups.	 I	 made	 every	 effort	 to	ensure	the	translator	I	worked	with	during	this	research	was	of	a	high	standard	and	understood	fully	what	the	research	was	aiming	to	achieve.	Every	interview	or	 focus	 group	 where	 the	 translator	 was	 involved	 was	 preceded	 by	 a	conversation	in	which	the	aims	of	the	encounter	were	discussed	in	depth.	During	interviews,	 the	 translator	and	 I	communicated	 throughout,	which	also	gave	me	an	 opportunity	 to	 ask	 ad	 hoc	 questions	 based	 on	 respondents’	 answers.	Additionally,	a	conversation	was	held	immediately	after	every	interview	or	focus	group	 to	 confirm	 the	 data	 collected	 and	 to	 ensure	 that	 any	 nuances	 of	 the	translation	 had	 not	 been	 misunderstood.	 Based	 on	 previous	 challenging	experiences	working	with	other	translators,	this	method	ensured	a	harmonious	working	 relationship	 between	 myself	 and	 the	 translator	 during	 this	 research,	
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and	 ensured	 that	 a	 robust	 and	 accurate	 set	 of	 data	 was	 collected	 during	interviews	and	focus	groups.		
4.3	 My	 positionality,	 reflexivity	 and	 conducting	 research	 in	 the	 Global	
South		As	 noted	 by	 the	 Women	 and	 Geography	 Study	 Group	 (Mullings,	 1999),	‘knowledge	 is	 never	 pure	 but	 situated	 in	 the	 complex	 and	 sometimes	contradictory	 social	 locations	 of	 producers	 and	 audiences’.	 Therefore,	 when	conducting	academic	research,	collecting	raw	data	and	drawing	conclusions	from	it,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 situate	 you	 as	 a	 person	 within	 the	 research	 process	 and	understand	 what	 implications	 this	 has.	 A	 close	 similarity	 or	 vast	 differences	between	 the	 researcher	 and	 those	 being	 researched	 can	 have	 a	 significant	implication	on	how	data	 is	 collected	 and	understood	and	whilst	 some	of	 these	issues	 will	 always	 exist,	 an	 acknowledgement	 of	 them	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 more	comprehensive	and	nuanced	set	of	results.	As	well	as	the	Women	and	Geography	Study	 Group,	 since	 the	 1970s	 (Murray	 and	 Overton,	 2003)	 a	 number	 of	 other	Feminist	 scholars	 have	 drawn	 attention	 to	 the	 need	 to	 explore	 relationships	between	 the	 researcher	 and	 their	 participants	 and	 the	 aspects	 of	 positionality	that	 can	 affect	 these	 relationships.	 They	 believe	 that	 every	 ‘individual	 and	group’s	 position	 in	 contextually	 specific	 yet	 enduring	 networks	 of	 power	 and	privilege’	(Eubanks,	2012:228)	and	that	this	impacts	upon	our	knowledge	of	our	research,	our	knowledge	of	ourselves	as	a	researcher,	and	how	these	combine	to	produce	results.		Before	 discussing	 the	 specificities	 of	 my	 data	 collection	 for	 this	 thesis,	 it	 is	important	 to	 examine	my	 own	 positionality	 as	 a	 young,	white,	 single,	 Scottish	woman	 in	 Tanzania	 and	 how	 this	 impacted	 upon	 the	 entire	 research	 process.	Gabriel	 (2000)	 reinforces	 the	 importance	 of	 reflexivity	 in	 current	 academic	research,	 as	 a	means	 to	 overcome	 ideas	 of	 ‘value	 free’	 research	 that	 does	 not	acknowledge	a	hidden	bias	in	a	researcher’s	analysis	of	their	data.	Furthermore,	whilst	Lee-Treweek	(2000)	discusses	a	reluctance	 to	discuss	her	own	thoughts	and	feelings	about	the	research	process	 in	an	academic	capacity,	 I	would	argue	
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that	 in	 many	 cases	 the	 epistemological	 impacts	 of	 the	 researcher	 on	 their	findings	 is	 every	 bit	 as	 important	 as	 the	 raw	 data	 that	 they	 collect.	 The	problematic	 nature	 of	 research	 conducted	 by	 ‘“development	 experts”	 from	 the	West	(Briggs	and	Sharp,	2004:662),	as	alluded	to	in	Chapter	3,	places	even	more	relevance	on	self-exploration	of	my	role	in	the	research	process.	By	considering	the	 dynamics	 of	 my	 postionality	 and	 role	 in	 the	 research	 process	 allows	 for	epistemological	analysis	of	the	data	created,	and	provides	further	insight	into	the	postcolonial	elements	of	discussion	included	throughout	this	thesis.			One	of	the	most	difficult	aspects	of	research	in	the	Global	South	to	overcome	is	justifying	the	research	in	the	first	place.	Scheyvens	and	Storey	(2003)	discuss	at	length	the	almost	existential	crisis	faced	by	researchers	carrying	out	fieldwork	in	the	 developing	 world,	 whereby	 they	 fear	 becoming	 ‘academic	 tourists’	 or	‘research	 travellers’	 (Scheyvens	 and	 Storey,	 2003:2).	 It	 is	 not	 clear	 however,	what	 can	 be	 gained	 from	 abandoning	 research	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 altogether.	This	 would	 only	 exacerbate	 the	 separation	 between	 the	 West	 and	 the	 South	(Scheyvens	and	Storey,	2003),	 and	would	 continue	 to	make	academic	 research	from	institutions	in	the	Global	South	marginalised	and	ignored.	What	is	instead	useful	 is	to	acknowledge	the	potential	 issues	as	a	Western	researcher	in	Africa,	and	make	every	effort	to	overcome	them.	In	fact,	whilst	Razavi	(from	Scheyvens	et	al,	2003)	felt	that	being	a	young,	small,	single	woman	conducting	research	in	her	 home	 country	 of	 Iran	 helped	 to	 reduce	 power	 relations,	 it	 must	 also	 be	considered	how	this	reflects	my	own	research.	Conducting	research	outwith	my	own	 country	 could	 reinforce	West/South	 dynamics,	 but	 my	 physical	 presence	may	 reduce	 this,	 and	 in	 many	 situations	 my	 reliance	 on	 others	 for	 access	 to	information	 may	 reduce	 any	 possible	 ‘exploitative’	 tendencies	 in	 my	 research	overall.10		There	 is	 also	 an	 element	 of	 safety	 that	 must	 be	 considered	 when	 conducting	fieldwork.	 Leslie	 and	 Storey	 (2003)	 discuss	 the	 day	 to	 day	 aspects	 of	 avoiding	and	managing	illnesses	like	food	poisoning	when	in	the	field.	As	a	result,	there	is																																																									10	There	is	a	more	in	depth	discussion	of	the	power	dynamics	that	can	exist	in	research	later	on	in	this	chapter.	
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a	definite	sense	of	never	fully	separating	from	the	role	as	a	researcher	when	in	the	field.	Practices	such	as	taking	anti-malarial	medication	and	washing	hands	a	little	more	often	than	you	do	at	home	become	 inherent	aspects	of	 the	research	experience,	certain	smells,	sounds	and	behaviours	become	associated	with	being	the	field	and	collecting	data.	There	are	however	more	serious	safety	issues	that	must	 be	 considered.	 Peterson	 (2000)	 reflects	 on	 an	 incident	 where	 a	 man	approached	him	drunkenly	with	a	knife	in	Mexico	and	how	when	he	discussed	it	with	 locals,	 they	 explained	 that	 Peterson	 as	 a	 male	 should	 be	 able	 to	 handle	himself	on	the	street,	but	his	partner	(also	 in	the	 field	with	him)	should	not	be	out	unaccompanied.	This	provoked	some	reflection	on	my	own	time	in	Tanzania,	as	 there	was	 an	 incident	during	my	pilot	 research	people	where	 a	man	with	 a	machete	tried	to	mug	at	the	place	I	was	staying	at,	but	the	gardener	noticed	and	was	 able	 to	 prevent	 the	 incident	 occurring.	 For	 the	 remainder	 of	 that	 trip	 in	Tanzania	all	of	the	men	at	the	house	became	very	overprotective	of	me,	watching	me	leave	and	return	each	day	and	ensuring	I	was	safe.	This	did	reassure	me	but	did	not	completely	alleviate	my	safety	concerns	for	the	remainder	of	my	time	in	the	 field.	 In	 light	 of	 recent	 news	 reports	 on	 acid	 attacks	 in	 Zanzibar	 and	 the	Westgate	mall	 shooting,	 it	 is	 impossible	 not	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 a	 significant	amount	of	time	in	the	field	is	spent	simply	being	concerned	about	keeping	safe,	which	undoubtedly	had	an	 impact	on	 the	data	 collection	and	my	 level	of	 focus	during	data	collection.	In	order	to	minimise	any	risks	to	the	best	of	my	abilities,	a	full	risk	assessment	of	the	fieldwork	was	conducted	in	line	with	the	University	of	Glasgow’s	guidelines	before	departure	for	the	field.11		Ward	and	 Jones	(1999)	also	state	 that	 the	relationship	between	the	researcher	and	 those	 they	 are	 researching	 can	 often	 be	 significantly	 determined	 by	 the	‘mode	 of	 entry’	 of	 the	 researcher.	 Putting	 discussions	 of	 nationality,	 age	 and	gender	 to	 one	 side,	 one	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	 I	 often	 found	my	 position	 to	 be	problematic	 is	 when	 I	 oscillated	 between	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ‘researcher’	 and	 a	‘volunteer’	at	the	civil	society	organisations	I	was	working	with.	In	many	cases	I	was	 often	 treated	 as	 a	 full	 member	 of	 staff,	 yet	 on	 other	 occasions	 I	 was	
																																																								11	A	copy	of	which	is	in	the	appendices	of	this	thesis.		
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presented	to	others12	as	a	researcher	and	placed	in	an	environment	where	it	was	completely	acceptable	for	me	to	sit	and	write	in	my	field	diary.	What	was	most	problematic	with	these	switching	roles	 is	 that	 I	often	had	no	agency	over	what	‘character’	I	was	playing	that	day,	which	made	it	not	only	difficult	to	prepare	for	any	 meetings	 that	 arose,	 but	 also	 meant	 that	 I	 was	 never	 fully	 sure	 of	 which	tasks,	such	as	making	cups	of	tea	for	everyone,	I	was	expected	to	carry	out.	Ward	and	 Jones	 (1999)	 also	 note	 that	 the	 mode	 of	 entry	 can	 often	 impact	 upon	accessibility	 to	 data	 sources,	 which	 was	 often	 an	 issue	 for	 me	 as	 when	introduced	 to	one	of	TWN’s	member	organisations	 I	was	never	 sure	whether	 I	was	supposed	to	be	interviewing	them	or	helping	with	a	task,	which	often	led	to	some	 quite	 awkward	 conversations.	 Generally,	 I	 would	 wait	 until	 I	 had	 been	introduced	 as	 a	 researcher	 to	 the	 individual	 in	 question,	 and	wait	 to	 be	 asked	about	 the	nature	of	my	research.	Once	 this	 topic	had	been	discussed	and	 I	had	developed	 a	 rapport	 with	 the	 individual,	 I	 then	 asked	 them	 if	 they	 would	 be	willing	to	participate	in	this	research.				As	 previously	 discussed,	 it	 is	 often	 difficult	 for	 a	 researcher	 conducting	participant	observation	to	be	aware	of	whether	they	have	become	an	‘insider’	to	the	 institutions	 that	 they	 are	 researching.	 Jorgensen	 (1989:55)	 stated	 that	 the	ways	in	which	an	observer	has	become	‘involved’	can	be	understood	by	‘what	the	researcher	is	able	to	see,	hear,	touch,	smell	or	feel’.	Phillips	and	Johns	(2012)	also	discuss	the	ways	in	which	eating	and	drinking	alcohol	with	participants	can	be	a	subtle	means	of	carrying	out	observation.	For	example,	 in	my	own	work,	when	volunteering	 at	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 I	 ate	 lunch	 with	 TWN	 and	 WPM’s	other	employees,	ate	 the	same	 food	as	 them,	and	participated	 in	 the	 lunchtime	discussion.	This	is	an	example	of	food	being	used	to	make	me	feel	more	of	a	part	of	these	organisations,	and	in	fact	were	been	some	of	the	most	valuable	moments	in	terms	of	making	bonds	with	these	groups.	Furthermore,	socialising	with	these	groups	 at	 evenings	 and	 weekends	 made	 me	 consider	 them	 more	 as	 friends	rather	than	research	subjects,	which	made	determining	which	conversations	to	record	as	data	and	which	not	to	a	complex	task.																																																										12	Such	as	TWN’s	member	organisations	or	other	stakeholders	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania.		
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Another	 level	 of	 complexity	 in	 terms	 of	 being	 an	 ‘insider’	 within	my	 research	setting	was	 the	 fact	 that	my	 accommodation	 in	 Tanzania	was	 frequented	with	other	 researchers	 and	 those	 working	 in	 international	 development.	 Some	 key	findings	in	this	research	have	in	fact	been	a	result	of	conversations	at	breakfast	or	at	a	bar	on	a	Friday	night,	and	once	again	when	writing	my	field	diary	 I	 felt	somewhat	 deceitful	 writing	 up	 information	 that	 someone	 probably	 told	me	 in	confidence	in	a	friendship	capacity.	It	becomes	not	only	a	question	of	feeling	like	an	‘insider’	or	not,	but	instead	an	experience	of	constantly	observing	and	never	feeling	able	to	‘switch	off’	from	being	a	researcher.	This	could	be	tiring	and	had	the	 potential	 of	 my	 research	 losing	 focus	 if	 I	 was	 unable	 to	 ascertain	 which	information	is	useful	or	not.	However,	regular	writing	in	a	field	diary	and	a	field	notebook	 helped	 organise	 my	 thoughts	 on	 the	 data	 that	 had	 been	 collected,	allowing	for	introspection	and	returning	focus	to	the	task	at	hand.			Whilst	I	may	eat	the	same	food,	read	the	same	documents	and	attend	the	same	meetings,	 this	does	not	 change	 the	 fact	 that	my	own	personal	 experiences	and	research	training	as	a	geographer	will	view	these	experiences	 far	differently	 to	the	 groups	 I	work	with.	Whether	 I	 include	 information	 that	 is	 perhaps	 ‘off	 the	record’	 or	 not,	 this	will	 still	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 how	 I	 view	my	 other	 data,	 and	interpret	 subsequent	 experiences	 (Ryen,	 2007).	 This	 is	 where	 the	 ‘insider’	dimensions	become	clearer,	as	it	would	be	impossible	for	me	to	fully	understand	the	perspectives	of	 the	groups	 I	am	working	with,	since	our	pathways	 towards	being	involved	in	the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam	are	so	different.			
4.4	Reflections	from	the	field		In	terms	of	the	internal	politics	and	challenges	faced	of	civil	society	organisations	in	Dar	es	Salaam,	a	vast	amount	of	information	was	provided	in	interviews	with	those	 working	 for	 NGOs.	 However,	 my	 own	 experiences	 as	 someone	 who	simultaneously	 acted	 as	 a	 researcher	 and	 a	 member	 of	 staff	 at	 these	organisations	 can	also	provide	nuanced	and	 important	 information.	Although	 I	was	acting	both	as	a	member	of	 staff	 and	a	 researcher	 simultaneously,	 it	often	appeared	that	in	the	eyes	of	TWN	and	WPM	the	former	took	precedent	and	I	had	
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become	 fully	embedded	 in	 these	organisations,	aligning	with	 the	 idea	of	 “going	native”	as	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter	(Bryman,	2012,	Tedlock,	1991).	This	did	 cause	 concern	 at	 times	 during	my	 fieldwork,	 as	 I	 felt	 a	 dynamic	 had	 been	created	in	both	organisations	where	it	had	been	somewhat	forgotten	that	I	was	a	researcher,	 even	 although	 I	 continued	 to	make	 this	 clear.	When	 scribbling	my	notes	in	my	field	notebook	or	writing	up	field	diary	entries	in	the	evening,	I	still	felt	 somewhat	 dishonest	 and	 that	 although	 these	 organisations	 knew	 I	 was	 a	researcher	they	maybe	had	not	realised	exactly	what	I	was	researching.			There	is	a	clear	trajectory	that	 is	apparent	 in	my	field	diary	and	field	notebook	that	 starts	 off	 with	 enthusiasm	 and	 excitement	 at	 working	 with	 these	organisations	 which	 gradually	 becomes	 a	 tone	 of	 frustration	 and	 at	 times,	boredom.	I	was	regularly	given	documents	to	sit	and	read,	which	often	felt	 like	an	attempt	to	keep	me	busy	rather	than	have	any	measured	contribution	to	the	work	of	the	organisation.	In	relation	to	this,	although	I	spent	a	significant	period	of	 time	 at	 both	 organisations,	 in	 the	 case	 of	WPM	 I	was	 confused	 about	what	their	activities	actually	were:		 “Sat	frustrated	at	WPM	as	I	am	sat	working	away	and	everyone	else	is	sat	reading	a	newspaper.”	(Field	Notebook	Excerpt,	5th	February	2014)		 “Someone	 has	 literally	 just	 said	 to	me	 ‘It’s	Monday	 so	 no-one	 feels	 like	working’.	 There	 is	 no	 boss	 today.	 Everyone	 has	 sat	 on	 youtube	 all	morning.”	(Field	Notebook	Excerpt,	10th	February	2014)		I	 spent	 many	 days	 at	 WPM	 frustrated	 at	 my	 own,	 seemingly	 tokenistic	 work	there,	but	also	at	the	lack	of	measurable	work	I	could	see	from	other	staff.	A	large	amount	 of	my	 annoyance	 undoubtedly	 came	 from	my	 initial	 understanding	 of	WPM	as	a	dynamic	organisation	providing	worthwhile	support	to	Tanzanians	for	them	to	access	something	as	vital	as	water,	but	instead	staff	seemed	to	be	taking	home	salaries	for	doing	little	to	no	work.	It	would	have	been	difficult	to	directly	question	 individuals	 on	 this,	 but	 there	 is	 potentially	 the	 case	 that	 they	 were	demotivated	 because	 of	 the	 perceived	 lack	 of	 impact	 of	 the	 work	 they	 were	
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doing,	 as	 this	 is	 something	 I	 also	 felt	 during	 the	 research	 period.	 This	 was	additionally	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 my	 experiences	 during	 the	 pilot	 period	 of	fieldwork	in	2013,	where	in	my	field	diary	I	had	written	“WPM	were	very	helpful	and	 every	 employee	 made	 an	 effort	 to	 understand	 my	 research”	 (Field	 Diary	Excerpt,	14th	 June	2013).	Although	aforementioned	 funding	 issues	and	changes	in	 director	 for	 WPM	 perhaps	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 these	 changes,	 in	 that	 WPM	perhaps	had	no	ongoing	projects	at	that	time,	I	was	equally	uncomfortable	at	the	lack	of	urgency	to	find	a	new	project,	or	the	fact	that	any	existing	project	money	was	being	used	on	staff	wasting	time	on	the	internet:	“Some	people	I’ve	yet	to	see	do	any	work,	how	don’t	they	feel	bad?!”	(Field	Notebook	Excerpt,	19th	February	2014).	As	previously	discussed,	there	was	a	recurring	theme	that	some	believed	that	non-Tanzanian	individuals	were	better	at	writing	funding	proposals,	and	at	WPM	I	was	asked	to	write	a	number	of	documents	of	this	type.	However,	I	was	not	involved	in	any	discussion	of	why	this	particular	funding	was	being	applied	for,	 and	 after	writing	 the	 proposal	was	 never	 given	 any	 feedback	 or	 follow-up	information	 on	 what	 had	 happened	 to	 the	 document.	 Additionally,	 I	 had	 also	written	in	my	diary	that	the	combination	of	staff	present	at	WPM	changed	every	day,	 and	 that	 after	 three	months	 I	was	 unable	 to	 keep	 track	 of	 anyone’s	work	schedules.	 A	 lack	 of	 continuity	 between	 work	 days	 replicated	 some	 of	 the	haphazard	practice	I	experienced	at	TWN,	and	indicated	how	volatile	this	sector	can	be.			My	role	at	TWN	was	rather	different.	I	was	treated	fully	as	a	member	of	staff	and	although	had	 similar	 tasks	 asked	of	me,	 such	as	proposal	 and	 report	writing,	 I	was	 always	 aware	 of	 the	 general	 work	 of	 the	 organisation	 and	 the	 reasons	behind	each	individual	activity:		 “There’s	such	a	different	vibe	at	TWN,	I	had	a	long	talk	with	the	director	this	morning	about	my	agenda	for	that	day	and	also	next	week.	I	was	able	to	 contribute	 ideas	 and	 also	 be	 open	 about	 my	 research	 contacts	 and	intentions.”	(Field	Notebook	Excerpt,	20th	March	2014)		
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I	was	given	the	opportunity	to	take	part	in	various	event	planning	activities,	one	notable	example	being	 the	 sensitisation	workshop	 I	 attended	 in	a	 small	 village	about	an	hour’s	drive	outside	of	Dar	es	Salaam.	This	gave	me	a	useful	insight	into	the	ways	that	these	types	of	events	are	organised	and	the	types	of	challenges	that	can	arise	such	as	 finding	a	venue,	sourcing	a	working	vehicle	 to	 transport	staff	there,	 and	 finding	 the	 capital	 to	 run	 the	 event	 and	 pay	 attendee-sitting	allowances	in	the	first	place.	Although	I	would	cautiously	suggest	that	TWN	did	not	 seem	to	make	much	more	of	an	 impact	compared	 to	WPM	during	my	 time	spent	with	 these	 organisations,	 I	 found	myself	more	 forgiving	 of	 TWN	 as	 they	faced	far	more	infrastructural	issues	and	the	staff	there	seemed	more	motivated	on	 solving	 the	 multitude	 of	 problems	 in	 Tanzania’s	 water	 sector.	 There	 were	similar	comments	made	in	my	field	diary	about	days	where	very	little	productive	activity	seemed	to	happen:	“We	just	sat	around	all	day	and	all	we	achieved	was	folding	of	t-shirts.	I	really	do	not	know	if	anything	else	happened	and	I	wonder	how	often	days	like	this	occur”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	26th	June	2013).	Both	WPM	and	TWN	had	changed	director	between	my	pilot	and	final	periods	of	fieldwork	and	 were	 still	 in	 the	 process	 of	 establishing	 new	 organisational	 dynamics.	Although	 I	 felt	more	 involved	 in	 the	work	of	TWN	compared	 to	WPM,	at	TWN	there	were	also	a	number	of	incidents	where	documents	that	I	had	written	had	not	been	read	by	the	director	as	he	said	he	did	not	have	time:		 “After	having	pressure	put	on	me	 for	 that	 report,	 I	 sent	 [the	director]	 a	partial	version	on	Thursday	6th	March	and	he	has	not	even	mentioned	it	again.	Whether	the	report	 is	no	 longer	a	priority	or	my	attempt	was	not	good	enough	I	don’t	know.”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	15th	March	2014)			Additionally,	towards	the	end	of	my	fieldwork	with	TWN	I	was	informed	that	the	staff	 there	were	working	on	a	voluntary	basis	 as	 there	were	not	enough	 funds	within	the	organisation	to	pay	them.	This	highlighted	that	despite	the	changes	in	the	organisation	and	the	types	of	activities	TWN	pursued	it	appeared	that	their	motivation	exited	on	an	altruistic	basis	and	not	a	financial	one.Although	at	times	there	 were	 issues	 with	 the	 work	 of	 TWN,	 it	 occasionally	 appeared	 somewhat	
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excusable	 due	 to	 the	well-meaning	 intentions	 of	 the	 staff	 there,	 and	how	 their	motivation	existed	on	an	altruistic	basis	and	not	on	a	financial	one.			Whilst	 conducting	 interviews	within	 Ilala	and	Temeke	 there	were	a	number	of	instances	 that	 reminded	me	 of	 my	 positionality	 as	 a	 white	 female	 conducting	research	 in	Tanzania.	 In	 Ilala,	during	 interviews	some	respondents	(customers,	board	members	and	local	government)	were	insistent	that	there	were	no	issues	in	the	community’s	water	project,	but	these	respondents	asked	me	for	money	to	fund	the	project	when	the	 interview	had	been	completed.	 It	was	challenging	at	times	to	ensure	separation	between	my	data	collection	and	my	positionality,	as	there	were	 a	number	of	 occasions	where	 respondents	 asked	me	 to	become	an	active	participant	 in	 their	projects,	which	would	have	undoubtedly	 skewed	my	data	and	compromised	the	robustness	of	this	research.		My	means	 of	 access	 to	 participants	 in	 Ilala	 also	 potentially	 affected	 the	 data	 I	collected.	 As	 the	 Mitonga	 Water	 Users	 Group	 was	 far	 more	 established	 and	organised	compared	to	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	Project,	the	manager	and	other	staff	members	were	happy	to	be	interviewed	and	also	accompany	me	and	introduce	me	to	customers	and	committee	members.	Ironically,	their	time	spent	doing	this	meant	 that	 customers	 were	 unable	 to	 pay	 their	 bills	 as	 the	 office	 was	 empty.	Additionally,	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	participants	asked	me	for	money	at	the	end	of	 each	 interview	 could	potentially	 have	been	 a	 result	 of	 the	management	team’s	 selection	 of	 participating	 individuals,	 and	may	 have	 provided	 a	 skewed	set	 of	 information.	 However,	 I	was	 nonetheless	 exposed	 to	 some	 of	 the	 issues	with	 the	 project,	 as	 when	 I	 attempted	 to	 interview	 one	 customer,	 who	 also	owned	 a	 domestic	 point	 for	 the	 project	within	 his	 home.	He	 explained	 that	 he	had	 reported	 that	 the	domestic	point	had	been	broken	 for	 a	while	 and	he	had	reported	it	to	the	individual	who	read	meters	for	the	project	on	a	daily	basis,	and	that	nothing	had	been	done.	Although	a	rather	positive	picture	had	been	painted	of	the	project	with	regards	to	trust,	efficiency	and	community	relationships	this	example	indicated	there	were	still	some	issues	prevalent,	and	calls	into	question	how	many	other	problems	were	masked	by	 the	management	 team	during	 this	research.			
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		Additionally,	my	work	with	communities	cannot	be	separated	from	the	fact	that	I	was	 asking	 them	 questions	 on	 their	 means	 of	 accessing	 water,	 having	 never	experienced	some	of	the	challenges	myself.			 “What	 people	 are	 assuming	 are	 problems	 are	 just	 part	 of	 their	 lives.	People	 have	 just	 been	 doing	 it.	 That	 is	 part	 of	 their	 life.	 You	 can’t	 call	somebody’s	life	a	challenge.”	(Civil	Society	Organisation	#4)		It	appeared	to	be	difficult	to	use	any	negative	discourses	such	as	crisis	in	my	data	collection	 as	 these	 situations	 had	 become	 reality	 for	 so	 many	 people	 I	encountered	during	my	research.	Unable	to	address	this	theme	explicitly	 in	my	interviews,	 I	 instead	 drew	 my	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 multitude	 of	investment	 in	 Tanzania’s	 water	 sector	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 making	 any	measurable	difference,	and	some	of	the	case	studies	in	this	research	can	indicate	why.	As	such,	earlier	discussion	in	this	chapter	on	how	data	can	be	collected	in	interviews	based	on	not	only	what	a	respondent	is	saying,	but	the	way	in	which	they	discuss	a	topic	(Secor,	2010)	is	relevant	here;	whilst	there	was	the	potential	for	 language	 and	 translation	 issues,	 the	ways	 in	which	 participants	 articulated	their	 responses	 to	 particular	 questions	 revealed	 hidden	 power	 relations	 and	nuances	that	were	not	immediately	obvious	in	the	initial	stages	of	this	research.			
4.5	Participant	observation		Cook	and	Crang	(1995)	state	that;		 “The	 basic	 purpose	 in	 using	 ethnographic	methods	 (such	 as	 participant	observation,	interviewing,	etc)	is	to	understand	parts	of	the	world	as	they	are	 experienced	 and	 understood	 in	 the	 every	 day	 lives	 of	 people	 who	actually	‘live	them	out’”	(Cook	and	Crang,	1995:4)	
	Thus,	 whilst	 participant	 observation	 gives	 participants	 ownership	 of	 the	research	 process,	 ethnography	 instead	 reveals	 the	 hidden	 dynamics	 and	
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discourses	that	exist	 in	participants’	 lives	that	they	may	or	may	not	themselves	be	 conscious	of.	As	 complimentary,	 but	not	directly	 related,	 research	methods,	participant	observation	and	ethnographic	 study	 can	be	used	 in	 combination	 to	develop	 an	 in-depth	 understanding	 of	 a	 research	 setting.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 this	research,	letting	TWN	and	WPM’s	staff	guide	my	day-to-day	activity	gave	them	a	degree	of	ownership	of	the	study,	but	in	turn	I	observed	a	great	deal	by	simply	being	in	the	organisations’	offices	or	simply	engaging	with	other	stakeholders	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania.	I	was	witness	to	meetings,	chance	encounters	and	the	daily	 tasks	of	each	organisation.	 It	 is	 important	 to	stress	here	that	 the	only	participatory	role	played	by	any	research	participants	was	through	introducing	me	 to	 other	 research	 participants	 and	 dictating	 the	 agenda	 of	 the	 days	 I	volunteered	 with	 them.	 In	 addition,	 there	 were	 occasional	 discussions	 with	individuals	 at	TWN	and	WPM	about	my	 research	 that	 encouraged	me	 to	 think	about	my	data	collection	differently,	and	highlighted	other	 topics	 that	 research	participants	 should	 be	 asked	 about.	 This	 research	 did	 not	 carry	 out	 an	ethnography	 of	 the	 organisations	 in	 question,	 but	 as	 per	 Cook	 and	 Crang’s	(1995)	definition,	considered	participant	observation	to	be	part	of	a	wider	group	of	 ethnographic	 research	methods.	As	 such,	 ethnographic	 study	will	 largely	 be	discussed	 in	 this	section	along	with	some	discussion	of	participant	observation	as	 a	 review	 of	 literature	 of	 purely	 ethnographic	 research	 provided	 inspiration	and	guidance	about	how	to	carry	out	my	own	data	collection.	By	carrying	out	the	tasks	asked	of	me	by	TWN	and	WPM’s	staff	as	well	as	observing	the	practices	and	behaviours	of	all	the	individuals	I	encountered	helped	to	elucidate	the	difference	between	the	work	these	organisations	wanted	me	to	see	they	were	doing	and	the	more	hidden	parts	that	they	had	kept	me	away	from.			Cook	and	Crang	(1995)	also	note	that	 there	are	a	number	of	different	research	methods	 that	work	 together	 in	order	 to	conduct	an	ethnography	of	a	 field	site.	This	 allows	 for	 a	more	 holistic	 understanding	 of	 the	 field	 site,	 and	 reveals	 the	social,	political	and	economic	context	that	interviews,	for	example,	are	conducted	in.		Interview	data	in	an	ethnographic	study	is	more	than	a	simple	dialogue,	but	instead	 a	 means	 of	 accessing	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 participants	 interpret	 and	navigate	 their	 own	 lifeworlds	 (Cook	 and	 Crang,	 1995)	 and	 in	 turn	 allows	 the	
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researcher	to	compare	these	to	their	own	personal	 interpretations.	There	are	a	number	of	ways	 in	which	an	ethnographic	 study	can	be	addressed	and	carried	out.	A	combination	of	techniques	such	as	interviews,	participant	observation	and	focus	groups	can	lead	to	a	comprehensive	interpretation	of	a	field	site	and	a	rich	and	nuanced	set	of	data.	Wax	(from	Irvine,	1998)	stated	that	to	know	the	exact	aims	of	a	study	before	beginning	leads	to	an	assumption	that	the	results	are	also	known,	 but	 instead	 an	 ethnography	 can	 very	 early	 on	 determine	 the	 research	questions	 that	 are	 most	 pertinent	 at	 the	 time	 of	 data	 collection,	 and	 what	participants	feel	are	the	key	issues	that	need	addressed.	Wax’s	point	is	proven	by	Cook	(from	Cook	and	Crang,	1995)	who	after	a	pilot	study	of	blind	people’s	travel	experiences	 had	 to	 completely	 reassess	 his	 research	 questions	 based	 on	 his	respondents’	answers.	Cook	prepared	for	interviewing	respondents	by	assuming	that	 their	 travels	 were	 based	 on	 memorised	 routes,	 and	 it	 was	 only	 after	speaking	 to	 respondents	he	 realised	 that	 the	blind	participants	 in	 the	 research	navigated	 their	 lifeworlds	based	on	a	detailed	memory	of	places.	This	example	stresses	 the	 point	 of	 how	 ethnographic	 research	 can	 reveal	 a	 different	 set	 of	discourses	 in	 a	 field	 site	 compared	 to	 those	 that	 are	 explicitly	 discussed	 by	respondents	involved.		Nonetheless,	 whilst	 participants	 will	 guide	 the	 researcher	 towards	 specific	topics,	 an	 equal	 amount	 of	 information	 can	 be	 revealed	 from	 the	 topics	 that	participants	do	not	want	 to	address	or	do	not	 feel	are	 important	 to	 them.	This	was	 made	 clear	 by	 Kurzman	 (1991),	 in	 a	 study	 of	 postgraduates	 who	 had	conducted	 ethnographic	 studies	 of	 various	 topics	 and	 presented	 them	 to	 their	peers	in	class.	One	student	concluded	that	the	fact	that	her	predominantly	female	participants	in	a	public	employees’	union	had	not	mentioned	gender	meant	that	this	 was	 not	 a	 topic	 worth	 paying	 attention	 to	 in	 this	 study.	 This	 analysis	neglected	 to	 address	 the	 fact	 that	 gender	 could	 have	 been	 a	 problem	 but	 that	there	were	wider	processes	in	place	that	meant	that	participants	were	not	aware	of	 it	 (Kurzman,	1991).	Nonetheless,	 if	 there	 is	 an	attempt	being	made	 to	make	the	 ethnographic	 study	 participatory,	 then	 participants	must	 be	 allowed	 some	jurisdiction	over	the	focus	of	the	study.	It	is	dilemmas	such	as	this	that	can	occur	when	conducting	an	this	type	of	research.	
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	As	 well	 as	 broader	 issues	 surrounding	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 study,	 there	 are	 also	issues	 that	 can	 be	 faced	 in	 the	 day-to-day	 practicalities	 of	 conducting	 an	ethnography.	 Cook	 and	 Crang	 (1995)	 suggest	 that	 the	 best	 way	 to	 begin	 an	ethnographic	study	is	to	identify	the	supposed	gatekeepers	who	are	most	aligned	with	 the	 research	 project’s	 aims,	 following	 the	 belief	 that	 even	 if	 these	individuals	 are	 unable	 to	 help	 the	 study	 they	 will	 be	 willing	 to	 pass	 the	researcher	onto	those	who	will.	This	type	of	research	can	be	altered	significantly	depending	on	which	 individuals	or	groups	 form	a	key	part	of	 the	study.	Davies	(1999)	discusses	 this	 in	depth,	noting	 that	 an	ethnographic	 study	 can	often	be	altered	by	which	 individuals	 or	 groups	 are	 accessible,	 and	 in	 turn,	which	ones	are	willing	to	take	part	in	the	research.		This	‘self-selection’	of	participants	in	an	ethnography	can	perhaps	prioritise	the	views	of	certain	groups	over	others,	but	conversely	 can	 help	 to	 alleviate	 the	 potential	 power	 dynamics	 that	 can	 result	from	 conducting	 research	 in	 the	 Global	 South,	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 conducting	participatory	 research,	 give	participants	 some	ownership	over	 the	 focus	of	 the	research.	Moreover,	Davies	(1991)	suggests	that	the	selection	of	participants	 is	key	information	that	should	be	included	in	the	write	up	of	the	final	project.			One	 of	 the	 main	 ways	 in	 which	 ethnography	 is	 carried	 out	 is	 often	 through	participant	 observation,	which	 is	 the	way	 in	which	 data	was	 collected	 for	 this	research.	 Aligning	 with	 previous	 discussions	 of	 participatory	 research,	participant	 observation	 as	 a	 research	 method	 can	 bring	 many	 of	 the	 positive	means	of	conducting	participatory	research	into	an	ethnography	(Davies,	1999).	There	are	two	ways	in	which	participant	observation	can	be	carried	out,	either	in	a	overt	or	covert	manner.	Overt	participant	observation	 involves	being	explicit	about	the	researcher’s	role	and	their	project’s	aims,	whereas	covert	observation	results	 in	the	researcher	playing	an	alternative	role	 in	the	research	setting	and	collecting	 and	 recording	 their	 data	 in	 secret	 (Bryman,	 2012).	 I	 feel	 that	 my	research	straddles	both	these	types	of	observation,	employing	what	Fine	(from	Ryen,	2007)	would	refer	to	as	‘shallow	cover’;	explaining	the	role	as	a	researcher	but	being	vague	about	the	exact	aims	of	the	project.	This	is	often	seen	as	a	means	of	deceiving	participants.	Whilst	 I	agree	that	a	 lack	of	knowledge	of	 the	project	
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can	be	ethically	questionable	(Bryman,	2012),	issues	of	language	and	translation	(see	 section	 4.8	 of	 this	 chapter)	made	 it	 very	 difficult	 for	me	 explain	 the	 finer	details	of	my	data	collection.	Taking	this	into	account,	an	adapted	description	of	the	 research	 project	 had	 to	 be	 created	 that	 was	 understood	 in	 Swahili	 and	ensured	 that	 participants	 had	 a	 full	 understanding	 of	 their	 contribution	 using	appropriate	language.		The	process	of	recording	data	in	participant	observation	goes	far	beyond	verbal	interactions	with	 those	being	studied.	 It	 is	also	an	entirely	 sensory	experience,	and	what	the	researcher	hears,	smells	and	touches	can	be	as	equally	important	to	the	study	(Fife,	2005).	The	environment	I	volunteer	in,	the	chairs	I	sit	on,	the	facilities	available	to	edit	reports	on,	as	well	as	the	food	served,	and	the	‘off	the	record’	 conversations	 overhead	 all	 have	 equal	 importance	 in	 the	 field	 diary.	Whilst	 civil	 society	 organisations	 may	 say	 to	 me	 that	 reports	 have	 not	 been	written	 in	 time	 because	 they	 are	 busy	 or	 tired,	 I	 am	 able	 to	 assess	 that	 one	working	laptop	to	three	people	has	just	as	much	of	an	impact	on	their	workrate.	Additionally,	Mosse	(2005)	discusses	how	the	writing	up	of	notes	is	in	itself	a	key	part	of	the	process.	The	production	of	the	field	diary	and	the	time	and	space	the	notes	are	written	in	can	affect	the	writing	up	(or	in	fact,	creation)	of	the	data,	and	can	impact	upon	how	it	is	analysed	upon	return	from	the	field.		As	Herndl	(1991)	notes,	the	field	diary	becomes	a	dialectic	between	the	actual	lived	experiences	of	the	 researcher,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 personally	 interpret	 them	 and	construct	them	into	written	text.		
4.6	Institutional	analysis		Cook	 and	 Crang	 (1995)	 state	 that	 ethnography	 is	 essentially	 a	 means	 of	understanding	 the	 grassroots	 lived	 experiences	 of	 people	 living	 in	 a	 variety	 of	geographical	 locations.	 Yet	 ethnography	 has	 more	 to	 offer	 than	 this	 localised	detail.	Burawoy	(1991:5)	writes	“we	are	interested	not	only	in	learning	about	a	specific	 social	 situation,	 which	 is	 the	 concern	 of	 the	 participant,	 but	 also	 in	learning	from	that	social	situation.”	One	of	the	key	ways	in	which	this	issue	has	been	addressed	in	ethnographic	research	in	recent	decades	is	through	the	use	of	
	 123	
institutional	ethnography.	Originating	in	the	writing	of	Dorothy	Smith,	she	refers	to	 institutional	 ethnography	 as	 “a	 methodological	 realisation	 of	 the	 project	 of	writing	 a	 sociology	 for	 women”	 (Smith,	 2001:160),	 as	 a	 means	 of	 using	ethnographic	 data	 to	 assess	 micro	 and	 macro	 level	 processes	 that	 affect	participants.	Del	Casino	Jr.	et	al	(2000)	stated	that:		 “Organisations,	 therefore,	 do	 not	 simply	 produce	 geographies;	 they	 are,	rather,	 infused	 with	 them,	 and	 these	 spatial	 ontologies	 and	epistemologies	 are	mapped	 onto	 their	 rules,	 procedures	 and	 practices.”	(Del	Casino	Jr.	et	al,	2000:524)		There	 is	 a	 clear	 argument	 for	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 ethnography	 can	 make	 a	significant	 comment	on	 the	wider	economic,	 social	 and	political	processes	 that	exist	 and	 impact	upon	an	ethnographic	 field	 site,	 and	 institutional	analysis	has	been	a	means	for	many	ethnographers	to	assess	this.	Data	can	be	gathered	on	the	macro-level	dynamics	that	enhance	the	data	discussed	by	Davies	(1991)	and	the	complex	nature	of	organisations	and	their	 impact	upon	these	dynamics.	Rather	than	proposing	 institutional	ethnography	as	a	definitive	method,	Smith	 instead	wished	 for	 the	 framework	 to	 be	 built	 upon	 and	 added	 to	 by	 researchers	 over	time	 (Devault,	 2006),	 allowing	 it	 to	 be	 adapted	 to	 fit	 a	 variety	 of	 research	projects	in	a	number	of	academic	disciplines.	In	order	to	explore	organisational	dynamics	 and	 their	wider	 role	 in	 the	water	 governance	 structure	 in	 Tanzania,	participant	 observation	 was	 used	 to	 analyse	 the	 geography	 of	 and	 power	relations	within	institutions	in	this	research,	taking	inspiration	from	institutional	ethnography	as	a	research	method.			As	previously	mentioned,	Smith	noted	 that	 institutional	ethnography	arose	out	of	 writing	 about	 studies	 of	 women	 (Smith,	 2001).	 As	 well	 as	 this,	 the	methodological	framework	also	adopts	a	Marxist	ontology;	by	tracing	the	social	relations	 participants	 experience	 in	 a	 work	 setting,	 using	 a	 Marxist	understanding	of	‘social	relations’	as	connections	amongst	day	to	day	work	tasks	as	opposed	to	social	relationships	(Devault,	2006).	Instead	of	focusing	solely	on	the	 grassroots	 experiences	 of	 the	 researcher	 and	 those	 being	 researched,	 this	
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framework	 concerns	 itself	 with	 the	 “social	 and	 institutional	 forces”	(Mykhalovskiy	 and	 McCoy,	 2002)	 that	 shape	 people’s	 lives.	 It	 is	 erroneous	 to	assume	 that	 an	 institutional	 ethnography	 focuses	 on	 specific	 institutions,	 ie	 a	hospital	 or	 prison	 (Smith,	 2006a)	 (Grahame,	 1998)	 but	 instead	 uses	ethnographic	 data	 to	 ascertain	 how	 certain	 mindsets	 and	 discourses	 have	become	institutionalised	and	the	impacts	this	has	upon	research	participants.			Mykalovsiky	 and	 McCoy	 (2002)	 used	 institutional	 ethnography	 to	 discuss	healthcare	systems	in	Toronto.	Through	focus	groups	and	interviews	they	were	able	to	use	participants’	responses	to	uncover	the	key	institutionalised	issues	in	health	 care	 for	 HIV/AIDS	 sufferers,	 by	 allowing	 respondents	 to	 bring	 up	 the	issues	that	were	relevant	to	them	as	well	as	analysing	in	what	ways	these	issues	were	addressed	in	focus	group	or	interview	settings.	As	well	as	showing	how	this	methodological	 framework	 can	 uncover	 institutional	 dynamics	 and	 discourses,	Mykalovsiky	and	McCoy’s	(2002)	also	proves	how	institutional	ethnography	can	have	a	participatory	element	to	it	also.				Herndl	(1991)	notes	that	ethnography	is	an	 inherently	textual	practice,	both	 in	terms	 of	 gathering	 the	 data,	 and	writing	 it	 up.	 Institutional	 ethnography	 pays	attention	to	texts	in	a	different	way,	however.	Smith	(2001)	notes	that	texts	can	co-ordinate	the	practices	of	a	workplace,	whilst	Devault	(2006)	expands	on	this;		 “Texts	such	as	medical	charts,	enrolment	reports	etc	are	mechanisms	for	co-ordinating	 activity	 across	 many	 different	 sites.	 Social	 science	 is	sometimes	a	part	of	this	co-ordinative	apparatus,	and	perhaps	as	a	result,	we’ve	 tended	 to	 take	 this	 kind	 of	 textual	 co-ordination	 for	 granted,	 too	often	 looking	 ‘through’	 texts	 without	 noting	 their	 power”.	 (Devault,	2006:294)			Conducting	an	research	into	institutions	involves	more	than	just	texts,	however.	Devault	 (2006)	 describes	 the	 process	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	 researcher	 takes	part	 in	 all	 of	 the	work	 that	 is	 done	 in	 the	 setting,	 and	makes	 a	 note	 of	which	activities	 are	 described	 as	 ‘official’	 and	 which	 are	 not.	 Additionally,	 Cook	 and	
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Crang	 (1995)	 discuss	 an	 example	 of	 Cook’s	 own	 experience	 of	 ethnography,	whereby	 interviews	 with	 a	 key	 participant	 in	 an	 organisation	 were	 often	interrupted	by	other	employees	or	phonecalls.	This	allowed	Cook	to	understand	the	 day-to-day	 activities	 of	 this	 executive	 and	 the	 specific	 challenges	 or	difficulties	 that	 they	 faced	 in	 trying	 to	do	 their	 job.	As	well	as	 this,	 this	 type	of	material	enables	the	researcher	to	see	the	differences	between	the	written	texts	and	the	actual	material	practices	of	an	organisation,	and	perhaps	elucidate	what	organisations	perceive	they	do,	and	what	their	actual	outputs	are.	In	terms	of	my	own	data	collection,	 I	was	 involved	 in	reading	 the	 texts	produced	by	TWN	and	WPM	 and	 related	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 water	 sector.	 Additionally,	 I	 was	 also	witness	 to	 proofreading	 of	 a	 number	 of	 these	 documents	 and	was	 able	 to	 see	commentary	 on	 different	 types	 of	 documents	 (such	 as	 funding	 proposals	 or	monitoring	and	evaluation	reports)	 from	a	variety	of	 individuals	 involved.	This	not	only	enabled	me	to	see	the	text-based	work	produced	by	these	organisations,	but	the	processes	that	existed	behind	these	texts	being	created	and	edited.			Using	Smith’s	(2001)	opinion	that	organisational	texts	are	able	to	provide	a	key	insight	into	institutional	practices,	given	that	I	was	often	given	full	access	to	civil	society	 organisations’	 publications	 and	 in	many	 cases,	 private	 emails,	 I	was	be	able	 to	 use	 these	 texts	 to	 develop	 an	 understanding	 of	 how	 organisations	communicated	 with	 each	 other.	 Additionally,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 use	 my	 data	 from	meetings,	 and	 day	 to	 day	 practices	 to	 ascertain	 which	 elements	 of	 an	organisation	are	not	presented	in	text	to	other	organisations,	funding	bodies	or	communities	 that	 these	 organisations	 engage	 with.	 Looking	 at	 direct	communication	 between	 different	 organisations	 in	 the	 water	 sector	 in	 Dar	 es	Salaam	revealed	the	different	power	dynamics	that	exist,	and	the	ways	in	which	language	is	used	to	represent	this.		Although	the	framework	of	institutional	ethnography	has	gained	popularity	over	the	 last	 few	decades,	 there	 is	 still	 a	degree	of	 scepticism	by	 some	scholars.	 Jay	(from	 Davies	 (1999)	 stated	 that	 the	 close	 relationships	 formed	 between	 the	researcher	 and	 participants	 (especially	 as	 a	 result	 of	 participant	 observation)	
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means	that	the	data	collected	is	not	reliable	or	objective	enough	to	comment	on	cultural	or	social	practices.	Additionally,	Marcus	(1995)	remarked	that;		 “The	idea	that	ethnography	might	expand	from	its	committed	localism	to	represent	 a	 system	 much	 better	 apprehended	 by	 abstract	 models	 and	aggregate	statistics	seems	antiethical	to	 its	very	nature	and	thus	beyond	its	limits.”	(Marcus,	1995:99)	
	Whilst	 it	 is	 understandable	 to	 suggest	 that	 an	 ethnography	 should	 be	 able	 to	provide	a	detailed	description	of	a	specific	situation	within	space	and	time,	in	the	same	 way	 that	 participatory	 research	 moves	 continually	 between	 local	specificity	and	broader	theoretical	conclusions	(Pain,	2007),	there	is	a	wealth	of	data	 that	 can	 be	 gleaned	 from	 this	 type	 of	 research	 that	 can	 speak	 to	 wider	processes	 and	 discourses	 also,	 and	 an	 institutional	 analysis	 is	 a	 sufficiently	appropriate	way	of	achieving	this.	Detailed	study	of	an	individual	organisation	or	event	 can	produce	 information	 that	 is	applicable	 to	other	 spatial	 and	 temporal	contexts.				In	 his	 discussion	 of	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 in	 the	 developing	 world,	 Mosse	(2008b)	states	that	smaller	development	organisations	do	not	offer	a	comment	on	 global	 issues	 such	 as	 economic	 inequality,	 but	 by	 using	 institutional	ethnography’s	ability	 to	 ‘scale	up’	 local	practices,	my	participant	observation	 is	able	to	contribute	to	what	is	perhaps	a	gap	in	the	literature,	and	at	the	very	least	identify	 the	 role	 of	 smaller	 organisations	 in	 development	 practice	 and	 their	contributions	 to	 water	 governance	 that	 are	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	 Tanzania’s	economic	development.	Furthermore,	Mosse	(2008b)	argues	that	it	is	difficult	for	development	professionals	working	 for	 these	 grassroots	organisations	 to	be	 at	all	 reflexive	 on	 their	 working	 environment.	 Whilst	 the	 data	 collected	 in	 my	fieldwork	 suggests	 this	 is	 not	 always	 necessarily	 the	 case,	 I	 believe	 that	 any	interviews	 I	 conducted	with	NGO	representatives	 contributed	 to	 this	 supposed	issue,	and	gave	civil	society	organisation	employees	an	opportunity	to	comment	on	the	way	in	which	their	industry	operates.			
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Keeping	in	mind	that	my	focus	was	not	just	on	the	civil	society	organisations	in	the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam	but	also	the	communities	that	are	affected	by	them,	 I	 also	 had	 to	 consider	 how	 my	 research	 will	 fit	 in	 with	 these	 groups.	Community	 residents	who	managed	 local	water	 schemes	and	purchased	water	from	them	were	also	 included	 in	 this	research.	Mykalovsiky	and	McCoy	(2002)	argue	 that	 in	 some	 cases,	 an	 institutional	 ethnography	 is	 not	 well	 suited	 to	community-based	 research	 as	 the	 processes	 and	 individuals	 involved	 in	 them	are	 not	 necessarily	 as	 structured	 as	 they	 would	 be	 in	 a	 formal	 setting	 like	 a	school,	hospital	or	business.	However,	I	feel	that	as	access	to	water	is	many	areas	of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 is	 increasingly	 becoming	 formalised	 through	 the	 creation	 of	Community	Owned	Water	and	Sanitation	Organisations	(COWSOs),	 the	 impacts	of	the	state	on	what	was	previously	an	informal	means	of	organisation	were	be	able	to	be	assessed.	For	the	communities	in	the	Ilala	distict	who	are	not	yet,	but	discussing,	becoming	formalised	COWSOs,	I	was	able	to	assess	how	they	organise	themselves	 to	provide	water	without	 official	 permission	 from	 the	 government,	and	 the	 differences	 between	 their	 means	 of	 providing	 water	 to	 their	 locality	compared	to	the	formalised	COWSOs	in	existence	in	Temeke.				In	 terms	 of	 the	 participatory	 nature	 of	 my	 research,	 I	 felt	 that	 involving	 my	participants	in	the	focus	of	my	research	questions	led	to	a	richer	set	of	data,	as	they	 were	 the	 ones	 who	 had	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 the	current	ways	 of	 accessing	water	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 and	 therefore	were	 able	 to	highlight	the	key	issues	that	I	should	cover	in	my	data	collection.	Participants	did	not	 write	 the	 research	 questions	 or	 help	 prepare	 for	 interviews,	 but	 in	 the	preliminary	stages	of	my	data	collection	I	had	some	short	informal	conversations	with	members	of	TWN	and	WPM	about	the	intentions	of	my	research	and	which	topics	 I	wished	 to	 explore.	 Participants	were	 able	 to	 highlight	 the	 increasingly	popular	phenomenon	of	COWSOs	within	Dar	es	Salaam,	and	after	developing	an	understanding	of	these	community-based	schemes	in	my	own	time	I	decided	to	make	 them	 a	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis.	 Although	 Stoecker	 (from	 Klodawsky,	 2007)	warns	 against	 letting	 participants	 guide	 the	 research	 process,	 it	 was	 almost	impossible	for	me	to	develop	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	dynamics	of	water	 access	 in	 the	 city	 without	 some	 guidance	 from	 those	 who	 are	 directly	
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involved	 in	 it.	 Furthermore,	 through	 conducting	 an	 analysis	 of	 institutionals	 I	was	able	to	identify	the	gaps	that	participants	have	perhaps	felt	unimportant	to	include,	which	will	alleviate	Stoecker’s	(from	Klodawsky,	2007)	concerns	about	reliability	of	data.			
4.7	Interviews		The	 potential	 issues	 that	 can	 result	 from	 conducting	 participant	 observation	have	 been	 explored	 in	 depth,	 and	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 data	 could	potentially	be	unreliable	and	affected	by	the	liminality	of	being	both	an	objective	researcher	whilst	playing	a	participatory	role	 in	 the	research	setting.	However,	supplementing	this	research	method	with	another	is	a	means	of	reinforcing	the	validity	of	data,	and	highlighting	the	commonalities	and	differences	that	appear	in	 the	 results	 when	 using	 either	 technique.	 This	 section	 will	 consider	 the	potential	methodological	challenges	I	experienced	when	conducting	 interviews,	both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 actual	 interview	 itself	 and	 the	 existing	 dynamics	surrounding	the	interview	process.	Interview	participants	for	this	research	were	identified	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways.	 Interview	 participants	 in	 this	 research	 ranged	from	 those	 working	 nationally	 to	 those	 involved	 in	 grassroots	 village	 water	projects.	Interviews	were	used	as	a	complimentary	technique	to	my	participant	observation	to	elucidate	such	information	on	water	governance	in	Tanzania.		Some	participants	were	contacted	due	to	the	role	they	played	in	the	water	sector	in	 Tanzania,	 based	 on	 my	 knowledge	 of	 conducting	 research	 into	 water	 in	Tanzania	 since	 2010.	 Snowball	 sampling	 was	 also	 sometimes	 used	 to	 find	interview	participants.	By	asking	one	participant	to	introduce	other	civil	society	organisations	who	would	be	happy	to	contribute	to	the	research,	this	technique	helped	me	 as	 a	 researcher	 gain	 trust	 in	 the	 field	 (Valentine,	 2005),	 something	which	was	 extremely	pertinent	 here	 as	 I	 am	not	 from	Dar	 es	 Salaam	and	 thus	have	a	limited	number	of	connections	there.	When	interviewing	the	Ministry	of	Water	 and	 street	 officers,	 purposive	 sampling	 (Ritchie	 et	 al,	 from	 Ritchie	 and	Lewis,	 2003:79)	 was	 instead	 used,	 as	 these	 respondents	 will	 have	 been	specifically	 chosen	 for	 their	 role	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 water	 provision.	 Upon	
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introduction,	 respondents	 were	 shown	 a	 statement	 of	 information	 that	 suits	their	language	competency13		acknowledging	as	a	researcher	the	varying	cultural	and	linguistic	identities	evident	within	the	city.			Hoggart	 et	 al	 (2002:190)	 cautioned	 that	 interviews	 are	 fundamentally	 an	imposition	on	respondents,	so	a	time	convenient	to	each	respondent	was	agreed	upon	with	the	assumption	that	each	interview	will	 last	no	more	than	one	hour.	Interview	questions	were	formulated	based	on	the	conceptual	framework	of	the	study	and	the	key	issues	that	the	research	hoped	to	cover,	and	were	tailored	to	suit	each	respondent’s	role	 in	the	city’s	water	provision.	Open	ended	questions	were	used	so	that	respondents’	answers	can	be	 full	and	detailed	and	can	cover	the	 topics	 they	wish	 (Kitchin	and	Tate,	2000:213),	and	 interviews	started	with	‘safer’	questions	so	that	the	interviewee	can	felt	comfortable	(Lindsay,	1997:41).	As	shown	by	the	documents	included	in	the	appendices,	respondents	were	made	aware	 that	 they	are	allowed	to	opt-out	of	 this	research	at	any	 time.	The	use	of	open-ended	questions	allowed	me	to	 tailor	my	 interview	style	 to	suit	who	was	being	 interviewed	 (Rapley,	 from	 Seale	 et	 al,	 2007:18),	 and	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	respondent	 unexpectedly	 vetoing	 a	 line	 of	 questioning	 (Lindsay,	 1997:40),	 it	gave	me	the	scope	to	alter	the	conversation	towards	collecting	the	data	needed.	Questions	 attempted	 to	 be	 clear	 and	 understandable,	 and	 as	 recommended	 by	Briggs	 (from	Hoggart	 et	 al,	 2002)	 took	 into	 account	 the	 communicative	 issues	that	 may	 be	 felt	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 language	 barrier.	 Interview	 questions	 were	discussed	in	advance	of	interviews	with	my	translator	in	order	to	anticipate	any	issues	around	understanding	and	mistranslation.			Some	literature	has	lauded	the	use	of	a	tape	recorder	during	interviews,	as	they	provide	 a	detailed	 record	of	 the	 interview	 to	 return	 to	 at	 a	 later	 time	 (Rapley,	from	Seale	et	al,	2007:18)	and	can	allow	the	interviewer	to	spend	time	engaging	with	 a	 fast	 paced	 conversation	 instead	 of	 constantly	 taking	 notes	 (Kitchin	 and	Tate,	 2000:218).	 Whilst	 this	 technique	 could	 have	 been	 problematic	 in	 this	research	as	a	result	of	the	language	barrier,	and	it	may	have	made	respondents	nervous	 (Rapley,	 from	 Seale	 et	 al	 2007:18),	 all	 respondents	 were	 extremely																																																									13	These	documents	can	be	found	in	the	appendices	of	this	thesis.		
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willing	to	be	recorded.	To	supplement	this	and	alleviate	any	chance	of	technical	error	handwritten	notes	were	also	taken	during	interviews	and	then	annotated	and	 expanded	 upon	 afterwards,	 as	 recommended	 by	 Kitchin	 and	 Tate	(2000:218).	 Interviews	 were	 then	 transcribed	 upon	 return	 from	 the	 field	 and	cross-referenced	with	the	handwritten	notes.			Once	again,	my	positionality	as	a	researcher	is	related	to	these	challenges.	There	has	been	significant	debate	 surrounding	whether	 to	 remain	objective	or	not	 in	the	context	of	an	interview,	as	whilst	neutrality	can	reduce	bias	in	data	analysis,	without	 building	 a	 rapport	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 certain	 information	 will	 not	 be	disclosed	 by	 the	 interviewee	 (Rapley,	 2007).	 This	 is	 an	 issue	 relevant	 to	 my	research,	as	the	close	relationships	I	formed	with	those	working	for	civil	society	organisations	 within	 Tanzania	 will	 undoubtedly	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 my	interpretation	 of	 those	 interviews.	 Moreover,	 considering	 the	 time	 taken	 by	interview	 respondents	 out	 of	 their	 day	 to	 answer	 my	 questions,	 it	 feels	somewhat	ungrateful	for	me	to	be	outwardly	critical	of	their	activity	in	the	water	sector;	unless	I	can	frame	it	around	direct	quotes	from	respondents.	As	a	way	of	ensuring	that	this	research	remained	a	robust	and	valid	piece	of	work,	I	ensured	that	relevant	pieces	of	information	were	included	in	order	to	provide	an	honest	and	accurate	response	to	the	research	questions	set,	and	only	left	out	data	that	was	either	potentially	specific	enough	that	 it	could	compromise	a	respondents’	employment	or	was	irrelevant	to	the	main	themes	included	in	this	thesis.			There	are	a	number	of	issues	related	to	access	to	participants	when	conducting	research	in	a	culturally	different	setting	(Herod,	1999).	Access	is	something	of	a	complex	 element	 of	 fieldwork,	 and	 there	 is	 the	 constant	 fear	 that	 it	 can	 be	withdrawn	at	any	time	(Smith,	2006b).	I	have	been	to	Tanzania	four	times	now	and	have	built	up	a	network	of	connections,	yet	I	was	still	unavoidably	reliant	on	a	 few	 individuals	who	acted	as	gatekeepers	 to	my	research	participants,	which	came	with	a	set	of	potential	risks.	If	there	is	a	significant	reliance	on	one	or	two	gatekeepers,	 the	 researcher	 is	 left	 feeling	 that	 they	 must	 keep	 on	 these	individuals’	 ‘good	 side’	 whether	 they	 agree	 with	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	research	topic	or	not.	Although	I	would	not	say	I	outright	disagreed	with	any	of	
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the	activities	of	the	Director	of	TWN,	I	was	often	conscious	of	keeping	her	happy	(responding	to	emails	promptly,	offering	her	cups	of	tea,	etc)	in	order	to	ensure	she	 does	 not	 cut	 off	 my	 access	 to	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 water	 sector	 in	 Dar	 es	Salaam.	Between	my	pilot	period	of	fieldwork	(from	June-July	2013)	and	my	final	period	of	fieldwork	(January-April	2014)	the	director	of	TWN	changed	which	in	turn,	 significantly	 altered	 the	 dynamics	 of	 my	 role	 as	 a	 researcher	 at	 the	organisation.	The	first	individual	was	less	willing	to	link	me	to	other	individuals	in	 the	 water	 sector	 in	 Tanzania	 and	 was	 selective	 about	 which	 elements	 of	TWN’s	 work	 that	 I	 encountered,	 whereas	 the	 director	 in	 the	 2014	 research	period	 was	 far	 more	 open	 and	 keen	 to	 introduce	 me	 to	 TWN’s	 member	organisations	as	well	as	any	other	relevant	individuals	within	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania.	 This	 indicated	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 gatekeeper	 in	 accessing	 research	participants	 and	 also	 proved	 how	 the	 co-operation	 and	 personality	 of	 that	gatekeeper	can	have	a	significant	 impact	on	 the	outcome	of	a	 research	project.	Valentine	(from	Scheyvens	et	al,	2003)	warns	that	gatekeepers	can	skew	the	data	collected	 by	 only	 introducing	 the	 researcher	 to	 individuals	 they	want	 them	 to	speak	to.	Whilst	I	do	not	feel	I	have	been	presented	with	a	particularly	selective	view	of	the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam,	my	overreliance	on	a	small	number	of	individuals	for	access	to	participants	may	have	had	some	subtle	impacts	on	my	data.	 Nonetheless,	 interviewing	 every	 individual	 involved	 in	 the	 water	 sector	would	have	been	 impossible	 to	 conduct	within	 the	 time	available,	 and	 through	contacting	organisations	of	different	 size,	 age	and	structure	served	 to	ensure	a	representative	sample	was	included.			As	 a	 young	woman	 conducting	 research	on	my	own	 in	Tanzania,	 there	were	 a	number	 of	 opportunities	 for	 gendered	 dynamics	 to	 impact	 on	 the	 interview	process.	Herod	(from	Mullings,	1999)	argues	that	whilst	gender	alone	can	impact	upon	the	research	process,	assumptions	surrounding	gender	can	also	affect	how	the	 interview	 is	 constructed	 and	 carried	 out.	McDowell’s	 (from	 Smith,	 2006b)	research	 into	 workplace	 culture	 exemplifies	 this,	 as	 she	 explains	 that	 when	interviewing	men	she	 found	herself	 ‘playing	dumb’,	with	older	women	she	was	efficient	 and	 business	 like	 and	 with	 women	 of	 her	 own	 age	 treated	 them	 as	friends.	 I	 have	 found	 the	 same	 in	 both	 interviews	 and	 other	 means	 of	 data	
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collection,	and	have	upon	reflection,	noticed	myself	playing	 these	varying	roles	almost	unintentionally.	As	in	some	cases	I	was	interviewing	people	I	had	already	formed	relationships	with	(i.e.	at	the	civil	society	organisations	I	will	be	working	with)	I	had	to	think	carefully	when	conducting	interviews	about	how	to	navigate	this	complex	relationship.	Interviewees	were	given	the	same	set	of	questions	as	respondents	who	I	had	met	for	the	first	time,	and	if	the	conversation	took	a	more	interpersonal	tone	I	made	every	effort	to	alter	the	dynamic	of	the	conversation	back	 to	 discussing	my	 research	 questions.	 Interviews	 do	 not	 only	 reveal	what	respondents	wish	to	say	on	a	particular	topic,	but	also	how	they	talk	about	that	particular	 topic	 (Secor,	 2010).	 As	 such,	 as	 much	 information	 could	 be	 gained	from	what	 respondents	 did	 not	 say,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 exact	 sentences	 that	 were	recorded.	 Combined	 with	 the	 other	 data	 collected	 in	 this	 research,	 interview	transcripts	 became	 part	 of	 the	 bigger	 picture	 surrounding	 the	 complexity	 of	water	provision	in	Tanzania.			In	 the	 way	 that	 Secor	 (2010)	 discusses	 interviews	 as	 conversations,	 she	 also	refers	 to	 focus	 groups	 as	 another	 form	 of	 conversation	 as	 a	 means	 of	 data	collection.	 In	 addition,	 focus	 groups	 are	 able	 to	 highlight	 the	 gaps	 between	respondents’	views	and	actions	(Conradson,	2005),	between	what	they	say	and	what	actually	happens	in	practice.	Although	it	was	never	the	intention	to	include	focus	groups	as	method	in	this	research,	it	was	often	the	case	that	customers	or	board	members	of	COWSOs	preferred	to	be	 interviewed	in	groups	and	as	such,	many	 interviews	 became	 ‘group	 interviews’	 or	 focus	 groups	 during	 this	research14.	 	 Conradson	 (2005)	 recommends	 setting	 up	 groups	 on	 the	 basis	 of	homogeneity	 (through	age,	 gender,	 class,	 etc)	but	 in	 this	 instance	groups	were	formed	on	 the	basis	 of	 their	 role	 in	 the	 community	water	project,	 either	 as	 an	employee,	committee	member	or	a	customer.	When	I	approached	an	individual	customer	 for	 example,	 to	 ask	 if	 they	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 participate	 in	 my	research,	 often	 they	were	 accompanied	by	others	during	 this	 exchange	 and	 all	individuals	 present	 would	 then	 agree	 to	 participate,	 and	 the	 group	 interview	would	begin.	Across	all	the	different	groups	studied,	focus	groups	were	generally																																																									14	This	is	a	common	occurrence	during	research	in	Tanzania	and	this	situation	had	occurred	on	a	number	of	occasions	during	previous	my	research	experiences	in	Dar	es	Salaam.	
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between	 4	 and	 8	 participants	 in	 size,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 recommendation	 of	between	 four	 and	 twelve	participants	by	Secor	 (2010).	 Focus	groups	are	often	praised	 for	 their	 ability	 to	 allow	 topics	 to	 be	 debated	within	 groups	 and	 for	 a	dialogue	 to	be	created	on	a	particular	 topic	 (Conradson,	2005;	Secor,	2010).	 In	Ilala	 and	 Temeke,	 they	 allowed	 the	 various	 groups	 involved	 in	 running	water	provision	to	come	together	and	discuss	the	various	issues	surrounding	their	day	to	day	role	in	the	community	water	scheme.	This	not	only	provided	a	format	for	these	 groups	 to	 provide	 information,	 but	 by	 reaching	 consensus	 on	 their	opinions	also	increased	the	validity	of	their	responses.		Whilst	focus	groups	have	also	been	critiqued	for	allowing	a	few	dominant	members	to	control	the	opinions	of	the	group,	every	effort	was	made	by	myself	and	my	translator	to	ensure	that	every	 participant	 spoke,	 and	 no	 one	 participant	 was	 able	 to	 speak	 a	disproportionate	amount	compared	to	the	other	individuals	present.	In	addition	Secor	 (2010)	 recommends	 that	 focus	groups	 last	 around	 two	and	a	half	hours,	but	as	 I	was	 conscious	 that	 for	 respondents	 to	participate	 in	my	 research	 they	were	taking	time	away	from	their	work	(and	ability	to	earn	money)	I	did	not	hold	any	focus	groups	that	lasted	longer	than	an	hour.	This	meant	that	I	was	able	to	gain	 enough	 information	 from	 each	 group	 without	 making	 a	 significant	imposition	on	their	day.	Conradson	(2005)	warns	that	 focus	groups	should	not	be	used	as	a	fast	solution	to	instead	conducting	a	series	of	individual	interviews,	but	 if	 participants	wished	 to	be	 spoken	 to	 in	 groups	 and	 it	was	 already	 taking	time	away	from	their	daily	work	it	seemed	pragmatic	to	collect	data	in	a	form	of	a	 focus	 group	 rather	 than	 potentially	 risk	 none	 of	 the	 participants	 willing	 to	participate	at	all.				
4.8	Interviewing	elites		The	 power	 dynamics	 that	 exist	 and	 oscillate	 in	 interviews	must	 be	 considered	also,	 as	 they	 can	 often	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	 other	 aspects	 of	 the	 research	process	 (Ryen,	 2007).	 Although	 Madge	 (writing	 in	 1993,	 from	 Scheyvens	 and	Storey,	 2003)	 argues	 that	 academics	 have	 yet	 to	 fully	 consider	 the	 power	relations	 that	 exist	 between	 those	 researching	 and	 those	 being	 researched,	 in	recent	 years	 there	 has	 been	 a	 turn	 towards	 focusing	 on	 these	 dimensions.	
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Feminist	thought	has	used	positionality	to	explore	in	depth	the	power	relations	that	 exist	 in	 research	 (Eubanks,	 2012),	 and	 argues	 that	 exploring	 these	 can	elucidate	the	hidden	dynamics	that	could	exist	in	something	such	as	an	interview	setting	(Smith,	2007).			Power	dynamics	are	most	explicit	when	interviewing	‘elites’,	something	which	I	have	had	significant	experience	of	when	interviewing	those	who	work	for	larger	international	NGOs	or	 the	Ministry	of	Water.	When	 conducting	 research	 in	 the	Global	 South,	 it	 is	 often	 assumed	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 researcher	and	their	participants	 is	an	exploitative	one	(Scheyvens	and	Storey,	2003),	and	that	 those	being	 researched	are	 simply	powerless.	The	process	of	 interviewing	elites	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 particularly	 is	 worth	 focus	 as	 explained	 by	 Gabriel	(2000)	who	states	that	there	is	a	perceived	sense	of	power	related	to	whiteness,	the	researcher	is	in	fact	the	inferior	one	in	this	relationship.	This	can	result	in	a	multitude	of	 impacts.	Yeager	and	Kram	(from	Welch	et	 al,	 2002)	noted	 that	 as	the	 interview	 setting	 when	 researching	 an	 elite	 actor	 can	 often	 be	 somewhat	hostile,	 they	 found	 themselves	 altering	 the	 focus	of	 the	 interview	 to	 the	 topics	the	interviewee	wished	to	discuss.	This	is	an	understandable	coping	mechanism	within	 this	 difficult	 research	 situation,	 but	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 reliability	 of	this	 data	 and	 the	 critical	 nature	 of	 the	 interview	 in	 general.	 Additionally,	interviewees	 in	positions	of	authority	may	only	respond	to	questions	using	the	rhetoric	 recommended	 by	 their	 organisation	 (Gabriel,	 2000),	 which	 makes	 it	difficult	 to	 obtain	 any	 data	 that	 could	 not	 also	 be	 found	 on	 a	 website	 or	 in	 a	written	 publication.	 Conversely,	 Smith	 (2006b)	 explained	 that	 organisations	were	 the	 most	 candid	 with	 them,	 whilst	 lower	 level	 employees	 were	 more	determined	 to	 assert	 their	 authority	 in	 the	 interview	 setting.	 I	 had	 similar	experiences	 when	 conducting	 my	 research	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 with	 certain	individuals.	As	a	researcher	who	was	clearly	not	Tanzanian,	I	often	had	a	 lot	of	respondents	 in	 positions	 of	 power	 spending	 the	 first	 few	 minutes	 of	 the	interview	speaking	to	me	in	a	rather	explanatory	way.	Some	respondents	were	very	 keen	 to	 explain	 to	 me	 the	 basic	 facts	 surrounding	 the	 water	 sector	 in	Tanzania,	 and	 had	 assumed	 that	 as	 I	 was	 not	 Tanzanian	 I	 would	 not	 already	know	 this	 information.	 It	 often	 took	 me	 a	 while	 and	 a	 particular	 line	 of	
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questioning	before	a	respondent	was	willing	to	discuss	the	nuanced	dynamics	of	the	water	 sector	 or	 provide	me	with	 any	 insightful	 information.	 This	 is	 not	 to	suggest	 that	 those	 somewhat	 explanatory	 interview	 responses	 were	 not	 still	useful	pieces	of	data,	however.	As	the	interviews	were	used	as	a	complementary	technique	 to	 other	 research	methods,	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 responses	 from	 these	individuals	was	able	to	be	correlated	with	other	data,	and	if	the	respondent	had	not	 provided	 an	 accurate	 response	 with	 regards	 to	 their	 organisation,	 their	reason	for	not	being	truthful	was	able	to	be	considered	a	finding	in	itself.			As	I	was	conducting	research	in	a	culture	entirely	different	to	my	own,	it	is	worth	making	 note	 of	 Sabot’s	 (1999)	 experiences	 of	 conducting	 research	 in	 recently	devolved	 Scotland.	 As	 a	 French	 woman,	 Scottish	 people	 were	 very	 keen	 to	explain	their	new	political	format	to	someone	from	a	different	country,	and	the	number	of	quasi-governmental	organisations	she	was	working	with	wanted	their	opinion	heard	and	recorded	to	add	to	their	legitimacy.	This	is	something	I	have	experienced	 in	 Tanzania,	 especially	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 several	organisations	and	other	stakeholders	involved	in	water	provision	in	the	city,	and	highlights	 how	 being	 from	 a	 different	 country	 could	 in	 some	 ways	 be	advantageous	 in	 overcoming	 this	 ‘elite’	 power	 dynamic.	 As	 previously	mentioned,	whilst	 some	respondents	wished	 to	provide	me	with	basic	 facts	on	the	 water	 sector	 in	 Tanzania,	 others	 took	 this	 an	 opportunity	 to	 engage	 with	someone	from	a	different	country	about	Tanzanian	culture,	and	this	made	them	more	than	willing	participants	to	my	research.			Whilst	there	is	a	belief	within	Economic	Geography	that	displaying	knowledge	of	the	 role	 of	 the	 elite	 you	 are	 researching	 can	be	 advantageous	 to	 the	 interview	(Mullings,	1999)	 it	was	often	very	difficult	 for	me	to	do	that	and	 it	would	have	felt	 in	many	 cases	 like	 I	was	 coming	across	as	precocious.	As	well	 as	 this,	 as	 a	visitor	to	Dar	es	Salaam	it	was	often	assumed	that	I	had	no	previous	knowledge	of	 even	 basic	 aspects	 of	 the	 water	 system	 in	 the	 city,	 which	 often	 led	 to	interviews	being	incredibly	base-level	and	key	issues	being	ignored.	However,	it	could	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 discourse	 surrounding	 exploitative	 research	(Scheyvens	and	Storey,	2003)	has	exacerbated	 these	power	plays,	and	 in	some	
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cases	 ‘elites’	were	 seeking	 to	 reclaim	 authority	 they	 feel	 has	 been	 taken	 away	from	them	by	the	West.					It	is	however,	important	to	problematise	what	is	meant	by	the	term	‘elite’	(Smith,	2006b).	Woods,	 from	(Ward	and	 Jones,	1999)	defines	 the	 term	as	a	word	used	broadly	to	describe	those	in	a	situation	who	are	supposedly	more	powerful	than	another	 individual	 or	 group	 in	 this	 setting,	 yet	 it	 is	 often	 very	 difficult	 to	determine	who	‘holds	the	power’	in	many	situations	(Smith,	2006b)	(Scheyvens	and	 Storey,	 2003).	 There	 can	 be	 the	 power	 dynamics	 that	 exist	 as	 a	 result	 of	wealth	or	education,	and	the	dynamics	that	exist	as	a	result	of	certain	individuals	in	 the	 research	 process	 feeling	 inferior	 to	 others	 for	 a	 multitude	 of	 reasons	(Scheyvens	et	al,	2003).	In	my	experience	this	is	often	the	case,	as	there	were	a	number	 of	 power	 relationships	 present	 that	 can	 even	 alter	 throughout	 the	course	 of	 the	 day.	 The	 Director	 of	 TWN	 has	 been	 a	 veritable	 (yet	 helpful)	gatekeeper	for	both	my	Masters	and	PhD	research,	introducing	me	to	other	civil	society	organisations	and	inviting	me	to	high	profile	meetings	with	her,	so	in	this	instance,	she	held	more	power	than	me.	Sometimes,	however,	she	would	ask	me	to	 proofread	 some	 reports	 for	 her	 or	 rewrite	 some	 documents	 to	 help	 her	improve	her	English,	and	thus	the	power	dynamic	shifted.	Additionally,	when	in	a	 room	 full	 of	 many	 people	 (other	 members	 of	 TWN,	 members	 of	 other	organisations)	 other	 relationships	 are	made	 clear;	 the	 Director	 clearly	 had	 an	influence	over	the	other	employees	of	TWN	but	was	often	made	to	feel	 inferior	by	 someone	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Water	 or	 a	 larger	 international	 NGO,	 for	example.	Therefore,	the	myriad	of	power	relations	must	therefore	be	considered	when	considering	 the	data	collected	 in	 this	research.	As	well	as	 this,	Ward	and	Jones’	 (1999)	 suggestion	 of	 considering	 the	 broader	 structures	 in	 place	 that	formulate	 these	power	 relations,	 as	well	 as	 Smith’s	 (2006b)	and	Scheyven	and	Storey’s	 (2003)	belief	 in	a	poststructural	understanding	of	power	must	also	be	acknowledged.				
4.9	Textual	analysis		
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As	 noted	 by	Mitchell	 (2003),	 “discourse	 helps	 to	 set	 the	 social	 context	 within	which	 social	 practices	 occur	 and	 are	 given	 meaning”,	 and	 the	 importance	 of	institutions	 in	 manifesting	 these	 discourses	 must	 also	 be	 considered	 (Mills,	1997)	 (Chilton	 and	 Schäffner,	 from	 Van	 Dijk,	 2011).	 Taking	 into	 account	Mitchell’s	 (from	 Aitken,	 2005)	 view	 that	 a	 sole	 focus	 on	 texts	may	 take	 away	understandings	of	the	material	world,	but	can	also	be	used	to	understand	power	structures	 in	 place,	 this	 research	 used	 textual	 analysis	 as	 a	 complementary	technique	to	other	research	methods	in	order	to	examine	these	power	structures	whilst	 connect	 these	 findings	 to	 empirics	 from	 said	material	world.	 The	 initial	texts	included	in	this	research	were	the	main	Tanzanian	water	policy	documents	used	 to	 frame	contemporary	water	policy,	 alongside	any	additional	documents	produced	 on	 the	water	 sector	 by	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 in	 conjunction	with	 this	policy	 framework.	As	well	as	 this,	documents	produced	by	 the	Tanzanian	state	on	 the	 broader	 issue	 of	 poverty	 reduction	 involving	 all	 sectors	 were	 also	analysed.	These	documents	were	reviewed	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	current	water	 policy	 framework	 in	 operation	 in	 Tanzania	 and	 how	 consistent	 it	 was	across	 a	 number	 of	 documents,	 including	 Tanzania’s	 wider	 poverty	 reduction	initiatives.	 Additional	 texts	 involved	 in	 this	 research	 varied	 from	 reports	 and	conference	papers	given	to	me	to	read	by	other	employees	of	TWN	and	WPM,	to	documents	 they	 asked	 me	 to	 write	 as	 part	 of	 my	 role	 as	 a	 volunteer	 at	 each	organisation.	 These	 ranged	 from	 funding	 proposals	 to	 project	 concepts	 and	 in	the	case	of	TWN,	a	newsletter.	 	Aitken	(2005)	discusses	 the	multitude	of	 items	that	 can	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 ‘text’.	 As	 such,	 every	 leaflet,	 report,	 email,	 or	conference	 paper	 encountered	 during	my	 fieldwork	was	 gathered	 as	 data	 and	analysed	accordingly.	Including	a	wide	range	of	documents	allowed	for	analysis	of	 consensus	within	 the	direction	of	Tanzania’s	water	 sector,	 and	 the	potential	reasons	for	a	shift	in	discourse	and	the	origins	of	influence	in	the	country’s	water	governance.			Although	 Rose	 (2001)	 praised	 discourse	 analysis	 for	 producing	 a	 set	 of	quantitative	results	that	could	perhaps	be	hidden	within	vast	amounts	of	data,	as	this	project	was	entirely	qualitative	in	nature	it	instead	attempted	to	unpack	the	text	used	in	these	documents,	and	uncover	the	hidden	meanings	behind	what	is	
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said.	 Stubbs	 (1983)	 stated	 that	 there	was	 no	 clear-defined	method	 to	 conduct	discourse	analysis,	so	after	consulting	 literature	on	the	 topic	 I	devised	my	own	method	 based	 on	 others’15	previous	 experiences	 that	 suited	 my	 analysis	 best.	Following	 the	 advice	 of	 Rose	 (2001)	 I	 initially	 read	 the	 texts	 several	 times	without	 taking	 notes,	 familiarising	 myself	 with	 the	 broader	 arguments	 before	analysis.	Then,	emulating	the	technique	used	by	Stubbs	(1983)16	I	attempted	to	summarise	these	arguments	in	around	two	hundred	words	per	document,	which	allowed	 a	 brief	 comparison	 to	 be	made	 over	 their	 content	 and	 viewpoints	 on	water	 governance	 in	 Tanzania.	 Once	 I	 felt	 that	 I	 had	 a	 clear	 understanding	 of	each	document,	 specific	arguments	made	by	each	were	 then	selected	and	used	for	in-depth	analysis.		
4.10	Translation	and	language	issues		As	 well	 as	 previously	 mentioned	 issues,	 one	 of	 the	 major	 logistical	 barrier	 to	conducting	 interviews	 was	 the	 use	 of	 a	 translator	 when	 engaging	 with	respondents	who	did	not	speak	English.	Translation	on	the	whole	can	be	deeply	politicised	and	problematic	for	the	research	process.	Spivak	(from	Muller,	2007)	argues	that	translation	is	in	fact	a	political	act,	and	the	ways	in	which	words	and	phrases	 are	 transformed	 from	 one	 language	 to	 another	 can	 make	 more	 of	 a	statement	 than	 the	 words	 themselves.	 Whilst	 it	 is	 broadly	 understood	 as	 the	literal	replacement	of	words	between	two	languages,	it	is	often	much	more	than	this.			The	 interview	 setting	 involving	 a	 translator	 itself	 can	 provide	 a	 set	 of	 issues.	Herod,	(1999)	remarked	that	the	use	of	a	translator	in	an	interview	can	often	be	very	tiring,	as	it	can	add	an	extra	layer	of	communication	to	the	research	process.	I	have	significant	experience	of	this,	and	as	such,	understood	that	a	good	working	relationship	with	a	 translator	was	essential	 for	effective	data	collection.	Whilst	Scheyvens	(from	Scheyvens	and	Storey,	2003)	remarked	that	lengthy	discussions																																																									15	Such	as	Sharp	(1993;2003;	Bryceson	et	al,	2009;	Fine,	2009).	16	In	his	research,	Stubbs	(1983)	gave	a	group	of	adults	a	short	story	by	Ernest	Hemingway	and	asked	them	to	read	the	story	and	summarise	the	plot	firstly	in	less	than	sixty	words,	and	then	in	less	than	twenty-five	words.		
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in	a	language	she	didn’t	understand	were	often	reduced	to	one	sentence	by	her	respondents	when	 translating	 for	her,	 I	have	had	experiences	of	 the	 translator	doing	 this	 instead	 and	 appropriating	 their	 own	 filter	 on	 the	 respondents’	answers.	I	have	on	several	occasions	watched	a	respondent	speak	for	almost	five	minutes	 then	 be	 given	 three	 words	 as	 a	 response	 from	my	 translator.	 This	 is	where	 the	 translation	 process	 becomes	 politicised.	 Whilst	 Delamont	 (2007)	notes	 that	 informants	 can	 often	 alter	 responses	 based	 on	what	 they	 think	 the	researcher	wants	to	hear,	in	my	experience	the	translator	can	play	as	much	of	a	role	in	this,	and	this	is	a	dynamic	that	is	difficult	for	the	researcher	to	overcome.			Translation	and	language,	can	also	have	an	impact	on	a	setting	where	participant	observation	 is	being	conducted.	 In	terms	of	being	considered	an	 insider	or	not,	whilst	 I	 was	 invited	 to	 have	 my	 meals	 with	 those	 working	 at	 civil	 society	organisations,	more	often	than	not	they	spoke	in	Swahili	and	only	translated	into	English	intermittently.	There	were	a	number	of	reasons	for	this,	some	of	which	have	been	explained	 for	me	and	others	which	 I	 have	 interpreted	myself.	Often	those	working	for	civil	society	organisations	(and	in	fact,	other	Tanzanians)	have	explained	that	with	English	being	their	 third	 language	 it	 is	often	very	tiring	 for	them	 to	 speak	 in	 it	 all	 of	 the	 time.	 As	 well	 as	 this,	 other	 employees	 often	(jokingly)	 remarked	 to	 me	 that	 the	 more	 they	 speak	 Swahili	 around	 me,	 the	quicker	I	will	learn	and	be	able	to	speak	it	with	them.	However,	sometimes	after	a	lengthy	discussion	in	Swahili	they	will	turn	to	me	and	say	‘Did	you	know	this?’,	often	followed	by	a	secret	or	some	sort	of	gossip	about	the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam.	 I	 sometimes	 got	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 discussion	 in	 Swahili	 is	 far	richer	in	‘gossip’	than	they	actually	translate	for	me,	and	perhaps	sometimes	the	discussion	 is	 surrounding	whether	 they	should	 tell	me	 this	 information	or	not,	although	this	could	also	have	been	my	own	paranoia.	(Scheyvens	et	al,	2003)	also	found	 this	 however,	 when	 conducting	 fieldwork	 in	 the	 Soloman	 Islands	 and	noted	that	women	would	discuss	a	topic	at	length	amongst	themselves	and	then	respond	 her	 in	 a	 short,	 and	 in	 her	 opinion,	 edited,	 sentence,	 so	 perhaps	 my	worries	about	being	excluded	from	information	during	my	data	collection	were	not	unfounded.		
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As	well	as	this,	the	specificities	of	language	can	also	become	problematic.	Herod	(1999)	uses	an	example	of	this	where	when	conducting	research	in	Honduras	he	initially	 thought	 a	 respondent	was	 discussing	 apples,	 then	 only	 later	 on	 in	 the	interview	 realised	 they	were	discussing	housing	policy	due	 to	 the	 similarity	of	some	words	in	the	Spanish	language.	Although	I	am	aware	of	some	of	the	cultural	dynamics	 of	 the	 Swahili	 language,	 such	 as	 which	 greetings	 to	 use	 in	 certain	situations,	it	was	often	challenging	to	understand	a	lot	of	the	nuanced	elements	of	the	language,	and	I	initially	often	misunderstand	the	true	meaning	of	what	was	being	said	by	a	respondent.	This	coupled	with	the	extra	level	of	translation	by	a	translator	and	their	own	politics	could	potentially	have	made	confidence	in	the	research	data	very	difficult.	However,	being	prepared	for	these	issues	led	to	me	coming	 up	with	 creative	ways	 of	 asking	 questions,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 tease	 out	some	 of	 these	 linguistic	 complexities.	 Even	 for	 those	 Tanzanians	 that	 spoke	English,	at	times	respondents	did	not	take	the	same	meanings	from	sentences	as	I	did,	which	meant	that	I	had	to	alter	my	sentence	construction	and	some	of	the	words	that	I	used	in	order	to	ensure	that	my	interview	respondents	and	I	were	discussing	 the	 same	 topic.	 Having	 been	 conducting	 research	 in	 Tanzania	 since	2010,	 this	 was	 something	 that	 I	 was	 prepared	 for	 and	 was	 able	 to	 adjust	 my	language	accordingly	with	ease.		Of	 course,	 whilst	 the	 interview	 itself	 is	 fraught	 with	 potential	 methodological	issues,	the	environment	it	takes	place	in	can	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	data	that	 is	collected.	Rapley	(2007)	refers	 to	an	experience	where	he	conducted	an	interview	in	a	coffee	shop	and	when	the	interview	turned	to	a	personal	topic	(the	interviewee’s	 sexuality)	 he	 began	 to	 talk	 in	 hushed	 tones.	 This	 is	 something	 I	took	note	of	when	conducting	my	own	interviews.	I	entered	the	field	concerned	that	 members	 of	 civil	 society	 organisations	 may	 be	 unwilling	 to	 discuss	 the	issues	within	 the	organisation	 if	 others	 are	 in	 earshot,	 and	 likewise	within	 the	COWSOs,	 members	 of	 the	 community	 may	 not	 be	 honest	 if	 people	 from	 the	COWSO	are	there.	However,	I	used	these	initial	concerns	to	mitigate	any	of	these	issues	arising,	by	interviewing	members	of	NGOs	and	civil	society	organisations	in	 a	 room	 by	 themselves,	 and	 interviewing	 different	 COWSO	members	 within	
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their	own	groups17	helped	 to	alleviate	 the	potential	 for	data	 to	be	 impacted	by	the	 surrounding	 environment.	As	many	of	my	 interview	 respondents	provided	me	 with	 openly	 critical	 information	 on	 the	 institutions	 they	 were	 being	questioned	 about,	 this	 made	 me	 confident	 that	 they	 had	 provided	 honest	responses	to	my	questions.			There	are	also	a	lot	of	elements	of	Swahili	that	can	make	me	feel	more	included	and	 thus	more	 ‘inside’	 the	research	setting.	This	 is	 something	 I	have	especially	found	 during	 my	 latter	 trips	 to	 Tanzania.	 Being	 told	 I	 no	 longer	 need	 to	 use	greetings	that	show	respect	and	instead	use	ones	typically	used	between	friends	made	me	feel	more	included	and	that	I	have	been	able	to	form	a	bond	with	this	person.	Additionally,	whilst	many	foreigners	visiting	Tanzania	are	often	referred	to	as	mzungu	(which	effectively	means	a	white	person	or	a	European),	during	my	pilot	research	period	I	was	told	that	‘you	are	no	longer	mzungu,	you	are	mzungu	
mtaani’	which	translates	as	‘traveller	of	the	street’	and	was	used	to	suggest	that	I	was	 increasingly	 becoming	 ‘Tanzanian’	 and	 had	 adapted	 well	 to	 Tanzanian	culture.	 Instances	 like	 this	 can	 often	 be	 a	 clear	 indicator	 for	me	 of	 when	 it	 is	appropriate	to	ask	certain	questions,	or	when	I	have	become	accepted	by	one	of	the	 groups	 I	 am	working	with.	 This	 however	 became	problematic	 as	 I	 became	concerned	that	I	was	no	longer	being	seen	as	someone	conducting	research.,	as	discussed	previously	in	sections	4.3	and	4.4.		
	
4.11	Analysing	and	interpreting	my	data		Notes	 from	 the	 field	 were	 written	 up	 immediately	 upon	 return	 to	 my	accommodation	in	Tanzania,	and	any	interview	recordings	checked	to	ensure	the	file	worked	properly.	Upon	return	from	the	field,	interviews	were	transcribed	in	full	 and	 then	 cross-referenced	 with	 the	 notes	 taken	 at	 the	 time	 the	 data	 was	collected.	There	are	various	 levels	of	detail	 that	can	be	used	when	transcribing	an	interview	(Crang,	2005).	In	the	case	of	this	research,	any	speech	by	myself	or	the	 interviewee	 was	 recorded	 verbatim,	 but	 any	 other	 occurrences	 that	 took																																																									17	The	 three	 main	 groups	 within	 COWSOs,	 board	 members,	 staff	 and	 customers	 were	 each	interviewed	separate	from	each	other.	Whilst	some	customers	were	interviewed	together	(in	the	form	of	a	focus	group),	customers	were	never	interviewed	near	any	staff	or	board	members.		
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place	during	the	interview	(such	as	the	respondents’	colleague	knocking	on	the	door,	or	a	phone	ringing)	were	not	included	as	they	were	either	not	relevant	to	the	 research,	 or	 recording	 this	 information	 would	 have	 felt	 ethically	questionable	as	the	voices	being	recorded	were	not	addressing	the	interviewee	directly.			Secor	(2010)	writes	that:		 “Coding	can	be	a	systematic	process	in	which	themes,	words,	phrases	and	interpretations	are	 flagged	within	and	across	 focus	group	and	 interview	transcripts.”	(Secor,	2010:202)		For	those	inherently	personal	reflections	from	the	field	already	discussed	in	this	chapter,	 time	was	 taken	 to	 review	 these	 thoughts	 after	 I	 had	been	back	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	for	a	few	months,	to	see	if	these	were	accurate	representations	or	statements	made	 loaded	with	my	emotions	at	 the	 time	of	writing.	As	such,	 I	took	 the	 time	 to	 critically	 reflect	 on	 my	 own	 field	 diary	 and	 field	 notebook	entries	 and	 situated	my	writing	within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 period,	 in	order	 to	 ensure	 that	 I	was	 still	 able	 to	produce	a	 robust	 and	 reflexive	piece	of	research.	 Initially,	 I	 used	 the	 technique	 of	 ‘open	 coding’	 discussed	 by	 Crang	(2005)	where	 field	 diary	 entries	 and	 interview	 transcripts	were	 read	 through	and	emerging	topics	and	themes	were	noted	down	for	further	coding	once	all	the	relevant	 themes	 to	 this	 research	had	been	 identified.	The	data	 recorded	 in	my	field	diary	and	notebook	were	therefore	coded	in	the	same	manner	as	all	of	the	other	 data	 included	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Coding	 themes	 were	 identified	 across	 all	interview	 transcripts,	 field	 diary	 entries	 and	 documents	 analysed	 in	 order	 to	triangulate	all	of	these	different	forms	of	data	in	order	to	answer	the	questions	set	 in	 this	 research.	 	By	 creating	 categories	based	upon	what	Kitchin	 and	Tate	(2000:235)	 refer	 to	 as	 “the	 most	 logical	 or	 implicit	 classes”	 this	 allowed	 the	analysis	to	focus	on	each	individual	theme	so	that	a	true	understanding	of	each	aspect	 of	 this	 research	 can	 be	 understood	 and	 demonstrated.	 As	 explained	 by	Crang	(2005),	there	is	no	comprehensive	and	absolute	way	to	analyse	qualitative	data	and	 it	must	be	done	so	 in	a	way	 that	 fits	 the	 relevant	 research	questions.	
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Taking	this	into	account,	data	was	coded	based	on	a	small	number	of	codes	to	fit	the	main	research	questions	of	this	thesis,	which	were	then	further	divided	into	a	series	of	sub-codes.			
4.12	Ethics		It	 is	 important	 to	 fully	examine	 the	ethical	 implications	of	one’s	 fieldwork,	and	even	if	there	is	no	means	to	alleviate	them	at	least	acknowledge	their	importance	and	potential	impact.	All	respondents	or	individuals	involved	in	my	ethnographic	research	were	 informed	 that	 I	was	a	 researcher	 from	 the	United	Kingdom	and	was	 interested	 in	 water	 governance	 in	 Tanzania.	 When	 appropriate 18 ,	respondents	 were	 shown	 a	 document	 explaining	 my	 research	 in	 detail,	 and	 a	consent	 form	 for	 them	 to	 sign	 and	 give	 permission	 to	 be	 part	 of	 my	 data	collection.	 Throughout	 the	 research	 process,	 no	 remuneration	 was	 offered	 to	research	participants,	with	the	only	expense	on	my	behalf	being	the	purchase	of	a	soft	drink	if	the	interview	was	taking	place	in	a	cafe	or	restaurant.	There	were	a	few	 occasions	where	 respondents	 asked	 to	 be	 paid	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 research	process,	and	 they	were	not	 interviewed	or	 involved	 in	ethnographic	study	as	a	result.			The	 risks	 involved	 for	 participants	 are	 a	 necessary	 consideration,	 especially	 if	their	job	title	and	organisation	could	make	them	easily	identifiable	(Secor,	2010).	Therefore	 all	 research	 participants	 have	 been	 anonymised	 to	 the	 best	 of	 my	abilities,	with	 all	NGOs	 interviewed	 for	 this	 research	 given	numbers	 and	 those	interviewed	in	Temeke	and	Ilala	only	referred	to	by	their	role	in	the	community	based	water	scheme	(ie	customer,	board	member	or	employee).	As	well	as	this,	the	organisations	 involved	 in	 the	observational	part	of	 this	research	have	been	given	 synonyms	 and	 their	 identity	 protected	 as	much	 as	 possible	 through	 the	omission	of	the	location	of	their	office	and	the	names	of	their	employees.	Those	who	 were	 interviewed	 in	 the	 capacity	 of	 either	 national	 or	 local	 governance	institutions	were	only	referred	to	by	the	specific	institution	where	they	worked,																																																									18	At	 times	 where	 there	 were	 language	 difficulties	 or	 the	 respondent	 had	 only	 a	 limited	 time	available	to	participate,	verbal	consent	was	given	by	respondents.		
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with	 their	 job	 title	 and	name	omitted.	 In	 addition,	 this	 research	 complies	with	the	Economic	and	Social	Research	Council’s	ethical	guidelines	in	order	to	ensure	the	 research	 is	 a	 valid	 and	 ethnically	 sound	 piece	 of	 work.	 	 As	 is	 custom,	 all	respondents	were	informed	that	I	would	destroy	all	raw	data	after	the	research	is	written	up,	and	the	only	data	that	will	be	public	will	be	that	which	is	included	in	the	final	report.				Scheyvens	 et	 al	 (2003)	 remarked	 that	 researchers	 are	 often	 faced	 with	 the	dilemma	over	whom	they	feel	obligated	to.	Undoubtedly,	my	bias	will	always	lie	with	the	communities	(both	formal	and	informal)	working	hard	to	provide	water	within	their	localities,	and	it	seems	the	majority	of	my	critique	of	water	provision	in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 will	 be	 involving	 the	 civil	 society	 organisations	 and	 NGO	employees	that	I	will	have	built	sustained	relationships	with	over	the	course	of	my	 PhD.	 These	 are	 the	 groups	 that	 have	 not	 only	 introduced	 me	 to	 the	individuals	and	groups	that	have	been	essential	to	my	data	collection,	but	during	my	time	as	a	Scottish	woman	in	Tanzania	have	looked	after	me	as	a	visitor,	as	an	employee	 and	 as	 a	 friend.	 However,	 as	 noted	 by	 Herod	 (1999),	 it	 is	 often	 the	easiest	 to	maintain	 a	 critical	 distance	 from	 those	 you	 are	 least	 sympathetic	 to.	Therefore	it	was	admittedly	difficult	for	me	to	have	confidence	in	my	data	based	on	my	 own	personal	 feelings,	 and	 reinforces	 the	 concerns	 about	 ‘going	 native’	and	 the	 pertinence	 of	 considering	 positionality,	 especially	 when	 conducting	participant	observation	(Delamont,	2007).		Additionally,	when	it	comes	to	the	completion	of	this	thesis	it	is	more	than	likely	that	 those	 that	 ask	 to	 read	 the	 document	 will	 be	 within	 the	 latter	 group	(especially	noting	 the	 fact	 that	many	members	of	 the	communities	 I	work	with	will	not	 speak	English),	 and	could	 result	 in	many	 feeling	 I	have	betrayed	 them	and	in	the	worst	case,	ending	friendships.	Myers’	(from	Phillips	and	Johns,	2012)	ethnographic	research	in	Africa	left	him	unsure	what	information	he	was	being	told	was	public	knowledge,	and	what	he	was	being	told	in	confidence.	This	was	a	constant	dilemma	I	was	faced	with	in	the	field	and	during	writing	this	thesis,	and	returning	to	Ryen’s	(2007)	point	that	you	cannot	forget	what	you	have	been	told	perhaps	in	confidence,	it	is	impossible	for	me	to	separate	these	interactions	into	
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data	or	socialising.	Being	true	to	my	data	but	also	reflecting	on	memories	of	the	individuals	 who	 have	 made	 me	 feel	 so	 welcome	 in	 Tanzania	 throughout	 the	fieldwork	process	was	a	difficult	conflict	to	overcome.		
4.13	Conclusion	
	Jupp	(2007)	states	that;		 “Whilst	social	science	research	might	aim	at	producing	shared	“spaces	of	thoughtfulness	and	imagination”	as	Thrift	(2003)	suggests,	these	are	also	likely	 to	 be	 spaces	 of	 uncertainty,	 and	 sometimes	 difficult	 negotiations	between	 different	 subjectivities,	 knowledges	 and	 representations,	 both	for	the	researcher	and	the	researched.”	(Jupp,	2007:2841)		I	 feel	 that	 using	 participatory	 research	 methods	 helped	 to	 alleviate	 these	potential	 “spaces	 of	 uncertainty”	 (Jupp,	 2007:2841),	 as	 it	 has	 given	 the	participants	involved	in	my	fieldwork	ownership	over	the	research	process,	and	allowed	me	to	collect	data	that	not	only	speaks	from	their	point	of	view	but	can	be	scaled	up	to	address	the	wider	theoretical	questions	that	will	be	included	in	my	final	thesis.	A	noted	by	Cook	and	Crang	(1995),	an	ethnographic	study	is	not	geared	towards	producing	positivistic	data,	but	instead	about	uncovering	“inter-subjective	 truths”	 (Cook	 and	 Crang,	 1995).	 By	 exploring	 research	 participants’	own	 interpretations	and	reflexivity	over	 their	own	 lives	and	 including	my	own	analysis	of	 this	data,	 this	research	project	has	addressed	this	 inter-subjectivity,	and	 attempted	 to	 provide	 a	 fully	 comprehensive	 study	 of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam.			Whilst	it	is	useful	to	consider	in	depth	the	methodology	of	a	research	project,	it	still	 seems	 difficult	 to	 ascertain	 the	most	 ethical	means	 of	 collecting	 data	 as	 a	Western	 researcher	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	 There	 are	 still	 a	 great	 deal	 of	assumptions	that	need	to	be	made	by	the	researcher	on	a	number	of	unknown	truths,	making	any	idea	of	reflexivity	in	the	research	process	problematic	(Rose,	from	 Smith,	 2006b).	 Woods’	 (from	 Ward	 and	 Jones,	 1999)	 argument	 for	 a	
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poststructuralist	 understanding	 of	 the	 term	 elite	 can	 in	 fact	 be	 applied	 to	 this	whole	 chapter,	 as	 often	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 explain	 firstly	 the	 structures	 that	 exist	and	then	in	turn,	what	created	them	in	the	first	place.	Perhaps	this	ambiguity	is	what	 makes	 this	 form	 of	 research	 unique,	 however,	 as	 whilst	 focusing	 on	 a	specific	 topic	 (in	 my	 case,	 access	 to	 water	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam)	 it	 can	 also	 help	provide	 a	 useful	 contribution	 to	 wider	 debates	 within	 Postcolonialism	 and	Feminism,	amongst	other	academic	fields.	There	may	not	be	a	‘correct’	position	to	be	in	as	a	white	researcher	(Gabriel,	2000),	but	the	flexibility	of	this	allows	a	number	of	different	roles	to	be	taken	on	in	the	field	that	can	lead	to	a	set	of	rich	and	nuanced	data.	 I	would	 argue	 that	 it	 has	 been	 almost	 impossible	 for	me	 to	remain	 neutral	 in	 any	 means	 of	 data	 collection	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Even	 a	 brief	encounter	with	someone	at	the	Ministry	of	Water	was	fraught	with	politics,	as	I	was	still	a	young,	white,	female	researcher	from	another	country	and	could	have	been	perceived	to	be	attempting	to	research	something	more	sinister	than	I	was.	Therefore	I	feel	any	discussions	of	objectivity	should	be	framed	around	how	this	relates	 to	 my	 own	 personal	 politics	 and	 those	 I	 interact	 with	 through	 my	research,	 and	 like	 Letherby	 (2000:104)	 I	 do	 believe	 that	 ‘being	 critical	 of	 my	involvement	 results	 in	 a	 more	 fuller	 picture’.	 This	 chapter	 has	 explored	 the	specific	methods	used	in	order	to	address	the	research	questions	 in	this	thesis,	and	 the	 ethical	 implications	 related	 to	 these.	 Secor	 (2010)	 notes	 that	 data	analysis	must	be	 linked	up	 to	wider	 theoretical	debates	 in	order	 to	be	 seen	as	valid.	The	following	chapters	will	 therefore	address	this,	 in	order	to	attempt	to	connect	 the	 data	 collected	 in	 Tanzania	 to	 wider	 theoretical	 debates	 in	 water	governance	and	international	development.														
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Chapter	5:	Water	Policy	and	Governance	in	Dar	es	Salaam	
	
5.1	Introduction		According	 to	 Lein	 and	 Tagseth	 (2009),	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy	 explains	 that	water	belongs	to	the	state	and	all	residents	who	want	to	access	water	from	one	of	 the	 country’s	 rivers	 or	 streams	 must	 obtain	 an	 official	 right	 from	 the	Tanzanian	state	to	do	so.	However,	as	small	and	large	scale	private	providers	of	water	 gain	 increasing	 prominence	within	 the	water	 governance	 framework	 in	Tanzania,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 growing	 responsibility	 is	 placed	 on	 grassroots	communities	 to	 manage	 and	 provide	 their	 own	 water.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 a	 state-owned	centralised	method	of	water	governance	is	no	longer	in	place.	Instead,	a	pluralistic	policy	environment	now	exists	in	Tanzania,	where	a	variety	of	means	of	 provision	 and	 interpretations	 of	 water’s	 value	 are	 currently	 in	 place	 for	residents	to	navigate	whilst	trying	to	access	water	for	their	own	basic	survival.			This	chapter	will	provide	a	conceptual	background	for	the	data	collected	in	this	research	 with	 regards	 to	 water	 policy	 discourse	 and	 practice	 in	 Tanzania.	Commissioned	 in	 1995	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 this	 relationship,	 the	 Helleiner	Report	 made	 recommendations	 such	 as	 avoiding	 the	 duplication	 of	 parallel	projects	 and	 the	 active	 incorporation	of	 civil	 society	 organisations	 into	project	planning	 and	 implementation,	 as	 well	 as	 clearly	 defining	 the	 roles	 of	 each	stakeholder	 involved	 (Helleiner	 Report,	 1995,	 from	 Wangwe,	 2002).	 As	 such,	these	 themes	and	others	will	be	examined	 in	 this	 chapter	 through	 the	use	of	a	discourse	 analysis	 of	 several	 water	 policy	 and	 other	 related	 documents,	 also	supplemented	 by	 observational	 and	 interview	 data.	 The	 key	 policy	 documents	involved	 in	 water	 governance	 in	 Tanzania	 will	 be	 discussed	 at	 length	 in	 this	chapter.	 Alongside	 other	 documents	 produced	 by	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 since	1991,	 the	 key	 themes	 prevalent	 in	 these	 documents	 will	 be	 assessed,	supplemented	by	empirical	data	that	indicates	how	these	policy	discourses	have	manifested	in	reality		
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Edwards	(2014)	explains	that:		 “For	 a	 long	 time	 scholars,	 analysts	 and	 aid	 officials	 had	 argued	 that	 the	absence	 of	 well-defined	 property	 rights	 was	 a	 fundamental	 problem	 in	Tanzania	–	and	in	most	of	Sub-Saharan	Africa,	for	that	matter.”	(Edwards,	2014:222)		Taking	 this	 into	 account,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 examine	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 water	provision	 in	Tanzania	has	been	affected	by	 the	 transfer	of	water	ownership	 to	the	grassroots	level,	and	whether	the	formalisation	of	this	means	of	access	is	the	panacea	to	Tanzania’s	water	problems.	The	chapter	begins	with	an	explanation	of	 the	 conceptual	 framework	used	 to	analyse	 the	direction	of	Tanzanian	water	policy	and	the	ways	in	which	the	country’s	socio-political	history	have	impacted	upon	it.	Tanzania’s	socialist	past	under	Julius	Nyerere	is	examined,	and	how	the	country’s	 political	 history	 has	 affected	 contemporary	 policy	 discourses.	 The	chapter	continues	with	an	analysis	of	Tanzanian	water	policy	documents,	before	moving	on	to	further	analysis	of	other	related	documents	that	inform	Tanzanian	policy,	 such	 as	 each	poverty	 reduction	 strategy	paper	 (PRSP)	 produced	by	 the	Government	of	Tanzania.	The	chapter	then	moves	on	to	discuss	other	documents	produced	 on	 the	 water	 sector	 in	 Tanzania	 by	 external	 stakeholders,	 before	discussion	of	 the	current	discourse	of	 community	water	provision	 in	Tanzania.	Finally,	 the	 chapter	 discusses	 different	 understandings	 and	 interpretations	 of	Tanzania’s	water	policy	amongst	different	stakeholder	groups,	before	reaching	a	conclusion	to	the	chapter.			
5.2	Contextualising	Water	Governance	in	Tanzania		Molyneux’s	 (2008)	 research	 in	 Latin	 America	 noted	 that	 ‘neoliberalism’	 is	 too	general	 a	 description	 for	 the	 varying	 economic	 forms	 of	 governance	 being	practiced	 there.	 As	 such,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 key	 tenets	 of	 this	 economic	doctrine,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 messy	 and	 hybrid	 forms	 of	 governance	 that	 can	materialise	 from	 it,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 consider	 how	 this	 has	 played	 out	 in	Tanzania,	with	respect	 to	 this	country’s	 specific	political	and	economic	history.	
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Like	many	others,	the	Tanzanian	state	faced	pressure	from	international	donors	to	 privatise	 their	 water,	 including	 an	 explicit	 refusal	 from	 the	World	 Bank	 to	provide	any	further	financial	assistance	until	the	country’s	water	provision	had	been	placed	under	private	control.			Tanzania’s	water	falling	into	a	state	of	disrepair	has	been	attributed	by	some	to	the	country’s	 first	postcolonial	president,	 Julius	Nyerere’s	“failed	experiment	 in	socialism”	 (Rice,	 2007).	 After	 The	 Arusha	 Declaration	 of	 1967,	 promoting	“equality,	self-reliance,	 ‘traditional’	African	communal	values,	and	the	virtues	of	education	and	hard	work”	(Sharp,	2013:22),	water	was	provided	to	residents	for	free	by	the	state	up	until	1991,	until	the	infrastructure	in	place	could	not	keep	up	with	rapid	population	growth.	Tanzania	was	 in	a	dire	economic	situation,	as	 in	1991,	 according	 to	 a	 World	 Bank	 Development	 Report,	 its	 Gross	 National	Product	(GNP)	per	capita	was	just	under	$100,	with	only	one	country	at	that	time	(Mozambique)	having	a	lower	GNP	than	Tanzania	(Edwards,	2014).			Nonetheless,	when	Nyerere’s	 successor,	Ali	Hassan	Mwinyi,	 came	 into	office	 in	1985,	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 Nyerere’s	 socialist	 ideals	 were	 abandoned,	 with	 a	conscious	move	 towards	 the	 free	market	and	privatisation	 taking	place	(Sharp,	2011).	 To	 describe	 Nyerere’s	 values	 as	 a	 “failed	 experiment”	 (Rice,	 2007)	 is	erroneously	polemical	however,	 as	 they	had	a	 significant	 impact	on	Tanzania’s	economic	 development	 and	 adoption	 of	 market-led	 values.	 Tanzania’s	conversion	to	the	free	market	lagged	behind	its	East	African	counterpart	Kenya,	and	 a	 number	 of	 Mwalimu	 Nyerere’s	 values	 and	 teachings	 are	 still	 prevalent	today.			Privatisation	 of	 the	 former	 capital,	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 poorly	 performing	 water	system	was	a	precondition	for	Tanzania	to	qualify	for	the	World	Bank	and	IMF’s	Highly	 Indebted	 Poor	 Countries	 initiative	 (Bayliss,	 2003).	 	 After	 the	 failure	 of	several	 private	 companies	 to	 extend	 provision	 and	 the	 inability	 to	 profit	 from	Tanzania’s	water	sector,	Dar	es	Salaam’s	water	was	transferred	to	the	control	of	a	public	limited	company	in	2003.	Kjellen’s	research	of	water	vending	in	Dar	es	Salaam,	 published	 in	 2000,	 stated	 that	 at	 this	 time	 less	 than	 half	 of	 the	 city’s	
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households	 were	 under	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 municipal	 system.	 Conversely,	compared	 to	 the	 economic	 situation	 in	 1991,	 Tanzania	 has	 gone	 through	somewhat	of	an	economic	recovery,	with	Gross	Domestic	Product	increasing	by	58.1%	between	1990	and	2010	(Edwards,	2014:2).	Robinson	et	al	(2011)	argue	that	this	economic	growth	is	largely	due	to	the	increase	of	market	led	thinking	in	Tanzanian	governance.			Water	 as	 an	 economic	 resource	 does	 not	 only	 contradict	 Tanzania’s	 socialist	history	but	its	religious	and	cultural	values	also;			 “Neoliberal	 conceptions	 of	 water	 inscribed	 in	 international	 water	agreements	 and	 national	 water	 governance	 strategies	 that	 focus	 on	 its	economic	 value	 collide	 with	 constructions	 of	 water	 as	 a	 “free”	 good	provided	 by	 nature,	 with	 traditional	 valuations	 of	 water	 as	 a	religious/cultural	symbol.”	(Wilder	and	Lankao,	2006:1978)		Mosse	 (2008a)	 discusses	 how	 in	 India	 water	 symbolises	 divinity	 and	 power,	whilst	 in	 Tanzania,	 Potkanski’s	 (1994)	 research	 into	 the	 Maasai	 community	found	that	this	East	African	tribe	viewed	water	as	a	gift	from	God	that	cannot	be	owned	 by	 an	 individual	 person.	 Additionally,	 Abdel-Gawad’s	 (2007)	 research	into	 Muslim	 communities	 in	 Egypt	 revealed	 that	 water	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 gift	 from	Allah.	As	Tanzania	also	has	a	significant	Muslim	population	 it	 is	clear	that	both	Muslim	 and	 Christian	 views	 of	water	 do	 not	 align	with	 ideas	 of	water	 being	 a	commodity	that	can	be	purchased	and	owned	by	an	individual.			Tanzania	 has	 one	 of	 the	 fastest	 growing	 populations	 in	 the	 world,	 with	 its	national	 population	 predicted	 to	 be	 276	million	 by	 2100	making	 it	 one	 of	 the	globe’s	 most	 populous	 countries	 (Fisher,	 2013).	 Additionally,	 in	 1996	 it	 was	estimated	 that	 85%	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 population	 lived	 in	 unplanned	 or	unserviced	 settlements	 (Kanza	 and	 Ndesamburo,	 1996).	 Increased	 population	growth,	urban	sprawl	and	a	lack	of	infrastructural	upgrading	in	the	city	will	have	undoubtedly	 worsened	 this	 figure	 leaving	 a	 larger	 proportion	 of	 the	 city’s	residents	without	access	to	basic	services;	
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	 “Among	 the	 many	 challenges	 confronting	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 residential	areas,	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 improved	 water	 sources	 is	 arguably	 the	 most	enduring,	 problematic	 and	 important.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	water	 system’s	low	production	capacity,	high	rates	of	 leakage,	and	limited	coverage,	the	vast	 majority	 of	 the	 city’s	 households	 regularly	 struggle	 to	 meet	 their	daily	water	needs.”	(Dill	and	Crow,	2014:189)		The	 Water	 Resources	 Management	 Act	 of	 2009	 supported	 a	 wholesale	formalisation	of	peri-urban	and	rural	water	provision,	naming	previous	informal	community-based	 ‘Community	 Owned	 Water	 and	 Sanitation	 Organisations’	(COWSOs).	 Perhaps	 based	 on	 de	 Soto	 and	 World	 Bank	 rhetoric	 surrounding	formalisation,	the	most	notable	change	is	further	levels	of	bureaucratisation	for	these	groups	but	with	a	continued	requirement	for	them	to	acquire	start	up	and	maintenance	 capital	 by	 themselves.	 Contradicting	 this,	 the	 2009	 Act	 also	recognises	 safe	 drinking	 water	 as	 a	 basic	 human	 right,	 even	 although	 the	majority	 of	 the	 population	 does	 not	 have	 a	 household	 connection	 to	 a	 water	system	(Dill	and	Crow,	2014).			The	informal	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam	continues	to	have	an	important	role	to	play	in	 the	majority	of	 residents	 accessing	 their	water,	 as	discussed	by	Solo	 (1999)	and	 Kjellen,	 (2000).	 As	 previously	 discussed,	 the	 issues	 of	 high	 pricing	experienced	by	 informal	sector	customers	are	undoubtedly	prevalent	 in	Dar	es	Salaam.	 Dill	 and	 Crow	 (2014)	 highlight	 the	 increasingly	 problematic	 nature	 of	expensive	 informal	 water	 that	 is	 often	 used	 by	 residents	 who	 face	 other	exorbitant	costs	(such	as	rent)	in	order	to	survive,	compared	to	the	more	middle	class	residents	of	the	city	who	tend	to	own	their	homes.	It	is	clear	that	capital	has	become	an	intrinsic	part	of	Tanzania’s	fragmented	water	governance,	with	policy	updates	 leading	 to	 no	 measurable	 change	 and	 residents	 still	 facing	 a	 daily	challenge	of	how	to	access	potable	water.	With	a	variety	of	conflicting	discourses	prevalent	 it	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 the	 context	 that	 these	 themes	 have	originated	 from,	 and	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 themes	 are	communicated	and	experienced.		
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5.3	 Tanzania’s	 social	 and	 political	 history	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 water	
governance		Often	referred	to	as	‘Mwalimu’19,	Nyerere’s	influence	over	Tanzanian	politics	and	culture	extends	 far	beyond	his	 twenty	one	years	as	President	of	Tanzania.	The	Arusha	 Declaration,	 published	 in	 1967,	 set	 out	 Nyerere’s	 core	 values	 towards	achieving	 his	 own	 brand	 of	 African	 Socialism,	 which	 reflected	 the	 political	ideology	of	many	 leaders	across	 the	 continent	 at	 that	 time	 (Berg,	1964).	Using	the	title	of	the	Swahili	word	‘ujamaa’	(which	translates	roughly	as	‘familyhood’),	Tanzania’s	 brand	 of	 socialist	 policy	 was	 an	 attempt	 to	 combine	 traditional	African	 family	 values	 with	 the	 needs	 of	 a	 newly	 independent	 post-colonial	country	 (Ibhawoh	 and	 Dibua,	 2003;	 Metz,	 1982).	 Across	 Africa	 at	 that	 time,	capitalism	was	 seen	 as	 the	 system	 of	 the	 colonisers,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 African	leaders,	including	Nyerere,	were	intent	on	running	their	country	differently	after	independence	 (Berg,	 1964).	 Based	 around	 three	 core	 values,	 Nyerere	 believed	that	 the	 ideal	 society	 should	 include	 elements	 of	 freedom,	 equality,	 and	 unity,	and	 firmly	 believed	 that	 socialism	 was	 a	 ideological	 mindset	 rather	 than	 a	specific	 economic	 doctrine	 (Ibhawoh	 and	Dibua,	 2003;	Metz,	 1982).	 Aiming	 to	value	 local	 knowledge,	 ujamaa	 was	 described	 as	 a	 small,	 village-based	production	 unit,	 emphasised	 in	 the	 policy	 as	 a	 means	 to	 allow	 the	 ethics	 of	socialism	to	re-emerge	through	a	collective	means	and	worker-based	ownership	of	production	(Metz,	1982):		 “This	denoted	not	merely	communal	production,	but	much	more	broadly	a	co-operative	and	 imaginative	way	of	putting	a	community’s	 resources,	skills	and	enthusiasm	at	the	service	of	the	development	of	all	its	members	(hence	‘familyhood’).”	(Schneider,	2004:349)		
																																																								19	The	Swahili	for	‘teacher’,	in	reference	to	Nyerere’s	occupation	previous	to	his	political	career.	Schneider	 (2004)	 makes	 the	 comment	 that	 the	 reference	 to	 Nyerere	 as	 ‘Mwalimu’	 extends	beyond	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	 his	 former	 profession	 to	 his	 role	 as	 a	 ‘Philosopher	President’	who	introduced	a	new	political	system	to	Tanzanian	governance.		
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Throughout	 his	 time	 in	 office	 Nyerere	 had	 a	 complex	 relationship	 with	international	 development	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 IMF	 (Edwards,	 2014).	Ujamaa	aligned	with	Nyerere’s	belief	that	the	development	of	Tanzania	should	be	home-grown	and	not	achieved	on	the	basis	of	external	organisations	(Schneider,	2004).	 The	 policy	 had	 a	 number	 of	 critics,	 with	 those	 on	 the	 left	 stating	 that	ujamaa	 did	 not	 fully	 address	 the	 class-based	 struggle	 necessary	 for	 a	 socialist	society,	whilst	those	on	the	right	stating	that	Nyerere	and	his	ruling	counterparts	had	 taken	 away	 the	 personal	 freedoms	 of	 Tanzanian	 citizens	 (Ibhawoh	 and	Dibua,	2003).	There	were	comments	at	the	time	from	the	World	Bank	stating	the	ambitious	 nature	 of	 the	 policy,	 but	 there	was	 no	 explicit	 critique	 of	 the	 policy	until	its	failures	became	evident	(Edwards	2014).	After	ujamaa’s	implementation	took	longer	than	expected,	communities	were	often	forced	into	relocating,	along	with	the	withholding	of	famine	relief	and	the	threat	of	arrest	to	communities	that	would	 not	 comply	 (Edwards,	 2014)	 (Schneider,	 2004).	 Ibhawoh	 and	 Dibua	(2003)	 provide	 a	 different	 viewpoint,	 however,	 stating	 that	 communities	were	often	more	 co-operative	 than	 some	 literature	 reports,	 and	 that	 the	 issues	with	the	policy	were	 far	more	nuanced	and	deeply	entrenched.	However,	 the	policy	was	 largely	 unsuccessful	 (as	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 1),	 with	 Nyerere	 even	critiquing	it	in	his	later	years	(Edwards,	2014).			Even	 after	 Nyerere	 stepped	 down	 from	 leadership	 he	 continued	 to	 give	interviews	 and	 provide	 advice	 to	 politicians	 (Edwards,	 2014),	 and	 his	 opinion	continued	 to	 be	 incredibly	 valued	 in	 Tanzania.	 Additionally,	 the	 legacy	 of	Nyerere’s	 time	 in	 office	 still	 serves	 as	 a	 backdrop	 to	 a	 number	 of	 policy	documents.	 The	 Tanzania	 Development	 Vision	 2025	 explains	 the	 values	 that	were	key	to	the	Arusha	Declaration	of	1967,	such	as	socialism	and	self-reliance	but	 critiques	 the	 document	 for	 high	 levels	 of	 state	 control	 over	 the	 means	 of	production	 and	 a	 failure	 to	 recognise	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 structures	 vital	 to	Tanzania’s	 development	 (United	 Republic	 of	 Tanzania,	 1999).	 However,	 the	document	goes	on	to	state	that:		 “Notwithstanding	 these	 strategy	 shortcomings,	 the	 Arusha	 Declaration	credibly	sought	to	realise	a	set	of	fundamental	moral,	spiritual,	ethical	and	
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civil	values	which	stand	the	test	of	time.	Thus	Tanzania	today	prides	itself	of	and	enjoys	national	unity,	social	cohesion,	peace	and	stability	largely	as	a	 result	 of	 the	Declaration’s	 core	 social	 values.	 These	 values	 have	 to	 be	acknowledged	and	should	 form	part	of	 the	underlying	underpinnings	of	the	Vision	2025”	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	1999:8)		The	 reverence	 towards	 Nyerere	 is	 clear	 here,	 as	 although	 the	 failures	 of	 his	policy	 are	 recognised	 in	 the	 document	 they	 emphasise	 that	 the	 Arusha	Declaration’s	 core	values	will	 still	have	an	 important	 role	 to	play	 in	Tanzania’s	future	development,	 even	although	 they	 ideologically	 conflict	with	 some	of	 the	plans	 for	 Tanzania’s	 development,	 such	 as	 the	 wholesale	 incorporation	 of	 the	private	sector.			Nyerere	is	still	discussed	on	a	regular	basis	 in	Tanzania’s	print	media	also.	The	Citizen	 newspaper	 mentioned	 the	 former	 president	 in	 almost	 every	 edition	(Field	 Notebook,	 17th	 March	 2014).	 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 a	 glance	 at	 The	Citizen’s	 website	 provides	 an	 insight	 into	 how	 often	 Nyerere’s	 name	 is	mentioned.	In	one	article	discussing	the	embezzlement	of	money	from	a	fund	put	in	place	to	help	elderly	Tanzanians,	support	 is	given	for	recovering	the	missing	funds,	with	the	justification	that	this	is	the	generation	that	helped	Julius	Nyerere	fight	“poverty,	ignorance	and	diseases”	and	should	be	given	respect	for	doing	so	(The	 Citizen,	 2015a).	 In	 another	 article	 discussing	 some	 political	 fractions	amongst	 the	 CCM,	 one	 Tanzanian	 politician	 is	 reported	 to	 have	 said	 “in	 the	Nyerere	era,	[said	individual]	would	have	been	kicked	out	[of	the	party]”	before	going	on	to	state	that:		 “If	 we	 are	 really	 serious	 about	 promoting	 Mwalimu	 Nyerere’s	 political	legacy,	 then	 we	 must	 give	 priority	 to	 the	 people’s	 demand,	 and	 not	picking	[election]	candidates	out	of	our	interests.”	(The	Citizen,	2015b)		Indeed,	 it	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 case	 that	 as	 Tanzania	 prepares	 to	 elect	 a	 new	president,	the	influence	of	the	country’s	most	prominent	political	predecessor	is	still	integral	to	political	discourse.		
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	Nyerere’s	influence	still	has	an	impact	on	Tanzania’s	water	policy.	As	noted	in	a	speech	 at	 a	 water	 sector	 conference	 in	 the	 north	 of	 Tanzania	 in	 2000,	 the	rationale	behind	community-level	responsibility	for	water	provision	dates	back	to	the	time	of	the	Arusha	Declaration,	although	due	to	the	financial	contributions	by	development	and	donor	organisations	the	ways	in	which	this	policy	has	been	financed	 has	 changed	 over	 time	 (Annual	 Water	 Experts	 Conference,	 2000).	However,	 the	 provision	 of	 free	 water	 by	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 until	 1991	 is	critiqued	 by	 some	 non-governmental	 organisations	 (NGOs),	 who	 explain	 that	this	 means	 of	 provision	 was	 not	 sustainable	 and	 led	 to	 significant	underinvestment	 in	 the	 sector	 that	 has	 contributed	 to	 its	 contemporary	challenges	(AMCOW,	2011;	WaterAid,	2015).	Further	discourses	were	discussed	in	a	field	report	by	a	Tanzanian	NGO:		 “The	 Government	 of	 Tanzania	 has	 for	 a	 long	 time	 convinced	 the	 rural	people	 that	 it	 was	 a	 government	 responsibility	 to	 provide	water	 and	 it	would	do	so	free	of	charge.	Naturally,	this	historical	fact	has	been	deeply	entrenched	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 the	 rural	 people	 despite	 the	 government’s	failure	to	maintain	rural	water	supply	facilities.”	(Wedeco,	2009)		Within	the	contemporary	governance	structure,	water	is	no	longer	provided	for	free	 by	 the	 state	 but	 for	 rural	 Tanzanians	 still	 includes	 elements	 of	 local	provision	 dating	 back	 to	 the	 1960s.	 When	 discussing	 the	 decentralisation	 of	education	 policy	 in	 Tanzania,	 SNV20	et	 al	 (2011)	 explained	 that	 it	 had	 “led	 to	confusion	 about	 roles	 and	 responsibilities”	 (SNV	 et	 al,	 2011:73).	 Those	interviewed	 in	 their	 research	 felt	 that	 communities	had	become	overburdened	and	 did	 not	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 fulfil	 their	 responsibilities.	 As	 Nyerere’s	villigisation	project	was	widely	critiqued	not	only	by	scholars	and	development	organisations,	but	 later	by	Nyerere	himself	 (Edwards,	2014)	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	see	similar	ideologies	still	being	used	in	contemporary	water	policy	in	Tanzania.	
																																																								20	SNV	stands	for	Stichting	Nederlandse	Vrijwilligers	and	is	the	name	of	the	Netherlands	Development	Organisation.		
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Lein	 and	Tagseth	 (2009)	 also	 found	 this	 in	 their	 research	 into	water	 policy	 in	Tanzania;		 “the	 activities...can	 probably	 best	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 a	traditional	top-down	bureaucratic	approach	to	water	management,	rather	than	representing	a	renewal.	The	water	laws	and	the	water	management	system	 –	 formulated	 by	 the	 British	 and	 later	 carried	 on	 by	 Nyerere’s	socialist	 government	 and	 continuing	 right	 up	 to	 present-day	 policies	 –	have	 neither	 been	 designed	 to	 secure	 local	 communities’	 active	participation	 in	water	management	 nor	 to	 facilitate	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	functioning	market	for	water.”	(Lein	and	Tagseth,	2009:216)		Indeed,	there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	there	is	the	chance	of	history	repeating	itself,	and	the	potential	for	another	policy	to	be	deemed	unsuccessful.	It	appears	to	be	the	case	that	 instead	of	a	 full	paradigm	shift	 in	policy	discourse,	policy	 in	Tanzania	 instead	 follows	 a	 parallax	 process,	 where	 incremental	 changes	 are	made	 but	 with	 no	 measurable	 difference	 to	 policy	 rhetoric	 (Zizek,	 from	 Ioris,	2012).			A	 number	 of	 informal	 conversations	 about	 Nyerere’s	 impact	 on	 contemporary	Tanzania	often	provided	some	insight	into	different	understandings	of	access	to	water:		 “We	spoke	about	the	legacy	of	Nyerere	and	the	clear	generational	gap	that	exists	 in	 terms	 of	 expectations	 from	 the	 state.	 He21	said	 that	 because	pictures	 of	 Nyerere	 are	 up	 in	 every	 building	 some	 rural	 people	 in	Tanzania	still	believe	that	he	is	alive!”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	15th	February	2014)		Indeed,	conversations	such	as	this	revealed	the	disparities	in	understandings	of	policy	across	Tanzania,	 indicating	 that	 the	policy	shift	 from	water	provided	 for																																																									21	This	field	diary	excerpt	refers	to	a	conversation	with	an	expatriate	individual	who	ran	an	NGO	in	Tanzania.		
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free	to	water	as	a	commodity	and	a	community	owned	resource	had	not	been	as	severe	 and	 has	 instead	 been	 a	 gradual	 process.	 The	 confusion	 between	 the	distinctions	of	a	Water	User	Association	and	a	COWSO	is	also	relevant	here,	as	it	appears	 to	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 COWSO	was	 only	 introduced	 into	Tanzanian	 water	 policy	 in	 2009	 but	 certain	 groups	 still	 refer	 to	 these	 groups	with	either	dated	or	incorrect	terminology.	The	ways	in	which	Tanzanian	water	governance	 currently	 reflects	 policy	 documents	 and	 the	 country’s	 postcolonial	history	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section,	before	an	analysis	of	the	ways	in	which	 certain	 policy	 terminology	 is	 understood	by	different	 stakeholders	 in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania.			A	diagram	has	been	included	below	to	indicate	the	documents	discussed	in	this	chapter.	
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Figure	 5.1	 ‘Inter-relationship	 of	 the	 NWSDS	 with	 other	 policies	 and	 strategies’	
from	 the	 National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	 Strategy.	 (United	 Republic	 of	
Tanzania,	2005a:9)																									This	 diagram	 is	 described	 within	 the	 National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	Strategy	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2005)	as	showing	the	 interrelationships	with	 this	 policy	 document	 and	 others	 produced	 by	 the	 Tanzanian	 state.	 This	follows	 on	 from	 discussion	 of	 how	 the	 National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	Strategy	will	guide	the	implementation	of	the	National	Water	Policy	published	in	2002,	which	will	then:	
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	 “in	 turn,	 guide	 the	 formulation	 of	 the	 National	 Water	 Sector	 Strategic	Implementation	Plan	and	the	sub-sectoral	investment	programmes	under	the	Water	Sector	Development	Programme	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2005:8)		Therefore,	 this	 diagram	 explains	 the	 pathway	 of	 policy	 development	 that	 the	government	 of	 Tanzania	 has	 taken	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 planning	 and	implementation	of	 its	water	policy,	 and	which	documents	have	 impacted	upon	which.	As	 an	attempt	 to	 encompass	 the	variety	of	perspectives	 included	 in	 the	contemporary	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy	 framework,	 this	 chapter	 discusses	 the	following	documents	highlighted	in	Figure	5.1;			
• Development	Vision	2025	
• Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	
• Millennium	Development	Goals	
• National	Strategy	for	Growth	and	Reduction	of	Poverty	(MKUKUTA)	
• National	Water	Policy	2002	
• National	Water	Sector	Development	Strategy		The	chapter	also	discusses	other	documents	not	listed	in	the	diagram,	which	are	listed	 fully	 in	 the	appendices	of	 this	 thesis.	This	chapter	attempts	 to	assess	 the	key	 themes	 prevalent	 in	 a	 number	 of	 Tanzania’s	 water	 policy	 and	 related	documents	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 way	 in	 which	 water	 governance	 in	Tanzania	 is	visualised,	and	 in	 turn,	 lay	out	 the	policy	 framework	with	which	to	compare	this	research’s	other	empirical	data	to	in	subsequent	chapters.			
5.4	Tanzanian	water	policy,	1991	–	present	day		
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Table	5.1	History	of	Dar	es	Salaam’s	water	sector	1961	 Independence	from	the	United	Kingdom.	1963	 Tanganyika	and	Zanzibar	merge	to	become	Tanzania.	1964	 Julius	Nyerere	elected	as	first	president	of	Tanzania.	1967	 Arusha	Declaration	published.		1970s	 Last	 significant	 investment	 in	 the	 infrastructure	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	water	 system	(Pigeon	2012).			1980	 Julius	Nyerere	throws	the	IMF	out	of	Tanzania	(Edwards,	2014).		1985	 Julius	Nyerere	steps	down	as	first	president	of	Tanzania.		1961-1991	 Water	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 provided	 for	 free	 by	 the	 Government.	 Residents	 could	collect	 free	water	 from	public	 kiosks	 and	 only	 had	 to	 pay	 for	water	 if	 they	 had	 a	private	connection	in	their	home	(Pigeon,	2012).		1976-1991	 Tanzania’s	GNP	declines	by	45%	(Edwards,	2014).	1991	 National	Water	Policy	 is	developed	–	 removal	of	Government	 subsidies	 for	water,	aim	for	water	utility	to	be	self-financed.	1997	 To	 further	 develop	 self-financing,	 and	 as	 a	 condition	 by	 the	World	 Bank	 and	 the	International	Monetary	 fund	 for	 Tanzania	 receiving	 debt	 relief,	 semi-autonomous	Dar	es	Salaam	Water	and	Sewerage	Authority	(DAWASA)	is	created.		1997	 The	 Government	 of	 Tanzania	 consults	 with	 private	 water	 companies	 about	 a	concession	contract,	but	none	were	willing	to	invest	in	a	system	that	had	not	been	improved	for	twenty	years	(Pigeon,	2012).		1999	 Tanzania	Development	Vision	2025	published.		2002	 DAWASA’s	 assets	 released	 into	 the	 private	 sector,	 bid	 won	 by	 City	 Water.	 New	National	Water	Policy	is	Developed.	2004	 After	great	 losses,	poor	performance	and	no	 improvement	 to	 the	municipal	water	system,	 City	Water	 is	 replaced	with	newly	 formed	DAWASCO,	 a	 publically	 owned	company.		2005	 The	National	Water	Sector	Development	Strategy	2006-2015	is	published.		2009	 The	 Water	 Resources	 Management	 Act	 and	 the	 Tanzania	 Water	 Supply	 and	Sanitation	Act	are	published.			As	 the	 earliest	 water	 policy	 document	 available,	 the	 National	 Water	 Policy	(1991)	was	described	by	one	interview	respondent	as	being	heavily	informed	by	the	 various	 approaches	 used	 by	 international	 donors,	 explaining	 these	
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organisations’	 prominence	 in	 Tanzania’s	 water	 governance	 framework.	 The	1991	 National	 Water	 Policy	 has	 been	 replaced	 with	 a	 new	 water	 policy,	published	 in	 2002	 which	 focused	 more	 on	 the	 decentralisation	 of	 water	governance	to	the	grassroots	level	and	supported	the	increasing	involvement	of	the	 private	 sector	 in	 Tanzania’s	 water	 provision.	 The	 documents	 discussed	 in	this	section,	namely	the	National	Water	Policy	(2002),	the	National	Water	Sector	Development	Strategy	(2009)	and	the	Water	Resources	Management	Act	(2009)	were	 all	 produced	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Water	 in	 Tanzania,	 and	 are	 publicly	available	in	English.			The	 National	 Water	 Policy	 (2002),	 recognising	 the	 changes	 in	 Tanzania’s	population,	 geography	 and	 outputs,	 suggests	 that	 the	 country’s	 water	 policy	should	be	adapted	to	fit	its	modern	needs:		 “Over	 the	 past	 [fifteen]	 years	 these	 demands	 have	 intensified	 with	 the	increase	 in	 population	 and	 concurrent	 growth	 of	 economic	 activities	requiring	 water	 as	 an	 input	 such	 as	 hydropower	 generation,	 irrigated	agriculture,	 industries,	 tourism,	 mining,	 livestock	 keeping,	 domestic,	fisheries,	wildlife	and	forestry	activities.”	(National	Water	Policy	2002:4)		Recognising	 the	multifaceted	uses	 for	water,	as	well	as	 its	 importance	across	a	number	 of	 different	 areas	 in	 Tanzania,	 the	 policy	 attempts	 to	 consider	 how	improved	water	use	can	be	achieved	for	all	of	these	needs,	whilst	promoting	an	integrated	water	 resources	management	 framework	 of	 governance.	 The	 policy	explains	that	 the	 institutional	 frameworks	 in	place	 for	managing	water	sources	need	 to	 be	 strengthened,	 and	 that	 the	 current	 mode	 of	 governance	 is	 too	fragmented	 to	 promote	 successful	water	management	 explaining	 that	 the	 new	approach	 to	 water	 policy	 will	 include	 three	major	 shifts,	 detailed	 in	 the	 table	below:		
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Table	5.3	The	Tanzanian	State’s	Water	Policy	Approach	in	2002	(National	Water	
Policy,	2002:14)	Comprehensiveness	 A	 holistic	 basin	 approach	 for	 integrating	 multi-sector	 and	multi-objective	planning	and	management	that	minimises	the	effects	 of	 externalities,	 and	 ensures	 sustainability	 and	protection	of	the	resource.	Subsidiarity	 Decentralising	 decision	 making	 and	 devolving	 to	 the	 lowest	practicable	 level,	 with	 stakeholders	 participating	 in	 the	planning,	design,	 implementation	of	 the	management	actions	and	decision	making	Economic	 Decision	 making	 in	 the	 public	 sector,	 private	 sector	 and	 in	civil	 society	 on	 the	 use	 of	 water	 should	 reflect	 the	 scarcity,	value	 of	 water,	 water	 pricing,	 cost	 sharing	 and	 other	incentives	for	promoting	the	rational	use	of	water		The	three	key	shifts	discussed	indicate	the	change	in	focus	for	Tanzanian	water	policy,	and	align	with	the	neoliberalisation	of	water	through	documents	such	as	the	 Dublin	 Principles	 (1992)	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 by	 emphasising	 the	economic	 value	of	 the	 country’s	water.	As	well	 as	 this,	 they	 reflect	 each	of	 the	models	of	water	management	discussed	by	Lein	and	Tagseth	(2009);	by	using	a	basin	 approach	 they	 align	 with	 a	 state	 method	 of	 water	 management,	 by	decentralising	provision	 the	policy	reflects	a	community	model,	and	by	placing	economic	value	on	Tanzania’s	water	they	reflect	a	more	market-based	model	of	water	governance.	Whilst	Lein	and	Tagseth	(2009)	discuss	these	models	as	three	distinct	 modes	 of	 water	 governance,	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 appears	 to	 be	straddling	 each	 of	 the	 three	 categories,	 providing	 a	 conceptually	 complex	method	of	managing	 the	country’s	water.	This	 could	 inhibit	 the	possibility	of	a	clear	 and	 robust	 strategy	 that	 provides	 the	 most	 effective	 means	 of	 water	management	 for	 the	Tanzanian	people.	The	disparity	between	rural	 and	urban	access	to	water	is	also	recognised	in	the	document,	explaining	that	only	fifty	per	cent	of	the	rural	population	has	access	to	a	water	supply	service,	and	coverage	in	urban	 areas	 stands	 at	 seventy	 three	 per	 cent	 but	 with	 malfunctioning	 water	sources	reducing	the	availability	of	sources	to	urban	dwellers.			
	 163	
Aligning	with	 the	 rhetoric	 surrounding	participatory	development	discussed	 in	Chapter	 3,	 the	 2002	 policy	 suggests	 that	 “beneficiaries	 participate	 fully	 in	planning,	construction,	operation,	maintenance	and	management	of	community	based	domestic	water	schemes”	(National	Water	Policy,	2002:5)	explaining	that	this	will	promote	sustainability	and	a	stronger	institutional	framework	in	which	Tanzania’s	water	 is	managed.	 Community	 level	water	 groups	 are	 described	 in	the	policy	as:		 “Responsible	 for	 local	 level	 management	 of	 allocated	 water	 resources,	mediation	 of	 disputes	 among	 users	 and	 between	 groups	 within	 their	areas	 of	 jurisdiction,	 collection	 of	 various	 data	 and	 information,	participate	in	the	preparation	of	water	utilisation	plans,	conservation	and	protecting	 water	 sources,	 and	 catchment	 areas,	 efficient	 and	 effective	water	 use	 and	 ensuring	 return	 flows,	 enforcement	 of	 the	 law	 and	implementation	 of	 the	 conditions	 of	 water	 rights,	 and	 control	 of	pollution.”	(National	Water	Policy,	2002:28)			The	 policy	 also	 notes	 that	 local	 water	 user	 associations	 must	 provide	representatives	 to	 meetings	 held	 at	 the	 basin	 level.	 It	 is	 apparent	 that	 the	Tanzanian	state	believes	that	decentralising	water	provision	will	promote	more	efficient	and	sustainable	water	governance,	but	appears	to	somewhat	contradict	the	document’s	concern	that	the	mode	of	water	governance	in	Tanzania	in	2002	was	too	fragmented.	Additionally,	the	above	quote	suggests	that	the	expectations	on	 communities	 extend	 beyond	 simply	 the	 management	 and	 distribution	 of	 a	local	water	resource	to	the	environmental	and	legal	elements	of	it.	The	emphasis	on	 community	 provision	 is	 discussed	 throughout	 the	 policy,	 noting	 that	 the	different	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 at	 each	 level	 (national,	 basin,	 district	 and	community)	 of	 governance	 will	 be	 clearly	 established.	 As	 well	 as	 the	 topic	 of	decentralised	water	provision,	the	other	recurring	theme	in	the	policy	is	that	of	formalised	 guidelines	 and	 regulatory	 mechanisms	 across	 the	 water	 sector	 in	Tanzania,	 both	 within	 local	 level	 community	 provision	 to	 dam	 safety	 and	ownership.			
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The	National	Water	Policy	(2002)	provides	a	clear	warning	that	with	population	growth	 levels	 in	 Tanzania	 and	 the	 rapidly	 depleting	 resources	 of	 fresh	 water	available,	the	country	is	on	track	to	experience	water	scarcity	by	2025.	However,	after	 discussing	 this	 important	 statistic,	 the	 document	 then	 goes	 on	 to	 discuss	the	varying	water	uses	required	in	the	country	in	detail,	for	example	explaining	why	 water	 is	 important	 to	 Tanzania’s	 beekeeping	 and	 mining	 industries.	Although	it	is	stated	within	the	policy	that	“use	of	water	for	human	consumption	shall	 receive	 first	 priority”	 (National	 Water	 Policy,	 2002:31),	 the	 overall	document	neglects	to	acknowledge	how	detrimental	water	scarcity	 in	Tanzania	would	be	 to	 the	country’s	population	and	 instead	diverts	attention	 to	 the	need	for	water	in	Tanzania’s	economic	production.			The	 National	 Water	 Policy	 (2002)	 states	 that	 the	 institutional	 reform	 in	Tanzania’s	 water	 sector	 suggested	 in	 this	 document	 “requires	 effective	institutionalised	 linkages	 between	 key	 sector	 actors	 including	 Central	Government,	 Local	 Government,	 External	 Support	 Agencies,	 Private	 Sector,	NGOs,	 Community	 Based	 Organisations,	 and	 the	 Communities	 themselves”	(National	Water	Policy,	2002:37).	This	multi-stakeholder	framework	is	reflected	in	the	diagram	below:														
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Figure	 5.2	 New	 Institutional	 Framework	 for	 Water	 Supply	 and	 Sanitation	
(National	Water	Sector	Development	Strategy,	2005:46)																																	
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The	 diagram	 shows	 the	 variety	 of	 stakeholders	 present	 in	 the	water	 sector	 in	Tanzania,	 from	 various	 Ministries	 to	 local-level	 councils,	 to	 the	 non-governmental	and	grassroots	organisations	that	directly	engage	with	consumers.	As	can	be	seen,	there	are	multiple	routes	in	which	consumers	can	achieve	water,	through	 the	 listed	 service	 providers,	 COWSOs,	 or	 through	 water	 supply	authorities	 such	 as	 DAWASA.	 To	 add	 a	 further	 level	 of	 complication,	 if	 a	consumer	does	receive	water	from	a	COWSO,	this	COWSO	could	be	represented	at	either	a	municipal,	district	of	village	councils.	COWSOs	can	also	provide	water	to	a	consumer	directly,	or	via	a	proxy	service	provider.	In	turn,	service	providers	such	 as	 NGOs	 are	 able	 to	 provide	water	 to	 consumers	 directly	 or	 through	 the	guidance	 of	 DAWASA.	 Importantly,	 Figure	 5.2	 provides	 an	 accurate	 visual	representation	of	the	complex	nature	of	Tanzania’s	water	sector	and	the	ways	in	which	its	population	are	able	to	access	water.			Published	 more	 recently,	 The	 Water	 Resources	 Management	 Act	 (United	Republic	 of	 Tanzania,	 2009a)	 provides	 a	 legally	 specific	 explanation	 of	 water	governance	 in	 Tanzania.	 The	 document	 states	 that	 “all	 water	 resources	 in	Mainland	Tanzania	shall	continue	to	be	public	water	and	vested	in	the	President	as	 the	 trustee	 for	 an	 on	 behalf	 of	 citizens”	 (United	 Republic	 of	 Tanzania,	2009a:366).	 Although	 this	 conflicts	 with	 the	 promotion	 of	 involvement	 of	 the	private	sector	mentioned	in	the	National	Water	Policy	(2002),	it	aligns	with	the	recommendation	 of	 the	 involvement	 of	 Tanzanian	 communities	 in	 their	 local	water	 resources.	 Discussing	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 ideas	 of	 crisis	 can	 become	embedded	 in	 the	 fabric	 of	 everyday	 life,	 Vigh	 (2008)	 explains	 how	 it	 becomes	difficult	 to	 determine	 a	 state	 of	 normality	 in	 which	 to	 govern	 in	 response	 to.	Taking	 this	 into	 account,	 it	 may	 be	 the	 case	 that	 Tanzania	 has	 faced	 such	difficulties	 in	providing	a	potable	water	supply	to	 its	residents	 for	a	number	of	years,	and	as	a	result	there	is	no	policy	direction	in	place	that	is	deemed	to	have	been	successful,	which	contributes	to	significant	changes	in	direction	over	short	spaces	of	time.		Interestingly,	 unlike	 the	 2002	 and	 2009	 policy	 documents	 produced	 by	 the	Tanzanian	 state,	 the	 National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	 Strategy	 (2005)	
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acknowledges	the	existence	of	peri-urban	areas	in	Tanzania	and	the	issues	that	could	affect	them	specifically:		 “Peri-urban	 Areas:	 Emerging	 settlements	 outside	 the	 formal	 housing	areas	of	an	urban	area.	In	these	settlements	there	is	lack	of	basic	services	such	as	water	supply	and	sanitation	facilities.	Generally	the	people	living	in	these	areas	are	in	the	low	income	group	with	limited	ability	to	pay	for	water	 and	 sanitation	 services.”	 (National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	Strategy,	2005:11)		Whilst	this	definition	includes	a	consideration	for	those	unable	to	afford	to	pay	for	 water	 services,	 there	 is	 very	 little	 within	 the	 aforementioned	 policy	documents	 to	 suggest	what	 alternative	means	of	 access	 are	 available	 for	 these	groups.	 In	 the	 way	 that	 the	 2002	 and	 2009	 policy	 documents	 talk	 about	financially	self-sustainable	community	based	water	services,	the	National	Water	Sector	 Development	 Strategy	 goes	 on	 to	 discuss	 other	 terminology	 such	 as	‘water	 consumers	 association’	 indicating	 that	 water	 is	 seen	 within	 Tanzanian	water	policy	as	a	consumer	good.				Overall,	 the	 text	 within	 the	 document	 states	 that	 the	 main	 objective	 of	 the	National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	 Strategy	 is	 to	 develop	 a	 coherent	 and	integrated	 plan	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 2002	 National	 Water	 Policy,	further	 promoting	 more	 integrated	 sector	 wide	 governance	 across	 Tanzania	(National	Water	 Sector	 Development	 Strategy,	 2005).	 	 Like	 the	 2002	 National	Water	Policy,	the	document	acknowledges	the	various	sectors	that	require	water	to	 function	 in	 Tanzania,	 such	 as	 agriculture	 and	 mining,	 reinforcing	 the	importance	 of	 water	 access	 for	 Tanzania’s	 industries	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 the	country’s	economic	growth.	In	addition,	the	document	“recognises	the	important	role	 that	 NGOs	 have	 to	 play	 in	 the	 provision	 of	water	 and	 sanitation	 services,	particularly	 at	 the	 community	 level”	 (National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	Strategy,	2005:23)	explaining	that	this	has	increased	the	importance	of	COWSOs	within	Tanzania’s	strategy	for	improved	water	provision	for	its	population.			
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Rather	than	laying	out	specific	policy	clauses	or	acts,	the	National	Water	Sector	Development	 Strategy	 (2005)	 sets	 out	 the	 background	 to	 the	 water	 sector	 in	Tanzania,	 before	 identifying	 a	 number	 of	 problem	 statements,	 then	 following	each	of	them	with	a	policy	direction	and	a	specific	goal	and	a	strategy	in	order	to	achieve	this.	For	example,	the	document	states	that	effective	allocation	of	water	and	monitoring	water	use	is	difficult	because	of	issues	such	as	water	rights	being	inadequately	 enforced	 and	 ineffective	 prioritisation	 of	 resources.	 The	 policy	direction	stated	to	solve	these	issues	is	as	follows:		 “Allocation	 of	 water	 for	 basic	 human	 needs	 in	 adequate	 quantity	 and	acceptable	quality	will	 receive	highest	priority,	while	 other	uses	will	 be	subject	 to	 social	 and	 economic	 criteria.	 Water	 for	 protection	 of	 the	environment	and	eco-systems	will	be	reserved.”	(National	Water		Sector	Development	Strategy,	2005:34).		This	is	followed	by	a	stated	goal	of	“responsive,	effective	and	sustainable	water	resources	 utilisation	 and	 allocation”	 (National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	Strategy,	2005:35)	and	a	multi-direction	strategy	 involving	 the	classification	of	river	 systems	 and	 the	 development	 of	 a	 detailed	 set	 of	 criteria	 in	 order	 to	determine	 water	 allocation.	 Although	 the	 National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	Strategy	 (2005)	 and	 the	 National	 Water	 Policy	 (2002)	 explain	 the	 different	sectors	that	require	water	for	Tanzania’s	economic	development,	it	is	interesting	to	 note	 that	 human	 needs	 are	 explicitly	 prioritised	 here,	 as	 this	 does	 not	necessarily	 align	 with	 discussion	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy.	 In	addition,	the	document	states	that	the	role	of	the	Tanzanian	state	is	moving	from	one	of	 provision	 to	 that	 of	 co-ordination	 and	policy	making,	 firmly	placing	 the	provision	 of	 water	 to	 Tanzania’s	 people	 to	 what	 the	 document	 refers	 to	 as	“successor	 organisations”	 (National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	 Strategy:	2005:42),	whilst	acknowledging	that	local	government	institutions	are	currently	weak	and	need	additional	support	in	order	to	play	a	key	role	in	Tanzania’s	water	governance.		
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5.5	 Poverty	 reduction	 strategies	 in	 Tanzania	 and	 links	 to	 international	
development	initiatives		As	well	 as	producing	policy	documents,	 the	Tanzanian	 state	has	made	poverty	reduction	a	central	part	of	 their	strategy	since	2005	(Edwards,	2014).	As	such,	there	have	also	been	poverty	reduction	strategy	papers	(PRSPs)	produced	by	the	government	in	recent	years.	Also	known	as	the	‘National	Strategy	for	Growth	and	Poverty	Reduction’,	 the	 first	version	of	 the	MKUKUTA22	was	published	 in	2005,	followed	by	a	 second	edition	of	 the	document	 in	2010.	The	documents	discuss	various	goals	pursued	by	the	Tanzanian	state,	such	as	poverty	reduction	or	the	improvement	of	basic	services,	and	details	 in	a	step	by	step	manner	how	these	goals	 will	 be	 achieved	 (Edwards,	 2014).	 Also	 produced	 by	 the	 Government	 of	Tanzania,	these	documents	discuss	a	number	of	sectors	including	water,	and	are	also	 publicly	 available.	 When	 discussing	 the	 Tanzanian	 annual	 event	 of	 Maji	
Week	(which	translates	as	‘Water	Week’)23,	the	Ministry	of	Water	explained	that:		 “There’s	water	targets,	 there’s	the	Millennium	Development	Goals	target	in	2015,	and	there’s	the	MKUKUTA.	The	MKUKUTA	initially	was	supposed	to	end	last	year,	and	it	has	been	extended	up	to	June	this	year	[2014].	And	according	to	the	other	goals,	the	MDG	goals	for	the	urban	coverage,	water	supply	was	supposed	to	reach	95%,	and	in	the	rural	areas	it’s	supposed	to	go	 from	 56%	 to	 65%.	 For	 the	 Tanzanian	 National	 Vision,	 [and]	 the	MKUKUTA,	 coverage	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 100%,	 and	 this	 is	 by	 2025.”	(Ministry	of	Water	Interview	2014)		Indeed,	 this	document	produced	by	 the	Tanzanian	state	ambitiously	 intends	 to	achieve	more	than	global	indicators	such	as	the	Millennium	Development	Goals.	An	early	version	of	the	document	states	that:		
																																																								22	This	acronym	is	based	on	the	Swahili	title	of	the	document:	‘Mpango	wa	Pili	wa	Kukuza	Uchumi	na	Kuondoa	Umaskini	Tanzania’	which	translates	as	‘Second	Strategy	for	Growth	and	Reduction	of	Poverty’	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2010)	23	For	a	full	discussion	of	Maji	Week,	see	Chapter	7.		
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“The	PRSP	encompasses	poverty-oriented	extra-budgetary	activities,	and	various	 non-financial	 considerations	 that	 have	 an	 important	 bearing	 on	poverty	reduction.”	(The	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2000)		The	 PRSP	 goes	 on	 to	 explore	 two	 participatory	 poverty	 research	 projects	 in	Tanzania;	namely	the	‘Voices	of	the	Poor’	project	conducted	by	the	World	Bank	and	 another	 by	 the	United	Nations	Development	 Programme	 in	 the	 Shinyanga	region	 of	 Tanzania.	 The	 PRSP	 explores	 the	 different	 perceptions	 of	 poverty	across	Tanzania,	and	how	aspects	such	as	poor	social	service	provision,	gender	inequality,	weak	governance	and	scarcity	of	funding	were	obstacles	to	the	people	of	Tanzania’s	development.	This	reflects	some	of	the	content	of	Tanzania’s	policy	documents,	 such	 as	 allocating	 service	 provision	 to	 the	 grassroots	 level	 and	formulating	 a	 specific	 governance	 hierarchy	 to	 do	 so,	 as	well	 as	 ensuring	 that	community-based	 water	 committees	 were	 gender	 balanced.	 Additionally,	 the	comment	on	scarcity	of	funding	indicates	why	Tanzania	is	happy	to	incorporate	the	work	and	financial	capital	of	NGOs	so	heavily	into	their	water	policy.	This	is	reinforced	later	on	in	the	document:		 “The	 financing	 of	 poverty	 alleviation	 efforts	will,	 as	 in	 the	 past,	 depend	substantially	 on	 external	 funding.”	 (The	 United	 Republic	 of	 Tanzania,	2000:22)			The	 document	 goes	 on	 to	 suggest	 how	 responsibilities	 for	 Tanzania’s	 poverty	reduction	 strategy	 will	 be	 devolved	 to	 local	 government	 authorities	 and	 that	water	 will	 be	 one	 of	 the	 seven	 key	 areas	 that	 the	 government	 will	 direct	 its	financial	interventions	towards.	This	was	a	slightly	different	line	of	argument	to	the	water	policy	documents	produced	by	 the	Tanzanian	state,	as	 they	 included	little	to	no	mention	of	state	funding	in	the	water	sector.		The	2005	PRSP	 firstly	begins	with	 an	 explanation	of	 the	 changes	between	 this	document	 and	 the	 initial	 one	 produced	 in	 2000.	 The	 2005	 PRSP	 states	 that	 a	period	of	 five	years	will	now	be	used	to	assess	Tanzania’s	progress	 in	reaching	its	 targets,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 three	 year	 term	 recommended	 in	 the	 earlier	
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version	of	the	paper.	Additionally,	 the	document	recognises	that	the	targets	set	in	the	earlier	document	were	too	ambitious	and	the	resources	required	to	fulfil	them	were	not	available.	As	such,	the	2005	document	notes	that	more	resources	and	more	 inter-sectoral	 co-ordination	 are	 required	 for	 Tanzania	 to	 achieve	 its	poverty	 reduction	 targets.	 Tanzania’s	 poverty	 reduction	 strategy	 is	 said	 to	 be	focused	 around	 three	 components,	 the	 first	 of	 which	 is	 an	 aim	 to	 integrate	participatory	 processes	 fully	 into	 a	 number	 of	 sectors,	 as	 opposed	 to	 making	them,	 as	 the	 document	 notes,	 a	 “one-off	 event”	 (United	 Republic	 of	 Tanzania,	2005:2).	The	further	two	components	mentioned	aim	towards	“greater	attention	[paid]	to	cross-cutting	issues”	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2005:3)	such	as	HIV,	gender	and	governance,	as	well	as	 improving	policy	 to	address	 the	 inequalities	experienced	by	vulnerable	social	groups.		When	 the	2005	PRSP	moves	on	 to	discuss	poverty	 reduction	within	 the	water	sector	 in	 Tanzania	 specifically,	 the	 strategy	 discussed	 by	 the	 document	 is	somewhat	vague:		 “Community-awareness	 campaigns	 and	 participation	 in	 water	 and	sanitation	 programmes	 and	 regulations	 to	 enforce	 environmental	 and	health	 safeguards	 in	 industry	 and	 extractive	 activities	 such	 as	 mining,	logging	 and	 fisheries	 will	 limit	 water	 and	 air	 pollution	 and	 related	diseases.”	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2005:14)		Whilst	 following	 the	 document’s	 intentions	 and	 working	 towards	 a	 multi-sectoral	 approach	 to	 poverty	 reduction,	 by	 covering	 so	 many	 different	 policy	areas	in	one	sentence	it	fails	to	provide	any	clear	direction	of	what	activities	will	actually	be	carried	out	by	the	Tanzanian	government.	Like	other	aforementioned	documents,	 the	 2005	 PRSP	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 local-level	 capacity	building	and	the	strengthening	of	 local	governance	structures.	Emphasising	the	role	 of	 communities	 and	 civil	 societies,	 the	 2005	 PRSP	 notes	 that	 the	government’s	capacity	is	being	reduced	to	that	of	a	facilitator	and	co-ordinator	of	various	 stakeholders	 involved.	 The	 document	 also	 expands	 upon	 this	 policy	discourse;	
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	 “Other	challenges	include	improvement	in	collection,	analysis	and	use	of	data	 at	 lower	 levels,	 addressing	 broad	 inequalities	 among	 regions	 and	districts;	and	dissemination	of	information	and	sensitisation.	Translation	of	 the	 NSGRP	 into	 Swahili	 and	 its	 dissemination	 to	 district	 and	 village	levels	were	further	underscored.”	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2005:22)		It	 is	 impressive	 to	see	 these	aims	being	 included	 in	 the	document.	Particularly,	the	 translation	 of	 documents	 into	 Swahili	 to	 enable	 residents	 to	 engage	 with	them	 is	 a	 progressive	 step,	 as	 Dill	 (2009)	 noted	 that	 the	 community-based	organisations	involved	in	their	research	in	Dar	es	Salaam	were	largely	producing	documents	 in	 English	 which	 community	 members	 were	 not	 able	 to	 read	 nor	challenge.	However,	as	Dill’s	(2009)	research	was	published	four	years	after	the	2005	version	of	the	PRSP	was	written,	it	is	unclear	as	to	how	well	this	objective	has	been	adhered	to.	Within	this	research,	both	organisations	I	worked	with	had	the	translation	of	documents	into	Swahili	as	one	of	their	key	mandates,	and	the	majority	 of	 public	 documents	 produced	 by	 TWN	were	 indeed	 in	 Swahili.	 This	also	 appeared	 to	 be	 the	 case	 for	 the	 water	 user	 associations	 involved	 in	 this	research,	 but	 I	 did	 not	 come	 across	 any	 national	 documents	 (such	 as	 PRSPs)	written	in	any	language	apart	from	English.			Following	previously	vague	discussion	 in	earlier	parts	of	 the	2005	PRSP,	 in	the	main	body	of	the	document	specific	targets	are	discussed	followed	by	the	specific	strategies	that	will	be	employed	by	the	Tanzanian	state	in	order	to	achieve	them.	With	regards	to	access	to	water,	specific	percentage-based	targets	are	discussed,	with	an	aim	towards	 increasing	rural	water	provision	 from	fifty	 three	per	cent	access	to	sixty	five	per	cent	by	2010	and	within	urban	areas,	from	seventy	three	per	cent	to	ninety	per	cent	over	the	same	period	of	time.	The	document	goes	on	to	discuss	how	these	increases	in	access	will	be	achieved:		 “Measures	 that	 will	 be	 pursued	 including	 expanding	 and	 maintain[ing]	existing	 protected-water	 sources,	 properly	 maintaining	 sanitation	
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facilities	 and	 ensuring	 facilities	 at	 public	 institutions	 and	 meet	Government	guidelines.”	(The	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2005:47)		However,	once	again	this	section	of	the	document	does	not	provide	any	specific	discussion	 of	 how	 and	 where	 these	 strategies	 will	 be	 employed,	 nor	 does	 it	explain	where	the	resources	will	come	from	to	do	so.			The	 latest	 version	 of	 the	 PRSP	 produced	 by	 the	 Tanzanian	 government	 was	published	in	2010,	and	begins	with	discussion	by	the	then	president	of	Tanzania,	Jakaya	Kikwete24,	 surrounding	 the	successes	 that	have	been	achieved	since	 the	2005	 document,	 in	 sectors	 such	 as	 education,	 health,	 infrastructure	 (such	 as	roads)	 and	 water).	 Kikwete	 discussed	 water	 sector	 improvements	 in	 the	document,	mentioning	 an	 increase	 in	 access	 from	 almost	 fifty	 four	 per	 cent	 in	rural	areas	to	just	over	sixty	per	cent	and	an	increase	from	seventy	four	per	cent	to	 eighty	 four	 per	 cent	 in	 urban	 areas	 respectively.	 Kikwete	 praises	 these	increases	 in	access	 for	Tanzania’s	residents,	but	 these	do	 fall	 short	of	what	 the	2005	 version	 of	 the	 MKUKUTA	 set	 out,	 and	 his	 discussion	 of	 how	 these	improvements	 were	 made	 in	 the	 latest	 edition	 is	 vague	 and	 sparse	 in	 detail.	Building	upon	the	progress	made	over	the	five	year	period,	Kikwete	explains	that	the	MKUKUTA	II’s	emphasis	focuses	on	“sharper	prioritisation	of	interventions	–	projects	 and	 programmes”,	 increasing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 private	 sector,	 and	strengthening	 local-level	 capacity,	 amongst	 others.	This	 follows	 similar	 themes	of	 other	 documents	 produced	 prior	 to	 this,	 and	 suggests	 that	 this	 direction	 of	policy	 pursued	 by	 the	 Government	 of	 Tanzania	 still	 needs	 work	 in	 its	implementation.			The	document	has	 a	detailed,	 discursive	 style	of	writing	 that	marries	 statistics	about	 Tanzania’s	 development	 with	 qualitative	 explanations	 of	 the	 reasons	behind	them:		
																																																								24	Jakaya	Kikwete	was	elected	as	President	of	Tanzania	in	2005	and	thus,	was	also	in	office	at	the	time	this	document	was	published.		
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“GDP	growth	shows	a	rising	 trend,	except	 for	years	with	shocks	such	as	food	 crisis,	 power	 crisis	 and	 global	 economic	 and	 financial	 crisis.	 Since	2005,	Tanzania’s	GDP	annual	growth	rate	averaged	7	percent,	which	was	in	line	with	the	MKUKUTA	target	of	6-8	percent	per	annum.	In	2009	GDP	growth	was	6.0	percent,	declining	partly	due	to	the	global	financial	crisis.	Volume	 and	 prices	 of	 exports	 fell,	 flows	 of	 capital	 and	 investment	fluctuated,	 tourism	and	demand	 for	 tourism	products	 fell	 as	well.”	 (The	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2010:6)		In	 the	main	body	of	 the	document,	 the	rhetoric	discussed	by	 Jakaya	Kikwete	 is	reinforced	 and	 discussed	 in	 more	 detail,	 whilst	 also	 explaining	 that	 the	 2010	PRSP	 is	 part	 of	 a	 medium-term	 strategy	 for	 Tanzania	 to	 work	 towards	 the	Tanzania	Development	Vision25	of	2025	and	the	Millennium	Development	Goals.	Indeed,	it	could	be	suggested	that	the	writing	in	the	documents	discussed	in	this	section	 is	more	 aligned	 to	 fitting	within	 the	 goals	 laid	 out	 by	 the	 international	development	agenda.	Considering	the	ways	in	which	the	Tanzanian	water	sector	and	 its	 culture	 are	 impacted	 upon	 by	 the	 country’s	 social	 and	 political	 history	and	external	influences	is	useful	to	examine	the	reasons	behind	which	discourses	are	prevalent.	In	Chapter	2,	the	growth	of	neoliberalism	as	an	economic	doctrine	was	 discussed	 in	 depth,	 explaining	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 ideas	 such	 as	decentralising	 and	 devolving	 services	 from	 centralised	 state	 providers	 had	become	increasingly	prominent.	Similar	themes	such	as	these	emerged	from	the	discourse	analysis	carried	out	in	the	documents	discussed	in	this	chapter,	which	will	now	be	discussed.			
5.6	Formalising	community	water	provision	in	Tanzania		The	National	Water	Policy	(2002)	discusses	the	Tanzanian	state’s	recognition	of	customary	water	rights	and	how	those	in	possession	of	said	rights	can	apply	to	
																																																								25	Produced	in	1999,	the	Tanzanian	Development	Vision	2025	is	a	short	document	that	sets	out	a	list	of	goals	for	Tanzania	to	work	towards	in	order	for	it	to	become	a	middle-income	country.	The	three	key	objectives	of	the	document	are	“achieving	quality	and	good	life	for	all;	good	governance	and	 the	rule	of	 law;	and	building	a	strong	and	resilient	economy	that	can	effectively	withstand	global	competition”	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	1999:4)	
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the	 Basin	Water	 Board	 for	 a	Water	 Use	 Permit.	 This	 aligns	with	 the	 theme	 of	establishing	 clear	 integrated	 water	 governance	 frameworks	 in	 the	 National	Water	Policy	(2002),	and	reflects	Dill’s	(2009)	discussion	on	the	formalisation	of	water	 provision	 in	 Tanzania	 and	 the	 dominant	 rhetoric	 surrounding	participatory	development		which	indicates	that	residents	can	only	participate	if	they	 do	 so	 through	 formally	 recognised	 institutions.	 An	 explanation	 of	 the	establishment	of	Water	User	Associations	is	also	provided:		 “A	 Water	 Users	 Association	 may	 be	 formed	 by	 the	 agreement	 of	 the	majority	 of	 a	 group	 of	 water	 users	 for	 one	 or	 a	 combination	 of	 the	following	purposes	to-	manage,	distribute	and	conserve	water	from	a	source	used	jointly	by	the	members	of	the	water	user	association;	acquire	and	operate	any	Permit	under	the	provisions	of	this	Act;	resolve	 conflicts	 between	 members	 of	 the	 association	 related	 to	the	joint	use	of	a	water	resource;	collect	water	user	fees	on	behalf	of	the	Basin	Water	Board”	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2009a:397)		According	to	the	Act,	a	constitution	must	be	submitted	to	the	Basin	Water	Board	for	 approval	 in	 order	 for	 a	Water	 User	 Association	 to	 be	 established,	 and	 the	document	 includes	 a	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 the	 details	 a	 constitution	 must	include	in	order	for	it	to	be	approved.	The	dynamics	of	the	different	levels	of	the	water	provision	hierarchy	reflected	my	own	comments	in	my	field	diary,	so	there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	these	policy	documents	are	informing	the	thinking	of	local	NGOs	in	Tanzania.			As	well	 as	 an	 effort	made	 to	bring	 informal	means	of	water	provision	 into	 the	policy	framework,	there	has	also	been	an	attempt	to	quantify	and	report	on	the	water	 sector’s	 progress.	 The	 MKUKUTA	 II	 provides	 an	 honest	 account	 of	Tanzania’s	 progress	 since	 the	 first	 version	 of	 the	 MKUKUTA,	 recognising	 any	shortfalls	that	may	have	occurred	during	that	period.	With	regards	to	education	policy,	the	document	discusses	how	whilst	the	intention	to	expand	enrolment	in	
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teacher	 training	 institutions,	 this	 has	 led	 to	 larger	 class	 sizes	 within	 these	institutions	 which	 has	 potentially	 compromised	 the	 quality	 of	 education	available	(The	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2010:12).	With	regards	to	the	water	sector,	discussion	is	slightly	more	specific	than	the	aforementioned	discussion	by	Kikwete:		 “The	 WSDP	 (Water	 Sector	 Development	 Project)	 mobilised	 significant	financial	 resources	 to	 the	sector.	Through	 its	quick-win	sub-projects;	an	additional	 8,285	 water	 points	 have	 been	 developed,	 providing	 water	supply	to	over	1.89	million	additional	beneficiaries.”	(The	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2010:16)		Whilst	 the	 document	 should	 rightly	 praise	 the	 development	 of	 this	 number	 of	water	 points,	 it	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 case	 that	 these	 will	 be	 a	 permanent	improvement	 to	 access	 to	water	 in	 Tanzania.	Welle	 and	Williams	 (2014)	 note	that	 twenty	 per	 cent	 of	 hand	 pumps	 installed	 in	 Tanzania,	 Sierra	 Leone	 and	Liberia	lose	their	functionality	after	only	a	year.	The	use	of	the	phrase	‘quick-win’	only	 serves	 to	 exacerbate	 this	 concern,	 implying	 that	 impressive	 statistics	 are	being	chased	at	the	expense	of	measureable	progress.				The	 format	of	 the	2010	version	of	 the	PRSP	 is	 similar	 to	 that	of	 the	2005	one,	with	 specific	 goals	 and	 strategies	 discussed	 in	 a	 point	 by	 point	 format.	 The	MKUKUTA	 II	 however,	 expands	 upon	 these	 by	 describing	 Tanzania’s	 progress	towards	 each	 goal,	 before	 discussing	 a	 further	 set	 of	 strategies	 that	 will	 be	employed	 in	 pursuit	 of	 Tanzania’s	 overall	 target	 of	 poverty	 reduction.	 The	following	are	examples	of	the	strategies	discussed	in	the	document	with	regards	to	the	water	sector:		 “i.	Strengthening	the	capacity	of	basin	level	water	resources	management	institutions	 including	 water	 user	 associations,	 to	 effectively	 and	efficiently	support	multi-sector	array	of	productive	activities;		
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ii.	 Rehabilitating	 non-functioning	 hydrometric	 stations;	 designing,	constructing	 and	 installing	 new	 hydrometric	 stations	 for	 proper	 water	resource	monitoring	in	all	basins;		 ...		 v.	 Establishing	 water	 use	 and	 effluent	 discharge	 permit	 register	 for	proper	 recording	 of	water	 extraction	 and	 enforcement	 of	water	 quality	standards;		 vi.	Integrating	management	of	water	resources.”	(The	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2010:55)		Again,	the	MKUKUTA	II	echoes	the	rhetoric	of	other	documents,	with	regards	to	strengthening	the	capacity	of	local	water	governance	institutions	and	integrating	the	means	of	water	resource	management.	The	discussion	of	permits	also	aligns	with	 the	 overall	 discourse	 of	 formalising	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 residents	 access	water	 in	order	 to	 improve	 the	management	of	 the	resource.	This	 is	 referred	 to	later	on	in	the	document	also,	when	registration	of	all	COWSOs	is	noted	as	one	of	the	key	strategies	for	the	next	five	years.	Moreover,	whilst	previous	discussion	in	the	document	caused	concern	about	 the	sustainability	of	newly	 installed	water	points,	rehabilitating	existing	points	that	are	broken	suggests	a	cost-effective	and	pragmatic	 approach	 is	 being	 taken	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 the	 Tanzanian	population’s	access	to	water.	The	2010	version	of	the	PRSP	develops	the	targets	previously	 set	 in	 2005,	with	 different	 percentage	 increase	 targets	 set	 for	 rural	settlements,	small	towns,	urban	authorities	and	Dar	es	Salaam	respectively.	The	overall	aim	 is	 to	 increase	“improved	sources	of	water”	(The	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2010:77)	which	suggests	again	that	the	strategy	is	not	to	simply	build	new	water	points	but	improve	existing	ones.		It	would	be	difficult	to	provide	an	in-depth	taxonomy	of	methods	of	water	access	in	Tanzania	as	understandings	of	definitions	varied	from	person	to	person,	and	did	not	necessarily	relate	to	descriptions	used	in	academic	literature.	Bjornlund	
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(2004)	 argues	 that	 the	 difference	 between	 ‘formal’	 and	 ‘informal’	 provision	 is	that	 ‘formal’	 provision	 refers	 to	 long-term	 access	 to	 a	 water	 source	 whereas	‘informal’	provision	refers	to	a	brief	period	of	access	to	a	water	source	for	a	short	time.	However,	although	the	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	had	been	in	place	for	a	few	 years,	 one	 respondent	 explained	 that	 Ilala	 was	 ‘unsurveyed’	 and	 thus,	informal,	 although	 residents	 were	 attempting	 to	 formalise	 their	 means	 of	accessing	water.	This	does	not	mean	that	residents	were	trying	to	gain	access	to	Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 municipal	 water	 supply,	 but	 that	 they	 wished	 for	 their	community	means	of	water	provision	to	be	recognised	by	the	state	as	an	official	way	 of	 accessing	 water,	 perhaps	 aligning	 with	 the	 procedures	 involved	 in	forming	 a	 Water	 User	 Association	 discussed	 in	 the	 Water	 Resources	Management	 Act	 (2009).	 Dill	 (2009)	 discusses	 the	 importance	 for	 community	organisations	 to	 receive	 recognition	 by	 the	 state,	 especially	 as	 it	 assists	many	grassroots	 organisations	 in	 obtaining	 external	 funding.	 Additionally,	 Lein	 and	Tagseth	 (2009)	 describe	 the	 dual	 system	 of	 rights	 to	 water	 that	 exists	 in	Tanzania,	and	how	the	National	Water	Policy	(2002)	states	that	customary	rights	to	water	will	over	time	become	formalised	via	the	state.	This	is	expected	to	make	it	 easier	 for	 community	 water	 organisations	 to	 charge	 customers	 for	 water,	although	there	was	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	were	 experiencing	 any	 difficulties	 related	 to	 their	 lack	 of	 formalised	 status.	Indeed,	 as	 previously	 discussed,	 community	 provision	 has	 been	 embedded	within	Tanzania’s	water	policy	framework,	but	it	appeared	to	be	the	case	that	as	residents	 of	 Ilala	 had	 taken	 their	 own	 initiative	 to	 set	 up	 a	 community	 water	scheme	 instead	 of	 waiting	 on	 direction	 from	 the	 state	 or	 a	 civil	 society	organisation,	 this	 was	 not	 considered	 to	 be	 ‘formal’.	 However,	 amongst	 the	confusion	 between	 understandings	 of	 formal	 and	 informal	 water	 provision,	 it	was	unclear	as	to	what	benefits	becoming	formal	would	afford.					As	 discussed	 in	 this	 section,	 there	 a	 number	 of	 documents	 that	 inform	 water	governance	in	Tanzania.	When	asked	their	personal	opinion	on	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania,	one	respondent	from	the	Ministry	of	Water	stated:		
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“As	 far	 as	 I’m	 concerned	 [the	 main	 problem]	 is	 management.	 Why?	Because	 like...overall	we	have	 twenty	 three,	 twenty	 four	 regional	 towns.	Coverage	 in	 these	 towns	 averages	 at	 42%.	 The	 management	 of	 the	resource	is	the	problem.	The	resource	is	there.	A	lot	of	money	is	put	into	pumping	water	into	the	treatment	works,	treating	water	with	chemicals,	but	 you	 can	 find	 that	 some	 utilities	 lose	 up	 to	 50%26	of	 what	 they	 are	producing.”	(Ministry	of	Water	Interview,	2014)		This	emphasises	the	importance	of	robust	and	clear	policy	documents	in	order	to	guide	 a	 country’s	 water	 governance.	 The	 same	 rhetoric	 of	 decentralised	provision	and	the	increasing	role	of	communities	and	civil	society	organisations	is	discussed	across	all	documents,	yet	there	is	at	times	vague	discussion	of	how	these	policy	 changes	will	materialise.	The	 fact	 that	 the	 same	 themes	 appear	 in	documents	over	a	period	of	almost	a	decade	calls	into	question	which	challenges	the	Tanzanian	 state	 is	 facing	 in	 implementing	 this	 type	of	 policy	direction	 and	the	limitations	the	state	faces	when	trying	to	implement	them.	When	questioned	on	 the	 success	 of	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy,	 one	 respondent	 from	 the	 Ministry	stated:			 “Our	policy	successes	should	be	assessed	at	the	lowest	local	level,	because	water	 is	 for	 the	 people,	 so	 you	 have	 to	 consider	 the	 grassroots	management	 of	 water	 resources,	 for	 management	 of	 water	 supply	services.	And	this	policy	aspiration	has	been	implemented	by	establishing	the	 water	 user	 associations	 all	 over	 the	 country…to	 have	 a	 grassroots	level	to	manage	water	services,	and	water	resources.”	(Ministry	of	Water	Interview	2013)		This	quote	succinctly	sums	up	the	key	theme	that	has	arisen	across	the	various	documents	discussed	in	that	chapter,	 that	of	decentralised	water	provision,	 the	role	of	NGOs,	and	the	 importance	of	community	responsibility	over	 local	water	
																																																								26	Based	on	observation	and	informal	discussions,	it	is	my	understanding	that	water	is	generally	lost	in	local	utilities	due	to	theft	from	local	residents	and	broken	pipes	that	lead	to	water	leaking	before	it	reaches	a	community	tap	or	evaporating.		
	 180	
resources.	The	rationale	behind	this	form	of	water	provision	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	sections,	and	its	relationship	with	Tanzanian	culture	and	practice		
5.7	Decentralising	Tanzania’s	water	sector		The	role	of	the	private	sector	is	emphasised	in	the	MKUKUTA	II,	explaining	that	it	will	 “develop	 inclusive	 markets	 that	 are	 profitable	 and	 pro-poor”	 as	 well	 as	create	employment	and	jobs	within	Tanzania	(The	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2010:107).	The	expectations	of	communities	 to	participate	 in	service	provision	whilst	supported	by	the	government	and	other	stakeholders	is	also	discussed,	as	well	 as	 how	 civil	 society	 organisations	 will	 be	 key	 to	 Tanzania’s	 poverty	reduction	 strategy,	 both	 in	 the	 form	 of	 capacity	 building	 and	 advocacy.	 This	echoes	official	water	policy	documents	produced	by	the	Government	of	Tanzania	and	suggests	this	form	of	decentralised,	community-based	service	provision	has	been	 within	 Tanzanian	 policy	 rhetoric	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years	 across	 several	policy	areas.		 			The	 National	 Water	 Policy	 (2002)	 states	 the	 various	 responsibilities	 of	 each	different	 level	 of	 the	 water	 management	 hierarchy.	 It	 explains	 that	 at	 the	National	 level,	 investment	 priorities	 and	 externally	 funded	 projects	 should	 be	managed,	 as	well	 as	 the	 production	 of	 a	 bi-annual	 report	 on	 Tanzania’s	water	resources.	The	National	Water	Board	should	also	advise	on	a	number	of	 issues	such	 as	 inter-sectoral	water	 resources	management,	 inter-basin	water	 transfer	and	 trans-boundary	 water	 resources	 management.	 At	 the	 Basin	 level,	 water	resource	 management	 plans	 are	 produced,	 alongside	 guidelines	 around	construction	and	maintenance	of	a	basin	water	source.	The	Basin	Water	Board	is	also	expected	to	provide	balance	sheets	of	their	finances	on	an	annual	basis.	The	document	then	details	 the	expectations	of	 local	waters,	such	as	coordination	of	water	 resource	 management	 and	 resolution	 of	 water	 conflicts.	 Interestingly,	unlike	 the	National	Water	Policy	(2002)	that	 focuses	on	communities	and	 local	provision,	the	Water	Resources	Management	Act	tends	to	discuss	decentralised	
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water	provision	in	terms	of	the	water	resources	available	and	which	river	basin	they	are	served	by.			Dill	(2010a)	asserts	that:		 “In	 Tanzania	 the	 culture	 of	 authoritarianism	 that	 was	 sown	 during	colonial	 rule	 and	 evolved	 during	 the	 postcolonial	 era	 has	 created	 a	particularly	 unfavourable	 environment	 for	 efforts	 to	 impose	 the	institutional	 superstructure	 of	 community-based	 development.”	 (Dill,	2010a:43)			However,	those	such	as	Tungaraza	(1993)	would	instead	explain	that	community	cohesion	is	a	natural	social	dynamic	within	Tanzania.	One	topic	that	often	came	up	 in	 my	 data	 collection	 was	 that	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Tanzania’s	 communities	work	together	to	provide	services,	asking	respondents	about	Tanzanian	culture	and	 what	 led	 to	 this	 natural	 community	 cohesiveness.	 When	 asked	 why	Tanzanian	 communities	 were	 able	 to	 work	 together	 to	 provide	 water,	 one	respondent	explained:		 “This	one	village,	the	water	source	is	almost	seven	kilometres	away	up	a	steep	slope,	so	women	cannot	go	there.	The	other	source	is	almost	three	kilometres	 away.	 At	 this	 source,	 the	women	 have	 to	wait.	 If	 they	 go	 at	8pm,	 they	 will	 come	 home	 at	 12pm	 the	 next	 day	 with	 one	 bucket27	of	water.	And	that	is	a	person	who	is	lucky.	So	those	are	the	challenges	that	our	communities	are	facing.	And	people	have	established	organisations	to	support	these	people.	Because	we	cannot	wait	until	Nicola28	[or	any	other	
mzungu]	comes	to	support	the	community.”	(NGO	#3)		The	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	in	Ilala	began	in	a	similar	way,	as	a	response	to	inefficient	water	provision	within	 their	 locality,	 so	 the	community	 took	 it	upon																																																									27	A	‘bucket’	of	water	is	the	colloquial	term	used	for	one	container	of	water,	which	is	usually	20	litres	in	size.		28	This	is	not	to	say	my	research	involved	‘supporting	the	community’	in	any	way,	but	more	that	the	respondent	was	generalising	about	foreign	individuals	who	come	to	Tanzania	to	work.		
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themselves	to	establish	a	formalised	means	for	the	community	to	work	together	to	 access	 water.	 	 Other	 respondents,	 talking	 about	 Tanzanian	 culture	 more	generally,	explained	that:		 “In	my	 community	 if	 a	 neighbour	 has	 lost	 a	 child,	 even	 a	 neighbour	 far	away	 from	 that	house,	people	will	meet,	without	being	 forced,	 and	 they	will	work	together	until	that	child	is	buried.”	(NGO	#5)			 “Because	of	our	background	maybe,	ujamaa,	we	normally	share.	We	share	even	in	 funerals,	weddings,	maybe	because	of	 that.	Political	background,	and	it’s	our	culture.”	(Temeke	MWST	Interview)		Brian	Dill	has	also	used	a	comparison	between	weddings	and	grassroots	water	schemes	 to	 illustrate	 the	 dynamics	 of	 communities	 in	 Tanzania	 (Dill,	 2010a).	Whilst	 Tungaraza	 (1993)	 believes	 that	 community	 cohesion	 in	Tanzania	 exists	beyond	these	emotional	support	networks	and	celebrations,	Dill	(2009)	instead	says	 that	 there	 is	 an	 expectation	 of	 the	 Tanzania	 state	 that	 community	organisations	are	able	to	capitalise	on	these	kinship	based	relationships	that	the	government	 has	 previously	 been	 unable	 to	 make	 use	 of.	 Although	 there	 is	evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 community	 relationships	 in	 Tanzania	 are	 strong,	 it	 is	potentially	the	case	that	these	are	inappropriate	to	manage	a	local	water	scheme.	With	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 within	 communities	 of	 how	 to	 install	 and	 maintain	local	water	schemes	efficiently	it	is	often	the	case	that	schemes	fall	to	disrepair	or	provide	water	to	communities	in	an	unequal	fashion.	Additionally,	to	return	to	earlier	 discussions	 in	 Chapter	 6	 on	 the	 role	 of	 expatriates	 and	 INGOs,	 the	comment	by	NGO	#3	on	not	being	able	 to	wait	on	 foreign	 individuals	 could	be	linked	 to	 the	 continued	 presence	 of	 international	 actors	 in	 Tanzanian	 water	provision	 and	 the	 reaction	 of	 communities	 to	 their	 inefficiency.	 Interestingly,	similar	 discussions	 occurred	 in	 other	 interviews	 where	 one	 respondent	explained	 that	Tanzanian	community	 relations	had	been	 “borrowed”	 (NGO	#5)	into	the	water	sector	by	international	donors,	and	the	idea	of	community	water	provision	 had	 been	 promoted	more	 by	 international	 actors	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	Tanzanian	state.			
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	The	temporality	of	Tanzanian	water	policy	and	its	focus	on	community	provision	is	also	important	to	discuss.	When	questioned	on	what	communities	did	before	COWSOs	existed,	the	Ministry	of	Water	responded:			 “[They	were]	 just	 fetching	 from	the	streams	or	some	of	 the	areas	where	you	would	 find	 that	 they	 had	 dug	 their	 own	 dams	 or	wells.	 Sometimes	they	would	just	wait	for	the	rain	to	come.”	(Ministry	of	Water	Interview,	2014)		It	 is	 incorrect	to	refute	this	viewpoint	completely,	as	many	communities	across	Tanzania	 have	 been	 accessing	 water	 through	 these	 methods	 for	 a	 number	 of	years.	Dill	 (2009)	explains	 that	 local	water	organisations	were	often	 formed	 to	avoid	 engaging	 with	 existing	 power	 structures	 within	 the	 Tanzanian	 state.	Nonetheless,	this	viewpoint	from	the	Ministry	of	Water	fails	to	recognise	groups	such	as	 the	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	who	established	 community	provision	without	 external	 coercion	 and	 before	 the	 policy	 framework	 aligned	with	 their	methods.	 In	 addition,	 the	 fact	 that	 community	 water	 provision	 has	 been	incorporated	into	Tanzanian	water	policy	comes	into	conflict	for	the	very	reason	they	 perhaps	 existed	 for	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Communities	 took	 ownership	 over	their	water	provision	because	they	had	been	left	out	of	the	remit	of	the	municipal	system	and	the	Tanzanian	state	offered	no	alternative.	Now	what	was	originally	a	coping	mechanism	has	become	embedded	in	Tanzania’s	water	policy.			The	 rationale	 for	 community	 based	water	 provision	was	 also	 attributed	 to	 the	lack	of	efficiency	of	politicians	which	is	ironic	given	that	the	Tanzanian	state	has	now	adopted	a	process	of	formalising	community	provision	as	a	reaction	its	own	inadequacies	into	its	official	policy	framework.	Respondents	discussed	the	ways	in	which	election	periods	can	lead	to	unfulfilled	promises	by	politicians:		 	
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“A	 lot	 of	 interventions	 are	 expected	 this	 year	 and	 next	 year.29	They’re	struggling	to	gain	votes,	especially	the	ruling	party.”	(NGO	#2)		 “People	 are	 talking	 about	 magical	 things	 that	 they	 can	 do	 for	 the	community.	In	Africa,	these	problems	have	never	ended.	They	will	never	end	because	the	MP	doesn’t	have	money.	He	is	waiting	on	the	government	budget…If	an	MP	is	standing	on	the	platform	saying	‘I	will	bring	water’	it’s	not	a	question	of	 ‘How?’	 ‘Under	which	budget?’’	Those	are	the	questions	which	are	not	asked…politics	is	playing	with	people’s	poverty.”	(NGO	#3)		The	respondent	went	on	to	discuss	how	a	lack	of	education	within	communities	often	led	to	them	being	unable	to	critically	assess	any	policy	promises	made	by	election	candidates	which	resulted	in	a	lot	of	statements	being	made	by	election	candidates	that	they	do	not	have	to	be	held	accountable	for	later.	Similar	points	were	made	in	other	interviews,			 “[The	state]	will	claim	over	and	over	again	that	they	are	doing	their	best	and	that	they	are	trying	to	reach	more	people	but	the	figures	do	not	seem	to	support	their	claims.”	(NGO	#1)		Similar	 views	were	 indicated	 in	 an	 interview	with	TWN,	who	 stated	 that	 after	discussion	of	a	number	of	issues	before	an	election,	after	the	election	has	taken	place	 “nothing	 is	 done”	 (TWN	 Interview).	 This	 also	 echoes	 Zizek’s	 (from	 Ioris,	2012)	 idea	of	a	parallax	movement	of	policy,	as	discussed	 in	Chapters	2	and	3,	where	 amongst	 policy	 updates	 and	 state-led	 promises	 no	 measurable	 change	occurs	at	the	grassroots	level.			Although	 this	 research	 involved	 working	 with	 organisations	 who	 work	nationwide	across	Tanzania,	my	proximity	to	Dar	es	Salaam	and	my	case	study	communities	within	the	city	provided	an	insight	into	the	cultural	specificities	of	water	provision	in	the	country’s	former	capital	and	its	surrounding	areas.	One	of	the	 most	 striking	 themes	 to	 emerge	 from	 various	 documents	 on	 the	 topic	 of																																																									29	The	respondent	is	referring	to	the	Tanzanian	general	election	due	to	take	place	in	2015.		
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water	provision	was	the	focus	on	upgrading	rural	communities’	access	to	water.	Notably,	 access	 to	 water	 in	 rural	 areas	 of	 Tanzania	 has	 traditionally	 been	 far	worse	 compared	 to	 those	 living	 in	 urban	 settlements.	 The	 World	 Bank’s	development	 indicators	 show	 that	 for	 the	 period	 between	 2010	 and	 2012,	around	79%	of	Tanzania’s	urban	population	had	access	to	an	improved	drinking	source30	compared	 to	 44%	 in	 rural	 areas	 (World	 Bank,	 2014).	 This	 issue	 was	brought	 up	 in	 several	 interviews	 where	 respondents	 working	 for	 NGOs	 were	keen	 to	 emphasise	 the	 difficult	 situation	 that	 those	 living	 in	 rural	 settings	 in	Tanzania	 were	 experiencing.	 The	 Tanzanian	 Water	 Policy	 (2002)	 indicates	 a	similar	disparity,	stating	that	coverage	at	this	time	was	73%	in	urban	areas	and	50%	in	rural	areas,	whilst	the	PRSP	published	in	2000	discusses	how	poverty	in	Tanzania	 is	 “largely	 a	 rural	 phenomenon”	 (The	 United	 Republic	 of	 Tanzania,	2000:6)	although	the	document	does	then	go	on	to	discuss	how	urban	poverty	is	increasing	in	urban	areas	such	as	Dar	es	Salaam.	The	2005	document	followed	a	similar	theme,	before	going	on	to	list	the	multitude	of	both	explicit	and	nuanced	issues	that	can	affect	processes	such	as	agricultural	productivity.	This	shows	the	complex	 and	 multi-faceted	 ways	 in	 which	 poverty	 can	 be	 experienced,	 and	justifies	 the	 qualitative	 nature	 of	 this	 project	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 these	nuances	do	not	go	overlooked.	As	indicated	by	one	respondent,	there	are	issues	experienced	specifically	by	urban	residents	of	Tanzania:		 “There	are	urban	poors,	who	are	also	facing	a	lot	of	[the	same]	problems	experienced	 in	 rural	 areas,	 but	 also	 ones	 that	 they	 only	 experience	 in	cities.	Because	like,	those	runaway	channels	of	water	are	polluted	which	is	not	an	issue	in	rural	areas	and	also	acquiring	that	water,	one	bucket	can	be	 sold	 from	 up	 to	 500	 Tshs31	to	 1000	 Tshs,	 which	 is	 very	 expensive.”	(NGO	#7)		
																																																								30 	The	 World	 Bank	 describes	 this	 as	 “piped	 water	 on	 premises	 (piped	 household	 water	connection	 located	 inside	the	user’s	dwelling,	plot	or	yard)	and	other	 improved	drinking	water	sources	 (public	 taps	 or	 standpipes,	 tube	 wells	 or	 boreholes,	 protected	 dug	 wells,	 protected	springs	and	rainwater	collection.”	(World	Bank,	2014)	31	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	exchange	rate	for	£1	GBP	is	approximately	3190	Tshs	(XE	Currency	Converter,	2015).		
	 186	
In	addition	to	this,	one	report	found	that	the	worst	performing	area	in	terms	of	latrine	numbers	 in	 a	nationwide	 study	was	 the	Temeke	municipality	 of	Dar	 es	Salaam	(SNV	et	al,	2011).	Indeed,	whilst	the	National	Water	Sector	Development	Strategy	(2005)	clearly	defined	peri-urban	areas	and	the	issues	that	affect	those	Tanzanians	 living	 there,	 there	 seemed	 to	 be	 nothing	 within	 Tanzanian	 water	policy	to	reflect	these	areas	that	span	the	dichotomy	or	rural	and	urban	living	in	Tanzania.	 After	 reading	 through	 a	 number	 of	 similar	 documents	 and	 spending	time	in	Ilala	and	Temeke	I	sometimes	wondered	if	Dar	es	Salaam	was	forgotten	amongst	 all	 these	 development	 initiatives,	 and	 that	 the	 areas	 with	 the	 worst	levels	of	access	were	being	given	priority,	which	aligned	with	this	viewpoint	by	one	respondent:		 “They	build	a	house	next	to	the	rich	person,	and	the	person	thinks	“well,	all	of	this	area	are	rich	people”	and	then	there	is	no	attention	paid	to	the	poor	people	staying	there.”	(NGO	#7)		This	is	not	to	wholly	disagree	with	this	method,	but	aligns	with	later	discussion	in	Chapter	6	 surrounding	 the	 continued	use	of	 funding	 to	 establish	new	water	points	 instead	of	mending	broken	ones.	By	only	 focusing	on	 the	areas	 that	 are	the	 absolute	worst	 state,	 those	 not	 deemed	 ‘bad’	 enough	 run	 the	 risk	 of	 being	ignored	until	 they	reach	a	detrimental	enough	state	 for	 them	to	gain	attention.		Vigh’s	 (2008)	 notion	 of	 endemic	 crisis	 is	 pertinent	 here,	 as	 it	 appears	 that	development	within	 the	water	 sector	 in	Tanzania	 is	 reactionary	 as	 opposed	 to	progressive,	as	the	institutions	involved	are	unable	to	keep	up	with	demand	and	the	 crisis	 of	 a	number	of	Tanzanians	having	poor	 access	 to	water	perpetuates.	Instead	 of	 anticipating	 and	 preventing	 future	 problems	 in	 the	 water	 sector,	projects	 focus	on	areas	 that	are	almost	 in	an	emergency	state,	and	then	after	a	piecemeal	 improvement	 these	 communities	 are	 left	 until	 they	 reach	 a	problematic	state	once	again.	With	policy	unable	 to	catch	up	with	 the	 issues	 in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania	and	continually	only	able	to	focus	on	the	absolute	worst	 areas,	 there	 is	 limited	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 areas	 experiencing	 less	extreme	 issues	 will	 ever	 see	 any	 measurable	 change	 and	 will	 continue	 in	 a	challenging	situation	until	the	policy	deems	them	worth	attention.			
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5.8	 COWSOs,	 MWSTs,	 WUAs:	 Community	 water	 management	 definitions	
and	dynamics		As	 community-based	 water	 provision	 becomes	 written	 into	 policy,	 it	 is	important	to	make	sense	of	the	terms	being	used	and	how	they	are	understood	by	different	stakeholders	in	Tanzania’s	water	sector.	Interestingly,	there	was	no	mention	of	the	use	of	community	owned	water	and	sanitation	organisations	(or	COWSOs)	within	 the	2002	National	Water	Policy	or	 the	2009	Water	Resources	Management	Act:			 “[Interviewer]And	the	COWSOs,	they’re	a	fairly	new	idea?		 “Yes	that’s	one	of	the	new	ideas	because	it	comes	through	[the	2009	Act].	With	 this	 act	 they	 said	 all	 water	 projects	 should	 be	 managed,	 through	COWSOs.”	(NGO	#2)		The	 act	 referred	 to	 by	 the	 respondent	 is	 the	 Tanzania	 Water	 Supply	 and	Sanitation	Act	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2009b).	Describing	its	key	mandate	as	 “promot[ing]	 and	 ensur[ing]	 the	 right	 of	 every	 person	 in	 Tanzania	 to	 have	access	 to	 efficient,	 effective	 and	 sustainable	 water	 supply	 and	 sanitation	services”	 (United	 Republic	 of	 Tanzania,	 2009b:9)	 the	 document	 discusses	 the	establishment	of	community	owned	water	organisations.	This	document	goes	on	to	discuss	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 district	 councils	 in	 the	 establishment	of	 these	community	groups,	with	regards	to	facilitation,	mobilisation	and	promoting	local	water	 and	 sanitation	 facilities.	 The	 Tanzania	Water	 Supply	 and	 Sanitation	 Act	also	notes	that	it	is	the	responsibility	of	village	councils	to:		 “(i)	promote	 the	establishment	of	 community	organisations	as	provided	for	under	section	31;		(ii)	 co-ordinate	 community	 organisation	 budgets	 with	 village	 council	budgets;	and	
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	(iii)	 resolve	 conflicts	 arising	 within	 the	 community	 organisations.”	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania	2009b:12)		The	establishment	of	COWSOs	and	where	responsibilities	lie	in	the	hierarchy	is	explained	 in	 this	 document,	 but	 no	 links	 are	made	with	 similar	 discussions	 in	other	 documents,	 such	 as	 the	 water	 user	 associations	 discussed	 in	 the	 other	water	 policy	 document	 produced	 by	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 in	 the	 same	 year	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2009a).	 Interestingly,	 the	document	 introduces	a	further	level	of	complexity	in	how	these	groups	are	described;		 “A	 community	organisation	 established	pursuant	 to	 subsection	 (1)	 shall	be	a	corporate	body	for	the	purposes	of	this	Act	as	may	be	prescribed	in	any	law	including-		 (a) A	Water	Consumer	Association;	(b) A	Water	Trust;	(c) A	Cooperative	Society;	(d) A	Non-Government	Organisation;	(e) A	Company;	or	(f) Any	other	body	as	may	be	approved	by	the	Minister.”	(United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2009b:25)		With	no	mention	of	water	user	associations	in	this	list	of	terms,	it	is	unclear	as	to	why	 so	 many	 different	 names	 are	 necessary	 for	 the	 same	 format	 of	 water	provision,	 and	 the	 policy	 documents	 do	 not	 address	 what	 the	 individual	differences	are	between	them.	Much	like	the	Water	Resources	Management	Act’s	(2009)	 discussion	 of	water	 user	 associations	 and	 the	 requirement	 for	 them	 to	have	a	constitution,	this	discussion	is	echoed	in	the	Water	Supply	and	Sanitation	Act	 when	 referring	 to	 COWSOs.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 these	organisations	are	 financed,	 the	document	provides	a	variety	of	sources	such	as	internal	member	contributions	 to	 “any	moneys	 that	may	be	contributed	by	 the	respective	 local	government	authority	 to	 finance	construction	of	new	schemes”	
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(United	 Republic	 of	 Tanzania,	 2009b:28).	 To	 summarise,	 although	 the	 Water	Supply	 and	 Sanitation	 Act	 (2009)	 provides	 explanations	 of	 COWSOs	 and	 how	they	are	 to	be	established	and	managed,	 in	 terms	of	 the	 terminology	used	and	the	lack	of	clarity	in	other	respects	such	as	financing,	it	is	still	difficult	to	develop	a	 clear	 understanding	 of	 this	 phenomena,	 especially	 when	 comparing	 and	contrasting	 the	 writing	 in	 this	 policy	 document	 with	 others	 produced	 by	 the	Tanzanian	state.			The	concept	of	COWSOs	is	also	discussed	in	depth	in	the	National	Water	Sector	Development	Strategy,	published	by	the	Ministry	of	Water	in	2005.	COWSOs	are	described	 in	 the	 document	 as	 the	 most	 viable	 option	 for	 local-level	 water	provision,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 sustainability	 and	 commercial	 benefit.	 Water	 user	associations	are	described	in	a	similar	way	in	the	document,	the	only	difference	being	 that	 water	 user	 associations	 are	 noted	 to	 be	 able	 to	 resolve	 conflicts	between	 association	members	within	 their	 locality.	 However,	when	 explaining	that	 responsibilities	 will	 be	 ‘clustered’	 within	 locally	 based	 water	 supply	 and	sewerage	authorities	the	document	states	that:		 “clustering	is	envisaged	because	provision	of	water	supply	and	sewerage	services	 solely	 at	 the	 levels	 of	 individual	 district	 or	 village	 councils	will	not	 only	 be	 financially	 unsustainable	 but	 also	 could	 create	 excessive	demands	on	 individual	 government	 authorities.”	 (National	Water	 Sector	Development	Strategy,	2005:4)		This	is	somewhat	conflicting	with	other	policy	documents	as	the	very	issues	the	above	statement	warns	against	align	with	the	types	of	policy	recommendations	made	in	the	2002	and	2009	documents	produced	by	the	Tanzanian	state.	If	the	flaws	in	this	type	of	grassroots	based	water	provision	were	realised	as	early	as	2005,	it	remains	to	be	seen	why	this	type	of	local	community	organisation	is	still	being	encouraged	at	the	time	of	writing	this	thesis.	It	is	potentially	the	case	that	this	 in	 a	 form	 of	 policy	 by	 default,	 in	which	 new	 policy	 initiatives	 are	written	about	existing	practices	in	order	to	legitimise	them	and	minimise	any	activity	on	the	 state’s	 behalf.	 The	 document	 also	 provides	 a	 number	 of	 definitions	 for	 the	
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different	 terminology	 used	 in	 the	 document,	 such	 as	 describing	 ‘community	owned’	 as	 where	 legal	 entities	 are	 created	 and	 owned	 by	 communities	 which	they	 have	 full	 responsibility	 and	 accountability	 over	 (National	 Water	 Sector	Development	Strategy,	2005).		Moreover,	 the	 terminology	 to	 describe	 different	 kinds	 of	 grassroots	 water	provision	 was	 incredibly	 confusing,	 as	 a	 variety	 of	 respondents	 provided	completely	 different	 definitions.	 The	 Tanzanian	 National	 Water	 Policy	 (2002)	states	 that	 “water	 user	 associations	 or	 water	 user	 groups	 will	 be	 the	 lowest	appropriate	 level	 of	management”	 (National	Water	Policy,	 2002:28).	Whilst,	 as	discussed	in	an	earlier	section,	the	use	of	the	term	COWSO	was	only	introduced	into	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy	 in	 2009,	 both	 terms	 appeared	 to	 be	 used	interchangeably	by	different	groups	 in	Tanzania,	with	a	 lack	of	clarity	over	 the	distinction	between	the	two	terms.	In	the	2010	version	of	the	PRSP,	the	phrase	‘water	 user	 association’	 is	 used	 when	 discussing	 the	 improvement	 of	infrastructure	 for	 the	 production	 sector,	 and	 the	 term	 COWSO	 is	 used	 when	discussing	household	water	access	(The	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	2010),	but	there	is	nothing	to	suggest	in	other	documents	that	water	user	associations	are	industry-based	 institutions,	when	 they	 are	 often	 referred	 to	 in	 a	 household	 or	village	level	capacity	instead.	When	asked	the	difference	between	a	COWSO	and	a	Water	User	Association	(WUA)	the	Ministry	of	Water	then	responded:		 “I	 think	 that…is	 it…I	 think	 that	 a	 small	 COWSO…it’s	 a	 small	 community	getting	a	water	supply	from	a	certain	area,	for	a	small	community.	But	a	WUA,	 it	 could	 be	 bigger	 than	 a	 COWSO.	 So	 you	 could	 have	 different	COWSOs	within	certain	areas,	and	then	there’s	a	WUA	that	oversees	those	COWSOs.”	(Ministry	of	Water	Interview,	2014)		However,	other	respondents	provided	different	answers:		 “So	 in	 these	 villages,	 there	 are	 some	 people,	 like	 farmers	 who	 are	engaging	in	irrigation.	Small	small	small	groups.	Those	ones	are	called	the	water	 user	 associations.	 But	 the	 COWSOs	 are	 bigger.	 It	 combines	more	
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than	these	small	WUAs.	The	COWSOs	are	the	ones	that	manage	the	entire	scheme.	So	that’s	the	difference.”	(NGO	#2)		 “A	 water	 user	 association	 is	 also	 a	 COWSO.	 A	 COWSO	 is	 a	 community	owned	 water	 organisation,	 and	 it	 can	 be	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 water	 user	association,	it	can	be	in	many	forms.	I	am	not	an	expert	on	it	but	I	know	that	a	WUA	is	a	form	of	a	COWSO.”	(Temeke	MWST	Interview)		It	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 were	 a	 number	 of	 different	 interpretations	 of	 the	 policy	terminology	 across	 different	 interest	 groups,	 with	 even	 the	Ministry	 of	Water	unable	 to	 provide	 a	 robust	 definition.	 For	 a	 representative	 from	one	 of	Dar	 es	Salaam’s	 three	MWSTs	 to	state	 that	 they	were	 “not	an	expert”	 (Temeke	MWST	Interview)	is	somewhat	concerning	and	questions	who	is	the	authority	on	which	definition	is	correct.	If	there	is	confusion	at	the	policy	and	management,	it	would	be	 unsurprising	 if	 definitions	 were	 equally	 blurred	 in	 the	 settings	 where	 this	policy	 is	 implemented.	 Indeed,	 in	 Ilala,	 the	word	COWSO	was	virtually	unheard	of,	 but	 WUA	 was	 a	 widely	 used	 term.	 When	 interviewing	 the	 ward	 executive	officer	 for	 the	 area,	 he	 claimed	 he	 had	 never	 heard	 of	 a	 COWSO	 (Ilala	 Ward	Executive	Office	Interview).		In	terms	of	the	financial	resources	required	to	establish	a	COWSO,	opinion	also	varied.	 The	 National	 Water	 Sector	 Development	 Strategy	 (2005)	 states	 that	“COWSOs	will	 be	 expected	 to	meet	 all	 the	 costs	 of	 operating	 and	maintaining	their	water	supply	systems	through	charges	 levied	on	water	consumers,	and	to	contribute	 to	 the	 capital	 costs	 of	 their	 systems”	 (National	 Water	 Sector	Development	 Strategy,	 2005:43)	 but	 this	 did	 not	 strictly	 agree	with	 the	 policy	interpretations	of	interview	respondents:		 “[Interviewer]	And	COWSOs,	do	they	need	financial	resources	to	start	up?	Do	they	need	a	specific	amount	of	money?		 “No.	They	are	given	 it.	They	get	 told	 this	 is	your	station	 to	sell	water	 to	people,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 amount	 that	 you	 sell.	 They	 get	 told	 that	 a	
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percentage	of	the	money	they	can	make	goes	back	to	the	management	and	the	 rest	 is	 to	 go	 to	 the	 project.	 And	 then	 a	 percentage	 is	 paid	 to	 the	authority	figure.”	(Ministry	of	Water	Interview	2014)		This	conflicted	with	other	data	however:		 “Each	 household	 contributes	 so	 that	 they	 can	 become	 a	member	 of	 the	WUA.	 So	 that	 you	 can	 be	 a	 participant	 in	 the	meetings,	 because	 not	 all	people	in	the	organisation	are	members.”		 “[Interviewer]	So	that	 is	how	they	bring	together	their	start	up	costs,	or	do	they	need	external	funding?”		 “External	 funding…no.	 If	 someone	 maybe	 in	 their	 community	 supports	them…I’m	not	aware,	maybe.	And	they	have	a	bank	account	of	their	own.	Normally	 they	attach	 their	bank	statements	 to	 the	 financial	 reports	 that	they	send	to	us.”	(Temeke	MWST	Interview)		The	view	that	COWSOs	did	not	need	external	funding	contradicted	the	evidence	from	 each	 of	 the	 COWSOs	 encountered	 in	 this	 research.	 A	 COWSO	 I	 visited	 in	Temeke	(as	part	of	my	observational	research	with	WPM,	outwith	the	case	study	area)	had	 received	 start	up	 funding	 from	a	 large	 international	water	NGO,	 and	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	project	was	 set	up	as	a	 result	of	 an	 international	 aid	grant	from	a	European	country	 to	 the	Tanzanian	government.	Although	not	strictly	a	COWSO,	 even	 the	 Mitonga	Water	 Users	 Group	 had	 received	 external	 financial	assistance:		 “The	government	knew	our	problem,	so	they	gave	us	help	from	the	World	Bank	 to	 drill	 the	 first	well.	 Because	 the	 government	 knew	 our	 problem	they	came	to	us	and	asked	people	to	mobilise	themselves.	So	we	had	the	money	 from	 the	World	Bank	and	 the	money	 from	members	 to	 start	 the	project.”	(Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	Employees)		
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These	various	means	of	 financing	 a	 community	based	water	project	 align	with	the	 work	 of	 Dill	 (2010b)	 who	 explained	 that	 community	 based	 organisations	“may	be	homegrown,	catalysed	by	development	organisations,	and/or	the	result	of	 government	 policies	 and	 practices”	 (Dill,	 2010b:612).	 Whilst	 Dill	 (2009)	argues	 that	 being	 formally	 recognised	 by	 the	 government	 helps	 a	 community	organisation	obtain	external	funds,	the	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	originated	at	the	grassroots	level	and	was	still	able	to	obtain	financial	support	from	the	World	Bank	 and	 another	 international	 NGOs.	 In	 relation	 to	 this,	 the	 role	 of	 the	Tanzanian	 state	 becomes	 increasingly	 blurred,	 as	 its	 understanding	 of	 its	 own	policy	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 comprehensive	 nor	 extend	 beyond	 the	 role	 of	distributing	funds	from	international	sources.	The	ward	executive	officer	in	Ilala	described	 the	 water	 projects	 in	 the	 area	 (including	 the	 Mitonga	 Water	 Users	Group)	 as	 independent	 from	 the	 government,	 and	 that	 he	 was	 only	 involved	when	customers	refused	to	pay	their	bills,	or	the	group	needed	to	find	expansion	space	(Ilala	Ward	Executive	Officer	Interview).			There	 were	 even	 some	 basic	 attributes	 of	 COWSOs	 that	 caused	 confusion.	COWSOs	 were	 explained	 to	 me	 by	 WPM	 as	 autonomous	 financially	 self-sustaining	 organisations	 that	 were	 in	 control	 of	 their	 own	 capital,	 and	 each	COWSO	 encountered	 in	 this	 research	 was	 indeed,	 in	 possession	 of	 their	 own	bank	 account.	 One	 NGO	 responded	 also	 discussed	 how	 bank	 accounts	 were	required	to	set	up	a	community	water	project	(NGO	#7).	However,	the	Ministry	of	Water	provided	a	different	description:		 “In	 terms	 of	 COWSOs	 they	 do	 not	 have	 these	 bank	 accounts.	 For	 the	management	 of	 COWSOs...in	 a	 village	 there	 are	 administrative	 officers,	like	 a	 street	 officer.	 Such	 kind	 of	 people	 are	 put	 in	management	 of	 the	COWSO.”	(Ministry	of	Water	Interview,	2015)		However,	 the	 quote	 from	 the	 representative	 from	 the	Temeke	MWST	not	 only	confirms	 the	 requirement	 for	 COWSOs	 to	 have	 their	 own	 bank	 account	 but	explains	the	importance	of	them	for	reporting	mechanisms.		
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Across	the	board,	although	this	research	endeavoured	to	ensure	that	all	data	was	discussed	using	the	correct	terminology	 it	was	 incredibly	difficult	 to	determine	what	this	actually	was.	Official	policy	documents	provided	a	different	message	to	Ministry	of	Water	employees,	whilst	local	level	government	representatives	and	those	 playing	 an	 active	 role	 in	 community	 water	 provision	 all	 had	 their	 own	interpretations	 of	 the	 various	 acronyms	 and	 definitions	 used.	 It	 could	 be	suggested	 that,	 as	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy	 has	 simply	 officially	 recognised	grassroots	water	provision	that	has	been	used	as	a	coping	mechanism	as	a	result	of	state	inefficiency	for	a	number	of	years,	piecemeal	gestures	are	being	made	to	indicate	 that	 the	policy	 is	working,	when	 existing	behaviours	 are	 simply	being	rebranded	without	a	genuine	shift	in	practice.		
	
5.9	Urban	and	rural	water	provision	in	Dar	es	Salaam		As	well	as	the	variety	of	definitions	in	use	for	community	water	schemes,	it	was	equally	difficult	to	determine	which	areas	of	Dar	es	Salaam	were	categorised	as	urban	and	which	were	categorised	as	rural.	I	initially	explained	to	WPM	that	my	research	was	solely	 focused	on	urban	water	provision.	After	taking	me	to	meet	COWSOs	in	parts	of	Temeke,	they	insisted	these	areas	were	rural,	although	these	areas	were	 as	 densely	 populated	 as	 any	 other	 area	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam.	 	 	 There	appeared	 to	 be	 a	 sense	 that	 as	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 population	 had	 grown	 and	previously	 rural	 areas	 had	 become	part	 of	 the	 city’s	 urban	 sprawl,	 these	 rural	policy	 discourses	 had	 remained	 even	 although	 these	 communities	 faced	 the	same	issues	of	overpopulation	and	resource	scarcity	than	any	other	resident	of	the	city.	Within	the	National	Water	Policy	(2002),	a	series	of	objectives	for	rural	water	supply	were	listed:		 “(iii)	 to	 emphasise	 on	 communities	 paying	 for	 part	 of	 the	 capital	 costs,	and	 full	 cost	 recovery	 for	 operation	 and	 maintenance	 of	 service	 as	opposed	to	the	previous	concept	of	cost	sharing,		 …		
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(v)	to	manage	water	supplies	at	the	lowest	appropriate	level	as	opposed	to	the	centralised	command	control	approach		 (vi)	to	promote	participation	of	the	private	sector	in	the	delivery	of	goods	and	services”	(National	Water	Policy,	2002:30)		The	above	objectives	accurately	reflect	the	form	of	water	provision	used	in	both	Temeke	and	Ilala,	even	although	they	were	still	part	of	the	city	of	Dar	es	Salaam.	Additionally,	 the	 phrase	 “lowest	 appropriate	 level”	 with	 regards	 to	 water	provision	 was	 also	 used	 in	 the	 Dublin	 Principles	 in	 1992,	 showing	 Tanzanian	water	policy’s	alignment	with	global	water	policy	discourses.	In	a	later	document	produced	by	the	Ministry	of	Water,	it	is	stated	that:		 “The	supply	of	water	and	provision	of	 sewerage	services	 in	urban	areas	will	 be	 the	 responsibility	 of	 regulated,	 commercialised,	 autonomous	water	 and	 sanitation	 authorities.	 In	 rural	 areas,	 emphasis	 is	 on	community	 owned	 water	 supply	 organisations,	 with	 local	 government	authorities	playing	 a	 financing	 and	 facilitation	 role.”	 (Ministry	of	Water,	2008)			It	 could	 also	 be	 the	 case	 that	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 separate,	unique,	 entity	within	 Tanzanian	water	 policy,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 the	 2010	version	of	the	PRSP,	Dar	es	Salaam	was	given	a	separate	target,	perhaps	due	to	the	 city’s	 rapid	growth	and	 the	 large	proportion	of	 the	population	outwith	 the	coverage	of	the	municipal	system.	In	urban	areas,	the	‘market’	model	is	used	to	provide	water	to	urban	citizens,	but	 in	rural	areas	the	 ‘community’	approach	is	being	 used.	 However	 some	 urban	 dwellers	 are	 accessing	 water	 through	community-based	 provision.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 infer	 here	 that	 unplanned	settlements	 that	 have	 appeared	 in	 recent	 years	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	increasing	 population	 are	 still	 considered	 to	 be	 rural,	 especially	 as	 the	 2002	policy	 document	 is,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 thirteen	 years	 old.	 However	 in	 the	urban	policy	section	of	 the	2002	document	 it	refers	 to	poor	water	provision	 in	urban	 squatter	 settlements	 in	 Tanzania’s	 cities,	 and	 the	 infrastructural	
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challenges	faced	there.	Whilst	the	National	Water	Policy	(2002)	calls	for	greater	institutional	 clarity,	 it	 is	 still	 unclear	why	 certain	 localities	 fall	 under	 different	sections	of	the	policy,	undoubtedly	making	interpretation	for	those	outwith	the	Tanzanian	 state	 incredibly	 difficult.	 DAWSACO	 is	 lauded	 by	 Pigeon	 (2012)	 for	improving	coverage	within	the	city,	but	it	is	perhaps	the	case	that	coverage	has	improved	 only	 by	 repairing	 leaks	 and	 reconnecting	 households	 that	 are	 still	within	 the	 geographical	 areas	 covered	 by	 DAWASCO.	 The	 peri-urban	communities	 that	 exist	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 city	 still	 remain	 outwith	 the	organisations’	 remit,	 which	 provides	 some	 explanation	 for	 the	 policy	discrepancies.		Indeed,	Pigeon	(2012)	explains	that	any	expansion	of	the	network	has	been	driven	by	industrial	or	tourism-based	interests	and	has	not	focused	on	these	unserviced	communities.			
5.10	The	role	of	NGOs	in	water	policy	in	Tanzania		As	noted	previously,	 the	role	of	NGOs	and	development	organisations	has	been	written	 into	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy,	 giving	 this	 sector	 an	 integral	 role	 in	 the	country’s	 water	 governance.	 The	 way	 in	 which	 donors	 and	 development	organisations	 maintain	 involvement	 in	 Tanzania’s	 water	 sector	 (and	 other	sectors)	 varies,	 as	 noted	 by	 a	 respondent	with	 significant	 experience	 of	 policy	advocacy:		 “Some	is	passive	funding,	so	donors	put	directly	into	say,	the	water	basket	[of	 the	overall	budget	 for	Tanzania].	There’s	 the	general	budget	support	that	 I	was	mentioning	earlier,	money	directly	 into	the	Tanzanian	budget	and	 then	 the	 government	 decides	what	 they’re	 going	 to	 do	with	 it.	 And	then	there	is	direct	project	funding.”	(NGO	#1)		With	 the	 decreasing	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 Tanzania’s	 water	 sector	 there	 are	 a	variety	of	ways	in	which	NGOs	can	play	a	part	in	providing	water	to	Tanzanian	people.	 	NGOs	 can	provide	 their	 support	 through	 the	Tanzanian	 state,	 or	 carry	out	work	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania	through	their	own	project,	subverting	any	 state	 influence	 and	 in	 turn	 reducing	 the	 role	 of	 the	Tanzanian	 state	 in	 the	
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country’s	 water	 provision.	 Both	 Tanzania	 Water	 Network	 (TWN)	 and	 Water	Project	 Management	 (WPM)	 participated	 in	 all	 three	 activities.	 During	 my	observational	 research	 I	 witnessed	 a	 variety	 of	 activities	 such	 as	 attending	meetings	 with	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Water	 to	 assist	 in	 event	 planning,	 applying	 to	external	 international	organisations	 for	 funding	 to	carry	out	 local	projects,	and	village	 workshops	 that	 provided	 hygiene	 education	 and	 technical	 training	 to	grassroots	water	schemes.	It	appeared	both	TWN	and	WPM	not	only	worked	in	collaboration	 with	 the	 state	 in	 certain	 situations,	 but	 also	 came	 up	 with	 their	own	projects	and	 initiatives	 to	assist	 the	people	of	Dar	es	Salaam	 in	producing	and	managing	their	own	water	supply.	Through	holding	workshops	and	training	within	 communities,	 TWN	 and	 WPM	 were	 filling	 the	 gap	 left	 by	 the	 state	 in	educating	 communities	 and	 allowing	 Tanzania’s	 water	 governance	 to	 be	decentralised	to	the	local	level.			One	respondent	 from	an	organisation	 that	had	been	working	 in	Tanzania	 for	a	number	 of	 years	 discussed	 the	 shift	 in	 practice	 for	 development	 organisations	within	the	country	that	had	occurred	in	the	last	two	decades:		 “We	 continued	 with	 small-scale	 water	 supply,	 pumps,	 boreholes,	 or	shallow	wells.	But	the	major	change	was	the	intervention	of	participatory	approaches	and	sanitation	promotion.	The	dialogue,	the	type	of	activity	at	the	 community	 level,	 and	 then	 that	 again	 evolved	 and	 we	 started	strengthening	the	technical	skills	at	the	community	level	to	construct	any	improved	toilets.”	(NGO	#5)		The	respondent	went	on	to	elaborate	how	they	began	training	individuals	at	the	village	level	to	manage	locally	based	water	and	sanitation	projects.	As	noted	by	the	African	Ministers	Council	on	Water	 (AMCOW)	(2011:17):	 “The	ministry	 [of	water]’s	new	role	as	co-ordinator	(rather	than	implementer)	requires	a	different	skill-set	 and	 different	 thinking”.	 As	 such,	 NGOs	 and	 other	 development	organisations	 have	 an	 increasing	 role	 to	 play	 in	 water	 provision	 in	 Tanzania	whilst	the	Tanzanian	state	simply	manages	the	different	types	of	projects	these	organisations	are	willing	to	implement.	Although	this	decentralised	power	from	
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the	 state	 would	 align	 with	 Nyerere’s	 beliefs,	 the	 active	 incorporation	 of	international	organisations	into	Tanzanian	governance	goes	against	some	of	his	core	 values	 and	 in	 turn,	 indicates	 a	 profound	 shift	 in	 policy	 discourse	 which	could	lead	to	some	challenges	faced	in	its	implementation.			As	well	as	the	activities	that	NGOs	carry	out	at	the	grassroots	and	regional	levels	in	 Tanzania,	 they	 also	 have	 platforms	 for	 direct	 communication	 with	 the	Tanzanian	state:		 “The	 water	 sector	 in	 Tanzania	 is	 having	 a	 sector-wide	 approach	 to	planning,	so	the	government	of	Tanzania	have	developed	a	system	where	donors	and	the	government	plan	together,	they	implement	together,	they	monitor	 together…within	 the	 water	 sector	 development	 programme,	 it	has	 created	 various	 dialogue	 mechanisms,	 so	 there	 are	 water	 sector	working	 groups,	 technical	 working,	 steering	 committees,	 and	 these	comprise	 of	 the	donors,	 the	 government,	 the	NGOs	 and	 the	 civil	 society	organisations.”	(NGO	#2)		 “There	 is	 the	 health	 sector	 development	 partners	 group,	 a	water	 sector	one,	 education	 sector	 one...and	 then	 there	 are	 mechanisms,	 these	development	 partners	 who	 are	 mostly	 the	 international	 ones	 who	 sit	together	with	the	government	part32.”	(NGO	#5)		The	 latter	 respondent	 went	 on	 to	 discuss	 how	 this	 was	 an	 improvement	 on	previous	relations	between	 the	state	and	development	organisations,	as	before	this,	 dialogue	 generally	 took	place	 between	 an	 individual	 organisation	 and	 the	Tanzanian	 state,	 with	 no	 co-ordination	 across	 the	 development	 sector	 or	different	 ministries.	 Another	 respondent	 further	 explained	 the	 current	relationship	between	development	organisations	and	the	Tanzanian	state,	noting	that	 they	 see	 the	 state	 as	 another	 one	 of	 their	 partner	 organisations,	 and	 that	they	 work	 with	 a	 number	 of	 Ministries	 in	 order	 to	 carry	 out	 their	 work	 into																																																									32	It	is	assumed	here	that	the	respondent	is	referring	to	the	relevant	Ministry	to	their	area	of	work.	
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water	and	sanitation.	Both	the	explanations	of	the	various	dialogues	in	place	and	the	 reference	 to	 the	 state	 as	 another	 partner	 organisation	 show	 how	 integral	development	 organisations	 are	 to	 the	 policymaking	 framework.	 As	 discussed	previously,	the	1991	National	Water	Policy	was	referred	to	by	one	respondent	as	being	 heavily	 informed	 by	 the	 interests	 of	 development	 organisations,	 and	 it	appears	to	be	the	case	that	this	sector	still	has	a	significant	influence	over	water	governance	in	Tanzania.			
5.11	Conclusion		This	chapter	has	shown	the	dominant	discourses	currently	present	in	Tanzanian	water	policy	and	their	origins,	be	it	from	Tanzania’s	postcolonial	history	or	from	the	 influence	 of	 international	 development	 organisations.	 In	 addition,	 the	chapter	 has	 also	 explored	how	policy	 is	 interpreted	by	 the	 variety	 of	 different	actors	 involved	 in	 water	 provision	 in	 Tanzania,	 and	 just	 how	 messy	 and	fragmented	 the	 sector	 currently	 is.	 As	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 has	 retreated	 from	water	provision,	a	variety	of	actors	with	conflicting	objectives	now	play	a	pivotal	role	 in	 the	country’s	water	governance.	The	role	of	water	as	an	economic	good	with	monetary	value	is	prevalent,	conflicting	with	the	belief	held	by	others	that	water	 is	 something	 that	 should	 be	 accessed	 by	 all.	 In	 addition,	 the	 multiple	definitions	 and	 understandings	 of	 community	 water	 provision	 have	 been	 a	convenient	replacement	for	the	Tanzanian	state’s	previous	responsibilities,	with	no	 clear	 mandate	 or	 support	 for	 these	 community-based	 schemes	 to	 provide	water	successfully.			In	contrast	with	Tanzanian	policy	under	Nyerere,	where	the	state	took	a	key	role	in	 service	 provision,	 Schneider	 (2004)	 suggests	 that	 the	 state’s	 transition	 to	almost	absent	from	a	number	of	contemporary	Tanzanian	governance	processes	is	a	matter	of	concern.	Nonetheless,	this	chapter	has	indicated	that	there	are	still	elements	 of	 the	 Arusha	 Declaration,	 and	 thus,	 Tanzania’s	 form	 of	 African	socialism	 evident	 in	 contemporary	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy.	 This	 calls	 into	question	 how	 this	 policy	 manifests	 itself	 without	 a	 centralised	 governance	structure	 in	 control	 of	 the	 water	 sector,	 and	 with	 a	 number	 of	 autonomous	
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organisations,	 such	 as	 NGOs	 and	 civil	 society	 organisations	 having	 such	 an	integral	role	to	play	in	Tanzanian	water	provision.	By	examining	the	role	of	these	organisations	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 before	 exploring	 the	 experiences	 of	 community-based	water	provision	 in	Chapter	7,	 the	ways	 in	which	Tanzanian	water	policy	materialises	in	reality	will	be	examined,	in	order	to	analyse	the	effectiveness	of	these	policy	documents	and	in	turn,	provided	a	clearer	picture	of	the	complexity	of	the	water	sector	within	Tanzania.																														
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Chapter	6:	NGO	Politics	and	the	Role	of	Development	Organisations	in	Dar	
es	Salaam		
6.1	Introduction		In	 1991	 Tanzania	 had	 forty-one	 non-governmental	 organisations	 (NGOs)	registered	within	 the	 country,	 but	 by	 2000	 this	 figure	 had	 risen	 to	 almost	 ten	thousand	 (Reuben,	 from	 Hearn	 2007).	 Since	 then,	 the	 number	 of	 NGOs	 has	continued	to	grow,	and	they	have	an	increasingly	important	role	to	play	in	water	provision	 in	 Tanzania.	 Involved	 in	 service	 provision,	 technical	 assistance	 and	community	 education,	 organisations	 based	 both	 locally,	 nationally	 and	internationally	 occupy	 the	 space	 held	 between	 the	 Tanzanian	 state’s	 former	provision	 and	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 private	 sector.	 Some	 of	 the	 earlier	discussion	 of	 NGOs	 examined	 their	 role	 in	 relations	 between	 the	 developed	world	and	the	Global	South,	and	whether	they	are	part	of	“a	new	type	of	cultural	and	economic	colonialism”	(Wallace,	2004:202).	As	such,	this	chapter	takes	into	account	data	from	respondents	as	well	as	my	personal	reflections	from	the	field	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	work	of	these	organisations	and	how	my	presence	as	a	white	researcher	revealed	some	nuances	within	this	data.			This	 chapter	will	 examine	 the	 activities	 undertaken	 by	 both	 international	 and	locally	 based	 NGOs	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 and	 other	 parts	 of	 Tanzania,	 and	 the	organisation-specific	and	sector	based	problems	that	they	encounter	in	doing	so.	Through	 an	 examination	 of	 three	months	 of	 ethnographic	 data	 and	 a	 series	 of	interviews,	this	chapter	attempts	to	discuss	the	various	barriers	to	carrying	out	successful	development	work	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania,	and	also	examines	the	 rationale	 behind	 doing	 so.	 Themes	 covered	 in	 this	 chapter	 include	competition	 between	 organisations,	 inter-sectoral	 relationships	 and	 the	challenges	 of	 funding	 acquisition.	 After	 discussing	 the	 issues	 faced	 by	organisations	on	a	daily	basis	 this	chapter	will	examine	the	challenges	 that	are	embedded	within	development	sector	discourse	and	the	impacts	that	these	can	have	 on	 organisational	 activity.	 The	 chapter	 will	 then	 discuss	 the	 role	 of	 the	development	sector	in	Tanzania	and	its	future	prospects,	before	concluding	with	
	 202	
some	 personal	 reflections	 of	 experiences	 of	 being	 a	 member	 of	 staff	 and	 a	researcher	at	two	civil	society	organisations	based	in	Dar	es	Salaam.			
6.2	Organisational	activity		Although	 there	 are	 different	 viewpoints	 on	 what	 work	 international	 non-governmental	 organisations	 (INGOs)	 and	 civil	 society	 organisations	 should	 be	doing,	ethnographic	data	collected	in	this	research	indicated	two	main	themes	in	their	activity,	that	of	‘hardware’	and	‘software’.	‘Hardware’	was	described	as	any	activity	that	included	the	construction	of	something,	for	example	the	drilling	of	a	borehole	 or	 the	 installation	 of	 a	 domestic	 point.	 ‘Software’	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	referred	 to	 any	 advocacy,	 education	 or,	 as	 described	 by	 those	 in	 the	 sector,	‘sensitisation’	 activities	 that	 involved	hosting	of	workshops	or	any	other	water	and	sanitation	themed	events.	These	activities	align	with	academic	literature	on	this	topic,	as	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	combined	with	the	rise	of	global	neoliberal	economic	 doctrine,	 NGOs	 increased	 their	 remit	 to	 service	 provision,	 advocacy	and	policy	analysis	(Mawdsley	et	al,	2005,	Kang	2010).			In	 terms	 of	 the	 general	 aims	 of	 individual	 organisations,	 one	 international	organisation	interviewed	stated	that:			 “The	vision	of	the	organisation	is	to	see	one	day,	to	ensure	that	everyone	has	access	 to	water	and	sanitation.	And	how	can	we	achieve	 the	vision?	We	 have	 the	mission	 that	we	work	with	 the	 poor,	 with	 rural	 and	 local	partners.”	(NGO	#2)			Another	 international	 organisation	 had	 activities	 based	 across	 a	 variety	 of	sectors,	but	stated	that	their	water	and	sanitation	work	was	all	about	improving	access	 and	 quality	 of	 these	 services,	 most	 specifically	 for	 Tanzania’s	 children.	The	majority	of	NGOs	interviewed	also	discussed	that	one	of	their	main	outputs	was	monitoring	and	evaluation	of	 communities	and	water	projects,	 in	order	 to	elucidate	the	challenges	faced	and	to	help	mitigate	them	in	future.			
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As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	Tanzania	Water	Network	(TWN)	manage	a	network	of	organisations	working	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania,	and	run	and	contribute	to	a	number	of	roadshows	and	education	events	across	the	country.	Water	Project	Management	 (WPM)	 work	 on	 technical	 assistance	 for	 community-level	 water	projects	 and	 teaches	 communities	 how	 to	manage	 their	 own	water	 systems	 at	the	grassroots	level.	When	asked	to	describe	their	own	activities,	TWN	stated:		 “We	try	to	popularise	the	policies	and	the	laws,	in	our	language,	Swahili,	so	that	the	poor	communities	and	the	rural	communities	can	understand	it.	And	we	have	 created	 the	popular	version	of	policy	 so	even	people	 in	poor	 or	 rural	 communities	 can	 understand	 what	 is	 going	 on	 in	 the	government	regarding	water	and	sanitation.	And	also	we	print	material	to	raise	 awareness	 and	 educate	 those	 in	 schools	 and	 communities.”	 (TWN	Interview)		As	well	as	managing	the	network	of	other	civil	society	organisations	working	in	the	water	sector	 in	Tanzania,	TWN’s	outputs	 largely	reflected	those	considered	‘software’.		During	my	time	there,	I	was	able	to	get	involved	in	the	organisation	of	and	 running	 of	 a	 handwashing	 sensitisation	 workshop	 in	 a	 small	 village	 just	outside	Dar	es	Salaam.	This	event	lasted	two	days	and	initially	involved	lessons	on	 good	 sanitation	 practice	 and	 timely	 identification	 of	 water	 borne	 illnesses.	Day	 two	 was	 more	 practical,	 allowing	 the	 group	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 practical	handwashing	 tutorial	 and	 a	 quiz	 on	what	 they	 had	 learned	 over	 the	 past	 two	days.	 Other	 tasks	 at	 TWN	 involved	 report	 writing	 or	 attending	meetings	 with	other	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 INGOs	 or	 the	Ministry	 of	Water.	WPM	on	 the	other	 hand	 had	 some	 more	 involvement	 with	 the	 technical	 side	 of	 things,	engaging	 with	 solar	 power	 companies	 and	 working	 with	 engineers,	 although	they	 did	 also	work	 on	 ‘software’	 type	 education	 practices.	Daily	 tasks	 at	WPM	often	 involved	 reading	 documents	 and	 meeting	 with	 potential	 partner	organisations.		For	 the	 NGOs	 based	 solely	 in	 Tanzania,	 one	 other	 organisation	 acted	 as	 a	network	in	the	same	capacity	as	TWN,	although	they	worked	across	a	number	of	
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different	 sectors.	 Other	 organisations	 worked	 specifically	 in	 rural	 settings,	working	 on	 environmental	 conservation	 based	 activities,	 even	 although	 their	main	 offices	 were	 based	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam.	 Some	 of	 these	 environmental	organisations’	 activities	 involved	 trying	 to	 protect	 rural	 water	 sources,	 and	teaching	communities	how	to	plan	their	agricultural	activity	so	to	not	lower	the	water	quality	of	 local	resources.	Other	outputs	focused	on	“train[ing]	people	so	that	 they	 can	 train	 others”	 (NGO	 #3),	 which	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 common	 theme	across	 all	 organisations	 involved	 in	 this	 research	 and	 aligns	 with	 their	description	of	‘software’	activities.			
Figure	 6.1	 An	 example	 of	 a	 handwashing	 workshop	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 (author’s	
photography)																				A	significant	proportion	of	the	output	from	WPM	and	some	other	organisations	involved	in	this	research	was	setting	up	community	owned	water	and	sanitation	
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organisations	 (COWSOs).	 A	 setting	 up	 of	 one	 of	 these	 groups	 involves	 hosting	classes	 with	 the	 COWSO	 board	 on	 their	 responsibilities	 and	 the	 activities	involved	 in	running	a	COWSO,	and	also	speaking	 to	 the	 local	community	about	how	 water	 is	 going	 to	 be	 accessed	 in	 their	 area	 from	 now	 on.	 Civil	 society	organisations	 also	 helped	 COWSOs	 register	 with	 local	 government	 and	 were	involved	in	setting	up	COWSO’s	bank	accounts.			In	a	context	where	development	organisations	are	both	numerous	and	incredibly	active,	 it	 appeared	useful	 to	 examine	what	 the	Ministry	of	Water	believed	was	the	role	of	this	sector	in	water	provision	in	Tanzania;		 “TWN	 is	 an	NGO,	 so	 they	have	 connections	 to	 some	of	 the	 donors,	 they	have	access	 to	 funds	 to	 cover	 their	 ideas”	 (Ministry	of	Water	 Interview,	2014)		This	suggests	that	the	Ministry	believe	that	the	role	of	donors	and	development	organisations	have	a	key	role	to	play	in	water	provision	in	Tanzania,	and	shows	how	vital	their	connections	and	ability	to	win	funding	is	for	this	sector.	This	is	in	stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 early	 versions	 of	 NGOs	 and	 their	 counterparts,	 who	originally	 existed	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 state	 (Mawdsley	 et	 al,	 2005).	 One	respondent,	working	for	an	international	organisation	that	provided	funding	to	a	number	of	civil	society	organisations	and	provided	a	lot	of	support	for	TWN,	had	a	different	view	of	the	role	of	locally	based	organisations:		 “We	 are	 doing	 advocacy	 at	 the	 national	 level	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	 is	enough	money	 that	 it	 is	 fairly	allocated	and	 there	 is	environmental	care	for	 the	 resources.	 But	 when	 funds	 reach	 there,	 it’s	 now	 the	 role	 of	 the	local	civil	society	organisations	to	ensure	that	it	works	for	the	purpose	it	is	intended.”	(NGO	#2)		It	 therefore	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 case	 that	 a	 large	 output	 from	 the	 development	sector	 should	be	acquiring	 funds	 from	 international	donors	or	managing	 funds	already	acquired.	It	is	pertinent	to	note	that	there	was	limited	discussion	of	the	
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welfare	 of	 Tanzanian	 citizens	 in	 these	 examples,	 or	 their	 access	 to	 water	 and	sanitation	 services.	 The	 development	 sector	 in	 Tanzania	 appears	 to	 be	considered	 a	 necessary	 part	 of	 the	 governance	 framework,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	temporary	 fixture.	Edwards	and	Hulme’s	 (1996:961)	early	description	of	NGOs	existing	 “by	default	 rather	 than	design”	 is	 interesting	 to	note,	 as	 their	 role	has	changed	from	that	of	response	to	a	permanent	fixture	in	Tanzania’s	water	sector.	The	data	 from	both	 the	Ministry	of	Water	and	other	 stakeholders	 in	 the	water	sector	 in	 Tanzania	 suggests	 that	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 is	 that	 of	 a	 facilitator,	passing	on	donor	funds	to	NGOs.	This	places	the	responsibility	of	the	success	or	failure	on	these	organisations	and	leaving	the	state	free	from	blame	when	access	to	water	is	still	a	challenge	for	many	residents	across	the	country.			
6.3	The	impact	of	INGOs	and	civil	society	organisations	in	Dar	es	Salaam’s	
water	sector		After	making	sense	of	the	variety	of	tasks	undertaken	by	INGOs	and	civil	society	organisations	in	Tanzania,	it	is	useful	to	analyse	the	impact	of	their	activities	and	the	challenges	 that	 they	 face	on	a	daily	basis.	 In	 terms	of	 the	countless	reports	written	by	organisations	 in	this	sector,	 these	can	often	be	misleading,	with	one	respondent	claiming	that	reports	only	explain	the	existence	of	water	points,	and	do	not	consider	whether	they	are	functional	or	not.	This	 links	to	a	whole	other	broader	debate	of	the	sustainability	of	the	work	of	these	organisations,	and	their	long-term	 impacts,	 as	 explained	 by	 an	 individual	 from	 an	 organisation	 whose	primary	focus	was	research	and	producing	in-depth	reporting	of	various	issues	faced	by	residents	in	Dar	es	Salaam;		 “62%	of	the	water	points	are	functional,	38%	are	not	functional,	but	just	rectifying	 the	 non-functional	 water	 points,	 then	 you’re	 a	 step	 ahead	 I	think.	You’ve	created	crazy	access.	In	every	ten	water	points	invested	in,	four	broke	down.	It’s	a	waste.”	(NGO	#4)		Indeed,	 the	 scope	 of	 organisational	 impact	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 varying	 levels	 of	success	 depending	 on	 what	 statistics	 are	 considered.	 Across	 the	 various	
	 207	
organisations	involved	in	this	research,	there	appeared	to	be	a	significant	focus	on	 setting	 up	 new	 projects,	 as	 opposed	 to	 returning	 to	 ensure	 the	 quality	 of	existing	ones.	The	majority	of	tasks	that	I	witnessed	at	both	TWN	and	WPM	were	either	 writing	 funding	 proposals	 or	 reaching	 out	 to	 larger,	 more	 established	organisations	 to	 establish	 new	 projects.	 There	 appeared	 to	 be	 very	 little	attention	paid	to	projects	already	in	place,	and	instead	the	focus	was	on	what	the	organisation	 could	 do	 next	 in	 the	 near	 or	 distant	 future.	 It	 is	 unclear	 as	 to	whether	this	behaviour	was	a	result	of	dissatisfaction	with	the	current	output	of	TWN	and	WPM,	or	because	of	the	precarious	nature	of	the	ways	in	which	these	organisations	acquired	finance	for	day	to	day	running	costs.		When	 organisations	 discussed	 their	work	 related	 to	 setting	 up	 COWSOs,	 there	also	did	not	appear	to	be	a	long-term	strategy	in	place;		 “[COWSOs]	don’t	call	us	back	because	we	work	privately,	we	cannot	stay	there	 for	 the	 whole	 period.	 So	 whatever	 comes	 that	 maybe	 you	 can’t	afford,	you	have	to	report	it	to	the	district	councils.”	(NGO	#3)		This	 quote,	 from	 a	 small,	 grassroots	 based	 organisation	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam,	provides	insight	into	how	organisations	with	limited	resources	and	capacity	are	able	 to	 cope	with	 such	a	 significant	 task.	Civil	 society	organisations	are	 lauded	for	being	the	most	knowledgeable	in	setting	up	COWSOs	and	have	been	given	the	majority	 of	 this	 responsibility	 by	 the	 Tanzanian	 state.	 However	 these	organisations	do	not	seem	to	hold	any	more	responsibility	over	this	activity	than	simply	the	initial	set	up	process.	This	results	in	a	situation	similar	to	the	building	of	water	points,	where	an	organisation	or	the	Tanzanian	state	can	report	that	a	certain	number	of	COWSOs	have	been	set	up,	but	there	is	no	clear	information	on	how	many	of	these	COWSOs	are	still	working,	or	how	successful	they	are.			A	number	of	organisations	interviewed	for	this	research	worked	closely	with	the	state,	with	a	variety	of	levels	of	success.	Although	the	Ministry	of	Water	were	the	only	 industry	 interviewed	 in	 this	 research,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 and	 the	Ministry	 of	 Local	Government	 also	have	 an	 involvement	 in	 the	water	 sector	 in	
	 208	
Tanzania,	 and	 according	 to	 a	 number	 of	 respondents,	 were	 not	 co-ordinating	effectively.	Several	organisations	spoke	about	 the	creation	of	official	 spaces	 for	dialogue	with	the	state	and	the	impact	that	this	had;		 “Before	 [formalised	 dialogue]	 we	 were	 dialoguing	 [sic]	 with	 the	government	 individually,	 GTZ,	 the	 French,	we	would	 go	 alone.	 But	 now	we’ve	started	going	to	the	government	with	one	voice	and	a	co-ordinated	agenda,	and	the	government	was	very	willing	because	they	were	tired	of	dealing	with	one	donor	at	a	time.”	(NGO	#5)		The	 respondent	 went	 on	 to	 discuss	 how	 this	 formalised	 dialogue	 was	 a	 key	turning	point	 for	 the	Tanzanian	Water	 Sector	Development	Programme,	which	began	 in	2007,	 and	also	 explained	how	donors	were	 the	ones	 to	 suggest	more	community	 involvement	 in	 development	 projects.	 As	 an	 international,	 well-established	organisation,	this	respondent	was	able	to	discuss	the	ways	in	which	a	number	of	divergent	external	development	groups	are	now	able	to	provide	one	collective	 voice	 within	 Tanzania’s	 development.	 This	 has	 not	 been	 as	 easy	 a	process	 for	 smaller,	 more	 local	 organisations	 however,	 with	 one	 commenting	that	 it	was	 only	 after	 a	 long	 time	 of	 attending	meetings	 that	 their	 views	were	trusted	enough	to	be	taken	into	account	by	the	state.	A	number	of	examples	did	however	 reveal	 that	 the	 impact	 that	 INGOs	 and	 civil	 society	 organisations	 can	have	 on	 government	 practice.	 One	 organisation	 persuaded	 the	 government	 to	provide	an	annual	simplified	version	of	their	budget	to	citizens	of	Tanzania,	and	this	practice	has	been	in	place	for	four	years	now.	Another	organisation	referred	to	presenting	 the	 same	updated	 study	 to	 a	 government	over	 and	over	 for	 four	years	until	 the	government	eventually	realised	 the	 importance	of	 this	data	and	began	to	include	it	in	their	policymaking	(Author’s	Interviews).			One	 respondent,	 working	 for	 a	 large	 international	 NGO,	 indicated	 that	 the	Tanzanian	National	Water	Policy	of	1991	was	 largely	 informed	by	the	views	of	donors.	They	also	stated	that	the	updated	policy	in	2002	recognised	the	role	of	international	 NGOs	 and	 local	 development	 organisations	 in	 Tanzanian’s	 water	sector.	 These	 points	 indicate	 the	 potential	 for	 the	 views	 of	 grassroots	
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organisations	 to	 have	 influence	 over	 the	 Tanzanian	 state,	 but	 do	 also	 raise	concerns	over	the	influence	donors	can	have	over	state	practices.	The	following	comment	 by	 a	 respondent	 working	 for	 an	 international	 development	organisation	indicates	that	this	is	an	issue	worth	considering:		 “We	 sort	 of	 stand	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 development	partners,	as	almost	 like	an	honest	broker.	To	make	sure	that	the	donors	don’t	 drive	 at	 the	 government	 all	 of	 the	 time	with	 their	 own	 demands,	their	 own	 vested	 interests	 from	 their	 home	 countries	 and	 also	 that	 the	government	 stands	 strong	 to	make	 sure	 that	 national	 priorities	 are	 not	being	overridden	by	donor	policies.”	(NGO	#5)		The	 respondent	 went	 onto	 discuss	 the	 various	 priorities	 of	 different	international	donors.	For	example,	the	respondent	stated	that	German	aid	tends	to	 support	 large	 urban-based	 schemes,	which	 can	 often	 influence	 the	 types	 of	projects	 the	 European	Union	 is	willing	 to	 fund.	 The	World	 Bank,	 on	 the	 other	hand,	apparently	“is	for	huge	funding	for	new	projects,	to	make	big	differences,	rather	 than	 look	 for	 the	 people	 who	 fall	 between	 the	 cracks”	 (NGO	 #5).	 This	indicates	the	number	of	different	priorities	that	can	exist	across	the	international	donor	 spectrum	and	 the	 challenges	potentially	 faced	by	 the	Tanzanian	 state	 in	managing	 this.	 Clark	 (1995)	 discussed	 how	 a	 state	 can	 become	 marginalised	from	 decision-making	 processes	 if	 donors	 are	 able	 to	 influence	 the	 agenda	 of	NGOs	that	 they	 fund	based	on	their	own	priorities.	 In	 the	case	of	Tanzania,	 the	state	may	not	only	have	been	marginalised	 from	decision-making	but	 also	had	the	extra	task	of	managing	and	co-ordinating	the	various	mandates	of	each	of	the	international	donor	organisations.		It	 is	 a	 bit	 more	 complex	 to	 ascertain	 the	 impact	 of	 organisations	 that	 exist	primarily	to	manage	a	network	of	smaller	organisations,	which	is	the	case	with	TWN.	Another	similar	organisation	interviewed	for	this	research	stated	that	day	to	 day	 activities	 should	 largely	 consist	 of	 managing	 email	 lists	 and	 sharing	information	from	one	member	to	all	other	member	organisations	(NGO	#1).	The	respondent	stated	that	an	ethos	should	be	promoted	that	the	members	in	effect	
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own	 the	 network	 organisation,	 and	 the	 network	 organisation	merely	 acts	 as	 a	facilitator.	However,	from	my	time	spent	at	TWN	there	was	not	much	of	a	sense	of	this,	and	for	what	limited	contact	they	did	have	with	member	organisations	it	seemed	to	be	restricted	to	a	small	number,	notably	those	with	offices	nearby	to	the	TWN	office.	This	could	be	attributed	to	infrastructural	issues,	as	with	power	shortages,	mobile	signal	 issues	and	the	lack	of	capital	available	to	travel,	 it	was	often	 difficult	 for	 organisations	 to	 communicate	 via	 phone	 or	 email,	 and	 it	appeared	to	be	the	case	that	TWN	had	the	strongest	relationships	with	those	that	they	 were	 able	 to	 meet	 in	 person.	 At	 one	 point	 during	 my	 time	 with	 TWN	 I	became	 accidentally	 privy	 to	 an	 email33	that	 revealed	 more	 about	 the	 uneven	dynamics	of	the	network;		 “Today	 at	 TWN	 I	 accidentally	 read	 an	 angry	 email	 from	 one	 of	 the	founding	 members	 of	 the	 organisation,	 complaining	 that	 there	 was	 no	annual	 general	 meeting	 last	 year,	 there	 had	 been	 no	 2014	 plan	formulated,	no	 transparency,	no	 invite	 to	 represent	 the	network	at	Maji	
Week,	and	‘secretive	selection	of	member	organisations	for	events’”	(Field	Notebook	Extract,	7th	March	2014)		It	 became	 clear	 from	 this	 that	 some	 of	 TWN’s	 member	 organisations	 were	disgruntled	 at	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	 network,	 or	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 functional	network	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 and	 that	 there	had	been	 limited	 clarity	 from	TWN’s	perspective	 of	 the	 organisation’s	 role	 and	 benefits	 to	members.	 As	well	 as	 the	email,	this	viewpoint	was	backed	up	by	a	number	of	interview	participants	from	other	organisations.	Organisations	based	in	Dar	es	Salaam	that	were	involved	in	this	 research	 spoke	 frankly	 about	 their	 close	 relationship	 with	 TWN,	 and	 the	ethnographic	 data	 collected	 on	 TWN	 and	 its	 member	 organisations	 largely	included	 information	 on	 organisations	 based	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 and	 the	 city’s	surrounding	 areas.	 There	 is	 scope	 to	 suggest	 that	 although	 TWN	 could	 be	accused	 of	 favouritism	 with	 some	 of	 their	 member	 organisations,	 there	 is	potentially	a	geographical	bias	that	exists,	based	on	organisations	that	are	easier																																																									33	This	occurred	when	I	was	sat	sharing	a	computer	with	a	member	of	staff	at	TWN	and	they	were	checking	through	emails	in	front	of	me.		
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to	 regularly	 communicate	 with	 as	 there	 are	 less	 infrastructural	 barriers	involved:		 “We	 have	 a	 very	 close	 relationship,	 with	 the	 co-ordinator	 [of	 TWN],	because	basically	the	good	thing	is	we	are	in	Dar	es	Salaam,	we	have	our	own	base,	so	it’s	easy	to	work	with	us.”	(NGO	#3)		This	organisation	has	an	office	within	a	few	kilometres	of	where	TWN	is	based,	and	as	such	has	regular	face	to	face	interaction	with	TWN’s	staff	and	volunteers.	It	 is	 potentially	 the	 case	 that	 the	 organisations	TWN	deal	with	more	 often	 are	those	that	initiate	the	communication	with	TWN,	as	opposed	to	TWN	making	the	initial	 contact.	With	 the	 number	 of	 pressures	 placed	 on	 TWN	 on	 a	 day	 to	 day	basis	 to	write	 reports	 and	 source	 funding	 they	 could	be	 forgiven	 for	 following	the	 easiest	method	 of	 doing	 things.	 I	was	 involved	 in	 some	work	 at	 TWN	 that	involved	 emailing	 members	 for	 reports	 and	 about	 Maji	 Week	 and	 received	limited	 replies	 so	 an	 accusation	 of	 favouritism	 is	 perhaps	 unfair.	 In	 terms	 of	infrastructural	issues,	the	other	network	organisation	interviewed	revealed	that	they	had	thought	carefully	about	how	best	to	communicate	with	their	members;		 “A	 lot	 of	 our	members	 are	 based	 up	 country,	 they	 check	 their	 internet	once	a	week	if	they	can,	so	when	we	communicate	with	them	we	normally	send	an	email	and	what	we	try	to	do	these	days	is	reduce	the	number	of	emails	we	send	to	members.”	(NGO	#1)		It	is	therefore	clear	that	some	communication	issues	with	network	members	can	be	mitigated	with	 some	 consultation	with	 these	 organisations	 about	 how	 best	they	would	like	to	be	contacted.	This	organisation	further	went	on	to	discuss	that	they	limited	their	emails	to	being	sent	weekly	so	as	not	to	fill	up	inboxes	and	to	potentially	 mask	 important	 information.	 This	 organisation	 also	 noted	 that	 for	something	that	required	a	response	at	short	notice,	they	had	elected	to	use	text	messages	 as	 this	 had	 led	 to	 a	 better	 response	 from	members.	 	 Cumbers	 et	 al	(2008)	 discuss	 how	 the	 internet	 enhanced	 communication	 abilities	 between	geographically	disparate	groups,	yet	it	appeared	to	be	the	case	that	the	internet	
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and	its	communication	functions	were	not	being	used	to	their	full	advantage	by	NGOs	 in	Tanzania.	 	Reflecting	 this	argument,	Marsden	 (2004)	notes	how	NGOs	working	 in	 Nepal	 faced	 difficulty	 because	 they	 used	 communication	 channels	that	reflected	the	culture	of	the	Global	North	which	did	not	align	with	Nepalese	means	 of	 communication.	 It	 could	 be	 the	 case	 that	 whilst	 communication	 via	email	and	other	means	that	transcend	geographical	distance,	the	most	successful	working	 relationships	 in	 Tanzania	 are	 built	 in	 person.	 During	 my	 time	 at	 the	TWN	 office	 I	 was	 involved	 in	 sending	 a	 number	 of	 emails	 to	 member	organisations	 that	 in	 many	 cases	 led	 to	 no	 response.	 My	 efforts	 to	 increase	communication	with	members,	such	as	the	establishment	of	a	regular	newsletter,	were	 verbally	 welcomed	 by	 TWN	 staff	 but	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 materialise	 into	anything	substantial.	 It	 could	be	concluded	 that	efforts	 to	manage	 the	network	from	 TWN	 had	 been	 limited,	 and	 that	 whilst	 external	 factors	 can	 often	 affect	communication,	other	organisations	had	found	ways	to	work	around	them.			
6.4	Challenges	faced	in	the	development	sector	in	Tanzania		As	well	as	the	challenges	faced	that	impact	upon	the	minutiae	of	daily	activities	for	 INGOs	 and	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 there	 are	 also	 a	 number	 of	 issues	endemic	within	the	sector	that	create	a	multitude	of	difficulties.	One	of	the	most	common	 issues	 faced	 by	 organisations	was	 the	 pressures	 of	 funding,	 and	 how	difficult	it	is	to	obtain	a	regular	source	of	income:		 “Managing	 an	 NGO,	 it’s	 not	 a	 joke.	 You	 need	 to	 be	 creative,	 you	 need	support,	because	you	are	not	generating	income	of	your	own.	What	comes	in,	 goes	 out.	 Straight	 to	 the	 community.	 Because	 that’s	 the	 target.	 So	fundraising	 is	 a	big	 challenge,	 to	 run	 the	organisation.	That’s	why	you’ll	find	that	many	organisations,	they	die	out,	because	of	a	lack	of	support.”	(NGO	#3)		Reinforcing	 this	 viewpoint	 from	 a	 small,	 locally-based	 organisation,	 another	respondent	 from	 a	 Tanzanian	 organisation	 discussed	 the	 issues	 with	organisations	being	provided	with	funding	on	a	project	basis,	which	inhibits	any	
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forward	 planning	 or	 development	 of	 long-term	 strategies.	 Also	 discussed	 by	Wallace	 (2004),	 this	was	 incredibly	 apparent	 throughout	 the	 fieldwork	period,	and	had	a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	day	 to	day	 activities	 of	 organisations.	This	behaviour	is	appears	to	be	propagated	by	the	role	of	the	Ministry	of	Water.	One	respondent	at	the	Ministry	described	their	activities	as;		 “We	appraise	 the	project	 for	 that	area.	We	 try	 to	secure	 finance.	We	co-ordinate	studies.”	(Ministry	of	Water	Interview,	2014)		Indeed,	 the	 project	 to	 project	 cycle	 exists	 within	 state	 institutions	 as	 well	 as	within	 non-governmental	 and	 civil	 society	 organisations.	 Long-term	 strategies	are	instead	substituted	for	chasing	funding	and	continually	coming	up	with	new	projects	and	finding	stakeholders	to	support	them;		 “Some	of	these	projects	are	really	time-bound	and	it’s	not	really	clear	how	it	will	 add	 to	 the	 future	 so	 I’ve	 seen	 organisations	where	 for	 two	 years	they’re	 doing	 HIV/AIDS	 intervention,	 the	 next	 year	 they	 jump	 into	 the	environment,	and	 for	me	that’s	much	more	of	a	survival	mechanism	but	prevents	 them	 contributing	 something	 worthwhile	 in	 the	 longer	 term.”	(NGO	#1)		Other	 organisations	 discussed	 how	 they	 spent	 a	majority	 of	 their	 time	writing	grant	proposals	to	international	and	national	donors	even	although	they	almost	always	 expected	 a	 negative	 response,	 and	 they	 knew	 that	with	 the	 number	 of	organisations	 competing	 for	 the	 same	 funding	 they	were	aware	 they	 could	not	rely	on	it.	An	explicit	example	of	funding	pressures	occurred	during	my	time	at	TWN,	when	one	day	I	was	called	into	the	office	to	help	with	a	grant	proposal:		 “[TWN]	phoned	me	last	week	and	asked	me	to	come	in	right	away	to	look	at	this	funding	opportunity	that	they	had	found,	only	it	was	for	a	$300,000	USAID	 grant	 for	 a	 family	 planning	 project,	 something	 which	 they	 have	absolutely	no	experience	of.	It	took	almost	a	week	of	convincing	from	me	that	the	time	taken	on	this	application	would	absolutely	not	be	worth	it,	
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especially	 since	 the	 grant	 was	 for	 an	 area	 that	 was	 in	 no	 way	 their	specialisation.”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	9th	February	2014)34.			This	 is	 a	 clear	 example	 the	 views	 of	 Wallace	 (2004)	 and	 Leal	 (2007),	 that	organisations	change	their	priorities	to	fit	in	with	what	funding	is	available,	and	as	discussed	by	the	respondent	from	another	civil	society	organisation,	 inhibits	the	development	of	 long-term	goals	and	strategies.	 	 	One	respondent	discussed	how	World	Bank	procedures	often	created	a	 lot	of	administrative	work	 for	 the	state	and	smaller	organisations,	which	resulted	in	some	organisations	telling	lies	on	 funding	 application	 forms	 in	order	 to	 secure	 funding.	 It	 could	be	 suggested	that	 certain	 pressures	 on	 accessing	 funding	 are	 in	 fact	 breeding	 dishonest	practices	amongst	some	organisations.	Somewhat	related	to	this,	during	my	time	at	TWN	I	suggested	creating	an	email	newsletter	to	send	to	the	network	to	keep	them	informed	on	TWN	and	member	organisations’	activities.	This	was	met	with	the	response	of	showing	me	a	printed	copy	of	a	newsletter	that	was	several	years	out	of	date.	It	seemed	to	be	the	case	that	TWN	were	happy	to	do	activities	that	they	could	include	in	a	budget	or	financially	account	for,	but	were	less	interested	in	activities	that	could	not	be	measured	in	this	way.			An	informal	discussion	with	a	Tanzanian	working	for	a	civil	society	organisation	based	in	Dar	es	Salaam	led	to	a	conversation	about	how	in	Tanzania	“they	don’t	fund	organisations	here,	 just	individuals”	(Field	Notebook	Excerpt,	30th	January	2014).	 This	 theme	 reappeared	 in	my	 ethnographic	 data	 of	WPM.	 Between	my	pilot	 period	 of	 research	 in	 2013	 and	 my	 final	 fieldwork	 period	 in	 2014	 the	director	 of	 WPM	 sadly	 passed	 away,	 which	 had	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 WPM	accessing	funding.	There	was	a	noticeable	difference	after	a	change	in	director	as	to	how	much	pressure	WPM	had	on	them	to	gain	funding,	and	how	much	the	loss	of	one	staff	member	had	a	negative	 impact	on	the	organisation.	Other	 informal	discussions	 with	 international	 organisations	 with	 non-Tanzanian	 staff	 also																																																									34Although	me	attempting	to	convince	the	organisations	this	was	not	a	worthwhile	task	could	be	seen	to	have	impacted	upon	data,	I	did	not	express	this	opinion	on	other	occasions.	I	framed	my	argument	 around	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 was	 researching	 water	 in	 Tanzania	 and	 had	 no	 expertise	 in	family	planning	and	would	therefore	not	be	able	to	write	it.	This	could	be	seen	as	an	example	of	altering	data,	but	it	could	be	argued	that	writing	the	funding	proposal	for	the	organisation	would	equally	have	had	an	impact	on	their	activity.		
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alluded	 to	 this.	 Vail	 and	 Hollands	 (2013:543)	 found	 similar	 dynamics	 in	 their	research	of	a	film	and	photography	collective	in	the	Northeast	of	England:	“even	in	 the	most	egalitarian	of	organisations,	 there	may	well	be	certain	 figures	who	dominate	 based	 on	 their	 charismatic	 personalities	 and	 authoritative	 skills”.	Although	 respondents	 and	 other	 individuals	 encountered	 were	 willing	 to	articulate	that	WPM	had	changed	since	the	director	passed	away,	and	I	was	able	to	witness	 a	 stark	 difference	 in	 the	work	 of	 the	 organisation	 between	my	 two	fieldwork	 periods,	 no	 one	 was	 able	 to	 articulate	 precisely	 what	 had	 changed	apart	from	the	director’s	funding	connections.	It	is	potentially	the	case	that	some	of	 the	 most	 important	 attributes	 individuals	 can	 bring	 to	 development	organisations	 are	 intangible	 and	 are	 thus	 challenging	 to	 replicate	 when	 the	individual	is	no	longer	there.			Another	 theme	 that	 came	 up	 in	 interviews	 and	 informal	 discussion	 was	 how	funding	for	organisations	largely	depended	on	personal	networks	as	opposed	to	the	 quality	 of	written	 proposals.	 However,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 determine	whether	being	 of	 Tanzanian	 origin	 or	 not	 leads	 to	 better	 links	 to	 funding	 networks,	 as	another	 respondent	 remarked	 that	 organisations	 run	 by	 foreigners	 tended	 to	fare	 better	 with	 funding	 proposals.	 This	 aligns	 with	 the	 concerns	 raised	 by	Phillips	(2014:1),	who	calls	into	question	the	over-representation	of	“posh	white	blokes”	 in	 the	 development	 sector.	 Phillips	 laments	 that	 due	 to	 this	 group’s	upbringing,	 they	 can	never	 fully	 understand	 the	 issues	 faced	 in	 a	Global	 South	context,	but	the	fact	that	certain	funding	opportunities	are	only	open	to	foreign	development	professionals	indicates	a	disconnect	in	contemporary	development	practice.	 Taking	 Phillips’	 view	 into	 account,	 those	 without	 the	 required	knowledge	 are	 perhaps	 essential	 to	NGOs	 gaining	 funding,	 creating	 a	 situation	whereby	 development	 organisations	 always	 require	 the	 expertise	 of	 foreign	individuals	in	order	to	function.			As	previously	discussed,	the	majority	of	organisations	involved	in	this	research	existed	on	a	project	to	project	basis,	which	also	reflected	some	of	the	activities	of	the	 Ministry	 of	 Water.	 Pressure	 to	 source	 capital	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 an	
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organisation’s	survival	appeared	to	be	intrinsically	 linked	to	external	pressures	from	bilateral	donors;		 “The	publics	[sic]	in	Europe	are	donating	less	than	they	used	to,	taxpayers	of	 governments	 in	 the	 North	 are	 asking	 whether	 their	 money	 has	impacted	in	the	countries	that	it	is	sent	to	so	there	is	much	more	pressure	on	 international	 NGOs	 to	 show	 that	 they’re	 not	 just	 a	 middle	 man	handling	money	on	behalf	of	poor	people	in	the	South,	and	that	creates	a	scenario	whereby	they	have	to	react	by	proving	their	worth.”	(NGO	#1)		It	is	clear	that	the	monitoring	and	evaluation	culture	discussed	by	Mueller-Hirth	(2012)	and	Smith	(2010)	is	equally	prevalent	within	the	development	sector	in	Tanzania,	 which	 one	 respondent	 noting	 that	 it	 had	 been	 made	 worse	 by	 the	global	economic	crisis	and	either	less	money	being	made	available	by	donors,	or	donors	having	 to	ensure	 that	what	 they	do	 fund	achieves	maximum	results.	As	well	as	the	onus	that	monitoring	and	evaluation	activities	place	on	the	day	to	day	tasks	 of	 these	 organisations,	 it	 also	 breeds	 some	 of	 the	 corrupt	 practices	discussed	by	Burger	and	Owens	(2010);		 “When	monitoring	and	evaluation	people	come	from	Belgium	or	America,	Japan,	 and	 you	 have	 people	 from	 the	 health	 ministry,	 or	 the	 water	ministry,	moving	 all	 around	 them….they’re	 just	moving	 them	around	 so	that	 they	 can	 ensure	 that	 number	 one,	 the	 donors	 are	 happy,	 so	 when	they’re	 doing	 their	 ‘m	 and	 e’	 they	 don’t	 report	 poorly	 against	 them,	 so	they	will	 send	 them	 to	 the	 sites	 that	 are	 perhaps	 better	 functioning,	 so	they	 are	 hiding	 some	 of	 those	 structural	 problems	 that	 exist,	 and	 that	they’re	being	overstretched.”	(NGO	#1)		It	 is	 therefore	 apparent	 that	 as	 well	 as	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 practices	taking	up	 a	 lot	 of	 organisations’	 time,	 they	 are	not	 even	providing	 an	 accurate	picture	of	their	work	and	could	therefore	be	seen	as	somewhat	of	a	futile	activity.	This	 also	 indicates	 the	 seriousness	 of	 funding	 pressures	 on	 organisations	working	in	Tanzania	and	the	lengths	that	they	will	go	to,	to	ensure	the	survival	of	
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their	organisations.	A	superficial	narrative	is	presented	to	external	stakeholders	that	 masks	 the	 ground	 level	 realities	 and	 the	 issues	 prevalent,	 indicating	 that	presenting	improvement	in	order	to	gain	subsequent	funding	is	more	important	than	 actually	 improving	 grassroots	 water	 access.	 Townsend	 et	 al’s	 (2004)	research	into	NGOs	in	Mexico	City	revealed	that	smaller	organisations	wished	for	an	opportunity	to	engage	with	their	donors	more	in	person,	in	order	for	them	to	get	 a	 full	 understanding	 of	 the	 projects	 they	 were	 supporting.	 However,	 in	Tanzania	 it	appeared	to	be	the	opposite,	and	that	 face	to	 face	 interactions	with	donors	could	be	an	opportunity	to	expose	the	inadequacies	of	a	project.	Although	this	may	fall	into	the	category	of	what	Burger	and	Owens	(2010:1265)	refer	to	as	“deceit	and	ineffectiveness”,	there	is	the	potential	that	organisations	have	to	be	creative	with	the	truth	in	order	to	guarantee	their	survival	and	perhaps	be	able	to	do	some	meaningful	work	in	the	future.	As	noted	by	Smith	(2010),	it	is	often	the	case	that	those	with	the	best	of	intentions	can	become	embroiled	in	corrupt	practices,	 such	 as	 bribing	 in	 order	 to	 guarantee	 the	 success	 of	 funding	applications,	even	if	they	are	aware	of	why	this	is	incorrect	behaviour.			Whilst	international	organisations	are	able	to	conduct	monitoring	and	evaluation	work	with	 relative	 ease,	due	 to	having	both	 the	 sufficient	 financial	 and	human	resources	to	do	so,	there	is	perhaps	a	disconnect	in	understanding	the	capacities	of	 locally-based	 civil	 society	 organisations	 and	 what	 is	 feasible.	 With	 perhaps	less	 than	 five	 staff	 in	 some	 instances,	 and	 none	 of	 them	 in	 possession	 of	 the	adequate	 training	and	education	 level	 to	provide	 reports	 to	 the	 standards	 that	international	 organisations	 they	 work	 in	 partnership	 with	 can	 accept,	 civil	society	organisations	could	have	tasks	put	upon	them	well	beyond	their	abilities,	which	could	detract	from	any	meaningful	work	that	they	are	able	to	do.		It	could	be	 inferred	 that	 organisations	 have	 to	 alter	 their	 practice	 in	 order	 to	 provide	information	 that	 external	 parties	 desire,	 instead	 of	 spending	 time	 on	 the	activities	 that	 are	 important	 to	 them	 or	 deemed	 the	most	 effective.	 Insofar	 as	Briggs	and	Sharp	(2004:666)	note	 that	 “for	 local	knowledges	and	narratives	 to	be	 heard	 at	 all,	 they	 have	 to	move	 to	 this	 central	 terrain,	 where	 they	may	 be	“accepted”	 and	 subsequently	 appropriated”,	 for	 local	 organisations	 to	 gain	
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legitimacy	and	gain	financial	resources	for	future	outputs	they	must	comply	with	these	externally	imposed	targets	and	constraints.			Another	 dynamic	 of	 development	 organisations	 discussed	 at	 length	 in	 the	literature	(Clark,	1995;	Edwards	and	Hulme,	1996;	Porter,	2003)	and	prevalent	in	 Tanzania	 is	 that	 of	 working	 in	 partnership	 with	 other	 organisations.	 Some	organisations	 discussed	 the	 partnerships	 that	 they	 were	 involved	 in	 and	 how	they	worked;		 “First,	we	 identify	various	partners	and	then	we	do	a	screening	of	 them,	so	 once	 we	 are	 satisfied	 with	 the	 assessments	 we	 say	 we	 are	 going	 to	work	with	them.	After	that,	we	come	together	and	plan	together,	and	then	they	submit	the	proposals	and	then	we	fund	them.”	(NGO	#2)		 “It	is	supported	by	the	World	Bank	via	the	Ministry	of	Water,	provided	to	the	 district	 councils	 for	 their	 management.	 So	 they	 are	 the	 clients.	 We	have	been	doing	both	the	technical	and	the	facilitation	services.	(NGO	#3)		Although	in	some	instances	partnerships	can	exist	simply	between	two	NGOs	or	civil	 society	 organisations,	 in	 other	 cases	 international	 institutions	 provided	funds	 to	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 who	 then	 distributed	 this	 among	 grassroots	organisations.	 The	 use	 of	 the	 word	 ‘client’	 does	 not	 suggest	 the	 idea	 of	 equal	partnership	however,	and	more	that	Tanzanian	organisations	are	given	funding	to	conduct	work	on	behalf	of	a	larger	international	organisation,	and	perhaps	do	not	have	much	agency	over	 the	rationale	behind	 this	work	or	how	 it	 is	carried	out.	 As	 previously	 discussed,	 both	WPM	 and	TWN	work	 in	 partnership	with	 a	number	 of	 international	 and	 local	 organisations	 in	 Tanzania.	 	 However,	ethnographic	data	revealed	that	these	partnerships	were	not	necessarily	even;		 “TWN	 requested	 funds	 from	 [Civil	 Society	 Organisation	 #2]	 to	 improve	their	office	with	air	conditioning.	 [Civil	Society	Organisation	#2]	 instead	want	 them	 to	 move	 to	 Kariakoo.	 TWN	 currently	 pay	 500000	 Tshs	 per	
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month	for	a	whole	house,	if	they	moved	to	Kariakoo	it	would	be	700000	Tshs	for	just	one	room.”	(Field	Notebook	Excerpt,	31st	January	2014)		The	suggestion	by	the	larger	civil	society	organisation	would	have	resulted	in	a	significant	geographical	move	for	TWN,	and	with	traffic	issues	in	the	city	centre	of	Dar	es	Salaam	would	have	caused	a	lot	of	 infrastructural	challenges	for	their	staff	and	anyone	visiting	their	office.	It	also	seemed	peculiar	that	a	request	for	a	slight	improvement	to	an	office	that	is	largely	working	well	for	TWN	resulted	in	the	 organisation	 that	 provides	 the	 majority	 of	 their	 funding	 trying	 to	 make	 a	significant	 change.	Whilst	 TWN	were	 able	 to	 resist	 this	 (and	 did	 therefore	 not	receive	 air	 conditioning),	 this	 indicates	 the	 unequal	 power	 relations	 and	what	Gibbs	et	al	(2000)	refer	to	as	‘lopsided	friendships’,	that	can	exist	between	those	who	provide	the	capital	to	smaller	organisations	and	those	in	receipt	of	it.			Analysis	 of	 documents	within	 TWN	 offices	 revealed	 a	 lot	 of	 similar	 exchanges	with	this	international	organisation,	including	letters	pleading	for	one	desk	and	one	 chair	 for	 the	 office,	 the	 results	 of	 which	 were	 not	 revealed	 to	 me.	 When	interviewed	for	this	research,	and	the	topic	of	TWN	came	up,	said	international	organisation	made	a	point	of	referring	to	TWN	as	“our	child”	(NGO	#2),	further	revealing	 uneven	 partnership	 dynamics.	 Other	 organisations	 involved	 in	 this	research	explained	similar	issues	when	working	with	partners:			 “It’s	not	easy	because	every	organisation	has	its	own	mission,	vision	and	objectives.”	(NGO	#3)		This	echoes	previous	discussion	surrounding	the	Tanzanian	state’s	relationship	with	 international	donors,	and	 indicates	 that	 these	power	relations	are	evident	at	 all	 levels	 of	 contemporary	 Tanzanian	 development	 practice.	 The	 above	organisation,	being	both	grassroots-based	and	small	 in	size,	commented	on	the	challenges	faced	by	organisations	of	their	capacity	in	trying	to	promote	a	vision	that	 did	 not	 strictly	 align	 with	 that	 of	 the	 more	 larger,	 international	 and	influential	 organisations.	 Conversely,	 an	 organisation	 working	 in	 a	 similar	
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capacity	 to	TWN,	 albeit	 as	both	a	bigger	 and	 cross-sectoral	 initative,	 explained	how	they	mitigate	these	issues:		 “With	our	donors	at	least	I	think	there’s	a	bit	of	room	to	drive	the	agenda,	to	drive	the	focus	to	the	strategic	areas	you	want	to	work	in.	The	way	we	do	 it	 is	we	 have	 a	 strategic	 plan	 that	we	 agree	with	 our	members,	 and	then	 once	 that’s	 agreed	 we	 do	 fundraising	 against	 that	 strategic	 plan.”	(NGO	#1)		The	 organisation	 went	 on	 to	 explain	 that	 they	 controlled	 the	 influence	 of	partners	by	limiting	their	contributions	to	a	third	of	the	total	cost	of	this	project,	resulting	in	a	situation	where	no	single	donor	organisation	could	have	complete	financial	 control	 over	 the	 recipient.	 This	 strategy	 appeared	 to	 give	 this	organisation	 scope	 to	 have	 more	 agency	 over	 their	 own	 projects	 rather	 than	aligning	 their	 planned	 outputs	 to	 what	 funding	 from	 larger	 organisations	appears	 to	 be	 available,	 and	 is	 inherently	 connected	 to	 project-based	 funding	that	 organisations	 like	 TWN	 appear	 to	 exist	 on.	 The	 fact	 that	 TWN	 appears	 to	receive	 their	 funding	 from	 one	 or	 two	 large	 NGOs	 is	 indicative	 of	 how	 little	control	 they	have	on	not	only	 their	outputs	but	 their	day	 to	day	organisational	functions.	Being	referred	 to	as	a	 “child”	of	one	of	 these	organisations	calls	 into	question	TWN’s	 agency	 as	 an	 individual	 organisation	 and	what	 this	means	 for	their	 relationships	 with	 other	 organisations	 in	 the	 sector.	 Although	 it	 can	 be	argued	that	for	smaller	organisations,	existing	without	partnerships	with	larger	organisations	can	inhibit	their	survival	(Clark,	1995;	Edwards	and	Hulme,	1996),	it	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 aforementioned	 data	 that	 these	 relationships	 can	 present	their	own	set	of	difficulties.	 It	becomes	challenging	for	smaller	organisations	to	carve	 out	 their	 own	 agenda	 if	 it	 differs	 greatly	 from	 that	 of	 the	 larger	organisation	 supporting	 them,	 and	 similarly	 difficult	 for	 them	 to	 break	 away	from	the	relationship	if	they	have	become	dependent	on	the	larger	organisations’	capital	 for	 their	survival.	Taking	 these	power	dynamics	 into	account,	 it	may	be	the	case	that	two	or	three	well-established	organisations	are	able	to	influence	a	large	proportion	of	the	development	sector	in	one	country,	potentially	inhibiting	the	potential	for	innovation	and	debate.		
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	Another	challenge	discussed	by	organisations	is	that	of	coverage.	Infrastructural	barriers	 have	 already	 been	 discussed	 as	 a	 barrier	 to	 running	 a	 successful	network	 of	 organisations	 across	 Tanzania,	 but	 these	 issues	 can	 also	 cause	problems	for	organisations	that	are	based	in	the	urban	hub	of	Dar	es	Salaam	but	work	in	rural	areas:		 “Most	of	our	activities	are	based	in	the	rural	areas,	so	we	have	significant	operational	 costs	 compared	 to	 those	 who	 are	 working	 in	 urban	areas...Most	of	the	infrastructure	in	rural	areas	is	not	good,	which	means	that	 operational	 costs	 are	 high,	 because	 roads	 are	 not	 good,	 vehicle	service	costs	are	high	because	mostly	they	break	down,	so	we	also	need	bigger	vehicles.”	(NGO	#3)		This	means	that	even	if	an	organisation	is	able	to	successfully	gain	funding	there	are	a	still	a	number	of	challenges	 that	 they	must	mitigate	 in	order	 to	carry	out	their	work	successfully.	Related	to	this,	the	poor	quality	of	roads	and	the	costs	of	maintaining	 and	 repairing	 vehicles	 will	 mean	 that	 their	 work	 will	 incur	more	costs	than	an	organisation	based	in	another	area	of	Tanzania,	or	an	organisation	working	in	a	country	with	a	more	favourable	infrastructure.	Issues	such	as	this	are	 particularly	 problematic	 for	 smaller	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 one	 quoted	here,	 as	 their	 limited	 set	 of	 resources	 are	 further	 impacted	 by	 these	infrastructural	 challenges.	 These	 inevitable	 costs	 that	 organisations	 face	 may	potentially	 inhibit	 their	 ability	 to	 win	 certain	 funding,	 and	 could	 significantly	reduce	the	scope	and	quality	of	their	outputs.		
6.5	Competition	between	organisations		With	a	large	number	of	organisations	existing	within	the	development	sector	in	Tanzania,	 many	 working	 towards	 the	 same	 issues,	 the	 competition	 between	them	can	also	result	in	some	unfair	behaviour:		
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“It’s	always	a	mystery	to	me	that	at	times	you	feel	that	people	when	they	are	being	interviewed	hide	the	obvious	competition	amongst	civil	society	organisations	 and	 NGOs35.	 It	 comes	 from	 issues	 pretty	 much	 around	competition.	 Competition	 for	 funds,	 that	 sometimes	 results	 in	 smear	campaigns.	 You	might	 hear	 about	 negative	 competition,	 trying	 to	make	out	 that	 your	 organisation	 is	 the	 only	 entity	 that	 is	 worth	 donors	investing	in.	It	happens	a	lot.”	(NGO	#1)		Indeed,	this	impression	was	reinforced	by	reports	that	I	read	in	the	WPM	office,	which	revealed	the	existence	of	these	practices	across	the	development	sector	in	Tanzania,	noting	them	as	a	current	challenge	faced	by	a	number	of	organisations.	The	 reports	 discussed	 how	 ‘smear	 campaigns’	 between	 organisations	 were	causing	ill	feeling	across	the	sector,	as	well	as	organisations	using	ways	(such	as	offering	 a	 higher	 salary)	 to	 entice	 staff	 from	 other	 organisations	 to	 come	 and	work	 for	 them.	 Respondents	 further	 remarked	 that	 competition	 did	 not	 exist	simply	between	organisations	of	a	similar	size	and	output	but	also	between	local	organisations	and	those	that	work	internationally.	Donor	organisations	can	also	end	up	creating	competition	between	 locally	pre-existing	structures,	which	can	also	 have	 negative	 effects.	 Aldashev	 and	 Verdier	 (2010)	 warn	 that	 increasing	competition	between	NGOs	can	divert	away	 from	 their	original	objectives.	One	respondent	discussed	how	the	prioritisation	of	providing	healthcare	facilities	for	HIV	 patients	 whilst	 neglecting	 other	 illnesses	 has	 caused	 problems	 across	 the	sector;		 “The	 staff	 who	 are	 working	 with	 the	 poor	 equipment	 on	 one	 side	witnessing	 colleagues	working	 in	 a	 better	 situation,	 sometimes	 earning	more	 because	 they’re	 getting	 the	 opportunity	 to	 attend	 training	workshops	 and	 are	 receiving	per	diems	 etc,	 their	 lives	 they	 can	 see	 are	improving.	You	can	imagine	what	that	does	to	a	sector	if	you	partition	it	in	such	a	manner,	and	you	think	to	yourself	‘why	not	just	have	one	structure	that	works	for	everybody?’	(NGO	#1)																																																									35 	It	 is	 believed	 that	 in	 this	 instance	 the	 respondent	 differentiates	 between	 civil	 society	organisations	and	NGOs	as	they	believe	civil	society	organisations	to	be	locally-based	and	NGOs	to	be	international	organisations.		
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	Although	 not	 an	 example	 strictly	 related	 to	 the	 water	 sector,	 it	 is	 clear	 how	practices	 by	 international	 donors	 and	 their	 funding	 preferences	 can	 affect	 the	development	 sector	 on	 the	 whole,	 and	 explains	 how	 ill-feeling	 and	 the	demoralisation	of	employees	can	develop.	Providing	money	to	preferential	areas	of	a	sector	leads	to	conflict	and	can	potentially	exacerbate	the	issues	faced	in	the	less	 popular	 areas.	 If	 funding	 patterns	 only	 ever	 follow	 which	 issues	 are	 in	urgent	 need	 of	 support,	 other,	 less	 drastic,	 areas	 will	 eventually	 fall	 into	 this	position	after	years	of	neglect	creating	a	cyclical	and	inefficient	system.	For	those	such	as	TWN,	who	operate	by	managing	a	network	of	other	organisations,	there	is	 also	 scope	 for	 competition	 to	 exist	 between	 each	 of	 their	 members.	 This	became	 apparent	 in	 the	 aforementioned	 email	 exchange	 complaining	 of	favouritism	and	a	lack	of	transparency.	Competition	can	have	a	negative	impact	on	 the	 outputs	 of	 organisations	 if	 they	 become	 too	 focused	 on	 inter-sectoral	politics	 and	 devote	 less	 attention	 to	 providing	 services	 and	 assistance	 to	 the	communities	 within	 their	 remit.	 In	 addition,	 when	 one	 area	 of	 development	practice	 becomes	 in	 vogue	 and	 receives	 a	 lot	 more	 attention	 and	 funding	compared	 to	 other	 sectors,	 this	 can	 demotivate	 staff	 who	 are	 working	 in	 the	underfunded	areas,	and	potentially	 lead	to	them	moving	to	the	sectors	that	are	popular	with	donors.			
6.6	Network	organisations		Although	network	organisations	 such	as	TWN	exist	with	a	number	of	different	nuances	and	dynamics,	 it	 is	still	useful	to	compare	their	activities	with	those	of	other	similar	organisations.	Another	respondent	explained	how	they	make	every	effort	 to	 ensure	 that	 they	 have	 formed	 a	 good	 relationship	 with	 all	 of	 their	members	and	that	they	do	not	do	any	work	that	overshadows	the	work	of	their	individual	 member	 organisations.	 They	 remarked	 that	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	clarity	 was	 needed	 between	 a	 network	 organisation	 and	 their	 members	 over	what	 the	 network	 was	 going	 to	 provide	 and	 the	 various	 benefits	 for	stakeholders.	 This	 organisation	 discussed	 the	 concern	 that	 some	 member	organisations	could	conclude	that	the	network	organisation	are	“building	careers	
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off	of	our	backs”	(NGO	#1),	which	in	some	instances	could	be	representative	of	some	of	TWN’s	activities.			The	aforementioned	rushed	decision	to	apply	for	a	family	planning	project	grant	did	not	appear	to	involve	any	consultation	with	members,	and	reinforces	some	of	the	concerns	raised	in	the	email	complaining	of	favouritism.	Additionally,	TWN’s	frenzied	 attempts	 at	 funding	 at	 times	 suggested	 their	 focus	was	 survival	 as	 an	organisation	 of	 their	 own	 merits,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 synthesis	 of	 the	 work	 of	smaller	organisations	based	across	Tanzania.	Expanding	on	this,	one	respondent	remarked	 that	 competition	 can	 sometimes	 be	 exacerbated	 if	 organisations	 are	not	 clear	 on	 their	 outputs,	 which	 can	 lead	 to	 issues	 of	 perceived	 competition	when	 in	 fact	 organisations	 are	 working	 towards	 different	 goals.	 However,	 if	organisations	like	TWN	continue	to	alter	their	outputs	based	on	which	funding	is	available	 this	will	 continue	 to	blur	 their	 role	 in	 the	 sector	and	will	make	 these	issues	 of	 competition	more	 apparent.	 This	 data	 aligns	with	Dolinhow’s	 (2005)	research	 in	Mexico	which	discussed	how	 local	organisations	 focused	purely	on	short	 term	 projects	 rather	 than	 long-term	 structural	 strategies.	 Furthermore,	Elbers	and	Arts’	(2011)	discussion	of	organisations	in	Ghana	inserting	gender	or	HIV/AIDS	into	funding	proposals	even	although	they	did	not	relate	to	their	main	body	of	work	shows	how	development	terms	that	are	in	vogue	can	impact	upon	the	 types	 of	 funding	 applied	 for.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 funding	 pressures	 and	 the	emphasis	 on	 results-based	 development	 in	 Tanzania	 replicate	 development	practices	elsewhere.			
6.7	Development	organisations	and	the	impact	of	local	culture		Although	 a	 large	 number	 of	 the	 issues	 experienced	 by	 INGOs	 and	 civil	 society	organisations	 based	 in	 Tanzania	 aligned	 with	 research	 conducted	 in	 other	countries,	 there	were	some	 issues	 that	were	evident	 in	 this	research	 that	were	context	 specific	 to	 Tanzania.	 Some	 respondents	 discussed	 the	 issue	 of	 an	embedded	 “per	 diem	 culture”	 (Civil	 Society	 Organisation	 #1)	 which	 had	 a	significant	impact	on	trying	to	host	meetings	and	the	financial	costs	involved	in	doing	so.	The	concept	of	per	diems	originally	existed	on	the	basis	that	Tanzanian	
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government	officials	were	paid	expenses	to	attend	events	in	areas	of	the	country	outwith	 the	 area	 that	 they	 lived	 in.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 data	 collection,	 there	was	 a	great	deal	of	controversy	within	the	Tanzanian	press	over	government	officials	receiving	a	significant	increase	in	expenses	provided,	which	went	far	beyond	the	actual	 expenses	 accrued	 by	 these	 individuals	 and	 was	 looked	 upon	 very	negatively	by	the	Tanzanian	media	and	citizens:		 “For	top	officials	in	government	I	think	it	is	five	hundred	dollars	a	day.	It	doesn’t	matter	whether	 you’re	 going	 to	Addis	Ababa	or	Nairobi	 or	New	York	the	rate	is	the	same.	Can	you	see	why	it’s	an	incentive	for	anyone	not	to	stay	in	the	office?”	(NGO	#1)		These	expense	payments	had	also	extended	 to	 ‘sitting	allowances’,	which	were	payments	 provided	 to	 those	 attending	 meetings	 within	 their	 local	 area.	 This	behaviour	was	explained	 to	me	by	a	number	of	 respondents	as	something	 that	had	 originally	 started	 as	 an	 allowance	 received	 by	 government	 employees,	specifically	 politicians.	 This	 culture	 had	 extended	 to	 the	 development	 sector,	where	from	my	own	observations	and	experiences	of	trying	to	arrange	meetings	it	 became	 apparent	 that	 a	 number	 of	 individuals	 would	 not	 attend	 meetings	unless	they	were	being	financially	rewarded:		 “So	 these	 [sitting	allowances]	are	 if	you	call	up	 for	any	meeting,	even	 in	the	Ministry,	 you	 get	 given	 a	white	 envelope	 and	 in	 the	 envelope	 is	 an	allowance.	You	have	not	left	your	home	town.	That’s	crazy.	You	can’t	even	hold	meetings	with	these	guys	because	they	want	money	from	you.”	(NGO	#4)			Notably,	 this	 financial	 reward	was	often	 far	 in	excess	of	 the	 individual’s	 travel	costs	 and	 often	 just	 seemed	 to	 be	 an	 arbitrary	 amount.	 This	 often	 caused	problems	 for	organisations	when	 trying	 to	hold	meetings,	 although	some	were	strict	in	their	policies:		
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“I	would	rather	have	two	or	three	people	who	are	really	 intent	on	being	there,	who	enjoy	or	who	are	interested	in	the	work	that	they’re	going	to	come	to	do,	than	a	hundred	people	who	are	not	there	for	that	reason.	So	I’m	not	at	all	ashamed	of	having	five	people	in	that	room.”		(NGO	#1)		This	 organisation	 was	 nonetheless	 in	 the	 minority	 in	 its	 practices,	 and	 the	expenses	 required	 in	order	 to	get	 individuals	 to	attend	meetings	often	made	 it	feel	 like	 their	 message	 had	 been	 devalued.	 At	 the	 community	 sensitisation	workshop	I	helped	to	run,	every	attendee	was	handed	an	envelope	of	money	at	the	end	of	the	day.	Such	practices	call	 into	question	whether	individuals	attend	these	meetings	out	of	genuine	interest	and	commitment	to	better	safe	water	and	hygiene	 practices,	 or	 whether	 these	 events	 are	 merely	 seen	 as	 a	 source	 of	income.	Smith	(2003:713)	shares	a	similar	level	of	scepticism	based	on	research	in	Nigeria;	“workshops	are	opportunities	for	patronage	par	excellence,	enabling	organisers	to	cultivate	networks	of	clients	and	reward	patrons”.	 	The	culture	of	workshops	 is,	 as	 noted	 by	 Smith	 (2003),	 approved	 by	 both	 international	 and	locally	 based	 donors	 as	 a	 worthwhile	 activity	 that	 can	 provide	 a	 measurable	output,	 for	example	the	number	of	attendees.	However	 if	 these	events	are	held	based	on	the	premise	of	financial	gain	or	extending	professional	networks	their	ability	to	enforce	real	change	when	tackling	key	development	issues	remains	to	be	 seen.	Whilst	 this	 format	 of	 dissemination	 and	 discussion	 could	 be	 a	 viable	means	 to	mobilise	civil	 society	and	 involve	 them	 in	development	work	 in	 their	locality,	it	appears	that	in	some	instances	workshops	have	become	a	vehicle	for	impressive	statistical	reporting	and	personal	gain	for	those	that	run	and	attend	them.			
6.8	The	role	of	development	organisations	in	Tanzania		To	 return	 to	 discussions	 of	 issues	 that	 are	 related	 to	 elements	 of	 Tanzanian	culture	 and	 society,	 the	 longevity	 of	 development	 organisations	 must	 be	considered,	 and	 the	 long-term	 strategies	 that	 they	 employ.	 One	 respondent	raised	the	point	that	whilst	Tanzania,	Uganda	and	Ethiopia	have	similar	climates,	
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infrastructural	 issues	and	postcolonial	histories,	Tanzania	currently	spends	five	times	that	of	its	East	African	neighbours	on	the	water	sector,	with	no	evidence	of	measurable	 improvement	 compared	 to	 its	 counterparts.	 	 As	 previously	discussed,	the	Ministry	of	Water	indicated	that	the	most	important	role	of	these	organisations	is	their	ability	to	access	funding,	which	calls	into	question	where	in	the	process	the	Tanzanian	state	believes	their	role	is,	or	if	there	is	a	strategy	at	all	 in	place	with	 the	goal	of	no	 longer	 requiring	donor	 funding	 to	provide	vital	services.	Whilst	respondents	were	keen	to	suggest	that	this	was	a	problem	with	Tanzanian	 culture	 specifically,	 Smith’s	 (2003)	 research	 found	 similar	 practices	taking	 places	 in	 the	 development	 sector	 in	 Nigeria.	 Taking	 the	 role	 of	international	and	local	development	organisations	into	account,	their	interaction	with	 communities	 and	 ability	 to	 provide	 sustainable	 water	 provision	 raised	some	interesting	questions	in	this	research.				 “We	have	spent	fifty	years	building	water	wells.	One	of	the	biggest	things	that	 have	 come	 out	 of	 investigations	 into	 this	 is	 that	 the	 communities	have	not	been	 involved	 in	 these	organisations,	but	also	 that	 they	do	not	feel	a	sense	of	ownership	over	these	things	that	are	being	installed,	even	though	they	benefit	directly	from	them.	It’s	because	outsiders	come,	build	a	well,	then	leave.”	(NGO	#1)		There	appeared	to	be	a	noticeable	disconnect	between	the	work	carried	out	by	development	organisations	and	their	longevity	after	an	organisation	had	left	the	area.	 Issues	of	 sustainability	of	projects	were	unrelated	 to	 the	quality	of	water	points	 or	wells	 that	were	 installed,	 but	 seemingly	 attributed	 to	 a	 community’s	understanding	 of	 the	 project	 and	 whether	 it	 fit	 in	 with	 their	 local	 area’s	requirements	 and	 the	 existing	 forms	 of	 provision	 in	 place	 there.	 Community	understandings	 of	 ownership	 were	 not	 the	 only	 issues	 faced	 with	 regards	 to	sustainability,	with	one	respondent	stating	that	because	Tanzanians	do	not	have	an	 established	 tax	 system,	 and	 instead	 only	 pay	 ‘hidden’	 taxes	 through	 the	purchase	of	fast	moving	consumer	goods,	they	do	not	have	a	sense	of	ownership	or	accountability	 towards	anything	built	 in	 their	communities.	This	aligns	with	the	discussion	of	taxation	over	aid	by	Martin	(2014),	as	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	
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	The	 mention	 of	 the	 word	 “outsiders”	 by	 NGO	 #1	 is	 also	 pertinent,	 especially	when	 these	 supposed	 outsiders	 are	 connected	 to	 an	 international	 NGO	 as	opposed	 to	 one	 that	 operates	 only	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level.	 As	 discussed	 by	Edwards	 and	 Hulme	 (1996),	 NGOs	 have	 been	 providing	 health	 and	 education	services	in	Africa	and	Asia	for	a	number	of	years,	although	it	appears	in	Tanzania	this	applies	to	the	water	sector	also.	As	noted	by	Edwards	(2014)	Tanzania	has	a	long	 history	 with	 international	 donors,	 which	 has	 had	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	certain	 aspects	 of	 Tanzanian	 development	 in	 recent	 years.	 One	 respondent	discussed	how	donor	fatigue	in	the	late	1990s	significantly	decreased	funding	for	the	water	sector	at	that	time:		 “Fifteen	 to	 twenty	 years	 ago,	 donors	were	 getting	 tired.	Maybe	 in	 their	home	 countries	 policies	 were	 changing	 or	 maybe	 they	 had	 been	 in	Tanzania	 for	 so	 long	 that	 they	 thought	 ‘we	 have	 supported	 Tanzania	enough,	let’s	move	onto	Uganda’	or	whatever.”	(NGO	#5)		This	was	discussed	as	a	historical	issue	by	this	individual	respondent,	but	there	was	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 this	 was	 very	 much	 a	 contemporary	 issue	 in	Tanzania	as	well.	When	a	member	of	staff	at	TWN	attended	a	meeting	with	the	Ministry	of	Water	and	some	international	donors,	he	returned	to	the	office	and	reported	that	the	donors	present	were	refusing	to	contribute	because	they	were	unable	 to	 see	where	 their	money	was	going.	This	was	particularly	problematic	for	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Water	 as	 two	 thirds	 of	 funding	 for	 the	 water	 budget	 was	expected	to	be	funded	by	donors.	This	indicated	how	much	the	Tanzanian	state	was	 still	 dependent	 on	 external	 resources,	 creating	 a	 fractured	 system	 of	governance,	and	how	important	positive	relationships	with	donors	was	vital	 to	the	livelihoods	of	Tanzanian	citizens.	The	future	of	this	relationship	is	unclear,	as	the	Tanzanian	state	currently	does	not	have	the	financial	capacity	to	manage	its	own	 water	 resources,	 but	 is	 unable	 to	 provide	 the	 progress	 that	 donor	organisations	 are	 expecting.	 This	 could	 result	 in	 either	 a	 reduction	 in	 donor	funds	 available	 or	 a	 change	 in	 relationships	 so	 that	 donors	 provide	 funds	 to	NGOs	directly	and	hold	individual	organisations	accountable.	This	would	lead	to	
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the	Tanzanian	 state	having	 less	 of	 a	mandate	 and	 influence	 in	 its	water	 sector	and	would	make	 it	 increasingly	 difficult	 for	 the	 government	 to	 implement	 any	policy	 changes	 that	 do	 not	 align	 with	 donors	 and	 development	 organisations’	practice.			Although	each	individual	 interviewed	for	this	research	was	of	Tanzanian	origin	they	 had	 an	 in-depth	 understanding	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 presence	 of	international	 development	 actors,	 and	 how	 this	 dichotomy	 between	 what	 is	portrayed	 at	 home	 by	 bilateral	 donors	 and	 the	 experienced	 reality	 of	 their	activities;		 “Donors	seem	to	be	driven	by	the	photo	opportunities	and	to	write	a	good	story	back	home	and	to	keep	the	taxpayers	happy.	‘Here’s	a	case	where	a	community	was	sad	they	didn’t	have	water,	and	here	they	are	smiling’.	A	nice	before	and	after	picture	to	keep	the	money	flowing	in.	And	then	it’s	business	as	usual.”	(NGO	#1)		This	 respondent	 expanded	 upon	 this	 viewpoint	 by	 referring	 to	 an	 example	 in	Southern	Tanzania	where	a	farmers	group	were	given	a	new	machine	to	process	coffee	in	2013.	It	had	already	fallen	into	disrepair36	as	 it	had	not	been	installed	properly	 and	 the	 farmers	 were	 not	 taught	 how	 to	 use	 it	 properly.	 The	 Prime	Minister	of	Tanzania	was	however	present	 for	 the	grand	opening	and	“fanfare”	(NGO	 #1),	 even	 though	 the	 new	 machine	 has	 made	 very	 little	 impact	 on	 the		people	whose	lives	it	was	supposed	to	improve.	Another	respondent	commented	that	 donor	 funded	 projects	 had	 also	 had	 limited	 success	 because	 often	communities	 were	 not	 involved	 in	 the	 decision	 making	 or	 setting	 up	 of	 the	project,	so	the	communities	did	not	feel	any	responsibility	to	maintain	it	after	the	donors	had	left.	There	appeared	at	times	to	be	a	disconnect	between	the	needs	of	a	community	and	what	services	some	donor	organisations	actually	provided,	and	a	 lack	of	 consideration	 for	 the	 fact	 that	before	 the	donor	 arrived	a	 community	will	have	had	a	means	of	accessing	water	and	instead	of	improving	upon	it,	it	had	been	 disregarded	 and	 replaced	 with	 a	 new,	 and	 sometimes	 inappropriate																																																									36	By	Spring	2014,	when	the	data	for	this	research	was	collected.	
	 230	
method.	 Igoe’s	 (2003)	 reference	 to	 “mysterious	 white	 people”	 conducting	development	 processes	 not	 necessarily	 supported	 by	 local	 people	 is	 pertinent	here.			Interestingly,	this	theme	became	apparent	across	the	data	collection,	and	it	often	called	 into	 question	 the	 long-term	 impacts	 of	 various	 projects.	 I	 witnessed	 a	meeting	 where	 a	 planned	 water	 and	 sanitation	 event	 for	 children	 was	 being	criticised	 by	 one	 attendee	 because	 “this	 will	 be	 another	 day	 where	 a	 lot	 of	children	 get	 a	 new	 t-shirt	 and	 nothing	 changes”	 (Field	 Diary	 Excerpt,	 8th	February	2014).	The	person	in	question	went	on	to	discuss	how	it	was	unclear	the	legacy	of	handwashing	events	and	sensitisation	workshops	and	whether	they	had	any	impact	on	the	people	that	attended	them.	Based	on	research	in	Nigeria,	Smith	(2003)	explains	that	the	rationale	behind	giving	out	t-shirts	and	other	gifts	at	 these	events	 is	 so	 that	participants	 remember	attending	 them.	Based	on	 the	way	 that	 this	 practice	was	 discussed	with	 such	 disdain	 at	 the	 aforementioned	meeting	 however,	 whether	 participants	 actually	 remember	 the	 information	provided	 at	 these	 events	 is	 unclear.	 I	 arrived	 at	 similar	 conclusions	 reading	through	documents	 at	WPM	and	TWN	on	 their	projects	 and	 the	work	of	 other	organisations	 in	 Tanzania.	 Often	 phrases	 such	 as	 “this	 project	 sensitised	 2000	school	 pupils”	 were	 used,	 but	 with	 no	 follow	 up	 or	 long-term	 analysis	 of	 the	work	 carried	 out.	 This	 relates	 back	 to	 earlier	 discussion	 about	 Smith’s	 (2003)	research	into	a	workshop	culture	in	the	development	sector	in	Nigeria,	and	how	it	was	seen	as	a	key	way	to	measure	the	activity	of	development	organisations.	At	the	 sensitisation	 event	 I	 attended	 with	 TWN,	 I	 witnessed	 TWN	 repeat	 to	attendees	 over	 and	 over	 to	 shake	 their	 hands	 dry	 rather	 than	bring	 them	 into	contact	 with	 contaminated	 materials.	 Before	 even	 leaving	 the	 workshop,	attendees	 were	 drying	 their	 hands	 on	 their	 clothes,	 contradicting	 the	 entire	message	of	 the	day.	 It	was	difficult	 in	 these	 instances	 to	 see	 the	value	 in	 these	kinds	of	activities,	and	called	into	question	the	pressures	that	organisations	put	on	 themselves	 to	 fund	 these	sorts	of	outputs	when	 it’s	unclear	what	difference	they	make.			
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An	 international	 well-established	 organisation	 mentioned	 that	 there	 are	 key	issues	in	employing	people	who	are	not	Tanzanian:		 “It	 is	not	always	easy	 to	bring	a	harmonised	understanding	 [of	what	we	are	working	towards]	because	development	partners	have	a	tendency	of	bringing	in	their	people	for	a	maximum	of	three	years.	They	leave,	bring	in	new	people	 for	 another	maximum	of	 three	 years,	 so	 the	dynamics	 of	that	also	brings	in	challenges.”	(NGO	#5)		Noxolo	 (2011)	 has	 explored	 similar	 themes,	 examining	 the	 tensions	 that	 arise	from	 development	 volunteering	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	 Framing	 her	 conclusions	through	 Derrida’s	 idea	 of	 gifting,	 in	 that	 nothing	 can	 be	 ‘given’	 without	 being	intrinsically	 linked	to	economic	processes	of	exchange,	Noxolo	argues	that	 true	altruism	is	difficult	when	overseas	individuals	are	so	embedded	in	the	paradigm	of	 “the	 generous	 donor	 nation	 is	 contrasted	 with	 conspicuously	 needy	recipients”	(Noxolo,	2011:221).	 It	 is	understandable	 that	Tanzanian	 individuals	working	 in	 the	 water	 or	 development	 sector	 view	 those	 from	 other	 countries	monolithically,	especially	if	there	is	a	constant	influx	of	these	individuals,	none	of	which	 seem	 to	 have	 an	 intention	 to	 permanently	 stay.	 Tanzanian	 and	 non-Tanzanian	 individuals	working	 in	the	development	sector	specifically	appeared	to	 be	 viewed	 very	 differently,	 and	 were	 understood	 as	 two	 different	 groups	working	 together.	 When	 discussing	 the	 formalised	 dialogue	 that	 had	 been	created	 between	 various	 international	 donors	 and	 development	 organisations	and	 the	 state,	 one	 respondent	 remarked	 that	 it	was	 positive	 that	 “there	 is	 the	white	 people	 and	 the	 black	 ones,	 there	 is	 the	 international	 ones	 and	 the	Tanzanians	at	the	same	table”	(NGO	#5).	Another	respondent	however,	provided	a	somewhat	disturbing	view	of	this	relationship:			 “There’s	kind	of	a	saying	in	Africa.	We	say	the	mzungu,	the	white	person,	normally	 looks	 on	 an	 African,	 the	 black	 one,	 as	 a	 monkey.	 I	 know	 you	personally	don’t,	but	that’s	how	we	feel.”	(NGO	#3)			
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Another	respondent	went	on	to	discuss	how	those	born	in	the	United	Kingdom	who	 have	 not	 visited	 Africa	 are	 faced	 with	 only	 negative	 images	 of	 poverty,	fighting	 and	 other	 challenges,	 and	 that	 “they	 don’t	 show	 the	 good	 stuff”	 (NGO	#2).	 This	 viewpoint	 was	 backed	 up	 by	 Oxfam	 in	 2010,	 who	 after	 conducting	research	 into	 how	 these	 types	 of	 negative	 images	 were	 affecting	 charity	donations	in	the	UK,	revealed	that	it	was	making	the	UK	population	desensitised	to	the	issues	faced,	and	was	masking	any	achievements	by	organisations	such	as	Oxfam	 and	 deterring	 them	 from	 making	 donations	 (BBC	 News,	 2012).	 It	appeared	 that	 there	 was	 a	 distinct	 understanding	 of	 the	 opposing	 cultures	 of	Tanzanian	or	non-Tanzanians,	and	 that	 these	views	were	part	of	an	embedded	discourse	 of	 Tanzanians’	 receipt	 of	 aid	 and	 interactions	 with	 development	organisations.	This	aligns	with	Hearn’s	(1998:98)	idea	of	the	“multiple	spheres	of	influence”	of	colonialism	that	has	existed	in	Africa	since	countries	gained	colonial	independence,	and	reinforces	Townsend	et	al’s	(2002)	of	imperialism	reshaping	itself	to	suit	a	contemporary	context.			There	 were	 a	 number	 of	 instances	 in	 interviews	 that	 reflected	 a	 postcolonial	understanding	 of	 current	 development	 practice.	 At	 times,	 when	 interviewing	individuals	 from	 organisations	 I	 was	 described	 as	 a	 representative	 of	international	development	workers	or	researchers	who	come	to	Tanzania.	When	asked	why	Tanzanian	communities	work	so	well	together	in	Tanzania:		 “We	 cannot	wait	 until	 Nicola	 comes	 to	 support	 the	 community,	 we	 can	work	together	to	support	the	community.”	(NGO	#3)		Some	 data	 suggested	 that	 Tanzanians	 saw	 a	 clear	 dichotomy	 between	 local	individuals	 working	 in	 the	 development	 sector	 and	 those	 from	 international	backgrounds.	 These	 views	 were	 particularly	 apparent	 from	 grassroots-based	organisations	 included	 in	 this	 study,	who	only	had	Tanzanian	 staff	 and	no-one	from	 a	 non-Tanzanian	 background.	 This	 relates	 back	 to	 earlier	 discussion	 on	funding	 networks	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 individual	 connections	 for	organisations	accessing	 funds.	A	belief	 that	“institutions	run	by	 foreigners	 tend	to	fare	better	with	funding”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	30th	January	2014)	is	perhaps	
	 233	
related	to	a	belief	that	non-Tanzanians	have	higher	education	levels	and	are	thus	able	 to	 produce	 a	 higher	 quality	 of	 proposal	 document.	 My	 time	 at	 TWN	 and	WPM	often	involved	being	asked	to	write	funding	proposals	and	I	was	on	several	occasions	 told	 they	needed	my	writing	 skills	and	knowledge	 to	access	 funding.	On	some	occasions,	I	was	not	only	asked	to	write	the	document	but	to	come	up	with	the	entire	concept	for	the	project	by	myself.	I	was	also	often	being	asked	if	there	were	any	grants	that	I	was	aware	of	that	they	could	apply	for,	or	whether	I	had	 access	 to	 any	 funds	 back	 home	 they	 could	 use.	 I	 spent	 a	 lot	 of	 these	conversations	feeling	uncomfortable	and	a	little	confused	as	to	why	they	thought	a	geography	student	 from	Scotland	would	have	access	to	this	 information.	This	theme	was	 further	 expanded	 upon	when	 a	 respondent	 discussed	 the	 need	 for	international	members	of	staff	in	order	to	improve	organisational	culture:		 “Having	someone	 like	Nicola	will	bring	a	new	communal	 relationship	 in	terms	of	culture	changing,	professionalism,	and	by	doing	so	we	can	have	an	 assured	budget	 each	 year.	 I	 believe	 that	when	you	manage	 time	you	increase	the	sources	available	to	you	because	getting	somewhere	in	time	means	 maximising	 the	 production.	 So	 we	 don’t	 manage	 time,	 so	 when	Nicola	comes	in,	she	manages	time	and	we	learn	from	there.	There’s	your	culture	change.”	(NGO	#3)		This	 respondent	 then	 went	 onto	 discuss	 how	 whilst	 he	 believed	 it	 would	 be	advantageous	 to	 have	 these	 kinds	 of	 individuals	 working	 for	 his	 organisation,	lack	of	financial	security	and	guaranteed	income	made	attracting	these	kinds	of	professionals	 difficult.	 The	 respondent	 noted	 that	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 an	(international)	member	of	staff	of	a	high	calibre	it	would	cost	their	organisation	a	lot	of	money,	which	was	funds	that	they	were	simply	unable	to	commit	to.	The	dichotomy	between	foreign	and	local	members	of	staff	is	especially	pronounced	by	 the	 respondent’s	 belief	 that	 the	work	 of	 international	 staff	 is	 superior	 and	more	efficient.	This	echoes	an	aforementioned	viewpoint	by	Parpart,	discussed	in	Chapter	3:		
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“Development	 is	 predicated	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 some	 people	 and	places	 are	 more	 developed	 than	 others,	 and	 therefore	 those	 who	 are	‘developed’	have	the	knowledge	and	the	expertise	to	help	those	who	are	not.”	(Parpart,	from	Kothari,	2001:2005)		It	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 case	 that	 this	 mindset	 has	 become	 embedded	 in	 the	discourse	 of	 Tanzanians	 working	 in	 the	 development	 sector,	 which	 calls	 into	question	 their	beliefs	 in	 their	own	abilities.	Viewpoints	 such	as	 those	of	Hearn	(1998)	and	Townsend	et	al	(2004)	discussed	above	could	indicate	that	so	called	postcolonial	imperialist	development	processes	are	a	manifestation	of	the	West’s	influence	over	the	Global	South,	but	there	are	examples	from	this	research	that	suggest	that	some	of	these	ideas	originate	within	Tanzania,	potentially	as	a	result	of	 the	 country’s	 colonial	 history.	 Conversely,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 these	discourses	have	been	embedded	within	Tanzania	for	so	long	it	is	now	difficult	for	Tanzanians	 to	 critically	 assess	 them.	 Although	 this	 research	 has	 elucidated	 a	number	 of	 issues	 within	 organisations	 in	 Tanzania,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 estimate	whether	an	outsider	voice	would	be	able	to	overcome	an	embedded	culture,	or	whether	such	working	practices	are	the	most	appropriate	in	a	situation	that	is	by	nature	 haphazard	 and	 complex.	 Additionally,	 a	 belief	 that	 a	 change	 in	 human	resources	 would	 have	 a	 radical	 change	 in	 the	 successes	 of	 an	 organisation	neglects	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 issues	 such	 as	 time	 management	 are	 often	exacerbated	by	poor	 roads,	 inefficient	public	 or	private	 transport	 and	weather	related	issues,	that	one	foreign	employee	would	not	be	able	to	mitigate.			
6.9	The	future	of	NGO	practice	in	Tanzania	
		It	 is	 unfair	 to	 fully	 place	 the	 blame	 on	 donors	 for	 inefficient	 or	 unsuccessful	development	 projects.	 If	 smaller	 organisations	 in	 Tanzania	 are	 providing	 false	reports	 on	 their	 organisational	 capacity	 and	 health	 of	 their	 projects,	 donors	based	 in	 another	part	 of	 the	 country	or	 in	 another	 country	 all	 together	 can	be	forgiven	 for	 accepting	 this	 information	 as	 fact.	 Financial	 pressures	 for	 survival	and	a	need	to	keep	on	the	good	side	of	donors	has	resulted	in	organisations	only	being	motivated	by	monetary	sums	rather	than	if	the	project	is	possible	and	can	
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work.	 It	 is	 difficult	 for	 external	 donors	 to	 ensure	 the	 sustainability	 of	 projects	they	are	involved	in	if	they	are	not	told	that	anything	is	broken,	but	equally,	they	should	make	efforts	to	ensure	that	the	appropriate	technology	for	the	respective	community	is	installed	in	the	first	place.		One	respondent	remarked	that	the	most	efficient	way	to	work	in	this	sector	is	to	build	the	capacity	of	local	people	and	organisations,	aligning	with	the	literature	on	 participatory	 development	 (Clark,	 1995,	 Drabek,	 1987,	 Wallace,	 2004,	Kothari,	2001,	Williams,	2004).	However,	with	pressure	on	smaller	organisations	to	chase	funding	and	the	often	unequal	partnerships	they	find	themselves	in	with	international	organisations,	 it	 is	not	always	clear	whether	 local	 institutions	are	being	developed	or	that	is	simply	the	rhetoric	written	into	project	proposals.	The	role	 of	 civil	 society	 organisations	 amongst	 this	 complex	 sector	 is	 also	 worth	considering:		 “You	 realise	 that	 there’s	 a	whole	 gap	 in	 the	 entire	 thing,	 if	we	 continue	moving	 like	 this…people	 just	 become	 donor	 dependent	 and	 they	 can’t	think	on	their	own	and	they	just	think	about	the	donors.	What	should	civil	society	do?	Paint	the	situation	on	the	ground	and	continuously	monitor	it,	so	that	you	can	let	the	policymakers	understand	what	the	situation	is	so	that	something	is	done	about	it.”	(NGO	#4)		This	respondent	worked	for	an	organisation	that	did	a	lot	of	research	and	report	writing	 on	 various	 local	 situations,	 although	 they	 seemed	 to	 be	 an	 anomaly	compared	to	the	other	organisations	included	in	this	research.	Whilst	the	above	respondent	sees	civil	society	organisations	as	an	extra	resource	for	the	state	to	make	 informed	decisions,	 it	 seemed	more	of	 a	 common	 theme	 for	 civil	 society	organisations	 to	 be	 replacing	 the	 work	 of	 the	 state.	 Until	 there	 is	 a	 clear	consensus	on	what	work	civil	society	organisations’	role	should	be	it	will	make	the	water	sector	 in	Tanzania	 increasingly	complex	and	 inhibit	 the	achievement	of	commonly	held	goals	between	these	organisations.			
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There	 have	 been	 a	 number	 of	 theoretical	 discussions	 surrounding	 the	 idea	 of	‘fashionable’	 development	 topics	 (Cornwall	 and	 Brock,	 2007;	 Cornwall,	 2007;	Leal,	 2007).	 Described	 by	 Cornwall	 (2007:471)	 “passwords	 to	 funding	 and	influence”,	 a	 number	 of	 organisations	 clearly	 receive	 project	 based	 funding	 by	simply	following	development	trends.	Lawrence	and	Brun	(2011)	found	that	 in	India,	 large	 donors	 would	 not	 fund	 HIV/AIDS	 projects	 in	 certain	 areas	 of	 the	country	 due	 to	 the	 supposed	 low	 prevalence	 of	 a	 disease	 in	 these	 regions.	Combined	 with	 historical	 discussions	 of	 donor	 fatigue	 in	 Tanzania	 in	 the	 late	1990s,	 interviews	 suggested	 that	 this	 was	 the	 case	 in	 contemporary	 Tanzania	also:			 “I	think	when	you	have	donors	deciding	where	they	want	to	go	with	their	direct	 funding	 it	 creates	 a	 situation	 where	 “let’s	 pick	 the	 more	 sexier	project,	so	we	can	report	back	really	good	outcomes”.	And	that	leaves	the	other	stuff	that’s	maybe	not	so	popular	unfunded.”	(NGO	#1)		Much	 like	 the	 example	 of	 HIV	 facilities	 being	 provided	 over	 those	 for	 other	health	conditions,	it	is	clear	that	whichever	topic	is	de	rigueur	with	international	donors	 are	 the	 ones	 that	 receive	 funding,	 meaning	 that	 small	 organisations	without	regular	income	must	adapt	their	outputs	to	fit	with	current	development	fashion.	 Another	 respondent	 remarked	 that	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 make	 a	 case	 for	sanitation	 services	 in	 Tanzania,	 as	 reports	 indicate	 that	 eighty	 per	 cent	 of	households	have	a	toilet,	which	resulted	in	a	lack	of	holistic,	considered	thought	around	the	issue:		 “So	to	be	able	to	get	that	kind	of	thinking	back	to	understanding	what	it	means	 by	 having	 80%	 of	 households	 having	 a	 poor	 quality	 toilet,	 what	does	 it	 mean,	 in	 terms	 of	 child	 health,	 in	 terms	 of	 maternal	 health,	 or	reducing	communicable	disease.”	(NGO	#5)		This	is	perhaps	the	reason	for	TWN’s	sudden	decision	to	pursue	a	project	related	to	family	planning	having	had	no	previous	experience	in	this	area.	In	addition	to	this,	this	example	reinforces	the	issues	with	the	monitoring	and	evaluation	tasks	
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placed	 on	 organisations,	 and	 how	 the	 pressure	 to	 write	 reports	 and	 provide	statistics	is	altering	the	mindset	of	the	development	sector	and	their	goals.			As	previously	discussed,	when	examining	the	relationship	between	development	organisations	 and	 the	 state,	 there	 were	 some	 examples	 that	 suggested	 that	donors	had	a	significant	degree	of	influence	over	state	practices.	Maji	Week	(for	a	full	description	of	Maji	Week,	see	Chapter	7)	exists	as	a	 format	for	the	Ministry	and	 development	 organisations	 to	 present	 a	 united	 front	 to	 the	 people	 of	Tanzania	 about	 changes	 in	 the	water	 sector,	 but	 some	of	 the	 language	used	 to	describe	the	event	indicates	some	of	the	power	relations	involved;		 “Each	kind	of	new	technology	which	is	in	the	market	you	will	find	there	in	
Maji	Week.	It’s	a	way	for	us	also	to	find	out	what	products	are	currently	in	use.”	(Ministry	of	Water	Interview,	2014)		This	almost	neoliberal	description	of	the	event	hints	that	it	exists	as	some	sort	of	business	fair,	and	is	a	format	for	those	providing	the	technology	and	the	services	in	the	water	sector	to	explain	their	work	to	the	people	of	Tanzania.	There	does	not	appear	to	be	any	state-led	ownership	over	these	processes	and	 instead	the	Ministry	of	Water	play	the	role	of	facilitators	for	this	event.			
6.10	Relationships	between	the	Tanzanian	state	and	international	donors				The	 power	 relations	 between	 donors	 and	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 were	 further	revealed	by	one	interview	respondent;		 “One	 of	 the	 things	 about	 aid	 that	 I	 don’t	 like	 to	 touch	 upon…it	 puts	government	 in	 the	 dark	 in	 a	 way,	 because	 they	 don’t	 know	 how	many	resources	 are	 actually	 available.	 Yes,	 you	 can	 introduce	 a	 project	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	Water	 but	wouldn’t	 it	 be	 better	 if	 they	 just	 had	 a	 clear	 idea	about	what’s	coming	well	in	advance,	so	that	they	know	‘we	don’t	actually	need	 to	 put	 any	more	 wells	 in	 Temeke	 because	 Belgian	 aid	 is	 building	
	 238	
those,	and	then	they	can	send	these	funds	to	places	that	the	donors	aren’t	going.”	(NGO	#1)		This	 line	 of	 argument	 indicates	 the	 messy	 and	 fractured	 form	 of	 governance	present	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania,	and	the	lack	of	co-ordination	that	exists	between	the	numerous	stakeholders.	The	respondent	went	onto	suggest	that	yes,	bilateral	 funding	 has	 become	 less	 popular	 because	 of	 fear	 of	 corrupt	governments,	but	that	it	would	be	more	productive	to	fix	these	issues	rather	than	to	leave	the	state	out	of	the	process	completely.	Unfortunately	it	appeared	to	be	the	case	that	a	fear	of	corruption	was	embedded	across	all	levels	of	the	spectrum,	so	it	may	be	difficult	to	mitigate	these	concerns:		 “There’s	a	lot	of	risk	of	corrupt	consultants,	corrupt	contractors,	colluding	with	 corrupt	 district	 people,	 whatever.	 So	 there	 is	 always	 that	 fear	 as	well.”	(NGO	#5)			These	 risks	 became	 even	 more	 possible	 when	 during	 my	 fieldwork,	 a	 Social	Accountability	Monitoring	report	was	presented	by	a	health	NGO	working	in	Dar	es	Salaam,	which	was	supported	in	the	national	press:		 “It	 was	 reported	 that	 Mwananyamala	 hospital,	 the	 main	 public	 health	facility	 in	 the	 Kinondoni	 district,	 was	 in	 the	 2011/12	 financial	 year	supposed	 to	 start	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 mortuary	 to	 enable	 it	 to	accommodate	 fifty	bodies	at	a	 time,	 instead	of	 the	current	 fifteen.”	 (The	Citizen,	12th	February	2014).			The	 article	 goes	 on	 to	 explain	 that	 the	 project	 had	 not	 been	 implemented	properly,	 even	 though	 several	 documents	 described	 it	 as	 being	 fully	 complete.	This	 information	suggests	cause	 for	concern	with	regards	 to	 the	way	 funds	are	appropriated	 by	 the	 Tanzanian	 state,	 and	 provides	 some	 justification	 for	 why	funding	has	been	restricted	in	some	areas	due	to	a	fear	of	corruption.	 	Some	of	the	data	in	this	research	has	indicated	that	the	Tanzanian	state	is	maintaining	its	relationships	with	 the	aid	community	and	donors,	but	 it	 is	difficult	 for	 them	to	
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decide	to	take	an	active	role	in	the	water	sector	if	they	are	being	left	out	of	large	sections	 of	 the	 process.	 Indeed,	 as	 noted	 by	 Smith	 (2010),	 accusations	 of	corruption	can	often	be	used	to	mask	any	structural	complexities	that	inhibit	the	successes	of	various	development	projects.			Although	 one	 international	 development	 organisation	 remarked	 that	 they	believed	that	the	Tanzanian	state	should	be	responsible	for	providing	water	and	sanitation	 services,	 this	 was	 somewhat	 of	 an	 anomaly	 amongst	 the	 data	collected.	Additionally,	it	is	not	as	clear	cut	as	this	sort	of	commentary	suggests.	It	is	useful	to	note	that	from	Nyerere’s	Arusha	Declaration	in	1967	to	1991,	when	the	Tanzanian	 state	 stopped	providing	water	 for	 free,	 the	Tanzanian	 state	 still	received	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 its	 budget	 from	 donors.	 This	was	mentioned	 in	conference	 papers	 I	 consulted	 during	 my	 time	 at	 WPM	 and	 also	 by	 Edwards	(2014).	The	real	change	has	not	necessarily	been	a	rolling	back	of	the	Tanzanian	state	from	provision,	but	a	redistribution	of	donor	funding	through	a	variety	of	channels,	creating	a	complex	and	messy	system	of	water	governance	involving	a	large	 variety	 of	 stakeholders.	 When	 posed	 the	 question	 of	 the	 future	 of	Tanzania’s	 status	 as	 a	 recipient	 of	 large	 amounts	 of	 international	 aid,	respondents	were	able	to	provide	some	considered	responses;		 “To	really	see	Tanzania	as	a	country	graduating	from	aid	altogether,	being	able	 to	 use	 its	 own	 resources	 efficiently,	 accountably,	 these	 institutions	have	 to	 be	 built	 up.	 If	 these	 donors	 say	 “we’re	 walking	 out”	 but	 we’ll	spend	 the	 last	 few	 cents	 in	 this	 continent	 on	 building	 institutions	 for	accountability,	I’d	think	that	would	be	money	well	spent	at	the	end	of	the	day,	 rather	 than	 continuing	 to	 build	 these	wells	 that	 break	down.	 (NGO	#1)		Analyses	such	as	these	elucidate	the	lack	of	holistic	thinking	within	international	aid	and	even	grassroots	level	development	practice	in	Tanzania,	and	the	ways	in	which	activities	are	being	pursued	that	do	not	provide	a	sustainable	or	long-term	difference	 to	 the	 country’s	 water	 sector.	 The	 motivations	 of	 international	 aid	organisations	in	their	work	could	be	called	into	question,	as	the	data	collected	in	
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this	research	suggested	that	a	number	of	local	organisations	are	dissatisfied	with	current	 aid	 practices	 and	 believe	 they	 are	 able	 to	 provide	 more	 successful	alternatives.	Combined	with	this,	discussions	around	the	development	sector	as	an	industry	cannot	be	ignored;		 “That’s	why	 all	 in	 the	 aid	 sector	 have	 been	 accused	 of	 self-serving	 in	 a	way.	We	don’t	want	things	to	change	for	the	better	because	the	reality	is	we’re	out	of	a	job.”	(NGO	#1)		 “People	have	noticed	that	the	NGO	space	is	a	space	where	you	can	make	money,	which	I	think	is	wrong.	It’s	become	a	business	rather	than	a	call	to	change	things.”	(NGO	#4)		One	respondent	remarked	that	NGOs	and	other	development	organisations	had	begun	 to	 replicate	 the	 ways	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 because	 of	 pressures	 on	accessing	 funding	 and	 organisations	 having	 to	 make	 the	 majority	 of	 their	decisions	 based	 on	 what	 capital	 was	 available.	 This	 is	 a	 significant	 departure	from	Fisher’s	(1997:442)	description	of	NGOs	being	“idealised	as	organisations	through	 which	 people	 help	 others	 for	 reasons	 other	 than	 profit	 or	 politics.”	Indeed,	it	appears	to	be	the	case	that	access	to	capital,	although	not	necessarily	for	 profit-making,	 has	 become	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 the	 work	 of	 these	organisations.	Those	following	development	trends	and	inserting	popular	terms	into	 funding	 proposals	 to	 increase	 their	 chances	 echoes	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 Leal	(2007)	who	noted	that	the	development	sector	continually	reinvents	itself	with	new	terminology	and	buzzwords	 in	order	 to	provide	a	 fresh	perspective	on	 its	previous	 inadequacies	 in	 certain	 areas.	 Grassroots	 organisations	 become	embroiled	 in	 this	 dynamic,	 constantly	 in	 a	 process	 of	 fighting	 for	 funding	 and	wiping	the	slate	clean	and	rebranding	if	something	does	not	work.			Observations	 of	 development	 sector	 employees	 revealed	 similar	 data,	 with	 it	becoming	apparent	that	those	working	for	INGOs	lived	lifestyles	akin	to	that	of	a	senior	 Tanzanian	 diplomat.	 	 Edwards	 (2014)	 had	 similar	 findings	 in	 Tanzania,	and	 in	 Noxolo’s	 (2011)	 research	with	 overseas	 development	 volunteers,	 there	
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appeared	to	be	a	stark	 lifestyle	difference	between	those	expatriates	who	were	there	as	paid	employees	compared	to	those	who	were	visiting	the	Global	South	for	 voluntary	 work.	 With	 expensive	 vehicles	 and	 a	 driver	 to	 escort	 them	everywhere,	 as	well	 as	 a	 number	 of	 domestic	 staff	 at	 them	 and	 their	 families’	disposal,	it	was	often	difficult	to	associate	their	income	with	supposed	altruistic	work.	 It	 is	 understandable	 why,	 in	 the	 meeting	 I	 attended	 that	 discussed	 the	sustainability	 of	 handwashing	 events,	 one	 attendee	 remarked	 “you	 come	 here	with	your	big	cars,	after	you	leave	there	is	still	nothing”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	13th	February	 2014).	 The	 idea	 of	 these	 flashy	 vehicles	 driving	 about	 the	 roads	 of	Tanzania	 symbolising	 the	 wealth	 and	 power	 of	 their	 passengers	 was	 also	discussed	by	Edwards	(2014).	 	To	return	to	discussion	about	how	international	donor	 organisations	 work	 in	 close	 conjunction	 with	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 via	formalised	 dialogue	 spaces,	 it	 is	 pertinent	 to	 note	 the	 updated	 policy	 in	 2002,	driven	 by	 donors,	 recognised	 the	 importance	 of	 these	 organisations	 to	Tanzania’s	 water	 sector,	 making	 the	 drivers	 of	 these	 cars	 somewhat	indispensable	and	a	key	driving	force	between	Tanzania’s	water	policy.			It	 is	 concerning	 to	 consider	 matters	 from	 this	 perspective,	 in	 that	 there	 is	 a	possibly	 that	 water-related	 crises	 experienced	 by	 Tanzanian	 citizens	 are	perpetuated	 by	 individuals	 who	 are	 content	 to	 maintain	 the	 status	 quo.	Discussions	 surrounding	 expenses	 payments	 that	 individuals	 working	 in	 the	sector	insist	upon	before	agreeing	to	attend	meetings	only	serves	to	support	this	viewpoint.	However,	even	if	the	majority	of	organisations	are	working	with	the	best	 of	 intentions	 the	 issues	 faced	 by	 them,	 as	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 are	numerous	 and	 detrimental.	 As	 the	 state’s	 role	 in	 Tanzania’s	 water	 provision	becomes	increasingly	redundant,	pressures	on	organisations	to	provide	services	will	only	continue	to	increase;		 “Some	 civil	 society	 organisations	 are	 doing	 fantastic	 work,	 there’s	 no	denying,	 but	 in	 that	 fantastic	work	 there	 are	 also	 challenges	where	 the	demand	is	high.	There’s	forty-five	million	people	in	this	country	and	their	work	 is...not	 to	belittle	 it...not	 to	belittle	ourselves...it’s	 just	a	drop	 in	the	ocean.”	(NGO	#1)			
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	Another	organisation	remarked	that	“it’s	not	our	role	to	provide	everything,	it’s	to	tell	the	government	that	it’s	their	role	to	provide	the	services”	(NGO	#2).	From	whichever	angle	the	role	of	the	development	sector	in	Tanzania	is	considered	it	is	obvious	 that	 current	practices	are	neither	effective	nor	sustainable,	 and	 that	future	prospects	are	bleak.	It	is	difficult	to	determine	how	to	provide	a	measured	improvement	that	is	not	at	the	detriment	of	Tanzanian	citizens	however.	As	one	respondent	aptly	stated;	“there	are	kids	that	need	to	be	immunised	so	that	they	can	meet	their	fifth	birthday,	are	you	going	to	stop	aid	on	that?”	(NGO	#1).		Even	although	development	activity	in	Tanzania	both	in	the	water	sector	and	beyond	is	in	need	of	a	paradigm	shift,	the	execution	of	this	could	be	as	complex	a	task	as	the	current	provision	of	basic	services	already	is.				
6.11	Conclusion		In	 summary	 of	 the	 points	 raised	 above,	 one	 quote	 from	 my	 field	 diary	 is	especially	pertinent;		 “It	 must	 be	 called	 into	 question	 that	 in	 a	 country	 like	 Tanzania	 where	there	is	a	wealth	of	money	available	and	people	with	good	intentions	why	so	many	problems	still	exist	with	no	real	hope	of	improvement	in	the	near	future.”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	27th	January	2014)		Reflecting	 this	 point,	 Edwards	 (2014)	 noted	 that	 between	 1960	 and	 2010,	compared	 to	 Kenya,	 Rwanda	 and	 Uganda,	 Tanzania	 had	 been	 the	 biggest	recipient	of	overseas	aid	during	this	time.	Tanzanian	NGO	Twaweza	agreed	with	this,	 stating	 that	Tanzania	had	received	substantially	more	aid	compared	 to	 its	East	African	neighbours	between	1995	and	2005	yet	had	been	the	only	country	within	 this	 group	 unable	 to	 increase	 water	 provision	 for	 its	 residents.	 This	chapter	 has	 attempted	 to	 explain	 the	 work	 of	 INGOs	 and	 civil	 society	organisations	 in	 Tanzania,	 and	 the	 various	 challenges	 faced	 by	 organisations	working	 in	 this	 sector.	As	noted	by	 Jad	 (2007)	 the	donor	 community	 is	widely	heterogeneous	 with	 a	 number	 of	 different	 interests,	 and	 it	 is	 clear	 from	 this	
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research	 that	 these	 variances	 are	 replicated	 in	 locally	 and	 nationally	 based	organisations.	However,	 there	appeared	 to	be	a	number	of	difficulties	 faced	by	organisations	that	were	replicated	in	other	research	across	the	globe,	indicating	that	some	issues	in	the	development	sector	are	embedded	in	international	donor	relations	and	cannot	be	superseded	by	local	cultural	practice.	The	idea	of	an	NGO	working	as	a	 temporary	 fixture	 to	provide	a	service	was	not	a	strong	 theme	 in	this	research,	and	instead	these	organisations	seem	to	be	a	permanent	fixture	in	a	context	of	temporary	fixes,	as	part	of	a	fractured	governance	framework.	Both	written	 into	 policy	 and	 given	 legitimacy	 by	 the	 Tanzanian	 state,	 NGOs	 in	Tanzania	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 part	 of	 a	 transitory	 phase	 of	 improvement,	 but	instead	 just	 as	 much	 a	 part	 of	 all	 of	 the	 issues	 faced	 in	 the	 water	 sector	 in	Tanzania	instead	of	providing	a	solution	for	them.			When	 considering	 organisational	 dynamics	 specifically,	 it	 appeared	 that	 there	was	no	real	structure	in	place	for	current	civil	society	organisations	and	working	in	 Tanzania	 and	 that	 it	 was	 largely	 individual	 connections	 and	 abilities	 that	determined	 an	 organisation’s	 success.	 There	 was	 little	 to	 no	 evidence	 of	standardised	tasks,	or	a	set	of	routine	practices	to	follow.	Instead	organisations’	main	 outputs	 appeared	 to	 consist	 of	 a	 frenzied	 scramble	 for	 funding	 and	legitimacy.	Civil	society	organisations,	in	their	own	individual	ways,	are	each	in	a	state	 of	 crisis,	 with	 issues	 of	 staff	 turnover,	 funding	 pressures	 and	 inefficient	infrastructure	affecting	 their	 capacity	 to	 carry	out	 the	original	 tasks	 they	were	created	to	do.	INGOs	held	the	balance	of	power	in	a	number	of	instances,	having	the	reputation	and	capital	 to	allow	them	to	push	forward	their	 ideas,	but	these	organisations	faced	a	number	of	challenges	also.	Returning	to	ideas	of	“endemic	crisis”	 explored	 by	 Vigh	 (2008)	 in	 earlier	 chapters,	 such	 ideas	 can	 apply	 to	 a	number	of	themes	discussed	in	this	chapter.	There	is	a	constant	pressure	to	find	funding	and	outputs	may	sometimes	need	to	be	altered	in	order	to	do	so.	There	are	challenges	to	face	when	trying	to	provide	a	sustainable	project	that	will	make	a	 measured	 difference	 to	 Tanzanians’	 life,	 and	 all	 of	 the	 outputs	 of	 these	organisations	 come	 up	 against	 a	 series	 of	 embedded	 issues	 that	 have	 become	part	 and	 parcel	 of	 their	 practice.	Monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 activities	 are	 now	written	 into	 budgets	 and	 organisations	 write	 endless	 funding	 proposals	 for	
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grants	 they	 know	 they	 will	 not	 receive.	 Amongst	 this,	 relations	 between	 the	Global	North	and	the	Global	South	continue	to	create	dichotomous	practices	and	indicate	 that	 not	 everyone	 working	 in	 the	 development	 sector	 in	 Tanzania	 is	working	 towards	 the	 same	 goals,	 exacerbated	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 centralised	governance	 framework.	 However,	 NGOs	 are	 only	 a	 section	 of	 the	 many	stakeholders	involved	in	Tanzania’s	water	sector,	with	policy	decentralising	the	management	of	water	resources	to	the	community	level	in	rural	and	peri-urban	areas	 of	 Tanzania.	 Nonetheless,	 with	 many	 communities	 only	 having	 contact	with	 these	 organisations	 and	 receiving	 no	 communication	 from	 the	 state,	 it	 is	vital	 that	 INGOs	 and	 civil	 society	 organisations	 are	 able	 to	work	 to	 the	best	 of	their	abilities	in	a	coherent	format	that	is	the	most	appropriate	and	effective	way	to	provide	water	to	the	people	of	Tanzania.		
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Chapter	7:	Community	Water	Provision	in	Dar	es	Salaam		
7.1	Introduction		As	 previously	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 participatory	 methods	 of	 international	development	 have	 gained	 increasing	 popularity	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 in	 recent	years.	 Whilst	 lauded	 by	 some,	 and	 fiercely	 critiqued	 by	 others,	 this	 chapter	analyses	the	ways	in	which	Tanzanian	communities	playing	an	increasing	role	in	their	local	water	provision	impacts	upon	their	access	to	water,	and	in	turn,	their	overall	 position	 within	 the	 country’s	 complex	 water	 governance	 landscape	Tungaraza	 (1993)	discusses	 the	ways	 in	which	Tanzanian	 social	 networks	 and	kinship	ties	materialised	during	colonial	times,	and	how	these	were	important	in	times	of	difficulty	for	individuals,	families	and	communities.	As	evidence	of	these	social	 networks	 still	 being	 prevalent,	 Dill	 (2009)	 discusses	 the	 ways	 in	community-based	 organisations	 have	 gained	 increasing	 prominence	 in	Tanzania’s	 development	 since	 the	 urban	 upgrading	 organisations	 that	 were	established	in	Dar	es	Salaam	in	1992.	Community-based	provision	has	been	part	of	 the	 water	 governance	 framework	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years,	largely	originating	as	a	 coping	mechanism	 for	 the	areas	of	 the	 rapidly	growing	city	 left	outwith	the	remit	of	the	municipal	system.	As	the	city’s	population	has	continued	to	grow	and	this	means	of	grassroots	water	management	has	become	more	common,	Tanzania’s	water	policy	framework	has	shifted	to	legitimise	this	means	of	water	provision.	 In	addition,	non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs)	and	 other	 development	 organisations	 work	 towards	 establishing	 community-based	 water	 schemes	 and	 providing	 the	 technical	 training	 to	 community	members	in	management	and	maintenance	skills.		This	 chapter	 attempts	 to	 develop	 a	 contemporary	 understanding	 of	 Tanzanian	community	 relations	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 grassroots	 water	 projects,	 whilst	examining	 how	 they	 relate	 to	 Tanzanian	water	 policy	 and	 the	wealth	 of	NGOs	currently	working	in	Dar	es	Salaam.	As	well	as	this,	the	chapter	aims	to	provide	information	 on	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	 residents	 within	 the	 city,	 as	 they	negotiate	 access	 to	 water	 as	 well	 as	 in	 some	 cases,	 help	 others	 in	 their	
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community	 access	water	 also.	 Related	 to	 the	 prevalence	 of	 NGOs,	 community-based	 development	 initiatives	 have	 been	 supported	 by	 development	professionals	 and	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	World	 Bank	 (Dill,	 2010b),	 using	 the	argument	 that	 participation	 of	 local	 communities	 is	 vital.	 Considering	 as	 to	whether	 participatory	 processes	 contribute	 to	 what	 Hickey	 and	 Mohan	(2004:244)	refer	to	as	“the	weakening	of	the	‘social	contract’	between	state	and	citizen”,	and	the	notion	suggested	by	Dill	(2009)	that	these	methods	are	wholly	ineffective,	the	role	of	community	water	provision	will	be	discussed	and	in	turn	situated	within	 the	complex	 framework	of	water	governance	 in	Tanzania.	 	The	grassroots	manifestations	of	Tanzanian	water	policy	will	be	assessed,	alongside	an	exploration	of	residents	of	Dar	es	Salaam	as	both	recipients	and	active	agents	within	the	city’s	water	sector.			This	 chapter	 uses	 interview	 and	 observational	 data	 collected	 on	 community	based	water	 provision,	 as	well	 as	 documentary	 analysis	 of	 the	 various	 reports	and	publications	involved	in	my	daily	work	at	these	organisations.	Additionally,	this	 chapter	 examines	 the	 data	 collected	 with	 two	 community-based	 water	organisations	 within	 Ilala	 and	 Temeke,	 the	 two	 case	 study	 areas	 of	 this	research.37	The	 chapter	 begins	 with	 the	 rationale	 behind	 community	 water	provision	in	Tanzania	and	how	policy	is	understood	by	various	different	groups.	It	 then	 goes	 on	 to	 problematise	 various	 definitions	 used	 in	 community	 water	provision	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 my	 understanding	 of	 the	 terminology	 and	 what	definitions	are	used	to	describe	the	data	collected	in	this	research.		The	ways	in	which	Tanzanian	water	 policy	materialises	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level	will	 then	 be	discussed,	 followed	 by	 a	 section	 on	 the	 specific	 sets	 of	 challenges	 that	community-based	 water	 groups	 face.	 The	 chapter	 concludes	 with	 a	 section	devoted	to	Maji	Week,	discussing	how	the	event	is	understood	by	communities	in	Tanzania	and	their	level	of	involvement	in	this	week	of	activities.				
7.2	Grassroots	water	provision	and	policy	realities																																																										37	For	a	full	description	of	both	the	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	in	Ilala,	and	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	Project	in	Temeke,	see	Chapter	4.		
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In	 terms	 of	 whether	 community	 owned	 water	 and	 sanitation	 organisations	(COWSOs)	were	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 successful	 part	 of	 Tanzanian	water	 policy,	one	NGO	explained	that	the	 idea	was	still	 too	new	to	make	any	full	assessment	(NGO	 #2).	 However,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 examples	 in	 this	 research	 that	indicate	the	ways	in	which	this	policy	is	materialising	at	the	grassroots	level.	The	manager	of	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	Project	spoke	positively	about	the	impact	of	the	project:		 “[Before	 the	 project]	 people	 were	 collecting	 from	 people’s	 houses	 and	local	water	wells.	It	was	a	problem,	because	the	supply	of	private	owners	was	not	enough.	Their	network	was	not	at	every	corner.	Their	prices	were	too	high.	 If	 they	were	 to	 connect	 you,	 at	 your	home,	because	 they	don’t	have	 those	 public	 domestic	 points,	 they	 would	 only	 do	 an	 in-house	connection,	their	price	is	very	high.”	(Maji	Kwa	Wote	Manager	Interview)		The	 manager	 went	 on	 to	 state	 that	 since	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 project	residents	did	not	have	to	travel	as	far	for	water	and	can	access	it	more	easily.	The	local	government	representative	near	to	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	project	agreed	with	this,	 saying	 that	 before	 the	 project	 water	 was	 too	 expensive	 for	 the	 local	community	at	between	600	and	1000	Tshs	per	bucket,	but	now	residents	paid	only	 50	 Tshs	 per	 bucket.	 (Temeke	 Street	 Chairperson	 Interview).	 However,	experiences	were	not	wholly	positive	across	the	project:		 “It’s	 still	difficult	 to	access	water	here	even	after	 the	scheme	was	put	 in	place.	There	is	poor	coverage,	and	water	is	not	available	frequently	at	the	domestic	points.	The	scheme	hasn’t	helped	at	all	here.”	 (Maji	Kwa	Wote	Customers	Focus	Group)		 “People	 cannot	 afford	 to	 get	water	 for	 their	whole	 household	 and	 their	dependents.	There’s	only	one	domestic	point	for	the	whole	area,	and	it	is	expensive	 to	 get	 to	 as	 your	must	 pay	 transport	 costs.”	 (Maji	 Kwa	Wote	Customers	Focus	Group)			
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It	 appeared	 to	be	 the	 case	 in	Temeke	 that	 those	 in	 close	proximity	 to	 the	 first	village	 and	 the	 board	 of	 management	 had	 been	 offered	 a	 far	 more	 affordable	form	of	water	provision,	 although	 these	benefits	 had	not	 extended	 to	 all	 areas	supposedly	 covered	 by	 the	 Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	 project.	 These	 geographical	discrepancies	were	also	admitted	by	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	Manager,	who	explained	that	for	the	eight	domestic	points	in	in	the	second	village,	they	were	all	located	in	one	section	of	the	area,	so	many	residents	did	not	live	near	a	domestic	point	that	they	could	purchase	water	 from.	Nonetheless,	 residents	of	 the	 first	village	also	had	 complaints	 about	 the	 project,	 stating	 that	 distances	 and	 queue	 times	 at	domestic	points	still	meant	that	collecting	water	was	a	challenge:		 “The	 domestic	 points	 are	 open	 at	 six	 in	 the	 morning,	 but	 the	 water	 in	them	has	run	out	by	half	past	ten.	You	have	to	wait	two	hours	for	the	tank	to	 fill,	 if	 the	 power	 is	working,	 and	 this	 pattern	 goes	 on	 until	 six	 in	 the	evening.	 Often	 you	 have	 to	 queue	 for	 two	 hours.”	 (Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	Customers	Focus	Group)		Residents	 also	 discussed	 that	 they	 often	 had	 to	 resort	 to	 the	more	 expensive,	privately	provided	means	of	water	provision	during	these	periods	when	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	project	is	not	available,	which	indicates	that	the	project	has	not	been	established	 as	 a	 wholesale	 replacement	 for	 the	 previous	 means	 of	 water	provision	in	the	area.												
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Figure	 7.1	 Community-based	 water	 storage	 and	 collection	 points	 (author’s	
photography)																				Residents	 in	 Ilala	 also	 discussed	 the	 impact	 that	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	had	 on	 their	 access	 to	water.	One	 customer,	who	used	 the	water	for	both	his	family	and	his	farming,	explained	that	it	was	cheaper	and	safer	to	access	water	from	the	scheme,	as	well	as	the	benefits	of	a	community	working	collectively	to	provide	water:		 “When	 you	 are	 alone,	 you	 cannot	 get	 assistance.	 Before	 becoming	 a	member	 I	 was	 using	 a	 shallow	well	 and	 it	 was	 not	 good	 water.	 You’re	supposed	to	have	clean	water.	If	you	have	clean	water	you	cannot	get	any	diseases,	 which	 is	 important	 for	 me	 and	 my	 animals.”	 (Mitonga	 Water	Users	Group	Customer	#1)			
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The	 resident	 went	 on	 to	 describe	 how	 the	 cost	 of	 purchasing	 water	 from	 the	scheme	was	a	“manageable”	(Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	Customer	#1)	portion	of	 his	 income,	 and	 that	 for	 a	 bucket	 the	 scheme	 charged	1250	Tshs.	 This	was,	according	 to	 the	 resident,	 much	 cheaper	 than	 private	 providers	 who	 could	charge	 up	 to	 3500	 Tshs	 for	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 water.	 Similar	 views	 were	expressed	 by	 local	 government	 representatives	 in	 the	 area.	 Taking	 the	 above	prices	 for	 both	 Temeke	 and	 Ilala	 into	 account,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 compare	 these	results	to	other	studies	that	have	taken	place	 in	Dar	es	Salaam.	Dill	and	Crow’s	(2014)	 work	 stated	 that	 the	 official	 price	 of	 water	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 as	established	 by	 EWURA38 	was	 20	 Tshs	 per	 bucket.	 Dill	 and	 Crow’s	 (2014)	research	 with	 residents	 in	 the	 city	 revealed	 that	 households	 without	 a	connection	 to	 the	 city’s	municipal	water	 system	 paid	 the	median	 price	 of	 100	Tshs	 for	 a	 bucket	 of	 water.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 the	 water	 project	 in	Temeke	 had	 brought	 the	 price	 residents	 paid	 for	 water	 below	 this	 threshold,	although	 it	 was	 still	 above	 what	 the	 regulatory	 authority	 suggested.	 In	 Ilala,	resident	were	 paying	 far	more	 than	 this	 for	water	 but	 this	was	 still	 seen	 as	 a	positive	move	away	from	the	even	more	expensive	private	providers.			The	rationale	for	decentralising	water	provision	to	the	“lowest	appropriate	level”	(Tanzanian	 National	 Water	 Policy	 2002:30)	 was	 related	 to	 the	 established	hierarchical	 structure	 in	 place	 for	 communities	 to	 report	 issues	 to	 and	 for	information	to	be	communicated:																																																																			38	The	Energy	and	Water	Utilities	Regulatory	Authority	
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Figure	7.2	Hierarchy	of	reporting	for	decentralised	water	provision	in	Tanzania													The	 information	 presented	 in	 the	 above	 diagram	 is	 a	 result	 of	 documentation	consulted	 on	 the	 topic	 during	my	 research	 as	well	 as	 a	 number	 of	 formal	 and	informal	conversations	on	the	topic,	and	partially	aligns	with	the	 four	different	levels	discussed	in	the	National	Water	Policy	(2002):	national,	basin,	district	and	community.	 In	Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 instead	of	 a	District	Water	 and	 Sanitation	Team	there	 is	 Municipal	 Water	 and	 Sanitation	 Team	 (MWST)	 for	 each	 of	 the	 city’s	three	municipalities.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 ascertain	 how	 established	 or	well-known	this	hierarchical	structure	is.	The	Temeke	MWST	representative	interviewed	for	this	research	stated	that	the	chain	of	communication	between	different	levels	of	the	hierarchy	was	strong,	going	into	detail	about	how	this	materialises:		 “Normally	we	instruct	the	WUAs	to	bring	the	reports	to	mtaa39	level	and	they	have	to	report	to	us.	And	it	can	be	fast	tracked	if	there	is	an	issue	or	anything	 that	 requires	 immediate	 action,	 to	 avoid	delays.	Because	 these	reports	sit	at	mtaa	 level,	 then	go	 to	ward	 level	and	sit	with	members	of	the	 ward	 executive	 committee,	 they	 have	 to	 then	 sit	 and	 discuss	 the	report.	 And	 after	 discussing	 it	 they	 agree,	 then	 they	 transfer	 it	 to	 the	
																																																								39	Mtaa	literally	translates	from	Swahili	into	‘street’,	and	is	often	used	to	describe	the	lowest	level	of	 local	 government.	 Similarly	 to	 this	 research,	 Dill	 (2010a)	 explains	 that	 the	 communities	 he	encountered	often	corresponded	with	this	level	of	government.	
Ministry	of	Water	
Regional	Water	and	Sanitation	Team/Municipal	Water	and	Sanitation	Team	
District	Water	and	Sanitation	Team	
Community	Owned	Water	and	Sanitation	Organisation	(COWSO)	
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director’s	 office,	 which	 is	 at	 the	 municipal	 level.”	 (Temeke	 MWST	Interview)			Although	 this	 respondent	 provided	 a	 comprehensive	 explanation	 of	 how	 the	hierarchy	works,	this	was	not	reflected	across	all	of	the	data,	as	one	respondent	from	the	Ministry	of	Water	had	no	knowledge	of	what	a	DWST	or	MWST	was:		 “[Interviewer]	 What	 are	 the	 role	 of	 the	 District	 Water	 and	 Sanitation	Teams?	Are	they	directly	above	COWSOs	in	the	hierarchy?”		 “I’m	sorry,	what	are	those?”		 “[Interviewer]	I’ve	seen	them	written	in	publications	about	COWSOs	and	in	some	reports.”		 “This	must	be	a	rural	thing.	I’m	overseeing	urban	water	so	I	don’t	know.”		 “[Interviewer]	 I	 think	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 they	might	 be	 called	Municipal	Water	and	Sanitation	Teams?	There’s	one	for	Kinondoni,	one	for	Ilala	and	one	for	Temeke?”		 “So	these	are	municipal	water	sanitation	teams?”		 “[Interviewer]	Yes,	I’ve	seen	the	term	used	widely	in	reports.”		 “Sorry,	 what	 was	 your	 question	 again?”	 (Ministry	 of	 Water	 Interview,	2014)		This	 highlights	 the	 disconnect	 between	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 and	 the	 practices	that	exist	at	the	grassroots	level,	and	emphasises	the	lack	of	clarity	with	regards	to	Tanzanian	water	 policy	 and	 the	ways	 that	 it	 is	 implemented.	Moreover,	 the	phrase	 ‘COWSO’	was	 virtually	unheard	of	 in	 Ilala,	which	 indicates	 the	policy	 is	not	widely	known	or	has	not	been	 communicated	effectively	by	 the	Tanzanian	
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state.	 	 It	 appeared	 to	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 DWSTs	 and	 MWSTs	 were	“institutionally	weak	 in	 capacity	 and	did	not	have	 the	 resources,	 nor,	 it	 seems,	the	 interest	 to	 help	 establish	 or	 facilitate	 COWSOs”	 (Field	 Diary	 Excerpt,	 6th	March	2014).	 This	 comment	 in	my	 field	diary	was	based	on	 the	 lack	 of	 clarity	received	from	the	Ministry	of	Water	on	this	issue,	and	was	also	reflected	in	both	Temeke	and	Ilala.	For	example,	respondents	within	Ilala	had	never	even	heard	of	the	term	COWSO.	These	findings	align	with	research	conducted	by	Dill	(2009)	in	Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 who	 noted	 that	 the	 relationships	 between	 community-based	organisations	and	the	Tanzanian	state	was	often	either	ad	hoc	or	 insubstantial,	rather	 than	 an	 institutionalised	 process	 created	 to	 benefit	 these	 community-based	groups.			SNV	 et	 al	 (2011)	 found	 similar	 poor	 relationships	 in	 the	 education	 sector,	between	school	committees	and	village	governments.	Additionally,	the	Ministry	of	Water	recognised	these	issues	in	a	strategic	framework	document	written	in	2008,	 noting	 that	 the	 human	 resources	 required	 to	 make	 community	 water	organisations	successful	were	often	in	limited	supply,	both	at	district	and	village	level.	 The	 document	 also	 referred	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 understanding	 within	communities	 about	 why	 a	 decentralised	 approach	 to	 water	 provision	 was	important	 and	 what	 their	 personal	 responsibilities	 were	 with	 regards	 to	 this.	The	fact	that	many	communities	do	not	have	the	skills	required	to	manage	their	own	water	 systems	was	also	discussed.	WPM	explained	 that	a	 large	amount	of	their	work	involved	helping	communities	access	this	knowledge,	which	indicates	that	several	years	 later	these	issues	are	still	prevalent,	 to	the	extent	that	a	civil	society	organisation’s	work	focuses	predominantly	on	alleviating	them.			As	alluded	to	previously,	the	importance	of	a	connection	with	local	government	or	managers	seemed	to	have	an	impact	on	residents’	experiences	of	the	project	in	Temeke.	The	Maji	Kwa	Wote	manager	explained	that	a	monthly	meeting	was	held	 with	 a	 leader	 of	 each	 of	 the	 three	 areas,	 and	 the	 local	 government	representative	for	the	area	of	the	project	noted	that:		
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“Sometimes	when	[residents]	have	a	problem	they	report	their	problems	to	 the	 Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	 [management]	 group.	 And	 then	 later	 I	 will	 be	forwarded	what	has	been	 reported	 to	 them	and	 then	we	 sit	 together	 to	sort	 out	 the	 problem.	 The	 three	 groups	 of	 eight	 [from	 each	 area]	what	they	 have	 discussed	 at	 subward	 level	 they	 are	 then	 supposed	 to	 report	their	 problems	 to	 the	 Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	 [management]	 group.”	 (Temeke	Street	Chairperson	Interview)			However,	the	residents	in	the	community	told	a	different	story:		 “In	 [the	 first	village],	where	 the	management	and	a	 large	number	of	 the	domestic	points	were	 located,	customers	were	happy	to	complain	to	the	managers	 about	 issues	 faced	 and	 felt	 that	 they	were	 listened	 to.	 In	 [the	second	 village],	 ten	 minutes	 on	 a	 dala	 dala	 [micro	 bus]	 from	 [the	 first	village],	customers	only	complained	to	local	government	representatives	and	felt	that	their	views	were	not	listened	to	at	all.”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	3rd	April	2014)		 “We’ve	reported	challenges	to	our	local	leaders	but	they’re	not	taking	any	action,	so	we	have	given	up	complaining.	We’re	just	working	on	our	own	to	 get	 water	 from	 private	 providers,	 although	 this	 is	 very	 expensive.”	(Maji	Kwa	Wote	Customers	Focus	Group)		In	addition	to	 this,	some	of	 the	basic	statistics	about	 the	project	were	reported	differently	by	the	project’s	manager	and	a	local	government	representative.	The	manager	 stated	 that	 the	 scheme	 had	 twenty-four	 domestic	 points,	 whereas	 a	local	 government	 representative	 in	 Temeke	 believed	 there	 were	 only	 eleven	points.	When	conducting	my	research	 it	was	explained	 to	me	 that	a	number	of	the	points	were	too	far	away	for	me	to	visit	all	of	them,	so	I	was	unable	to	verify	this	 information.	Residents	 interviewed	 in	 the	 third	 village	which	was	 furthest	from	 the	 board	 of	management	 said	 they	 did	 not	 feel	 that	 the	Maji	 Kwa	Wote	project	 had	made	 any	 real	 difference	 to	 their	 lives	 and	 they	were	 still	 largely	using	 the	 same	 sources	 of	 water	 in	 place	 before	 the	 project	 was	 started.	 This	
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information	shows	the	effects	the	visibility	of	those	in	control	of	the	project	can	impact	 on	 residents’	 opinions	 of	 it,	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 raise	 issues	with	 these	individuals	and	in	turn	alleviate	them.			This	was	not	strictly	 the	case	 in	 Ilala,	however,	with	the	ward	executive	officer	for	the	area	stating	that	residents	did	not	complain	to	him	about	the	project.	The	street	officer	for	the	area	said	she	did	receive	complaints	from	residents,	but	that	they	were	either	related	 to	bills	being	 too	high,	or	any	work	being	done	 in	 the	area	 that	 could	 affect	 the	 supply,	 such	 as	 road	 improvements.	 Whilst	 it	 is	interesting	 that	 residents	 chose	 to	 complain	 to	 her	 about	 issues	 affecting	 the	project	that	were	not	necessarily	within	the	remit	of	those	on	the	committee	or	management	team,	the	street	officer	said	that	she	responded	to	these	complaints	by	 simply	 passing	 them	 onto	 these	 groups.	 When	 customers	 discussed	complaining	 to	 the	 project	 staff	 about	 issues	 faced,	 one	 respondent	 explained	that	his	complaints	were	often	acted	on	(Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	Customer	Interview	 #2).	 Conversely,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 an	 interview	 with	 another	customer,	he	explained	that	he	had	one	of	the	domestic	points	for	the	project	in	his	home	and	 it	had	been	broken	 for	a	while,	which	meant	he	had	 lost	a	 lot	of	customers.	 The	 resident	 stated	 that	 they	 had	 reported	 the	 issue	 to	 the	 meter	readers,	 but	 the	manager,	who	accompanied	me	 to	 conduct	 the	 interview,	was	unaware	of	the	issue.	This	is	an	example	that	potentially	indicates	that	whilst	the	hierarchical	 structure	 is	 different	 from	 that	 in	 Temeke,	 similar	 issues	 are	prevalent.			
7.3	Residents’	experiences	of	community	water	projects		In	 the	 Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	 project	 in	 Temeke,	 after	 only	 two	 months	 the	 water	committees	 complained	 that	 the	 coverage	 of	 the	 project	 was	 poor,	 and	 that	neither	 the	 committees	 nor	 the	 customers	 had	 been	 properly	 trained	 in	community	management:		 “We’re	not	getting	training	on	how	to	run	the	project,	we’ve	only	had	it	at	the	 initial	 stage	 but	 we’ve	 had	 nothing	 since	 and	 we	 would	 like	 more.	
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We’d	like	some	training	on	management,	controlling	the	water	supply	and	how	 to	 lead	 a	 committee.”	 (Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	 COWSO	 Committee	 Focus	Group)		The	 respondents	 went	 on	 to	 state	 that	 neither	 the	 international	 donors,	 local	NGOs	 or	 local	 government	 were	 willing	 to	 help	 them	 receive	 this	 additional	training.	 As	 well	 as	 the	 ability	 of	 committee	 members	 to	 run	 water	 projects,	these	 individuals	 were	 also	 able	 to	 impact	 upon	 the	 success	 of	 a	 local	 water	project	in	other	surprising	ways:		 “The	water	scheme’s	manager	[in	Temeke]	reported	that	some	committee	members	 are	 able	 to	 be	 more	 influential	 than	 others,	 providing	 a	 very	specific	example	of	COWSO	members	that	support	the	CUF40	only	placing	the	project’s	domestic	points	near	to	the	homes	of	other	CUF	supporters.”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	3rd	April	2014)			This	 reflects	Dill’s	 (2009)	 argument	 that	 it	 is	 problematic	 for	 a	 small	 group	 of	people	to	be	representative	of	a	whole	community,	when	these	groups	they	are	representative	are	often	 large	and	 incredibly	diverse,	based	on	similar	 findings	in	his	research	in	which	religious	and	class-based	tensions	affected	the	ways	in	which	 a	 community-based	 water	 scheme	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 was	 run.	 The	requirement	for	communities	to	provide	a	financial	contribution	per	household	to	a	water	system	also	led	to	some	difficulties	and	confusion.	WPM	explained	the	difficulties	faced	with	regards	to	this:		 “Whist	people	seem	to	support	the	principal	of	the	National	Water	Policy,	they	believe	that	the	government	should	be	financing	COWSOS	and	do	not	understand	that	 they	are	designed	to	be	self-sustaining.	WPM	are	trying	to	help	with	this	education	but	I	learned	today	that	they	can	only	do	this	when	there	is	funding	available	and	they	are	invited	by	a	COWSO	or	CWST	to	do	so.”	(Field	Notebook	Excerpt,	19th	June	2013)																																																									40	The	Civic	United	Front	(CUF)	is	a	political	party	in	Tanzania	who	exist	in	opposition	to	the	CCM	(Chama	Cha	Mapinduzi),	who	have	been	in	power	since	Tanzanian	independence.		
	 257	
	This	 aligned	 with	 earlier	 commentary	 on	 this	 project,	 as	 SNV	 et	 al’s	 (2011)	report	discussed	the	idea	of	 ‘contribution	fatigue’	and	how	the	expectation	that	households	 must	 fund	 local	 water,	 health	 and	 education	 systems	 can	 be	especially	 challenging	 for	 the	 most	 financially	 constrained	 households.	Conversely,	one	INGO	explained	that	 the	government	policy	 indicated	that	only	five	per	cent	of	start	up	costs	needed	to	be	provided	by	the	community,	however	I	 could	not	 find	any	evidence	of	 this	 reported	 statistic	within	Tanzanian	water	policy	 documents	 and	 instead	 simply	 a	 clause	 saying	 that	 communities	 should	provide	a	contribution	without	specifying	a	specific	amount.		As	well	as	this,	the	COWSOs	 engaged	 with	 in	 this	 research	 appeared	 to	 have	 contributed	 a	significant	amount	of	the	start	up	costs,	as	opposed	to	a	small	amount.	There	are	also	potentially	issues	of	household	gender	dynamics	to	contend	with.	Although	COWSOs	try	to	ensure	that	women’s	voices	are	heard	by	making	them	make	up	the	majority	of	a	COWSO	committee,	as	men	often	control	the	household	budget	this	 can	 cause	 issues,	 as	 one	 respondent	 described	 it	 “he	 is	 not	 bothered	with	water	problems	because	he	does	not	 participate	 in	 the	water	 collection”	 (NGO	#4).			However,	 there	 are	 justifiable	 reasons	 for	 asking	 communities	 to	 make	 a	contribution	to	a	local	water	project:		 “If	I	had	paid	money	for	a	water	point,	I	would	make	sure	that	water	point	worked.	But	if	I	had	not	then	I	wouldn’t.	So	I	believe	that	if	communities	have	a	stake	in	the	water	point,	they	will	make	sure	that	it	works,	because	they	 have	 invested	 in	 that	 water	 point.	 But	 when	 you	 get	 a	 free	 water	point,	then	it’s	different.”	(NGO	#4)		Dill	 (2010a)	 explained	 the	 difficulties	 faced	 for	 communities	 asking	 for	 local	contributions,	and	that	there	is	often	a	choice	between	necessary	running	costs	of	 the	 project	 and	 what	 households	 can	 feasibly	 be	 able	 to	 contribute.	 Dill	(2010a)	 asserts	 that	 community-based	water	 organisations	 often	 consider	 the	financial	 capacity	 of	 the	 local	 people	 over	 the	 financial	 requirements	 of	 the	
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project.	 This	 is	 potentially	 the	 case	 with	 both	 case	 studies	 in	 this	 research	 as	whilst	 they	 claimed	 to	 be	 financially	 self-sustainable	 both	 explained	 that	 they	would	require	additional	funds	for	project	expansion.			Whilst	this	chapter	discusses	the	realities	of	community	based	water	provision	it	should	 be	 noticed	 that	 similar	 policy	 models	 are	 being	 put	 in	 place	 across	 a	number	of	sectors	in	Tanzania,	further	exacerbating	concerns	of	overburdening	financial	and	human	resources	in	communities.	The	Citizen	newspaper	reported	that	 free	 tuition	 in	 primary	 schools	 may	 have	 led	 to	 a	 dramatic	 increase	 in	enrolment	figures,	but	this	was	not	accompanied	by	a	proportional	expansion	of	teachers	 and	 classroom	 resources,	 which	 led	 to	 a	 number	 of	 issues	 (Field	Notebook,	 17th	 March	 2014).	 This	 is	 a	 further	 example	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 holistic	thinking	with	regards	to	policy	initiatives	by	the	Tanzanian	state,	and	links	back	to	 discussion	 in	 Chapter	 6	 about	 chasing	 impressive	 figures	 that	 mask	 a	problematic	reality.	It	further	shows	the	lack	of	resources	available	for	effective	service	 provision	 across	 a	 variety	 of	 sectors	 in	 Tanzania.	 Another	 field	 report	commented	 that	 one	 of	 the	 main	 issues	 faced	 was	 that	 communities	 did	 not	understand	 their	 rights	 in	 relation	 to	water	 access,	 but	 if	 articulating	 rights	 is	intrinsically	linked	to	providing	a	financial	contribution	it	may	be	that	simply	the	commodification	of	a	right	to	water	is	inhibiting	communities	from	fighting	for	it.			There	was	a	general	 feeling	of	 scepticism	across	 the	board	with	regards	 to	 the	Tanzanian	 state	 and	 their	 role	 in	 water	 provision.	 A	 number	 of	 civil	 society	organisations	mentioned	that	the	topic	of	water	was	often	used	as	a	political	tool	to	win	 elections,	 but	 this	 issue	was	 soon	 forgotten	 about	 after	 those	 elections	were	won.	 	 Some	 field	 reports	 by	 civil	 society	 organisations	 on	water	 projects	also	explained	that	some	politicians	guarantee	free	water	for	communities	if	they	win	the	election,	which	then	causes	confusion	when	communities	are	expected	to	provide	a	financial	contribution	to	access	a	local	water	project.			WPM	 introduced	me	 to	 one	 COWSO	 in	 Temeke	 that	 had	 been	 established	 for	three	years	at	the	point	of	data	collection.	It	had	begun	with	funding	from	a	large	international	water	NGO,	and	provided	water	to	sixteen	domestic	water	points	in	
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the	 local	 area.	 Like	 other	 COWSOs,	 each	 domestic	 point	 was	 metered	 and	residents	were	charged	for	 the	amount	of	water	used,	with	one	domestic	point	providing	 water	 for	 around	 three	 streets.	 The	 COWSO	 was	 financially	 self-sustainable,	and	two	of	the	sixteen	water	points	had	been	constructed	from	their	own	 profits.	 Whilst	 this	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 successful	 example	 of	 a	 community	water	 project,	when	 the	 COWSO’s	 committee	members	were	 asked	 how	many	people	 their	project	provided	water	 for,	 their	 answer	of	 six	hundred	 thousand	people	 called	 into	 question	 whether	 this	 really	 was	 water	 provision	 at	 the	“lowest	 appropriate	 level”	 (Tanzanian	 National	 Water	 Policy	 2002:30)	 and	whether	devolving	this	amount	of	responsibility	to	a	small	group	of	community	residents	 was	 the	 most	 efficient	 way	 of	 providing	 water.	 The	 coverage	 of	COWSOs	appeared	as	a	theme	in	other	instances,	where	the	representative	from	the	Temeke	MWST	explained	that	the	current	population	of	the	area	of	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	project	was	75000	according	to	the	most	recent	census	in	2012:			 “[Interviewer]	So	eight	people	provide	the	water	for	these	75000?”		 “It	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 like	 that,	 I	 don’t	 know	 how	 many	 are	 using	 the	COWSO	 because	 there	 are	 other	 sources	 of	 water.”	 (Temeke	 MWST	Interview)		In	 terms	 of	 the	 “lowest	 appropriate	 level”	 (Tanzanian	 National	 Water	 Policy	2002:30),	 if	 the	 representative	 from	 MWST’s	 opinion	 is	 widely	 held	 then	 it	appears	 that	 an	 inordinate	 amount	of	 responsibility	 is	being	placed	on	a	 small	number	 of	 community	 representatives.	 In	 relation	 to	 levels	 of	 population	supported	 by	 a	 COWSO,	 when	 questioned	 on	 the	 success	 of	 COWSOs,	 the	Ministry	of	Water	stated:		 “COWSOs	 are	 very	 successful.	 Because	 in	 some	 of	 the	 COWSOs,	 they	manage	all	of	the	project,	and	there	comes	a	time	when	in	an	area	where	COWSOs	are	operating,	 then	 it	becomes	a	small	 town.	Once	you	provide	the	 services	people	 start	moving	 there.	 It	 qualifies	 as	 a	 small	 town,	 and	
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when	 it	 does	 so	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	 have	 a	 utility.”	 (Ministry	 of	 Water	Interview,	2014)		Somewhat	confusingly,	this	respondent	from	the	Ministry	of	Water	appeared	to	be	 suggesting	 that	 the	 real	 benefit	 of	 COWSOs	 was	 their	 ability	 to	 promote	population	 growth	 in	 areas	 not	 deemed	 populous	 enough	 to	 merit	 their	 own	water	utility.	The	respondent	did	not	allude	to	 the	merits	of	COWSOs	for	 those	living	 rurally	 in	 Tanzania,	 or	 the	 impacts	 overpopulation	 can	 have	 on	 a	community’s	 water	 source.	 This	 also	 relates	 to	 earlier	 discussions	 on	terminology	and	how	other	understandings	of	what	a	COWSO	is	may	differ	from	this	individual’s	description	of	them.				In	terms	of	sustainability,	whilst	the	case	studies	in	Ilala	and	Temeke	were	able	to	 provide	 an	 accurate	 depiction	 of	 their	water	 projects	 over	 the	 three	month	fieldwork	period,	it	was	difficult	to	ascertain	where	these	projects	would	be	in	a	few	 years’	 time,	 as	 populations	 continue	 to	 grow	 and	 pressure	 on	 water	resources	increases.	The	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	appeared	to	be	able	to	be	financially	self-sustaining	for	its	current	levels	of	coverage,	with	one	respondent	claiming	“We	don’t	need	the	World	Bank	anymore”	(Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	Employees	Interview)	with	regards	to	how	they	funded	the	 last	domestic	point	that	 they	 built.	 However,	 the	 respondent	 went	 on	 to	 explain	 that	 for	 them	 to	expand	 the	 project	 they	 would	 need	 more	 funding	 to	 do	 so.	 Other	 examples	however	 indicated	 that	 periods	 of	 success	 within	 local	 water	 schemes	 do	 not	always	 last.	 An	 informal	 conversation	 with	 someone	 who	 owned	 a	 school	 in	Dodoma	alluded	to	this:		 “[The	water	 project]	 started	with	 his	 school	 and	 other	 local	 businesses	putting	 in	 large	 chunks	 of	 the	 initial	 investment	 and	 residents	 paying	twenty	Tanzanian	shillings	per	bucket	of	water.	But	then	people	stopped	wanting	to	pay	and	unless	he	chased	them,	the	 local	businesses	stopped	investing	and	eventually	the	whole	thing	fell	apart.”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	15th	February	2015)		
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Although	 this	project	did	not	 follow	 the	exact	 same	management	methods	as	a	COWSO,	 there	 are	 enough	 similarities	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 sustainability	 of	COWSOs	 may	 only	 be	 for	 a	 short	 length	 of	 time.	 In	 their	 research	 of	 social	networks	 in	 Tanzania,	 Tungaraza	 (1993)	 also	 had	 similar	 findings,	 explaining	that	the	coping	mechanisms	used	by	communities	working	together	for	survival	are	simply	that,	and	not	long-term	appropriate	strategies.	Indeed,	the	Ministry	of	Water	described	the	idea	of	COWSOs	as	being	a	short-term	solution	(Ministry	of	Water	 Interview	 2014),	 and	 the	 Temeke	 MWST	 agreed	 with	 this	 mindset	(Temeke	 MWST	 Interview).	 This	 aligns	 with	 Dill’s	 (2009)	 finding	 that	community-based	water	organisations	only	had	contact	with	the	Tanzanian	state	on	a	short	term	basis,	 in	that	long	term	relationships	were	perhaps	not	created	by	 government	 representatives	 as	 they	 do	 not	 see	 COWSOs	 as	 a	 long	 term	solution.		An	NGO	noted	that:			 “most	of	the	issues	with	water	wells	or	water	points	were	not	a	technical	problem	 as	 such,	 but	 more	 of	 an	 accountability	 issue.	 An	 issue	 of	 an	engineer	who	should	be	accessible,	who	is	instead	sitting	in	his	office	not	really	 caring	 about	 anything,	 when	 it’s	 actually	 just	 an	 issue	 of	 a	community	reaching	out	to	him,	and	bringing	him	over	to	fix	a	well”	(NGO	#1).			It	 seemed	 that	 the	 hierarchical	 structure	 in	 place	 to	 support	 and	 establish	COWSOs	 is	 not	 robust	 enough	 to	 ensure	 the	 success	 of	 these	 grassroots	organisations,	and	calls	into	question	their	potential	for	sustainability.	Whilst	in	could	be	argued	that	the	intention	for	these	COWSOs	to	be	short-term	solutions	may	be	part	of	the	reason	that	the	hierarchy	is	not	as	well	established,	it	does	call	into	question	why	the	effort	has	been	made	to	establish	these	community	based	organisations	in	the	first	place.				
7.4	Challenges	faced	by	community	water	organisations		The	 idea	of	a	weak	and	 ineffective	management	hierarchy	that	did	not	support	community	water	schemes	was	alluded	to	within	some	reports	also:	
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	 “The	 principles	 of	 subsidiarity	 (ie	 things	 that	 are	 done	 locally/at	 lower	levels	 rather	 than	 by	 central	 government)	 within	 education	 policy	documents	have	 led	to	confusion	about	roles	and	responsibilities.	Those	interviewed	felt	 that	the	community	 is	overburdened,	particularly	 in	the	case	 of	WASH	 [water,	 sanitation	 and	 hygiene],	 and	 do	 not	 have	 enough	capacity	to	supervise	construction.”	(SNV	et	al	2011:73)		As	 noted	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Water	 (2008),	 the	 success	 of	 COWSOs	 is	 largely	dependent	 on	 human	 resources,	 yet	 in	 the	 same	 publication,	 the	 Ministry	 of	Water	noted	that	many	communities	did	not	have	the	skills	required	to	manage	their	 own	 water	 systems.	 This	 aligns	 with	 Akin	 et	 al’s	 (2005)	 view	 that	 in	 a	situation	of	decentralised	service	provision,	 local	 level	 individuals	often	do	not	have	the	capacity	to	provide	services	effectively.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	Tanzanian	state	was	happy	to	devolve	responsibility	over	water	systems	to	the	grassroots	 level,	 even	 if	 they	were	 aware	 that	 this	 process	would	 be	met	with	some	 issues.	 Unfortunately,	 as	 time	 passed	 and	 community	 water	 systems	continued	 to	 be	 established	 the	 same	 challenges	 predicted	 in	 the	 report	continued	to	be	evident.	A	representative	from	the	Temeke	MWST	explained	that	they	 help	 to	 build	 the	 capacity	 of	 local	 communities	 so	 they	 are	 capable	 of	running	 their	 own	 water	 projects	 (Temeke	MWST	 Interview).	 Conversely,	 the	Maji	 Kwa	Wote	 water	 project	 committee	 members	 provided	 information	 that	contradicted	this;		 “What	 was	 most	 striking	 about	 the	 project	 was	 the	 comment	 by	 the	committee	members	who	said	that	the	project	needed	funding	to	expand	its	 coverage	 and	 that	 they	 had	 a	 little	 training	 at	 the	 start	 but	 required	more,	 and	 the	 donors,	 local	 leaders	 and	 the	 civil	 society	 organisation	involved	in	the	training	were	not	listening	to	them.”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	3rd	April	2014)		Whilst	 inefficient	coverage	and	a	 lack	of	 training	are	 fairly	common	complaints	from	COWSO	committee	members,	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 issues	are	prevalent	 in	a	
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project	that	at	the	time	of	data	collection,	was	only	a	few	months	old,	shows	the	barriers	 that	COWSOs	 face	 in	 their	success	and	how	these	challenges	are	 faced	from	their	establishment.	Similar	issues	were	discussed	in	a	reports	sent	to	TWN	by	four	of	its	member	organisations,	each	working	in	different	areas	of	Tanzania,	where	communities	either	did	not	understand	that	their	local	water	system	was	their	 responsibility,	 or	 that	 they	 did	 not	 have	 the	 skill	 set	 to	 manage	 it	sustainably	(Field	Notebook	Excerpt,	17th	March	2014).			The	 ways	 in	 which	 water	 committee	 members	 were	 selected	 tended	 to	 focus	around	 an	 individual’s	 role	 in	 the	 community	 and	 their	 capacity	 to	 make	 a	contribution	 to	 the	 project.	 Returning	 to	 earlier	 discussion	 of	 the	 confusion	between	different	definitions	within	community	water	provision,	the	Ministry	of	Water	explained	that	when	a	community	grows	in	size	and	merits	its	own	water	utility,	 original	 start	 up	 members	 often	 get	 replaced	 by	 formally	 elected	 ones	which	 can	 cause	 conflict.	 (Ministry	 of	 Water	 Interview,	 2014).	 This	 did	 not	explicitly	appear	to	be	the	case	in	either	case	study	area,	as	there	did	not	appear	to	be	a	stark	difference	between	the	types	of	individuals	involved	in	the	original	management	 committee	 compared	 to	 committee	 members	 at	 the	 time	 of	research.			Communities	 often	 select	 members	 that	 have	 other	 professional	 roles,	 which	resulted	in	some	committee	members	having	to	balance	a	demanding	job	as	well	as	their	role	in	the	community’s	water	scheme.	One	committee	member	in	Ilala	explained	his	reasons	for	volunteering	for	the	position:		 “Because	 I	 have	 an	 education,	 I	 was	 trained	 how	 to	 operate	 water	projects,	and	then	just	to	do	work	for	our	community,	 just	to	help	them.	You	 have	 to	 do	 something.”	 (Mitonga	 Water	 Users	 Group	 Committee	Member	#1)			In	my	data	collection	it	was	often	difficult	to	meet	with	all	members	in	Temeke	as	most	were	often	busy,	which	calls	into	question	their	ability	to	fulfil	their	role	in	
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a	COWSO.	The	committee	members	from	one	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	COWSOs	stated	that:		 “For	some	there	is	a	conflict	between	our	own	personal	needs	and	those	of	the	community.	The	committee	was	elected	based	on	people	who	focus	on	the	latter.”	(Maji	Kwa	Wote	COWSO	Committee	Focus	Group)		The	respondents	stated	that	they	believed	they	had	been	elected	because	of	their	ability	 to	 be	 committed	 and	 responsible,	 yet	 whilst	 they	 were	 enjoying	 their	current	roles,	they	were	not	sure	if	they	would	run	for	election	again.		The	Mitonga	Water	 Users	 Group	 in	 Ilala	 however	 appeared	 to	 be	 run	 slightly	differently:		 “I	 think	what	works	so	well	 for	 this	group	 is	 that	 they	have	a	dedicated	group	of	employees	working	on	maintenance,	meter	readings,	expansion,	rather	than	a	board	of	people	who	all	have	other	jobs	and	are	busy.	I	met	one	board	member	who	was	a	housewife,	so	it	may	even	be	the	case	that	the	board	selection	has	been	less	arbitrary	here.”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	1st	March	2014)		When	asked	about	their	role	in	relation	to	the	elected	committee,	the	employees	stated	that	“We	do	the	day	to	day	running,	and	the	board	deals	with	bigger	tasks”	(Mitonga	 Water	 Users	 Group	 Employees).	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 one	 of	 the	individuals	 employed	by	 the	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	 stated	 that	his	 salary	was	sufficient	and	that	he	did	not	need	another	job.	The	fact	that	the	Ilala	project	had	more	 individuals	who	gave	 their	undivided	attention	 to	 the	running	of	 the	project	 appeared	 to	 have	 a	 generally	 more	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	 project’s	success,	compared	with	Temeke.			The	topic	of	‘trust’	was	brought	up	several	times	with	regards	to	why	people	had	been	 selected,	 which	 could	 be	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 community	 decided	amongst	themselves	to	come	up	with	a	 local	water	project	as	opposed	to	being	
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mobilised	by	 local	government	or	a	civil	society	organisation,	which	may	affect	who	is	then	selected	for	committees.	Although	vandalism	had	been	mentioned	in	reports	on	COWSOs	and	by	respondents	in	other	areas,	this	was	also	reported	as	not	an	issue	for	this	water	project	as	they	employed	watchmen	to	look	over	the	water	points	during	the	day	and	night	time.	It	is	potentially	the	case	that	as	the	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	is	not	accountable	to	higher	levels	in	the	hierarchy	such	 as	 CWSTs	 and	 MWSTs	 they	 are	 able	 to	 manage	 their	 locality’s	 water	provision	more	efficiently,	as	opposed	to	COWSOs	who	are	set	up	in	such	a	way	that	the	involvement	these	other	levels	of	the	hierarchy	are	necessary	for	a	local	water	project’s	success.			Additionally,	relying	on	employing	community	members	to	collect	finances	from	domestic	points	also	reportedly	caused	issues	in	Temeke,	with	delays	of	two	to	three	days	in	passing	the	money	collected	on	to	the	management	of	the	project:		 “Sometimes	 during	 these	 elections	 [to	 select	 those	 who	 collect	 money	from	water	points]	there	are	no	qualifications	so	you	can	find	that	the	one	who	 is	 collecting	money	 has	 no	 capacity	 to	 do	 the	 required	 job	 at	 that	time.	 And	 they	 have	 other	 jobs,	 so	 sometimes	 people	 at	 the	 domestic	points	are	not	committed	 to	 their	work,	and	others	do	not	have	enough	education,	 so	 they	 do	 not	 have	 the	 skills	 required.”	 (Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	Manager)				The	manager	also	discussed	similar	issues	with	those	who	had	been	selected	to	sit	 on	 the	 project’s	 committee.	 The	 Temeke	MWST	 representative	 praised	 one	COWSO	 in	 the	 area	 for	 selecting	 committee	 members	 who	 had	 previously	worked	 in	 the	water	 sector	 or	 local	 government,	 believing	 that	 they	were	 the	best	 people	 to	 manage	 the	 project	 (Temeke	 MWST	 Interview).	 However	 it	appeared	to	be	the	case	that	a	supposed	‘best’	type	of	person	to	sit	on	a	COWSO	committee	was	a	matter	of	personal	opinion.		Language	was	also	an	issue	for	many	COWSOs.	One	respondent	in	Ilala	explained	that	 she	was	no	 longer	able	 to	be	on	 the	project	 committee	when	 they	 started	
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interacting	 with	 international	 donors,	 as	 she	 was	 unable	 to	 speak	 English	(Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	Customer	#2	 Interview).	A	 field	 report	by	a	 local	civil	society	organisation	also	referred	to	how	one	district	council	only	produced	documents	 in	 English	 which	 were	 then	 inaccessible	 to	 the	 community	 and	prevented	them	from	participating	in	the	project.	It	appears	that	a	continued	use	of	 the	English	 language	 can	be	 somewhat	 exclusionary	 for	 the	members	of	 the	community	 who	 only	 know	 Swahili,	 and	 in	 the	 instance	 of	 the	 respondent	 in	Ilala,	 can	 result	 in	 key	 figures	 in	 the	 community	 not	 being	 able	 to	 participate.	However,	the	respondent	from	Ilala	who	was	a	former	committee	member	went	on	 to	 explain	 that	 all	 meetings	 and	 reports	 written	 used	 Swahili,	 so	 it	 was	unclear	why	 she	was	 unable	 to	 be	 a	 current	 committee	member.	 Dill’s	 (2009)	research	 indicated	 that	 community-based	 organisations	 were	 publishing	 a	number	 of	 documents	 in	English,	 so	 it	was	 impressive	 to	 see	 that	 the	Mitonga	Water	Users	 Group	were	 using	 Swahili	 and	 allowing	 their	members	 to	 engage	with	the	literature	they	produced.				Issues	of	 affordability	did	not	 seem	 to	be	 recognised	by	 the	Ministry	of	Water.	One	respondent	from	the	Ministry	stated	that	there	was	an	arrangement	set	up	in	urban	areas	where	the	richer	residents	subsidised	those	who	were	unable	to	afford	 to	 pay	 for	 water,	 but	 this	 research	 showed	 no	 evidence	 of	 this.	 Ribot	(1995)	 also	 finds	 the	 converse	 situation	 applying,	 stating	 that	 the	 poorer	residents	 of	 a	 community	 often	 have	 to	 make	 more	 substantial	 financial	contributions	 to	 their	 wealthier	 counterparts.	 In	 fact,	 the	 accountant	 for	 the	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	provided	an	interesting	viewpoint,	that	“poor	people	always	 pay	 their	 bills	 on	 time,	 rich	 people	 are	 very	 difficult	 customers”	 (Field	Diary	Excerpt,	1st	March	2015).	This	was	backed	up	by	another	respondent,	who	explained	 that	 the	only	group	 that	were	 likely	 to	 complain	about	an	 inefficient	water	 supply	 are	 the	 upper	 classes,	 as	 they	 are	 not	 used	 to	 the	 challenges	 in	accessing	water	 that	 so	many	 households	 in	 Tanzania	 face	 (NGO	#4).	 Nyerere	warned	against	this	exploitation	of	Tanzanians	without	capital	by	those	that	do,	in	the	Arusha	Declaration:		
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“If	 we	 are	 not	 careful	 we	 might	 get	 to	 the	 position	 where	 the	 real	exploitation	 in	 Tanzania	 is	 that	 of	 the	 town	 dwellers	 exploiting	 the	peasants.”	(TANU,	1967,	from	Edwards,	2014:73).		It	is	potentially	the	case	that	having	a	community-based	water	scheme	masks	the	different	levels	of	income	within	the	community	that	impact	upon	the	ways	they	access	water.	 The	 aforementioned	 quote	 from	Nyerere	 is	 in	 a	 sense	 prophetic	with	regards	to	perceived	differences	between	urban	and	rural	access	to	water,	as	 “town	 dwellers”	 could	 be	 conceived	 to	 be	 those	 with	 a	 private	 water	connection	 and	 the	 capital	 to	 buy	 from	 the	 private	 sector,	 whereas	 the	“peasants”	are	those	working	as	a	community	to	try	and	provide	a	cost-efficient	means	 of	 water	 access	 for	 their	 locality.	 	 Additionally,	 one	 NGO	 responded	suggested	that	a	number	of	COWSOs	face	a	number	of	issues	in	maintaining	their	financial	sustainability:		 “There	 are	 charges	 that	 appear	 on	 bills	 that	 are	 unaccounted	 for,	maintenance	 costs	 are	 not	 yet	 included	 in	 their	 bills,	 and	 completed	project	 maintenance	 is	 not	 budgeted	 for,	 and	 then	 the	 people	 cannot	afford	 to	 maintain	 the	 project,	 and	 then	 the	 project	 collapses.	 For	instance,	many	studies	have	shown	that	12%	of	water	projects	have	failed	within	 two	 years	 of	 them	 starting	 because	 they	 have	 no	 finance	 to	maintain	them.”	(NGO	#7)		Whilst	 the	 case	 studies	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 reached	 the	 detrimental	 state	described	by	this	respondent,	some	of	the	issues	they	faced	indicated	that	this	is	an	 entirely	 possible	 situation	 for	 them.	 	 The	 idea	 of	 being	 financially	 self-sustainable	 for	 these	 organisations	 was	 perhaps	 simply	 based	 on	 day-to-day	survival	rather	than	being	able	to	meet	growing	demand	or	deal	with	unplanned	issues	that	require	surplus	capital.			There	were	also	some	infrastructural	 issues	that	caused	problems	for	COWSOs.	In	the	case	of	the	COWSO	in	Temeke	funded	by	a	large	international	water	NGO,	committee	 members	 noted	 that	 their	 water	 tanks	 could	 only	 hold	 a	 limited	
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amount	 of	 water,	 and	 with	 high	 demand	 they	 often	 needed	 to	 refill	 this	 tank	every	two	hours.	This	 issue	was	 intrinsically	related	to	electricity	based	 issues,	as	regular	power	cuts	in	the	area	often	inhibited	the	community’s	access	to	their	water	supply.	The	Ministry	of	Water	recognised	this	as	an	issue:		 “Electricity	 is	 still	 a	 problem.	 At	 least	 now	 it’s	 being	 produced	 by	 gas,	initially	we	were	relying	on	hydropower	generation,	hydropower	plants.	If	we	have	droughts,	if	there	is	not	enough	water	in	the	rivers,	there	is	not	enough	 power.	 But	 now	 that	 we	 are	 using	 gas	 turbines,	 power	 is	stabilised.”	(Ministry	of	Water,	2014)			However,	this	response	from	the	Ministry	of	Water	still	indicated	that	there	was	a	 disconnect	 in	 understanding	 the	 issues	 faced	 by	 community	water	 schemes.	Respondents	from	both	case	studies	indicated	that	power	was	still	an	issue	and	was	not	stabilised	in	the	way	that	the	Ministry	had	suggested.	One	of	the	board	members	from	the	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	explained:		 “There	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 water,	 or	 breakdowns,	 and	 sometimes	 some	 people	have	no	water	because	of	a	lack	of	energy.	Because	of	a	lack	of	electricity.”	(Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	Committee	Member	Interview)			The	Tanzanian	electricity	producer,	Tanesco,	has	been	under	much	criticism	of	late	for	its	intermittent	supply	in	Dar	es	Salaam,	as	well	as	being	embroiled	in	a	corruption	scandal	with	the	Tanzanian	state	(The	Guardian,	2014).	Problems	of	accessing	electricity	 in	Temeke	seemed	to	be	even	more	apparent	than	 in	Ilala.	The	manager	of	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	project	explained	that:		 “Yes	 electricity	 is	 a	 big	problem	because	now	we	 cannot	use	 electricity.	We	 are	 using	 a	 generator,	 because	 of	 the	 low	 voltage	 of	 the	 electricity	supply.	It	cannot	operate	our	pump.”	(Maji	Kwa	Wote	Manager	Interview)		
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Indeed,	 the	 Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	 project	 had	 experienced	 significant	 damage	 to	 a	water	pump	that	at	the	time	of	research	was	only	two	weeks	old,	due	to	power	surges	breaking	the	equipment:		 “[Interviewer]	So	this	building	only	opened	two	weeks	ago?”		 “Yes,	 on	 the	 12th	 of	 March.	 The	 power	 issue	 happened	 on	 the	 23rd	 [of	March].	But	the	whole	scheme	started	across	the	city	in	2013.”	(Maji	Kwa	Wote	Manager)				Although	the	city-wide	project	had	started	in	2013,	at	the	time	of	data	collection	the	 project	 in	 Temeke	 had	 only	 been	 established	 for	 “three	 or	 four	 months”	(Temeke	 MWST	 Interview).	 Residents	 also	 agreed	 that	 electricity	 was	 a	 main	challenge	 with	 regards	 to	 accessing	 water	 in	 the	 area.	 In	 the	 village	geographically	closest	to	the	board	of	management	of	the	project,	residents	said	that	 their	 complaints	 to	 the	 management	 board	 and	 local	 government	 were	generally	 listened	to,	but	 that	when	they	complained	about	electricity	 they	had	not	seen	any	action	being	taken	on	this	issue	(Maji	Kwa	Wote	Customers	Focus	Group).	With	so	many	issues	already	visible	in	Temeke,	it	called	into	question	the	sustainability	of	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	project	and	more	broadly,	the	intentions	of	international	 donors,	 as	 in	 this	 case	 by	 insisting	 on	 the	 participation	 of	 a	community	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 limited	 support	 has	 potentially	 left	 the	community	with	more	challenges	than	they	started	with.	The	donors	visited	this	project	 a	 few	weeks	before	data	 collection,	 for	 the	grand	opening	of	 the	water	point	 that	 had	 already	 broken,	 when	 issues	 of	 project	 coverage	 and	 a	 lack	 of	training	 within	 the	 community	 were	 prevalent.	 The	 data	 suggests	 that	 the	donors	did	nothing	to	address	these	issues	and	aligns	with	previously	discussed	discourses	of	referring	to	a	project	as	a	success	to	provide	impressive	statistics	and	 to	mask	 the	 disappointing	 reality	 of	 it.	With	 reference	 to	 the	work	 of	 bell	hooks,	Briggs	 and	Sharp	 (2004:667)	note	 that	 “experts	 look	 for	 experiences	 to	analyse,	but	not	the	voice	of	the	indigenous	peoples	which	might	offer	different	–	and	challenging	–	interpretations”.	 In	this	 instance,	external	 ‘experts’	took	their	own	understanding	of	the	success	of	the	project	and	reported	that	as	fact,	rather	
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than	 offering	 an	 opportunity	 for	 local	 residents	 to	 provide	 their	 views	 on	 the	success	of	 it.	Examples	such	as	 this	call	 into	question	 the	sustainability	of	such	projects	and	initiatives,	and	problematize	the	concept	of	when	such	activities	are	considered	to	be	a	successful	output.			
7.5	Community	relationships	with	NGOs		NGOs	 relationships	with	 community	 provision	 varied	 from	 those	who	 took	 an	active	 role	 in	 promoting	 it	 to	 those	 who	 provided	 critique	 over	 this	 policy	agenda.	 In	 terms	of	 local	NGOs,	 there	was	 evidence	of	 close	 relationships	with	local	government:			 “[Interviewer]	So	what	is	your	relationship	with	NGOs?”		 “With	 [local	NGO],	 I	 only	deal	with	 the	 technical	 issues.	 So	 the	 software	component,	 the	 teaching,	 the	 mobilisation,	 the	 sensitisation,	 is	 [local	NGO]…we	share	the	same	building	so	we	sit	together	and	discuss	how	to	tackle	the	issue	or	to	solve	a	problem.”			 “[Interviewer]	So	you	would	go	to	them	for	help	if	there	were	issues?”		 “Yes,	I	would	say	that	there	is	a	problem	and	that	I	need	their	action,	their	interventions,	that	they	have	to	go	there	to	instruct	the	people	what	is	the	proper	way	to	organise	and	manage	the	project.”		 “[Interviewer]	 And	 where	 does	 the	 funding	 come	 from	 for	 them	 to	 do	that?”		 “We	 support	 them.	 Because	we	 share	 the	 office	we	 share	 the	 costs,	we	share	everything.”	(Temeke	MWST	Interview)		This	 response	 provides	 some	 indication	 of	 the	 blurred	 lines	 of	 distinction	between	 the	 state	 and	 non-government	 organisations.	 Residents	 under	 the	
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jurisdiction	of	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	project	however,	reported	they	had	no	contact	with	 any	 NGOs	 which	 not	 only	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 any	community	education	projects	supposedly	executed	by	the	aforementioned	local	NGO,	but	also	suggests	that	work	by	said	NGO	could	be	operating	through	local	government	representatives,	 further	complicating	governance	networks.	Najam	(1996)	 notes	 how	 it	 is	 often	 difficult	 to	measure	 the	ways	 in	which	NGOs	 are	accountable	to	the	communities	they	are	supposedly	assisting,	but	providing	an	analysis	 of	 accountability	 with	 local	 government	 institutions	 is	 more	 tangible	and	 understood.	 As	 such,	 with	 previous	 discussions	 of	 proving	 the	 impact	 of	work	in	order	to	secure	more	funding,	 it	 is	potentially	the	case	that	the	NGO	in	this	instance	prioritises	their	relationship	with	local	government	representatives	(and	 potentially	 a	 wider	 professional	 network)	 in	 order	 to	 benefit	 their	organisation.			One	 NGO	 employee	 (who	 was	 Tanzanian)	 explained	 the	 disjuncture	 between	Tanzanian	community	relations	and	the	expectations	placed	on	communities	to	provide	their	own	water:		 “[For	the	international	donors]	it’s	something	new	to	them,	and	they	feel	‘can	we	use	it	in	the	water	sector,	maybe	it	will	work?	But	for	a	Tanzanian	it	 is	 a	 normal	way	of	 life,	 I	 cannot	 imagine	how	 to	use	 it	 in	 the	 [water]	sector…a	 person	 coming	 from	Europe,	 seeing	 that	 kind	 of	 life,	 they	 can	imagine	 that	 if	 they	 are	 so	 cohesive	 maybe	 they	 can	 work	 together	 to	contribute,	and	if	they	can	contribute	towards	a	funeral,	maybe	they	will	contribute	towards	the	operation	and	maintenance	of	a	pump.”	(NGO	#5)		The	respondent	then	went	on	to	suggest	that	the	Tanzanian	state	was	not	aware	of	the	support	required	by	communities	in	running	locally-based	water	schemes	and	accepted	the	idea	of	community-based	provision	“wholeheartedly”	(NGO	#5)	without	understanding	the	necessary	role	they	had	to	play	in	facilitating	this.	Dill	(2010b)	agrees	that	community	relationships	are	not	necessarily	suited	to	water	provision	and	inappropriately	lauded	by	external	forces:		
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“By	 implicitly	characterising	urban	and	rural	 ‘communities’	as	 internally	cohesive	 and,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 harmonious	 entities,	 such	 community-based	 approaches	not	 only	 reveal	 their	 lack	 of	 grounding	 in	 reality,	 but	also,	 and	more	 importantly,	 obscure	 both	 local	 and	wider	 structures	 of	power.”	(Dill,	2009)			There	was	 also	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	what	 international	 donor-led	 projects	were	 providing	was	 not	 necessarily	what	 the	 communities	 had	 asked	 for.	 One	respondent	 from	an	NGO	discussed	how	distance	 from	water	points	was	often	cited	 as	 a	 major	 issue	 by	 communities,	 whereas	 there	 was	 an	 expectation	amongst	international	and	national	NGOs	that	long	waiting	times	at	water	points	was	the	major	issue.	Customers	in	all	three	areas	of	Temeke	involved	in	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	project	 complained	of	 these	 long	waiting	 times	and	how	much	 they	detracted	from	other	daily	activities,	offering	little	 improvement	to	their	day	to	day	life.			A	 field	 report	 by	 a	Tanzanian	 civil	 society	 organisation	on	water	planning	 and	management	in	the	Shinyanga	area	of	Tanzania	revealed	a	number	of	issues	that	inhibited	 the	 sustainability	 of	 services	 (for	 earlier	 discussion	 on	 the	sustainability	of	water	projects	in	Tanzania,	see	Chapter	6).	The	report	discussed	issues	such	as	a	lack	of	consideration	for	wider	issues	and	only	the	inclusion	of	a	simplistic	 aim	 to	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 water	 points,	 relating	 to	 earlier	discussion	 of	 the	 inappropriate	 goals	 often	 pursued	 in	 community	 water	projects.	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 the	 report	 discussed	 examples	 of	 projects	 not	involving	 the	 community	 properly,	 which	 undermined	 understandings	 of	ownership.	 Lastly,	 the	 report	 mentioned	 inefficient	 monitoring	 and	 project	maintenance,	and	how	some	projects	did	not	align	with	the	cultural	values	of	the	locality.	Although	the	report	did	not	stipulate	the	nature	of	these	cultural	values,	other	 findings,	such	as	 the	previous	section	on	the	use	of	water	as	an	election-winning	tool,	suggest	 this	may	be	related	to	 the	 fact	 that	some	Tanzanians	still	believe	that	water	should	be	provided	for	free.	This	was	the	viewpoint	of	some	of	the	customers	in	Temeke:		
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“Another	 challenge	 we	 face	 is	 that	 we	 contributed	 5000	 Tshs	 per	household	to	be	part	of	this	scheme	and	therefore	we	expect	the	water	to	be	for	free.	We	still	need	to	pay	for	every	bucket	that	we	collect,	this	is	too	expensive	for	poor	families.”	(Maji	Kwa	Wote	Customers	Focus	Group)		At	the	very	least,	some	believe	their	original	financial	contribution	to	set	up	the	project	should	be	enough	remuneration	for	them	to	then	access	water	from	that	project	without	 having	 to	 pay	 for	 it.	 Communities	 not	 being	willing	 to	 pay	 for	water	after	 their	 initial	 financial	contribution	was	not	unique	 to	 those	 living	 in	Temeke,	 with	 one	 of	 TWN’s	 neighbour	 organisations	 also	 encountering	 this	viewpoint	 during	 their	 work	 in	 the	 Meru	 area	 of	 Tanzania	 (Field	 Notebook	Excerpt,	17th	March	2014).				The	aid	used	to	fund	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	water	project	was	also	used	to	construct	fourteen	other	similar	projects	across	Dar	es	Salaam	and	the	city’s	surrounding	areas:		 “Why	not	just	complete	a	project	properly	rather	than	minimise	the	issues	that	you	 leave	behind	for	 ill-equipped	communities	to	deal	with?”	(Field	Diary	Excerpt,	3rd	April	2014)		This	quote	emulates	the	ways	in	which	starting	a	project	 is	more	impressive	in	monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 documents	 as	 opposed	 to	 sustainable	 projects	 that	continue	 to	work	and	provide	benefits	 for	 their	 locality	 for	 a	number	of	 years.	What	 should	 be	 remembered,	 however,	 is	 that	 amongst	 all	 the	 statistical	reporting,	 publications,	 and	 fashionable	 development	 rhetoric,	 there	 are	communities	being	guided	to	manage	their	own	water	needs	in	a	certain	way	to	fulfil	 state	 and	 outsider	 expectations,	 when	 in	 reality	 the	 lives	 of	 these	communities	 have	 experienced	 no	 tangible	 improvement.	 When	 discussing	projects	led	by	international	donors,	one	NGO	recommended	that:		 “You	build	your	water	point,	you	want	people	to	get	water.	Give	it	to	them	for	free!	Water	is	life.	I	would	say	charge	them	for	this,	or	give	this	water	
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project	to	a	COWSO	that	is	already	existing,	then	there	are	people	who	can	manage	these	projects.”	(NGO	#4)		However,	 what	 this	 respondent	 appears	 to	 be	 insinuating	 is	 that	 placing	 a	community’s	water	 provision	 under	 their	 responsibility	will	mitigate	 issues	 of	sustainability	 and	efficient	 coverage.	However,	whether	 an	 international	donor	has	 had	 involvement	 or	 not,	 there	 is	 evidence	 in	 this	 chapter	 to	 suggest	 that	community	based	water	provision	is	not	without	its	issues.				The	 level	 of	 support	 provided	 to	 community	water	 projects	 after	 being	 set	 up	with	the	assistance	of	an	NGO	also	appeared	to	vary.	In	the	case	of	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	 project,	 when	 consulted	 on	 the	 start	 up	 costs	 provided	 by	 a	 large	international	donor,	the	manager	stated	that:		 “I	cannot	say	properly	how	we	got	the	money	because	this	was	initiated	by	 the	 government,	 so	 we	 are	 a	 community.	 We	 just	 see	 the	 water	coming.”	(Maji	Kwa	Wote	Manager	Interview)		Although	 community	 water	 schemes	 are	 lauded	 within	 the	 literature	 for	incorporating	local	people	and	following	a	participatory	approach,	the	apparent	disconnect	between	the	donors	and	those	facilitating	the	project	once	again	calls	into	question	how	participatory	these	projects	actually	are.	Whilst	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	manager	noted	that	“donors	like	to	see	the	commitment	of	the	community”	(Maji	Kwa	Wote	Manager	Interview)	there	was	 little	evidence	to	suggest	which	agency	the	community	had	within	this	project	beyond	the	day	to	day	operation	and	maintenance	of	it.		In	terms	of	the	electricity	issues	faced	by	the	project,	the	manager	explained	that	their	decision	to	stop	using	the	government’s	electricity	supply	and	 to	swap	 to	using	a	generator,	 for	 fear	of	causing	 further	damage	 to	the	 project’s	 equipment	 (Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	 Manager	 Interview).	 The	 assistance	provided	in	this	instance	appeared	to	be	purely	advisory	as	opposed	to	providing	any	 financial	 or	 technical	 support	 to	 the	 Maji	 Kwa	 Wote	 project	 in	 order	 to	alleviate	 a	 challenge	 that	 was	 severely	 inhibiting	 its	 success.	 The	 relationship	between	 the	project	 in	Temeke	and	development	organisations	appeared	 to	be	
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somewhat	one-sided,	and	considering	that	one	of	the	project’s	main	water	tanks	fell	to	disrepair	mere	days	after	the	donors	visited	due	to	an	ongoing	issue	calls	into	question	whether	establishing	the	community	scheme	was	more	to	do	with	the	 impressive	 statistics	 chased	 by	 development	 organisations,	 discussed	 in	Chapter	6.			Moreover,	Shivji	(2006)	takes	the	view	that	international	donors	are	replicating	the	 colonial	 practice	 of	 control,	 ensuring	 that	 they	 still	 have	 a	 stake	 in	 the	organisation	 of	 social	 or	 community	 practices.	 It	 is	 perhaps	 the	 case	 that	 the	aforementioned	 issues	 faced	 by	 community-based	 water	 organisations	 are	 a	result	of	these	international	misunderstandings	of	Tanzanian	culture.	Whilst	the	communities	in	question	may	have	the	capacity	to	help	each	other	on	an	ad	hoc	basis,	 this	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 foundation	 for	 established	 community	institutions	 that	 provide	 vital	 services.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 colonial	practice	of	control	discussed	by	Shivji	(2006)	has	halted	the	development	of	the	effective	community	relations	and	agency	needed	to	enact	efficient	local	service	provision.	 Instead	of	community	 loyalties	and	relationships	existing	as	support	mechanisms	 in	 times	 of	 crisis,	 they	 have	 instead	 been	 incorporated	 into	 the	minutiae	of	daily	life	placing	often	inappropriate	expectations	on	small	groups	of	individuals.	 Returning	 to	 discussion	 in	 Chapter	 3	 about	 the	 ways	 in	 which	Western	 knowledge	 is	 seen	 as	 both	 dominant	 and	 aspirational,	 this	 example	aligns	 with	 this	 viewpoint.	 Tanzanian	 community	 relations	 have	 been	interpreted	by	external	 influences,	and	provided	with	an	 imposed	solution	that	has	not	materialised	well	within	indigenous	culture	and	day	to	day	life.			
7.6	The	private	sector	and	the	commodification	of	water		This	 chapter	 so	 far	 has	discussed	 the	 role	 of	 community	 run	water	projects	 in	Tanzania,	 it	 is	 incorrect	 to	 assume	 that	 these	 are	 the	 only	means	 of	 accessing	water	 within	 individual	 localities.	 Indeed,	 whilst	 ‘the	 private	 sector’	 gives	connotations	 of	 large	 conglomerates	 taking	 control	 of	 a	 municipal	 system	 (as	was	the	case	in	the	early	2000s	in	Dar	es	Salaam,	discussed	in	Chapters	1	and	5),	a	number	of	respondents	used	this	phrase	to	refer	 to	any	means	of	purchasing	
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water	 not	 related	 to	 the	 community	 or	 the	 government,	 for	 example	 a	 private	borehole	owned	by	a	household	who	sell	water	to	their	neighbours:			 “[Interviewer]	So	who	are	the	private	sector	then?”		 “It	is	individuals.	Someone	drilling	a	well	in	their	house	and	selling	water	to	others.”	(Mitonga	Water	Users	Group	Customer	#1)		To	 return	 to	 earlier	 discussion	 about	 the	 differences	 between	 rural	 and	 urban	areas,	some	believed	that	there	were	clear	differences	between	understandings	of	water	by	rural	and	urban	inhabitants.	One	respondent	explained	that	people	in	 rural	 areas	 viewed	 water	 more	 as	 a	 natural	 resource	 belonging	 to	 them,	whereas	 in	urban	areas	water	was	 seen	as	more	of	 a	product	 that	was	bought	and	 sold.	 However,	 this	 distinction	 was	 blurred	 with	 community-based	 water	schemes.	As	previously	discussed,	community	members	often	felt	that	the	initial	contribution	they	made	at	 the	beginning	of	a	project	was	enough	to	mean	they	should	 receive	 water	 for	 free.	 Taking	 this	 viewpoint,	 community	 members	echoed	the	supposed	rural	understanding	of	water,	as	a	resource	that	is	owned	by	the	community	and	to	be	used	by	it.	However,	by	having	to	pay	to	access	this	water	it	also	aligns	with	the	urban	discourse	of	access	to	water	in	Tanzania.	It	is	clear	 that	 although	 the	 concept	 of	 paying	 for	 water	 is	 widely	 accepted	 across	Tanzania,	 the	 exact	 nature	 of	 paying	 for	 the	 resource	 varies	 between	different	interest	groups,	further	complicating	residents’	understandings	of	payment	and	access	 depending	 on	 how	 they	 choose	 to	 purchase	 water.	 The	 idea	 of	neoliberalism	not	being	“ideologically	pure”	(Crouch,	2010:viii)	is	relevant	here,	as	there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	commodification	of	water	has	adapted	to	various	cultural	understandings	of	it,	yet	the	fact	that	it	 is	an	economic	good	to	be	paid	for	is	central	to	citizens’	understanding	of	it.			There	are	also	examples	of	corporations	in	Tanzania	providing	water	services	in	communities.	Tanzania	Breweries,	who	are	one	of	the	largest	producers	of	beer	in	Tanzania,	have	built	a	well	in	Ilala	for	the	residents	to	run	a	community-based	scheme.	One	resident	explained	to	me	that	they	had	asked	Tanzania	Breweries	to	
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donate	 money	 to	 implement	 a	 water	 project	 but	 instead	 Tanzania	 Breweries	bypassed	 this	 and	 built	 a	 well	 directly.	 To	 return	 to	 earlier	 discussions	 of	corruption	 in	Chapters	3	and	6,	 it	 is	pertinent	 to	note	 that	Tanzania	Breweries	preferred	direct	involvement	rather	than	delegating	the	money	to	another	party.				The	 roles	 of	 these	 various	 privately	 providers	 of	 water	 highlights	 the	increasingly	 prevalent	 discourse	 of	 water	 as	 a	 commodity,	 which	 calls	 into	question	the	role	that	the	Tanzanian	state	should	be	playing	in	providing	water	to	 its	 residents.	 Indeed,	 Saad-Filho	 and	 Johnston’s	 (2005)	 view	 that	neoliberalism	 should	 not	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 process	 that	 happens	 along	 a	 linear	trajectory	 should	 be	 considered	 in	 this	 case,	 as	 the	 number	 of	 stakeholders	involved	in	providing	and	selling	water	in	Dar	es	Salaam	indicates	the	variety	of	ways	in	which	economic	values	have	become	embedded	in	Tanzanian	discourse.	In	 addition,	 the	 idea	 of	 neoliberal	 self-governance	 is	 also	 pertinent	 when	community-based	 schemes	 appear	 to	be	 increasingly	 autonomous	with	 limited	state	 intervention.	 This	was	 alluded	 to	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter	when	 the	 use	 of	water	 as	 an	 election	 winning	 tool	 was	 discussed,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	recognise	where	 the	 government	 of	 Tanzania’s	 role	 lies	 in	 the	 country’s	water	provision,	 irrespective	 of	which	 specific	 individuals	 are	 elected	 as	members	 of	parliament.	 Respondents	 from	 some	 NGOs	 indicated	 that	 they	 believed	 the	Tanzanian	state	should	play	a	stronger	role	in	Tanzania’s	water	sector:		 “[Interviewer]And	you	were	saying	that	the	government	has	a	strong	role	to	play	in	water	provision...”		 “Exactly.”		 “...but	 does	 the	 government	 think	 that?	 Do	 you	 think	 that	 you	 and	 the	government	agree	on	this?”		 “They	say	yes,	but	that	“we’ll	do	it	once	we	have	funds.”	That’s	the	answer	that	they	normally	say.”	(NGO	#2)		
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This	aligned	with	the	response	from	the	Temeke	MWST,	who	explained	that	the	reasons	that	COWSOs	were	only	short	 term	solutions	 is	because	eventually	 the	municipal	system’s	level	of	coverage	will	improve,	and	that	COWSOs	were	being	used	 as	 there	 was	 “no	 other	 option	 just	 now”	 (Temeke	 MWST	 Interview).	 As	such,	 it	was	apparently	 the	case	that	a	 lot	of	 time	and	financial	resources	were	being	used	to	set	up	forms	of	fragmented	water	provision	only	perhaps	intended	to	exist	until	the	state	was	able	to	bear	financial	and	technical	responsibility	for	Tanzania’s	water.			Also	related	to	discussions	of	the	capital	available	for	state-led	water	provision,	one	 respondent,	 whose	 organisation	 had	 carried	 out	 research	 in	 this	 area,	suggested	 that	 the	 transfer	 of	 responsibility	 to	 a	 number	 of	 different	stakeholders	meant	it	was	difficult	for	residents	to	hold	the	state	accountable:		 “If	people	see	a	water	point	 is	not	 functional	 they	would	stand	 together	and	 hold	 a	 government	 accountable.	 Or	 hold	 the	 local	 leaders	accountable.	 If	 the	 local	 leaders	 are	 held	 accountable	 then	 they	 just	 try	and	get	sources	[of	income]	and	then	they	come	back	and	say	‘you	know	what?	 There	 is	 no	money	 here’.	 So	what	 people	 simply	 do,	 is	 you	 guys	[mzungu]	have	to	give	money.”	(NGO	#4)		Indeed,	the	fragmented	nature	of	water	governance	in	Tanzania	makes	it	unclear	how	 the	 state	 would	 reclaim	 any	 responsibility	 as	 they	 have	 been	 heavily	dependent	on	external	sources	of	finance	for	a	number	of	years.	In	Dill’s	(2010b)	research	 into	 community-based	water	 provision	 in	 Tanzania,	 it	was	 suggested	that	 the	 government	 favoured	 these	 grassroots	 level	 institutions	 as	 it	 required	very	 little	 from	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 in	 terms	 of	 financial	 or	 logistical	 support.	Whilst	the	Tanzanian	government	could	be	accused	of	neoliberal	rolling	back	of	the	 state	 in	 its	 water	 provision,	 there	 did	 not	 necessarily	 appear	 to	 a	 viable	alternative	 when	 the	 country’s	 economy	 has	 been	 so	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	foreign	aid	for	a	number	of	years.			
	
	 279	
7.7	Maji	Week		Whilst	Maji	Week	 had	 been	 lauded	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	Water	 for	 its	 work	 and	TWN	seemed	enthusiastic	about	being	involved,	there	was	limited	knowledge	of	the	 event	 both	 within	 Ilala	 and	 Temeke.	 As	 a	 week-long	 celebration	 that	coincides	with	the	international	event	World	Water	Day,	Maji	Week	consists	of	a	variety	of	activities	that	take	place	across	Tanzania.	As	well	as	education	events	and	 handwashing	 demonstrations,	musical	 and	 theatrical	 performances,	water	sector	NGOs	and	the	Ministry	of	Water	are	heavily	involved	in	a	number	of	tasks	across	 the	week.	 Not	 one	 customer	 involved	 in	 this	 research	 from	 either	 case	study	 area	was	 aware	of	Maji	Week,	 even	 although	 the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	project	had	sent	three	committee	members	to	attend	the	event.	This	was	not	specific	to	the	case	studies	involved	in	this	research,	with	newspaper	cartoons41	at	the	time	reflecting	the	mood	of	the	people	of	Tanzania.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									41	These	cartoons	were	sent	to	me	after	an	informal	discussion	with	someone	working	in	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania.	They	were	published	in	Tanzanian	print	media	at	the	time	of	fieldwork,	between	January	and	April	2014.	
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Figure	7.3	Maji	Week	cartoons	from	Tanzanian	newspapers																													The	first	cartoon	shows	the	disconnect	between	the	lived	realities	of	the	people	of	 Tanzania	 compared	 to	 the	 somewhat	 inappropriate	 commendations	 that	occur	 within	 the	 confines	 of	Maji	 Week.	 As	 noted	 by	 one	 respondent,	 “it’s	 a	
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celebration	day”	(NGO	#4),	but	the	discourse	implied	by	the	first	cartoon	is	that	with	broken	water	points	 and	continued	challenges	 in	access	 to	water	 there	 is	very	little	happening	at	the	grassroots	level	worth	celebrating.	This	was	backed	up	by	other	interview	responses:		 “But	 the	 challenge	 is,	 [Maji	Week]	 takes	place	 in	 an	 environment	where	people	 are	 not	 getting	 sufficient	 water,	 on	 a	 daily	 basis,	 and	 even	 in	Dodoma42	there	are	 these	kinds	of	places.	 In	 the	villages	 the	situation	 is	worse	because	water	supply	coverage	in	the	villages	is	less	than	50%.	So	people	 are	 asking	 ‘What	 are	 they	 celebrating?	 What	 are	 they	commemorating?	 We	 don’t	 have	 water!	 Why	 all	 of	 this	 pomp	 and	ceremony	when	 all	 of	 the	money	 spent	 on	 these	meetings	 can	 buy	 one	pipe	and	extend	it	to	our	village?”	(NGO	#5)		The	second	cartoon	alludes	to	the	issues	of	sustainability	discussed	in	Chapter	6,	and	the	state	and	development	organisations’	continued	endeavour	to	build	new	water	 points	 and	 provide	 impressive	 statistics	 rather	 than	 correct	 previously	existing	issues.	The	fact	that	this	is	being	discussed	within	a	national	newspaper	suggests	 that	 this	 is	 a	 well-known	 issue	 across	 Tanzania	 and	 explains	 the	cartoon’s	scepticism	towards	an	event	such	as	Maji	Week.	Indeed,	this	scepticism	is	perhaps	justified	when	the	data	collected	in	this	research	shows	that	there	was	very	 little	 knowledge	 or	 interest	 in	 the	 event	within	 the	 communities	 studied.	The	Temeke	MWST	representative	interviewed	explained	that	around	six	water	user	 associations	 had	 accompanied	 them	 to	 Maji	 Week	 in	 2014	 in	 order	 to	explain	to	others	how	COWSOs	work:		 “How	to	produce	a	report,	how	they	are	working,	how	they	link	to	other	levels	of	government,	with	the	mtaa	and	the	ward	office.”	(Temeke	MWST	Interview)																																																										42	As	of	1974	Dodoma	is	the	capital	of	Tanzania,	and	has	experienced	far	less	urban	sprawl	and	population	growth	than	the	country’s	former	capital	Dar	es	Salaam.	Dodoma	often	referred	to	by	Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 residents	 as	 having	 a	 preferable	 infrastructure	 and	 less	 problems	 than	Dar	 es	Salaam	has.		
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Additionally,	the	Temeke	MWST	representative	explained	that	these	groups	have	to	 provide	 their	 own	 financial	 support	 to	 attend	Maji	Week,	 which	 potentially	inhibits	the	abilities	of	a	number	of	water	user	associations	to	attend.	Maji	Kwa	Wote	committee	members	stated	that	they	were	unable	to	attend	this	year	due	to	 the	 fact	Maji	Week	was	held	 in	Dodoma	(Maji	Kwa	Wote	COWSO	Committee	Focus	Group).			One	 respondent	 from	 an	 NGO	 provided	 some	 justification	 for	 Maji	 Week,	explaining	 that	 it	was	an	opportunity	 for	 the	state	 to	provide	 their	guidance	 to	communities	and	to	provide	advice	on	the	best	ecological	and	economical	means	of	 accessing	 water	 (NGO	 #5).	 This	 respondent	 also	 suggested	 that	 one	 of	 the	main	 issues	with	 the	 event	was	 that	 it	was	 only	 held	 in	 the	 capital	 city	which	resulted	 in	 those	 living	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 country	 being	 left	 out	 of	 the	celebrations	and	discussions.	 Indeed,	whilst	discussions	of	geographical	bias	 in	Chapter	 6	 related	 to	 the	 preferential	 situation	 for	 NGOs	 operating	 in	 Dar	 es	Salaam,	it	could	be	suggested	that	residents	of	Dar	es	Salaam	experience	this	bias	negatively	 in	 terms	 of	 Maji	 Week	 as	 they	 are	 not	 located	 near	 to	 Dodoma.		Another	 respondent	 noted	 that,	 whilst	 events	 such	 as	 Maji	 Week	 are	 a	theoretically	a	good	idea:		 “It	 should	 be	 a	 day	 of	 celebration,	 a	 day	 when	 we	 tell	 people	 we’ve	increased	 access	 of	 clean	 and	 safe	 water	 from	 10%	 to	 20%.	 But	 the	movement	for	that	day	stands	on	the	other	364	days,	what	have	we	been	doing,	 what	 progress	 we	 have	 made,	 what	 progress	 haven’t	 we	 made,	what	have	we	done	wrong.	What	 is	 the	hardcore	evidence	out	 there	 for	what	this	situation	is	at	the	moment…which	studies	are	available	to	give	you	high	frequency	data	of	the	situation	on	the	ground?”	(NGO	#4)			However,	the	Ministry	of	Water	described	Maji	Week	as	a	format	for	businesses	to	 showcase	 the	 latest	 water	 technology	 products	 to	 the	 people	 of	 Tanzania	(Ministry	of	Water	 Interview	2014)	which	made	 the	event	 sound	more	 like	 an	business	 fair	 as	 opposed	 to	 one	pursuing	 information	 sharing	 and	 inclusion	 of	the	Tanzanian	people	 in	 their	knowledge	of	 the	country’s	water	sector.	 Indeed,	
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the	 fact	 that	 whilst	 some	 groups,	 such	 as	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Water	 and	 a	 select	number	of	NGOs	seemed	to	be	positive	about	Maji	Week	compared	to	the	lack	of	knowledge	 of	 the	 event	 within	 communities,	 combined	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 robust	policy	knowledge	and	understanding	across	the	various	stakeholders,	calls	 into	question	the	government’s	ability	to	articulate	itself	to	the	people	of	Tanzania:		 “Well	 I	 mean,	 the	 government,	 generally,	 the	 way	 they	 communicate	 is	funny	to	say	the	least.	They	are	not	good	in	communications	and	there	are	a	number	of	other	examples	of	that	nature	where	they	claim	to	be	making	efforts	to	reach	out	to	the	local	people	so	they	can	understand	what	they	are	 doing.	 A	 normal	 person	 either	 has	 an	 incorrect	 assumption	 of	what	the	government	is	doing,	or	absolutely	no	awareness	at	all.”	(NGO	#1)		It	 could	 be	 suggested	 that	 Tanzania	 is	 following	 the	 neoliberal	 doctrine	 of	decentralised	governance	by	devolving	all	 responsibility	 to	a	number	of	 locally	based	autonomous	institutions.	It	appears	that	the	way	in	which	water	policy	has	been	devolved	 to	 the	 lowest	possible	 level	 in	Tanzania	has	 led	 to	 a	disconnect	between	the	state	and	the	lived	experiences	of	Tanzanian	people,	and	aligns	with	the	 critique	 of	 decentralised	 governance	 in	 the	 literature	 (Atampugre,	 1997;	Akin	 et	 al	 2005;	 Grindle,	 2004;	 McDonald	 and	 Smith,	 2004).	 There	 is	 also	evidence	 to	 suggest	 this	 mode	 of	 governance	 exists	 across	 other	 sectors	 in	Tanzania	as	opposed	to	being	unique	to	water	provision.	Those	working	for	the	Ministry	and	various	NGOs	were	able	to	talk	about	the	importance	of	Maji	Week	and	its	benefits	for	Tanzania,	but	Tanzanians	had	little	knowledge	of	or	interest	in	the	event,	reflected	in	both	my	data	collection	and	media	commentary	at	that	time.	 In	 the	 way	 that	 NGOs	 have	 been	 criticised	 in	 Chapter	 6	 for	 performing	various	 activities	 to	 produce	 impressive	 statistics	 and	publications,	 it	 could	 be	suggested	 that	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 are	 doing	 the	 same	 with	Maji	 Week.	 The	fractured	and	complex	ways	in	which	water	governance	materialises	have	been	discussed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 and	 it	 is	 potentially	 the	 case	 that	 as	 lines	 become	increasingly	 blurred	 between	 the	 various	 institutions	 involved,	 some	 of	 these	flawed	 practices	 have	 been	 adopted	 both	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Water	 and	 their	international	development	counterparts.	
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7.8	Conclusion		Dill	and	Crow’s	(2014)	conception	of	a	global	water	crisis	is	that	of	injustice	and	inequality	as	opposed	to	one	of	scarcity.	 Indeed,	Vigh’s	 (2008)	 idea	of	endemic	crisis	 is	most	pertinent	here	as	existing	coping	mechanisms	become	rebranded	as	a	policy	initiative	and	bring	further	sets	of	issues	to	communities	attempting	to	 manage	 their	 own	 water	 supply.	 Moreover,	 research	 such	 as	 Tungaraza	(1993)	 has	 also	 explored	 community	 level	 social	 dynamics	 in	 Tanzania,	 but	Tungaraza	(1993)	includes	the	caveat	that	the	data	collected	for	that	paper	was	during	 the	 time	 of	 the	 devaluation	 of	 the	 Tanzanian	 shilling	 and	 that	 this	 had	contributed	 to	 community	 members	 relying	 on	 each	 other	 for	 survival.	 This	research	was	not	conducted	 in	a	similar	economic	situation	however,	yet	 these	community	 relations	 prevailed,	 indicating	 that	 community	 relationships	 in	Tanzania	are	indeed,	a	response	to	crisis,	but	a	crisis	that	has	existed	in	the	form	of	 a	 backdrop	 to	 their	 lives	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 rhetoric	surrounding	 participatory	 development,	 for	 citizens	 to	 make	 a	 meaningful	contribution	 they	 must	 be	 able	 to	 do	 so	 within	 legitimised	 institutions	 (Dill,	2009),	which	the	Tanzanian	water	policy	is	currently	attempting.	Although	there	are	a	number	of	challenges	faced	by	COWSOs	and	other	community-based	water	organisations,	 there	 is	 the	 potential	 that	 they	will	 be	 alleviated	 over	 time,	 but	only	if	the	Tanzanian	state	ceases	to	see	community	water	provision	as	a	short-term	solution.	However,	as	indicated	in	this	chapter,	there	appears	to	be	a	lack	of	clarity	amongst	stakeholders	over	the	terminology	used	in	water	provision	and	how	 policy	 materialises,	 which	 results	 in	 communities	 focusing	 simply	 on	accessing	 water	 rather	 than	 take	 direction	 from	 external	 sources.	 These	organisations	 appear	 to	 lack	 the	 financial	 and	 technical	 know-how	 required	 to	manage	 these	 schemes	 successfully,	 and	 are	 overwhelmed	 by	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	growing	 population.	 NGOs	 and	 international	 donors	 make	 piecemeal	improvements	but	often	 these	are	 inappropriate	 for	 the	community’s	needs,	or	create	more	problems	than	were	there	in	the	first	instance.			
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Indeed,	whilst	Tungaraza	(1993)	agrees	that	the	community	networks	found	in	their	 research	 were	 often	 vital	 to	 the	 survival	 of	 Tanzanian	 community,	 Dill	instead	critiques	the	incorporation	of	this	into	policy	and	development	rhetoric.	As	noted	by	one	respondent	earlier	in	the	chapter,	the	idea	of	community-based	provision	 is	 something	 that	has	been	 imposed	upon	 the	people	of	Tanzania	by	international	 development	 actors.	 For	 all	 the	 issues	 both	 within	 and	 faced	 by	community	 water	 projects,	 however,	 Dill	 (2010b)	 is	 correct	 to	 assert	 that	community	 based	 institutions	 can	 catalyse	 local	 energy	 that	 state	 and	market	practices	 cannot.	 Faced	 with	 little	 other	 option,	 these	 communities	 must	 be	lauded	for	attempting	to	take	ownership	of	their	local	area’s	water,	irrespective	of	 the	 relationship	 this	 has	 to	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy	 or	 the	 role	 of	 external	stakeholders.	Dill	 (2009)	 claims	 that	 in	his	 research,	 government	officials	 took	the	 view	 that	 community-based	 organisations	 largely	 existed	 to	 provide	assistance	to	the	government.	However	the	evidence	from	this	chapter	indicates	that	whether	community	organisations	exist,	in	the	case	of	Mitonga	Water	Users	Group,	as	a	result	of	a	grassroots	initiative,	or	for	the	Maji	Kwa	Wote	Project,	as	a	response	to	being	given	external	funding,	these	are	nonetheless	responses	to	the	state	 not	 providing	 its	 citizens	 with	 water.	 Instead	 of	 assisting	 the	 state,	community	 water	 groups	 exist	 as	 quasi-state	 institutions,	 that	 have	 now	 had	what	was	previous	a	coping	mechanism	written	into	Tanzania’s	water	policy,	yet	have	had	very	little	in	the	way	of	institutional	support	and	still	face	a	myriad	of	challenges.	 Whilst	 Kjellen	 (2000)	 describes	 informal	 water	 provision	 as	 a	response	 to	 the	 formal	 service	 vacuum,	 there	 is	 evidence	 in	 this	 chapter	 to	suggest	 that	 the	 line	 between	 the	 two	 types	 of	water	 provision	may	not	 be	 so	discreet,	and	that	community-based	water	provision,	despite	 its	challenges,	has	an	important	role	to	play	in	many	Tanzanians’	access	to	water	irrespective	of	its	role	in	Tanzanian	water	policy.		Moreover,	this	chapter	has	elucidated	the	ways	in	which	policy	rhetoric	can	be	experienced	by	citizens,	and	the	ways	 in	which	ideas	surrounding	the	commodification	of	water	and	the	various	power	relations	within	the	development	sector	can	be	theorised	within	empirical	examples.					
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Chapter	8:	Conclusion		
8.1	Making	sense	of	water	governance	in	Dar	es	Salaam		The	 ways	 in	 which	 water	 governance	 can	 be	 interpreted	 and	 understood	 can	vary.	Rogers	and	Hall	(2003:7)	describe	it	as:		 “the	 range	of	political,	 social,	 economic	 and	administrative	 systems	 that	are	in	place	to	develop	and	manage	water	resources,	and	the	delivery	of	water	services,	at	different	levels	of	society.”		Taking	 this	 into	 account,	 this	 thesis	 has	 attempted	 to	 consider	 the	 variety	 of	stakeholders	 that	 play	 a	 role	 in	Tanzania’s	water	 governance,	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 this	materialises	 in	Dar	 es	 Salaam.	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 this	 research	 has	attempted	to	encapsulate	the	social,	political	and	economic	aspects	 that	 impact	upon	the	ways	in	which	Tanzania’s	water	sector	is	managed	in	theory,	and	how	it	is	experienced	in	practice	in	the	country’s	largest	and	rapidly	growing	city.	The	complex	 nature	 of	 water	 governance	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 has	 been	 examined,	showing	 the	 decreasing	 role	 of	 Tanzanian	 state	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	communities	 and	 non-governmental	 organisations	 (NGOs)	 are	 now	 key	components	of	the	city’s	population	accessing	water.			Abers	and	Keck	(2009)	suggest	that	when	researching	water,	too	much	emphasis	is	placed	upon	how	the	policy	is	created	and	in	turn,	how	it	is	implemented,	and	too	 little	 attention	 is	 paid	 to	 the	processes	 that	 exist	 in	between,	 such	 as	 local	cultural	understandings	of	water	or	other	prevalent	 and	 sometimes	 conflicting	discourses.	Taking	 into	account	a	variety	of	 interrelated	stakeholders	 in	Dar	es	Salaam’s	water	governance,	this	thesis	elucidates	the	social	flows	and	processes	that	 water	 policy	mediates	 through	 and	 attempts	 to	 coalesce	 around,	 and	 the	myriad	of	challenges	that	can	arise	throughout	these	processes.		Tanzania	could	be	considered	to	be	an	economic	success	story,	with	an	increase	in	 GDP	 figures	 as	 well	 as	 curbed	 inflation	 and	 increasing	 expenditure	 in	 a	
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number	 of	 social	 programs.	 However,	 this	 is	 just	 one	 perspective.	 Edwards	(2014)	references	Yale	Professor	T.N.	Srinivasan	who	claimed	that	quantitative	data	 is	 often	 full	 of	 biases	 and	 errors	 that	 can	 affect	 a	 piece	 of	 research’s	conclusion	 (Edwards,	2014:241).	As	a	qualitative	piece	of	work,	 this	 thesis	has	instead	attempted	to	provide	a	detailed	and	nuanced	picture	of	the	complexities	of	water	provision	in	Tanzania,	endeavouring	to	do	justice	to	the	stories	told	and	the	 experiences	 in	 the	 field,	 which	 can	 be	 woven	 together	 to	 construct	 this	interesting	 story.	 It	 could	 be	 suggested	 that	 Edwards’	 opinion	 of	 Tanzania’s	success	 is	 purely	 subjective	 based	 upon	 which	 quantitative	 indicators	 and	statistical	information	was	selected	to	make	this	judgement.	Indeed,	the	evidence	in	this	thesis	suggests	that	there	are	still	a	series	of	issues	that	plague	Tanzania’s	development,	which	can	be	easily	masked	by	selective	use	of	statistics,	mirroring	the	behaviours	of	NGOs	discussed	in	Chapters	3	and	6.		The	main	conclusions	of	this	research	are	threefold;	that	a	variety	of	discourses	are	in	place	in	Tanzania’s	water	policy	and	the	way	in	which	water	governance	manifests	in	Dar	es	Salaam,	that	NGOs	play	a	vital	role	in	the	city’s	water	governance	and	the	ways	in	which	it	 is	 implemented,	 and	 that	 the	 coping	mechanisms	of	unserviced	communities	have	become	a	permanent	 feature	 in	Tanzania’s	water	 governance	 framework,	despite	 being	 plagued	 with	 a	 series	 of	 challenges.	 These	 findings	 and	 the	contributions	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 academic	 research	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 this	chapter.			
8.2	Tanzania’s	relationship	with	international	donors	and	NGOs		In	terms	of	Tanzania’s	relationship	with	the	international	aid	community	and	the	important	role	of	NGOs	in	the	country’s	water	sector,	it	is	important	to	consider	what	 a	 significant	 departure	 the	 country’s	 embrace	 of	 development	organisations	 is	 from	 Nyerere’s	 views	 in	 the	 1960s.	 The	 third	 section	 of	 the	Arusha	Declaration,	entitled	“The	Policy	of	Self-Reliance”	states	that:		 “It	 is	 stupid	 to	 rely	 on	money	 as	 the	major	 instrument	 of	 development	when	we	know	only	too	well	that	our	country	is	poor.	It	is	equally	stupid,	indeed	it	is	even	more	stupid,	for	us	to	imagine	that	we	shall	rid	ourselves	
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of	 our	 poverty	 through	 foreign	 assistance	 rather	 than	 through	 our	 own	financial	resources.”	(TANU,	1967,	in	Edwards,	2014:73)		Tanzania	has	received	a	sizeable	contribution	of	funding	from	the	international	aid	 community,	 and	 “foreign	 assistance”	 makes	 up	 a	 key	 component	 of	 both	funding	 and	 implementation	 in	 the	 country’s	 water	 sector.	 However,	 with	 the	important	 role	 of	 both	 informal	 and	 formalised	 community	 water	 networks	there	 is	evidence	to	suggest	 that	 the	 locally-based,	self-reliant	 ideals	advocated	by	Nyerere	still	have	a	significant	role	to	play	 in	water	governance	in	Tanzania	and	 in	 other	 policy	 areas.	 Whilst	 international	 stakeholders	 have	 become	 an	intrinsic	 part	 of	 Tanzanian	water	 policy,	 the	 ideals	 of	Nyerere	 are	 still	 evident	amongst	Tanzanian	culture	and	practice.	Taking	the	view	that	water	governance	encapsulates	 a	 variety	 of	 power	 relations,	 and	 institutionalised	 systems	 of	inequality	and	allocation	(Franks	and	Cleaver,	2007)	it	is	important	to	consider	the	variety	of	stakeholders	involved	in	Tanzania’s	water	governance,	and	in	turn	the	ways	 in	which	 some	 stakeholders	 are	 able	 to	 influence	 others	 in	 order	 to	achieve	their	goals.			Nyerere	is	once	quoted	in	The	Bulletin	of	Tanzanian	Affairs	(1980)	saying	that:		 “My	 Government	 is	 not	 prepared	 to	 give	 up	 our	 national	 endeavour	 to	provide	 primary	 education	 for	 every	 child,	 basic	 medicines	 and	 some	clean	water	for	all	our	people.	Cuts	may	have	to	be	made	in	our	national	expenditure,	 but	we	will	 decide	whether	 they	 fall	 on	 public	 services	 or	private	 expenditure.”	 (The	 Bulletin	 of	 Tanzanian	 Affairs,	 1980,	 from	Edwards,	2014:97)		This	 type	of	 rhetoric	 is	 all	 too	 familiar	 at	 the	 time	of	writing	 this	 thesis,	when	austerity	policy	 is	being	 implemented	across	 the	world	as	countries	attempt	 to	recover	 from	 the	 global	 financial	 crash	 of	 2008.	 Analysing	 this	 quote	 from	Nyerere	 in	 isolation	 does	 not	 do	 justice	 to	 the	 positive	 effect	 and	 his	 revered	legacy	in	contemporary	Tanzania,	but	still	indicates	that	policy	during	his	time	in	office	pursued	 ideology	 to	 the	detriment	of	measured	 improvement.	Moreover,	
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taking	into	account	the	current	water	situation	in	Tanzania,	this	is	somewhat	an	indication	of	the	way	in	which	that	Tanzanian	water	policy	is	intent	on	following	a	specific	policy	pathway	irrespective	of	whether	it	 is	providing	a	better	means	of	water	 access	 for	 the	 Tanzanian	 population.	 The	 policy	 in	 place	 is	 unable	 to	take	into	account	the	ground	realities,	and	instead	adds	on	new	components	in	a	reactionary	manner	 to	 chronic	water	 issues,	 resulting	 in	 a	messy	 and	 complex	policy	 message	 with	 no	 clear	 mandate.	 Metz	 (1982)	 explains	 that	 Marxism	materialises	based	on	 the	 external	 forces	present,	 that	 continue	 to	mutate	 and	coalesce	 around	 an	 ever-changing	 social	 and	 political	 world.	 Taking	 a	 critical	view	of	neoliberal	policy	and	 its	manifestations,	 this	research	has	attempted	to	provide	 an	 in-depth	 insight	 into	 water	 governance	 in	 Tanzania,	 and	 more	broadly,	 current	 methods	 of	 fragmented	 and	 complex	 governance	 across	Tanzania	 on	 the	 whole.	 Whilst	 comparisons	 can	 be	 made	 with	 foreign	 aid	relations	 and	 community	 water	 provision	 in	 other	 countries	 and	 research	settings,	this	thesis	stresses	to	address	the	elements	of	Tanzania’s	current	water	governance	 that	 are	 truly	 Tanzanian,	 based	 on	 social	 and	 cultural	 values,	 and	historical	and	political	trajectories.			
8.3	Tanzanian	water	policy		When	discussing	the	transition	between	the	types	of	policies	used	under	Nyerere	compared	to	his	successors,	Edwards	(2014)	dichotomises	between	those	of	the	Arusha	 Declaration	 and	 the	 market-led	 forms	 of	 governance	 that	 followed.	However,	 I	 believe	 that	 there	 is	 not	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 these	 two	ideologies.	Indeed,	at	the	time	of	the	Arusha	Declaration’s	publication,	a	market	approach	 to	policy	making	was	avoided	by	 the	Tanzanian	state,	 instead	aiming	towards	 their	 form	of	African	 socialism.	However,	 there	 is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	that	the	values	of	that	seminal	document	still	live	on	within	water	governance	in	Tanzania,	 even	 as	 contradictory	 policies	 continue	 to	 gain	 prominence.	 This	confusing	 policy	 hybrid	 has	 undoubtedly	 contributed	 to	 the	 complexity	 and	chaos	 of	 the	 current	water	 governance	 framework	 in	Tanzania,	 as	 a	 variety	 of	different	 ideologies	 and	 methods	 of	 provision	 are	 working	 together	 towards	conflicting	 goals.	 In	 terms	 of	 a	water	 policy	 framework	 that	 acknowledges	 the	
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practices	 that	 communities	 have	 used	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years	 and	 incorporates	them	 into	policy	discourse,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 that	 in	 their	 research	of	water	 policy	 in	 Brazil,	 Abers	 and	 Keck	 (2009)	 concluded	 that	 whilst	 a	participatory	method	of	water	provision	could	provide	some	benefits	to	Brazil’s	citizens,	the	way	in	which	the	Brazilian	state	was	structured	did	not	enable	this	means	of	provision	to	manifest	 itself	successfully.	There	 is	evidence	within	this	thesis	to	suggest	that	the	situation	is	much	the	same	in	Tanzania,	and	there	is	the	potential	 that	 community-level	 means	 of	 water	 provision	 have	 simply	 been	written	 into	policy	as	a	matter	of	convenience	 for	 the	Tanzanian	state,	with	no	real	institutional	change	or	effort	made	on	their	behalf.	Indeed,	in	discussion	of	urban	water	provision	more	generally,	Bakker	(2008:245)	correctly	claims	that	it	 is	 worth	 paying	 attention	 to	 the	 “broader	 economic	 dynamics	 which	 foster	desires	 on	 the	 part	 of	 governments	 and	 the	 development	 industry	 for	 greater	community	involvement”.			Moreover,	continued	reference	to	‘Tanzanian’	water	policy	risks	recognising	the	role	 of	 the	 international	 aid	 community	 and	 the	 multitude	 of	 development	organisations	that	play	an	integral	role	 in	the	theory	and	practice	of	Tanzanian	water	governance.	Edwards	(2014)	asserts	that:		 “the	“productivity”	of	aid	depends	on	the	 level	of	 “effort”	exerted	by	the	local	 government	 and	 community.	 Effort,	 in	 turn,	 will	 depend	 on	 a	number	 of	 factors,	 including	 how	well	 the	 donors’	 intentions	 and	 goals	are	understood,	the	beliefs	of	the	recipient	community,	and	the	degree	of	participation	of	the	local	population	in	the	design	and	formulation	of	aid	programs.”	(Edwards,	2014:187)		Franks	and	Cleaver	(2007)	also	take	the	view	that	analyses	of	a	country’s	water	governance	can	often	be	indicative	of	wider	governance	issues	in	place	there.	As	such,	through	an	examination	of	the	role	of	the	NGO	and	development	sector	in	Tanzania	and	the	ways	in	which	this	sector	operates,	this	thesis	is	able	to	provide	a	comment	on	Tanzania’s	relationship	with	the	aid	community	more	broadly,	as	well	as	the	ways	in	which	these	organisations	have	historically	played	a	role	in	
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Tanzania’s	development	and	 their	prospects	 in	Tanzania’s	 future.	Water	policy	and	infrastructural	changes	have	been	largely	donor-driven,	and	incorporated	a	variety	of	different	donor	goals	and	 intentions	across	 the	country.	As	such,	 the	lack	 of	 clarity	 in	 Tanzanian	 water	 policy	 is	 replicated	 in	 the	 multitude	 of	activities	 being	 directed	 by	 various	 members	 of	 the	 international	 donor	community,	often	resulting	in	the	experiences	of	Dar	es	Salaam’s	residents	being	impacted	upon	which	project	happens	 to	be	 implemented	within	 their	 locality.	With	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 increasingly	 placing	 control	 into	 the	 hands	 of	 the	development	 sector	and	 the	grassroots	based	organisations	 that	are	 funded	by	them,	 it	reduces	 its	ability	to	guide	the	policy	framework	for	water	governance	and	other	sectors.				As	 a	 piece	 of	 research	 that	 examines	 the	 impact	 of	 aid	 on	 Tanzania’s	 water	sector,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Tanzanian	 state	 and	 its	 people	 in	 providing	water,	this	thesis	has	used	Edwards’		(2014)	recommendations	in	order	to	reach	its	 conclusions.	Edwards	 (2014)	states	 that	 to	develop	a	 true	understanding	of	the	 impact	 of	 aid	 a	 number	 of	 resources	 should	be	 consulted,	 such	 as	 archival	data,	primary	sources,	direct	contact	with	key	stakeholders	and	a	consideration	of	the	historical	background	to	the	context	being	researched.	Through	the	use	of	observational	 and	 interview	 data,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 detailed	 examination	 of	 policy	documents	and	other	related	publications,	this	research	has	attempted	to	situate	itself	 within	 the	 broader	 field	 of	 study	 of	 water	 in	 Tanzania	 and	 in	 turn,	Tanzanian	governance	on	 the	whole,	whilst	 endeavouring	 to	produce	a	unique	piece	of	work.			Dill	and	Crow	(2014)	argue	that	the	key	components	of	supposed	crisis	of	water	governance	 is	 not	 that	 of	 scarcity,	 but	 instead	 a	 lack	 of	 an	 appropriate	institutional	 framework	 to	manage	 and	 distribute	 that	 resource.	 Vitally,	whilst	there	was	 a	 key	 theme	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 aid	 and	 development	 organisations	across	 the	three	objectives	addressed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	that	without	 effective	 co-ordination	 between	 all	 stakeholders	 in	 Tanzania’s	 water	sector	 it	will	be	challenging	 for	 the	sector	 to	see	any	measurable	 improvement	for	some	time.	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	that	whilst	 this	 thesis	provides	
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critique	of	the	ways	in	which	Dar	es	Salaam’s	governance	has	been	decentralised	to	 the	 community	 level,	 this	 is	 still	 not	 a	 wholesale	 argument	 for	 Tanzania’s	water	to	become	centralised	under	the	control	of	the	state	once	more.	As	noted	by	Tortajada	(2010)	there	is	not	one	universal	method	of	water	governance	that	will	be	successful	in	all	contexts,	and	it	is	important	that	the	residents	of	Dar	es	Salaam	are	able	to	pursue	a	means	of	water	access	that	is	the	most	appropriate	and	 advantageous	 for	 them.	 If	 community	water	 provision	 is	 the	 endeavoured	policy	direction,	then	adequate	support	and	training	must	be	provided	for	these	communities	 to	become	 truly	 autonomous,	 or	pressure	on	 the	Tanzanian	 state	and	external	funding	bodies	will	only	continue	to	increase.			
8.4	Key	findings		The	key	findings	of	this	thesis	are	related	to	several	of	the	stakeholders	present	in	 the	 water	 sector	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam.	 This	 research	 indicates	 that	 water	governance	 in	Tanzania’s	 former	 capital	 is	 in	 a	 complicated	and	ever-changing	state	of	existence,	with	extra	layers	and	policy	directions	being	continually	added	with	 no	 real	 sign	 of	 improvement.	 The	 policy	 documents	 and	 other	 related	writings	illustrate	the	variety	of	discourses	prevalent	in	water	policy	in	Tanzania	since	1991,	and	provide	some	explanation	for	the	variety	of	ways	these	policies	have	been	interpreted	at	the	grassroots	level.	 Indeed,	the	findings	of	this	thesis	prove	that	the	absence	of	a	clear	policy	direction	and	the	presence	of	a	number	of	conflicting	governance	mindsets	can	result	in	a	convoluted	and	misunderstood	sector,	with	no	measure	of	success	or	 indication	of	the	most	viable	direction	to	go	in	future	policy	writing.		In	relation	to	this	entangled	and	contradictory	governance	framework,	 the	 lack	of	 a	 clear	 policy	 mandate	 has	 been	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 NGOs	 have	become	 so	 embedded	 within	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 water	 sector.	 Playing	 such	 an	integral	part	 in	driving	 the	direction	of	Tanzania’s	policymaking	and	providing	both	technical	assistance	and	education	at	the	grassroots	level	have	led	to	these	organisations	 becoming	 an	 almost	 irreplaceable	 element	 of	 the	 city’s	 water	provision,	and	show	no	sign	of	disappearing	any	time	soon.	Such	dependence	on	
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NGOs	creates	a	number	of	challenges	for	the	people	of	Tanzania,	as	the	state	 is	constantly	in	need	of	independent	organisations	to	facilitate	the	country’s	water	governance,	 but	 the	 sporadic	 nature	 of	 their	 funding	 means	 that	 this	 by	 no	means	 a	 reliable	 means	 of	 providing	 water.	 As	 a	 key	 part	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	water	sector,	these	organisations	are	constantly	in	a	state	of	trying	to	continue	to	survive,	 which	 draws	 attention	 away	 from	 their	 key	 activities	 and	 creates	 a	further	set	of	challenges	for	water	provision.		For	 those	 in	 the	 forgotten	 pockets	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 a	 coping	 mechanism	 of	community-based	 water	 has	 become	 part	 of	 the	 official	 policy	 rhetoric	 with	insufficient	assistance	provided	to	those	without	the	technical	skills	or	capital	to	provide	 water	 to	 their	 local	 community.	 A	 change	 in	 policy	 direction	 to	incorporate	community-based	water	projects	has	made	little	to	no	difference	to	those	who	desperately	need	 it	 for	 their	survival.	These	residents	still	exist	 in	a	policy	vacuum,	in	which	they	are	dependent	on	a	chance	amount	of	funding	from	an	international	donor	or	local	business,	and	are	still	heavily	reliant	on	their	own	means	 of	 raising	 money	 to	 establish	 a	 local	 water	 source.	 Local	 government	seems	 unaware	 of	 the	 issues	 faced	 by	 nearby	 residents,	 and	 these	 individuals	have	 given	 up	 on	 lobbying	 the	 state	 and	 simply	 take	 matters	 into	 their	 own	hands.	 On	 the	 whole	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 a	 series	 of	 temporary	 fixtures	 are	 now	 a	permanent	 part	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 water	 governance,	 creating	 a	 reactionary	state	of	existence	that	is	only	able	to	struggle	with	past	mistakes	and	has	limited	capacity	to	anticipate	and	manage	future	challenges.		
8.5	Theoretical	contributions		Exploring	the	ways	in	which	neoliberal	policy	impacts	upon	the	water	sector	in	Tanzania	indicates	how	neoliberal	policy	does	not	exist	in	a	true	and	prescriptive	form,	 and	 is	 always	 impacted	 upon	 the	 context	 in	 which	 it	 manifests	 and	 its	socio-cultural	 surroundings.	 With	 regards	 to	 the	 failed	 privatisation	 of	Tanzania’s	 water	 sector,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 Bakker’s	 (2002)	 research	into	the	introduction	of	markets	into	the	water	sector	in	Spain,	where	she	noted:		
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“an	organisational	and/or	institutional	shift	along	a	continuum	or	water-management	 options	 towards	 the	market	 and	 private	 corporations	 and	away	from	the	state”	(Bakker:2002:769).			This	 research	 conversely	provides	 a	unique	 take	on	a	 country	who	has	wholly	bought	 into	 the	 idea	of	private	provision	only	 to	 instead	 introduce	a	variety	of	different	 stakeholders	 into	 the	 water	 sector	 instead	 of	 one	 single	 private	provider.	 In	 Tanzania’s	 post-privatisation	 setting,	 policy	 changes	 have	 not	developed	upon	the	“continuum”	suggested	by	Bakker	(2002)	but	have	 instead	shifted	in	a	number	of	directions	that	incorporate	the	role	of	NGOs,	the	emphasis	on	decentralising	policy	to	the	local	level	and	the	role	of	water	as	simultaneously	vital	 to	 life	 and	 an	 economic	 good	 with	 monetary	 value.	 The	 evidence	 in	 this	thesis	 indicates	 that	 the	neoliberalisation	of	water	does	not	solely	result	 in	 the	advocacy	of	market-led	thinking	but	can	lead	to	a	fractured	and	complex	policy	environment	 when	 neoliberal	 ideology	 comes	 into	 conflict	 with	 a	 country’s	cultural	values.			In	 addition,	 although	 there	 is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 Global	 South	 is	negatively	impacted	upon	by	this	global	economic	doctrine,	there	is	an	argument	for	whether	neoliberalism	is	simply	a	modern	day	form	of	Postcolonial	policy,	in	which	a	select	group	of	countries	gain	from	the	resources	of	others	not	included	in	 influencing	 international	 development	 policy.	 Aligning	with	writers	 such	 as	Moyo	(2009),	this	research	calls	into	question	the	continuation	of	aid	and	foreign	assistance	in	the	Global	South	and	the	ways	in	which	vast	amounts	of	money	are	used	with	limited	sign	of	improvement.	Some	hold	the	opinion	that	aid	is	used	to	“exert	 control	 and	 influence	 by	 governments	 and	 corporations	 alike”	 (Alford,	2015),	 but	what	 this	 thesis	 illustrates	 is	 the	myriad	 power	 structures	 in	 place	within	the	 involved	sectors	that	require	further	examination.	There	 is	evidence	within	 this	 research	 to	 suggest	 that	 even	 perceived	 success	 stories	 of	 aid	 and	donor	 funding	 may	 not	 be	 entirely	 beneficial	 to	 the	 communities	 that	 it	 is	directed	 to.	 Aligning	 with	 Sharp	 et	 al	 (2000:1)’s	 view	 that	 understandings	 of	power	 involve:	 “countless	 processes	 of	 domination	 and	 resistance	 which	 are	always	 implicated	 in,	 and	mutually	 constitutive	 of	 one	 another”,	 this	 research	
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addresses	 the	 complexities	 of	 the	 domination/resistance	 couplet	 discussed	 by	Sharp	et	al.	Whilst	this	thesis	notes	the	complex	nature	of	water	governance	in	Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 it	 also	 indicates	 the	 intricate	 relations	 and	 inter-dependencies	that	exist	within	the	city’s	water	sector,	and	illustrates	Sharp	et	al’s	(2000)	point	that	 power	 relations	 do	 not	 simply	 exist	 on	 a	 binary	 basis.	 The	 variety	 of	different	 agents	 involved	 in	water	 governance	 in	Dar	 es	 Salaam	both	 influence	and	are	influenced	by	each	other,	despite	their	diversity	and	contradictions.	This	research	 illustrates	 the	 numerous	 ways	 in	 which	 power	 can	 be	 exerted	 and	experienced	in	Dar	es	Salaam’s	water	sector,	and	that	it	does	not	originate	from	one	individual	source.				 	In	 turn,	 there	 is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 there	 is	 a	 dichotomous	 power	relationship	between	 the	governments	of	 countries	 that	NGOs	work	 in	and	 the	NGOs	 themselves.	 NGOs	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 contemporary	 development	practice	and	many	Global	 South	 states	are	heavily	dependent	on	 them,	but	 the	multitude	 of	 challenges	 faced	within	 this	 sector	 inhibits	 the	 ability	 of	NGOs	 to	exert	 their	 supposed	 influence.	 In	 addition,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 civil	 society	 has	 an	important	 role	 to	 play	 in	 modern	 day	 access	 to	 water	 in	 the	 Global	 South.	Grassroots-based	organisations	have	a	 significant	degree	of	 responsibility	over	their	own	water	provision,	yet	their	agency	is	often	constrained	by	wider	social,	political	and	financial	frameworks	in	place,	and	their	capacity	to	enact	change	is	severely	 limited.	 The	 civil	 society	 relationships	 currently	 in	 place	 in	 Dar	 es	Salaam	indicate	strong	community	 ties	and	collective	responsibility	 for	 friends,	family	 and	 neighbours’	 needs,	 but	 this	 may	 not	 be	 the	 most	 appropriate	environment	to	provide	water	to	the	city’s	residents.			Incorporating	Townsend	et	al’s	(2004)	view	that	any	study	of	NGOs	is	relative	to	the	context	and	social	situation	in	which	they	operate,	this	thesis	has	examined	the	roles	of	NGOs	 in	 the	water	sector	 in	Dar	es	Salaam	in	relation	 to	other	key	stakeholders	prevalent	in	the	city,	and	attempted	to	make	sense	of	the	challenges	these	organisations	 face	when	operating	within	Tanzanian	culture.	 In	turn,	 this	thesis	also	provides	some	commentary	on	the	broader	issues	impacting	upon	the	NGO	 sector	more	 generally,	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 funding	 challenges	 and	 the	
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“new	 managerialism”	 (Townsend	 et	 al,	 2002:831)	 affects	 these	 types	 of	organisations	in	a	variety	of	contexts.	To	provide	an	objective	analysis	of	where	the	 true	 agency	 lies	 in	 water	 governance	 frameworks	 such	 as	 Tanzania’s	 is	 a	difficult	 judgement	 call	 to	 make,	 as	 power	 relations	 and	 influences	 are	 so	interrelated	and	co-dependent	 it	 is	unclear	which	 stakeholder	group	has	a	key	mandate	for	directing	policy	and	governance	over	any	other.		
8.6	Personal	reflections		Discussing	 the	 variety	 of	 methodological	 perspectives	 that	 can	 be	 used	 when	conducting	research,	Del	Casino	Jr	et	al	(2000:530)	take	the	view	that:		 “Researcher	and	research	subject	are	both	embedded	in	larger	social	and	spatial	structures,	and	thus	the	research	findings	are	contingent	on	these	structures	and	must	be	taken	into	account.”				It	 would	 be	 erroneous	 to	 suggest	 that	 my	 personal	 thoughts,	 feelings	 and	memories	of	Tanzania	did	not	have	as	much	of	an	impact	on	this	research	as	the	empirical	data	collected	in	the	field.	This	thesis	has	shown	that	the	water	sector	in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 is	 fraught	with	 issues,	 and	 is	 entirely	 dependent	 on	 a	 set	 of	institutions	that	are	experiencing	a	number	of	issues	that	inhibit	their	ability	to	carry	out	water	provision	and	governance	effectively.	However,	 amongst	 these	difficulties	are	groups	of	 incredibly	hard-working	people,	who	have	committed	themselves	 to	 water	 provision	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 and	 constantly	 endeavour	 to	provide	an	 improved	situation	 for	 the	city’s	 residents.	 In	addition,	 it	was	 these	people	who	had	the	patience	to	explain	their	work	to	me	and	the	challenges	they	faced	 in	 doing	 so,	 and	 who	 took	 the	 time	 to	 answer	 all	 of	 my	 questions	 as	 I	attempted	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 Dar	 es	 Salaam’s	 complex	 water	 governance	framework.	Discussions	of	governance	run	the	risk	of	simply	discussing	a	series	of	static	institutions	and	anonymising	the	individuals	who	play	a	significant	part	in	 it.	 	This	 research	has	attempted	 to	bring	 life	 to	 this	discussion	and	highlight	the	mix	of	people	and	personal	experiences	 that	play	a	 role	 in	Dar	es	Salaam’s	water	sector.	
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	As	noted	by	Smith	(2010):		 “The	notion	of	local,	situated	knowledge	raises	the	broader	political	(and	ethical	 issue)	 of	who	has	 the	 entitlement,	 or	 authority,	 to	 represent	 the	lives	of	particular	people	to	a	wider	audience.”	(Smith,	2010:415)		I	 claim	 no	 entitlement	 to	 represent	 the	 experiences	 of	 those	 Tanzanians	attempting	to	manage	water	within	their	communities,	or	those	simply	trying	to	find	an	affordable	access	to	a	clean	resource	of	water	where	they	do	not	have	to	queue	 for	 hours	 to	 receive	 it.	 I	 speak	with	 no	 real	 authority	 on	 the	 challenges	faced	by	those	who	have	worked	unselfishly	for	NGOs	in	Tanzania	for	a	number	of	 years	 and	who	 have	watched	 the	 sector	 become	 saturated	 and	 increasingly	office-based	as	they	struggle	to	exact	real	change	on	the	lives	of	those	in	need.	I	only	 hope	 that	 the	 data	 gathered	 in	 this	 thesis	 highlights	 the	myriad	 struggles	that	take	place	in	the	water	sector	in	Dar	es	Salaam,	and	that	the	questions	posed	by	this	research	are	eventually	answered.																									
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Appendices	
		
Appendix	1:	List	of	abbreviations	
	COWSO		Community	Owned	Water	and	Sanitation	Organisation	DAWASA		Dar	es	Salaam	Water	and	Sanitation	Authority	DAWASCO	Dar	es	Salaam	Water	and	Sanitation	Corporation	DWST		District	Water	and	Sanitation	Team	EWURA		Energy	and	Water	Utilities	Regulatory	Authority	MWST	Municipal	Water	and	Sanitation	Team	NGO		Non-governmental	organisation	PRSP		Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	TWN		Tanzania	Water	Network	WPM		Water	Project	Management																														
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Appendix	2:	Information	sheet				
INFORMATION	SHEET					Water	Governance	in	Dar	es	Salaam		
Invitation	
	My	 name	 is	 Nicola	 Pritchard	 and	 I	 am	 a	 research	 student	 from	 the	 School	 of	Geographical	 and	 Earth	 Sciences	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Glasgow.	 I	 am	 doing	research	into	water	governance	in	Dar	es	Salaam	and	the	different	ways	people	access	water	in	the	city.	I	would	be	very	grateful	if	you	would	participate	in	this	study.	 Before	 deciding	 whether	 you	 would	 like	 to	 contribute	 to	 this	 project,	 I	would	 like	 to	present	 you	with	 some	 information	on	 it	 to	 ensure	 you	 are	 fully	aware	of	what	is	involved	in	your	participation.	Please	read	the	information	that	follows	very	carefully	and	feel	free	to	ask	any	questions.	A	decision	over	whether	you	would	like	to	take	part	is	not	required	immediately,	however,	I	will	be	in	Dar	es	Salaam	from	the	25th	January	until	the	21st	April	and	I	am	contactable	during	this	time.	Contact	details	will	follow.			
Confidentiality	
	If	you	choose	to	participate,	your	contribution	may	be	used	in	written	work	that	may	 result	 from	 the	 project	 such	 as	 reports	 and	 a	 PhD	 thesis.	 Your	 name	will	NOT	 be	 associated	 with	 your	 response.	 You	 will	 be	 identified	 only	 by	 your	professional	 capacity	 in	 this	 organisation.	 You	 are	 free	 to	 express	 any	 opinion	you	wish	without	 any	 risk	 to	 yourself	 or	 your	 job.	 You	 are	 free	 at	 any	 time	 to	retract	any	statements	made	and	this	will	NOT	be	used	in	any	form	of	research	output.			
Background	
	The	field	research	aspect	of	this	project	will	run	from	the	25th	January	until	the	21st	April.	The	final	output	of	this	project	will	contribute	to	a	larger	PhD	project	which	 focuses	 on	 the	 challenges	 surrounding	 water	 provision,	 rights	 and	governance	 in	Dar	 es	 Salaam.	All	 research	will	 be	 conducted	personally,	 and	 if	you	 are	 willing	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 study	 you	 are	 fully	 entitled	 to	 request	 a	summary	of	the	final	findings	of	the	project.		
What	will	participation	entail?	
	If	 you	decide	 to	 take	part	 in	 this	 project,	 you	will	 be	 asked	 to	 contribute	 your	professional	 knowledge	 in	 a	 semi-structured	 interview	 setting.	 This	 interview	
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will	be	an	open	discussion	surrounding	water	governance	in	Dar	es	Salaam	and	your	 organisation’s	 role	 in	 the	 city’s	 water	 sector.	 Interviews	 will	 last	approximately	 one	 hour	 and	 will	 be	 conducted	 in	 your	 place	 of	 work,	 or	 any	other	location	that	you	wish	to	be	interviewed	in.	If	you	are	willing,	written	notes	will	be	taken	by	the	researcher	throughout	the	interview	and	a	dictaphone	will	be	 used	 to	 record	 the	 interview	 to	 ensure	 that	 your	 contributions	 are	 fairly	represented.	 If	 granted	 permission,	 I	 would	 also	 like	 to	 spent	 time	 with	 your	organisation	 to	 observe	 your	 practices	 and	 how	 you	work.	 I	will	 only	 observe	aspects	of	 your	organisation	 that	 I	 have	permission	 to,	 and	 if	 at	 any	point	 you	want	my	research	to	stop	then	you	are	within	your	rights	to	request	so.			
What	will	happen	to	the	information	that	I	provide?	
	As	 you	 will	 be	 performing	 in	 a	 professional	 capacity,	 your	 name	 and	 the	organisation	that	you	work	for	will	be	included	in	the	final	written	thesis	unless	you	wish	to	remain	anonymous,	 in	which	case	a	pseudonym	will	be	used.	I	will	use	your	responses	to	extract	 information	that	is	relevant	to	my	research	aims,	and	as	a	result	of	 this	only	part	of	your	responses	may	be	 included	 in	 the	 final	submission.			
What	are	my	rights?	
	You	have	 the	 right	 to	 ask	 for	 extra	 information	 about	 this	 project	 and	you	 are	free	to	refuse	to	participate.	You	are	free	to	withdraw	from	this	research	at	any	time.		
What	do	I	do	now?	
	Please	 read	 and	 sign	 the	 accompanying	 consent	 form	 if	 you	 are	 willing	 to	participate	 in	 this	 research	 and	 we	 will	 arrange	 a	 time	 and	 location	 for	 the	interview	to	take	place.	Thank	you	for	taking	the	time	to	read	this	 information.	Please	keep	this	information	sheet	for	reference.			
Contact	Details	
	Nicola	Pritchard		 	 	 								 Professor	Joanne	Sharp	Room	521	 	 	 	 	 Room	503	School	of	Geographical	&	Earth	Sciences	 	 School	of	Geographical	&	Earth	Sciences	University	Avenue	 	 	 	 University	Avenue	University	of	Glasgow	 	 	 	 University	of	Glasgow	G12	8QQ	 	 	 	 	 G12	8QQ		Email:	n.pritchard.1@research.gla.ac.uk	 	 Email:	jo.sharp@glasgow.ac.uk	Telephone:	 	 	 	 	 Telephone:	0141	330	5405				Subject’s	Signature	_______________________________________________	Date		_________________	Subject’s	Name	Printed	__________________________________________________________________	Organisation	_________________________________________________________________________	
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Appendix	3:	Consent	form		
	 
	 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
CONSENT	FORM				NB.	This	form	must	be	completed	by	the	respondent	and	signed	in	the	presence	of	the	researcher						Tick	appropriate	box				Have	you	read	and	understood	the	Information	Sheet?	 	 Yes o No o				Have	you	been	given	an	opportunity	to	ask	questions	and		further	discuss	this	study?	 	 	 	 	 	 Yes o No o				Have	you	received	satisfactory	answers	to	all	of	your	questions?	 Yes o No o				Have	you	now	received	enough	information	about	this	study?	 Yes o No o				Do	you	understand	that	your	participation	is	entirely	voluntary?	 Yes o No o				Do	you	understand	that	you	are	free	to	withdraw	from	this	study		at	any	time	without	having	to	give	a	reason	for	withdrawing?		 Yes o No o				Do	you	agree	for	your	interview	to	be	tape	recorded?	 	 	 Yes o No o				Do	you	understand	that	the	audio	tapes	will	be	destroyed		after	the	research?	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Yes o No o				Do	you	understand	that	the	information	gathered	from	interviews		will	contribute	to	a	PhD	thesis?	 	 	 	 	 Yes o No o				Do	you	agree	to	take	part	in	this	study?	 	 	 	 Yes o No o								Subject’s	Signature	_______________________________________________	Date	_________________		Subject’s	Name	Printed	_________________________________________________________________		Organisation	________________________________________________________________________	
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Appendix	4:	Research	details	
		
	 Participant/document	 Year	 Nature	of	
involvement	
Length	of	
involvement	
1	 Field	notebook	 2013	and	2014	 Daily	entries	
2	 Field	diary	 2013	and	2014	 Entries	written	two	or	three	times	a	week	
3	 DAWASCO	 Not	involved	 No	access	
4	 DAWASA	 Not	involved	 No	access	
5	 EWURA	 Not	involved	 No	access	
6	 Tanzania	Development	Vision	(1999)	 2014	 Textual	analysis	
7	 Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	(2000)	 2014	 Textual	analysis	
8	 Tanzania	National	Water	Policy	2002	 2014	 Textual	analysis	
9	 National	Water	Sector	Development	Strategy	–	2006	to	2015	(2005)	 2014	 Textual	analysis	
10	 National	Strategy	for	Growth	and	Reduction	of	Poverty	(2005)	 2014	 Textual	analysis	
11	 The	Water	Resources	Management	Act	(2009)	 2014	 Textual	analysis	
12	 Tanzania	Water	Supply	and	Sanitation	Act	 2014	 Textual	analysis	
13	 National	Strategy	for	Growth	and	Reduction	of	Poverty	II	(2010)	 2014	 Textual	analysis	
14	 Tanzania	Water	Network	 2012-2014	 Interviewed	in	2012,	studied	ethnographically	in	2013	and	2014	
15	 Water	Project	Management	 2013-2014	 Studied	ethnographically	in	2013	and	2014	
16	 Tanzanian	Network	NGO	 2014	 Interview	 90	minutes	
17	 International	NGO	 2014	 Interview	 60	minutes	
18	 International	NGO	 2014	 Interview	 90	minutes	
19	 Tanzanian	NGO	 2014	 Interview	 60	minutes	
20	 Tanzanian	NGO	 2014	 Interview	 90	minutes	
21	 Tanzanian	NGO	 2014	 Interview	 90	minutes	
22	 Ministry	of	Water		 2012	 Interview	 60	minutes	
23	 Ministry	of	Water	 2012	 Interview	 90	minutes	
24	 Ilala	Customer	 2014	 Interview	 30	minutes	
25	 Ilala	Customer	 2014	 Interview	 45	minutes	
26	 Ilala	Water	Project	Manager	 2014	 Interview	 60	minutes	
	 303	
27	 Ilala	Water	Project	Maintenance	Officer	 2014	 Interview	 30	minutes	
28	 Ilala	Water	Project	Nightwatchman	 2014	 Interview	 40	minutes	
29	 Ilala	Water	Project	Nightwatchman	 2014	 Interview	 30	minutes	
30	 Ilala	COWSO	Committee	Member	 2014	 Interview	 60	minutes	
31	 Ilala	COWSO	Committee	Member	 2014	 Interview	 30	minutes	
32	 Ilala	Ward	Executive	Officer	 2014	 Interview	 60	minutes	
33	 Ilala	Street	Chairperson	 2014	 Interview	 60	minutes	
34	 Temeke	Municipal	Water	and	Sanitation	Team	Member	 2014	 Interview	 60	minutes	
35	 Temeke	Water	Project	Management	 2014	 Focus	Group	 90	minutes	
36	 Temeke	Street	Chairperson	 2014	 Interview	 45	minutes	
37	 Temeke	COWSO	Committee	Members	 2014	 Focus	Group	 60	minutes	
38	 Temeke	Customers	 2014	 Focus	Group	 60	minutes	
39	 Temeke	Customers	 2014	 Focus	Group	 60	minutes	
40	 Temeke	Customers	 2014	 Focus	Group	 45	minutes	
41	 Temeke	Customer	 2014	 Interview	 30	minutes	
42	 Temeke	Customer	 2014	 Interview	 30	minutes			Fieldwork	periods:	June-July	2012	(6	weeks)												June-July	2013	(6	weeks)												January-April	(14	weeks)																							
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Appendix	5:	Sample	coding	table		Code	 Subcodes	Policy	 Key	policy	themes	Tanzanian	water	policy	Poverty	reduction	Nyerere	and	Tanzanian	political	discourse	Community	water	provision	NGOs	and	development	organisations	 Impact	Financial	challenges	Inter-sectoral	challenges	Other	challenges	faced	Culture	and	Tanzanian	discourse	Future	prospects	Community	water	provision	 Interpretations	of	policy	terminology	Policy	implementation	Challenges	faced	by	communities	NGO	relationships	Other	providers	of	water																															 	
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